The History of the European Monetary Union by Preda, Daniela
The financial and economic crisis that hit Europe in 2009 brought out 
the precariousness of the monetary union, accentuating the economic 
disequilibrium among European nations and strengthening Euro-skepticism. 
The crisis was the catalyst for long-standing and unresolved problems: 
the creation of a singly monetary area with intergovernmental control, the 
final act in the construction of a Europe economically united but without 
a government and a state; the consequent discrepancy between forming a 
consensus that remains in large part national and the political dynamics in 
Europe; the sustainability of a monetary union in the absence of an economic-
social union, which presents again the long-standing debate between 
“monetarist” countries and “economist” countries.
This book aims at placing current events within a long-term framework 
composed of a mosaic of multidisciplinary contributions that can provide the 
reader with keys which are adequate for an understanding of these events 
and useful for opening up new horizons.
Daniela Preda is Full Professor at the University of Genoa and Jean Monnet 
Chair ad personam in History of European Integration. Former president of the 
Associazione universitaria di Studi Europei (Italian section of ECSA), she is 
a member of the Scientific Board for the PhD program in History (University 
of Pavia). Her most important research interests concern the history of 
the European Community and the history of the federalist movements. She 
published many books and essays; she co-edited with Daniele Pasquinucci the 
following books published by P.I.E. Peter Lang: 





The History of the European  
Monetary Union 
Comparing Strategies amidst Prospects  

































The financial and economic crisis that hit Europe in 2009 brought out 
the precariousness of the monetary union, accentuating the economic 
disequilibrium among European nations and strengthening Euro-skepticism. 
The crisis was the catalyst for long-standing and unresolved problems: 
the creation of a singly monetary area with intergovernmental control, the 
final act in the construction of a Europe economically united but without 
a government and a state; the consequent discrepancy between forming a 
consensus that remains in large part national and the political dynamics in 
Europe; the sustainability of a monetary union in the absence of an economic-
social union, which presents again the long-standing debate between 
“monetarist” countries and “economist” countries.
This book aims at placing current events within a long-term framework 
composed of a mosaic of multidisciplinary contributions that can provide the 
reader with keys which are adequate for an understanding of these events 
and useful for opening up new horizons.
Daniela Preda is Full Professor at the University of Genoa and Jean Monnet 
Chair ad personam in History of European Integration. Former president of the 
Associazione universitaria di Studi Europei (Italian section of ECSA), she is 
a member of the Scientific Board for the PhD program in History (University 
of Pavia). Her most important research interests concern the history of 
the European Community and the history of the federalist movements. She 
published many books and essays; she co-edited with Daniele Pasquinucci the 
following books published by P.I.E. Peter Lang: The Road Europe Travelled 
Along: the Evolution of the EEC/EU Institutions and Policies (2010) and 
Consensus and European Integration: a Historical Perspective (2012).
P.I.E. Peter Lang
Brussels
Comparing Strategies amidst Prospects 



































Bruxelles  Bern  Berlin  Frankfurt am Main  New York  Oxford  Wien
The hisTory of The 
european MoneTary union
CoMparing sTraTegies aMidsT  
prospeCTs for inTegraTion  
and naTional resisTanCe
EUROCLIO is a scientific and editorial project, a network of research institutions 
and researchers, and an ideas forum. EUROCLIO as an editorial project consists 
of two aspects: the first concerns studies and documents, the second concerns 
tools. Both are aimed at making the results of research more accessible, and also 
at opening up paths through the history of European construction/integration/
unification.
The EUROCLIO series meets a dual objective:
- to provide reference tools for research,
- to provide a platform for this research in terms of the publication of results.
The series thus consists of two sub-series that satisfy these requirements: the 
Studies and Documents series and the References series. These two series are 
aimed at general libraries and/or university history departments, teachers and 
researchers, and in certain cases, specific professional circles.
The Studies and Documents series consists of monographs, collections of ar-
ticles, conference proceedings, and collections of texts with notes for teaching 
purposes.
The References series consists of bibliographies, guides and other tools. It thus 
contributes to the creation of a database making up a “Permanent catalogue of 
sources and bibliographies on European construction”.
 
Edited by 
Éric Bussière, Université de Paris-Sorbonne (France),
Michel Dumoulin, Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgique), 




The hisTory of The  
european MoneTary union
CoMparing sTraTegies aMidsT  
prospeCTs for inTegraTion  
and naTional resisTanCe
CIP available from the British Library, UK and from the Library of Congress, USA.
“Die Deutsche National Bibliothek” lists this publication in the “Deutsche Nationalbibliogra-
fie”; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at http://dnb.de.
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photocopy, microfilm or 
any other means, without prior written permission from the publisher. All rights reserved.
© P.I.E. PETER LANG S.A.
Éditions scientifiques internationales
Brussels, 2016
1 avenue Maurice, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
brussels@peterlang.com; www.peterlang.com
ISSN 0944-2294   ISBN 978-2-8076-0098-0
ePDF 978-2-8076-0099-7  ePub 978-2-8076-0100-0
Mobi 978-2-8076-0101-7  DOI 10.3726/b10858
D/2017/5678/22
Printed in Germany 
This publication has been peer-reviewed. 
With the support of the Lifelong Learning Programme of the European Union, 
Jean Monnet Chair ad personam “History and Politics of European Integration”. 
European Commission, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency – 
EACEA, Reference 542586-LLP-1-2013-1-ITAJM-CL, Decision No. 2013-2728 / 
001. This project has been funded with support of the European Commission. 
This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission 









Three Lessons from the Past: Monetary Unions  
in the 19th Century Europe ���������������������������������������������������������������21
Lara Piccardo
Robert Triffin et le processus d’intégration  
monétaire européenne ����������������������������������������������������������������������37
Ivo Maes
Le Plan Werner et la découverte de l’Europe monétaire ������������������59
Andreas Wilkens
The End of Bretton Woods and the Setting up of the Snake �����������75
Maria Eleonora Guasconi 
The European Monetary System ������������������������������������������������������89
Giovanni Battista Pittaluga
The Role of Giulio Andreotti in the Birth of the EMS  
and of the Monetary Union ������������������������������������������������������������107
Daniela Preda
La présidence Mitterrand, fer de lance de l’Union  
monétaire européenne (1988-1992) ? ��������������������������������������������129
Jean-Marie Palayret
The Action of the European Federalist Movement  
for the European Currency �������������������������������������������������������������157
Guido Montani
L’euro entre problèmes de naissance et incertitudes  
identitaires (1991-2016) �����������������������������������������������������������������185
Carlo Degli Abbati
Fiscal Discipline and Growth within EMU �����������������������������������197
Alberto Majocchi 
Crisis and Possible New Start of Integration Process.  
Beyond the Eurozone Predicament ������������������������������������������������221
Franco Praussello
From Pringle to Gauweiler. The Difficult Years of European  
Monetary Union and Their Impact on the EU Legal System ��������245
Francesco Munari
On the Metamorphosis of the Crisis and the  




The financial and economic crisis that hit Europe in 2009 brought out 
the precariousness of the monetary union, accentuating the economic 
disequilibrium among European nations and strengthening Euro-
skepticism� As occurred during the 1970s, the charges of self-interest 
levelled at the stronger countries were countered by accusations that the 
weaker ones were lacking in the necessary economic rigor�
The crisis served as a catalyst for long-standing unresolved problems: 
the creation of a single monetary area with intergovernmental control, 
the final act in the construction of a Europe economically united but 
without a government and a state; the consequent discrepancy between 
the forming of a consensus that remains in large part national and 
the European context of political dynamics; and the sustainability of 
a monetary union in the absence of an economic-social union, which 
presents again the long-standing debate between “monetarist” countries, 
whose priority was the establishment of common constraints to monetary 
policies, and “economist” countries, which gave priority to harmonizing 
economic policies before undertaking monetary cooperation�
The history of European unification provides us with several useful 
points to reflect on in terms of current events�
If at the start of the continental unification process the final objective 
of a European federation was clearly visible, beginning with the Treaties 
of Rome this objective became merely ancillary� Monnet’s functionalism 
called for a vertical integration by sector, characterized by the creation of 
supranational institutions with broad powers� In fact, it consisted in a sort 
of constitutional gradualism, whose final stage was clearly indicated as the 
creation of a European federation� The European Economic Community 
responded instead to a different idea of integration: a broader, horizontal 
one in which the function of the supranational institutions was to organize 
and manage the market� In short, this integration reflected a different 
functionalist model, the Anglo-Saxon functional approach, mitigated 
only partially by the independence of the Commission with respect to 
the governments and by the immediate efficacy of community legal 
regulations� This outmoded stance by the EEC toward the supranational 
aspects of the ECSC was immediately perceived by the federalist Altiero 
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Spinelli, who, in a strongly-worded manner, wrote of the “hoax of the 
Common Market”�1 
Nevertheless, even the Treaties of Rome were from the start considered 
as a sort of master-key to political integration on the continent, an 
interpretation that subsequently would continue to characterize all the 
stages of European integration, including monetary unification� The 
political aim was the last objective of the Founding Fathers, part of their 
cultural baggage and hopes� Interpreting the spirit and will that had led 
to the “European revival”, Paul-Henri Spaak stated that the men whose 
task it was to draw up the Treaties of Rome “croyaient que l’intégration 
économique les conduirait immanquablement à l’union politique” and 
considering economic integration as nothing other than “l’accessoire, 
ou tout au moins la première étape d’une révolution politique plus 
importante encore”�2
Therefore, political integration was part of the ‘spirit’ of the Treaties 
but not part of their substance�
In similar fashion, the creation of the European Central Bank and 
single currency, which in December of 1995 the Council of Madrid 
would call the “Euro”, along with the criteria set by the stability and 
growth pact, produced an effective and consistent transfer of sovereignty 
from the national states to the European Union� In this case as well, 
Europe proceeded, as Delors stated, “avec lo visage masqué”: that is, 
hiding the ultimate objective for fear of arousing the resistance of the 
governments� 
The Monetary Union can be considered the last act of a method 
(Monnet’s gradualist one) that has been very fruitful, but which over 
time seems to have lost sight of the final objective� As in the 1950s, the 
Founding Fathers of the EMU were convinced that a single currency 
would favor further progress toward a more stringent economic 
and political integration: once created, the single currency would 
have spontaneously produced the conditions for further transfers of 
sovereignty and for the completion of the institutional framework of 
the Union� After the positive experience of the  European Common 
Market, even many federalists shared this strategy� As highlighted in 
Guido Montani’s article in this book, at the start of the 1970s Mario 
Albertini, the President of the Union européenne des fédéralistes (UEF), 
1 Spinelli, Altiero, La beffa del Mercato comune, September 24, 1957, in L’Europa non 
cade dal cielo, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1960, p� 282-287� 
2 Spaak, Paul-Henri, Cambats inachevés, Vol� II, De l’espoir aux déceptions, Paris, 
Fayard, 1969, p� 100�
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believed the Monetary Union could have gained momentum among the 
political forces in support of economic unification� In his view progress 
of an institutional nature in the monetary field would be possible� For 
his part, Jacques Delors held that the Maastricht Treaty meant reopening 
the way toward a constituent process: monetary integration would have 
been the driving force behind economic and political integration� In fact, 
the currency was a basic element of sovereignty and could represent the 
foundation for a relaunching of political integration, just as in the 1950s 
the army was a basis for the initial attempt at creating a European state� 
Therefore, it appeared that the single currency had created the conditions 
for a common ground between the two strategies for the construction 
of a united Europe, economic or political union, which had opposed 
one another throughout the integration process� In this way economic 
and political integration would be joined according to the “constitutional 
gradualism” method�
In fact, the weakness of Maastricht at the political level was not 
overcome, and the monetary union did not succeed in facilitating the 
economic and political union�
The present crisis surrounding the euro brings to the fore once again 
those questions which were so urgent in the past and for which it is 
essential today to find solutions� It is clear that monetary union is not 
sustainable without an agreement among the member countries regarding 
the principles for the monetary policy of the Central Bank� It is not 
sustainable if the convergence of economic and financial actions of the 
member countries, guaranteed at the moment of entry into the union, is 
not maintained over time�
Particularly at issue, as the German Foreign Minister, Joshka Fischer, 
noted in his famous speech at Humboldt University in Berlin on June 12, 
2000, is the fate of the functionalist strategy in the event this does not 
revert to the original approach set forth by Jean Monnet, where the final 
objective is visible and shared: the European Union as a unitary political 
and economic entity� 
* * *
Despite the importance of the topic, studies on the history of 
monetary integration have been relatively patchy; above all, they have 
lacked a deep interdisciplinary analysis capable of understanding the 
historical-political, economic and legal implications�
This book, which presents the proceedings of a convention held in 
Genoa on May 7-8, 2015, as part of the activities of the Jean Monnet 
Chair ad personam in “History and Politics of European Integration”, and 
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whose essays are published here after being updated on May 31, 2016, 
aims at placing current events within a long-term framework composed 
of a mosaic of multidisciplinary contributions that can provide the reader 
with keys which are adequate for an understanding of these events and 
useful for opening up new horizons� The path toward monetary union 
is an uneven one marked by a long and deep reflection on methods, 
stages and conditions� This process has developed at the same pace as the 
evolution of the international context, often leading to an open contrast 
between the distinct positions of the “monetarists” and “economists” 
within the individual European countries and between those who 
considered the single currency as the decisive instrument for overcoming 
the economic policy differences of the European states and opposed the 
return of protectionism and those who held that the national states must 
not deprive themselves of one of the fundamental pillars of sovereignty�
The present work begins with a look at the monetary unification 
projects that have characterized the 19th century – the Latin Monetary 
Union, the Germanic Monetary Union, and the Scandinavian Monetary 
Union – which are described in Lara Piccardo’s essay, in an attempt to 
reconstruct the long road toward the single currency, which began back 
in the 1950s with the creation of the European Payments Union and 
later continued with the first monetary unification projects� Ivo Maes 
focuses in particular on Robert Triffin’s role in European monetary 
unification within a broader international system� Maes analyzes Triffin’s 
relationships with various figures, such as Monnet, Marjolin and Barre, 
beginning with his education and writings on the monetary system, 
dealing at length with Triffin’s proposals for a European Reserve Fund 
and European unit of account as a parallel currency, which opened up 
new prospects in advance of monetary integration� Maria Eleonora 
Guasconi deals with the birth of the European monetary snake during 
the Bretton Woods period of instability, during which there already 
emerged, at the Hague Conference, a battle between “economists” and 
“monetarists”� The Werner report, which called for the fixing of exchange 
rate parities among the various currencies and the start of a common 
monetary policy managed by an independent European Central Bank, 
is the topic of Andreas Wilkens’ essay� Wilkens focuses on the German 
plan for a harmonization of economic policies as a way of eliminating 
the disparities among the economic and financial policies of European 
countries before the implementation of monetary policy measures� He 
also deals with the German government’s awareness of the political 
implications of the economic and monetary union� 
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Starting from the Hague Conference and Albertini’s strategic turning 
point, Guido Montani explores the crucial stages in the federalist battle 
for the European currency, drawing critical conclusions in light of 
federalist thinking on the relationship between economic theory and 
political theory�
After the turbulence of the 1970s, the European Monetary System 
gave new impetus to cohesion among European countries, taking a 
further step towards a European political union� By examining the 
motivations that led to the birth of the EMS and its strengthening in the 
1980s, the economist Giovanni Battista Pittaluga tries to give answers to 
two main questions: Has the EMS been a success or a failure?, and What 
were the causes of the 1992 crisis in the EMS and its substantial collapse? 
The analysis in the essay provides a positive answer to the first question 
and underscores with regard to the second that the 1992 crisis clearly 
evidenced the limits of fixed exchange rate regimes� In her essay Daniela 
Preda focuses on the contribution made by the Andreotti government in 
Italy made to the birth of the EMS and the Monetary Union, emphasizing 
the relations with Europeanist and federalist economic study groups and 
bringing to light the close connection afforded monetary, political and 
economic integration by the Italian government�
Since the EMS had created a condition of relative monetary stability, 
it was possible to eliminate the other barriers that stopped the Common 
Market from being considered as an effective internal market� Despite 
its limits, the Single European Act brought back the prospects for an 
Economic Union, which, however, was not possible without a currency 
and a democratic consensus�
There thus began a long struggle for the Monetary Union, which 
would end at Maastricht� The Maastricht Treaty called for proceeding 
by stages toward the final goal of a Monetary Union at the same time 
that it instituted European citizenship, increased the Community’s 
authority, broadened the European Parliament’s prerogatives, and created 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the collaboration 
among states regarding internal affairs and justice� Jean-Marie Palayret 
analyzes the role of François Mitterrand in the process, which entailed his 
conversion, beginning in March 1983, to the idea of a broader monetary 
unification than that called for in the EMS, while also privileging Franco-
German relations during that period� He points out the continuity in 
the relative positions of the two countries on monetary union from the 
Hague Conference to the Maastricht Treaty, with Germany determined 
to advance simultaneously toward economic and monetary union, on the 
one hand, and political union on the other, and France holding firm to 
14 The History of the European Monetary Union
a monetary union alone; to its persistence in defending French interests 
in the project for relaunching the monetary union; and the fact that 
German reunification and the breakup of the Soviet Union would have 
implications for European integration�
The economists Alberto Majocchi, Carlo Degli Abbati and Franco 
Praussello and the jurists Francesco Munari and Adriano Giovannelli 
focus on the creation of and crisis in the Eurozone� Alberto Majocchi 
examines the conditions that should be met to join the single currency, 
the Stability and Growth Pact, and the different steps towards an 
effective governance of the Eurozone area for the sake of guaranteeing 
financial stability and growth – the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (the Fiscal Compact), the Six Pack and the Two Pack’s, the 
Juncker plan – proposing at the end of his essay a reform of the governance 
of the EMU, with particular reference to a Eurozone budget and a 
Eurozone Treasury� Carlo Degli Abbati reconstructs the development 
and introduction of the Euro as a single currency to uncover the main 
reasons for the subsequent crisis, upholding the need for a courageous 
relaunching of Europe, which could be achieved through strengthened 
cooperation� Franco Praussello analyses the origins, the remedies so far 
employed, and the possible ways out of the ongoing Eurozone crisis 
in view of a possible relaunching of the integration process, focusing 
mainly on the errors made by Eurogroup governments in their inefficient 
management of the flaws that underlay the sovereign debt predicament, 
which put at risk the viability of monetary integration�
Francesco Munari’s essay deals with the difficult years of European 
Monetary Union and their impact on the EU legal system, emphasizing 
from the legal viewpoint the shortcomings of rules concerning the EMU 
and financial assistance to states, which could undermine the  overall 
stability of the European system� Referring in particular to the decisions 
of the European Court of Justice in the Pringle and Gauweiler cases, 
Munari outlines the difficulties the Court faced in being forced to 
pronounce sentences strongly conditioned (in particular in the Pringle 
case) by politics, stating the need for a return to the rule of law, which has 
always characterized the legal order in the EU�
Finally, Adriano Giovannelli presents a detailed and valuable 
reconstruction of what the EU has already accomplished in managing the 
Eurozone crisis – Quantitative Easing, the European Financial Stability 
Facility, the European Stability Mechanism, the common monitoring of 
government budgets, and the Banking Union – in order to highlight the 
crisis in the functionalist method and the illusion of creating a currency 
without a state and a supranational democracy�
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As with all large-scale crises, the present one, made more acute by the 
result of the Brexit referendum, opens up new horizons and presents new 
challenges, raising the problem of the legitimization of the European Union 
and adding to the European agenda the need to complete the monetary 
union not only with a financial, fiscal, banking and budgetary union, 
based on the classic functionalist method, but with the definitive shifting 




It is a great pleasure to host, in this fine Branch of the Bank of Italy, the 
conference “The history of European Economic and Monetary Union”, 
organized by the Department of Political Science of the University of 
Genoa�
The current state of the Union will be discussed by eminent and 
illustrious experts, who will review its history, and then reflect on the 
perspectives of the integration process and the most suitable approaches 
to the current issues concerning Union’s role, framework, and governance� 
We are close to celebrate Europe Day on next May 9� On the same 
day in 1950 a speech held by Robert Schuman, the then French Foreign 
Minister, set out the idea for a new form of political cooperation 
in Europe� That speech is now considered to be the beginning of the 
European Union� 
On the occasion of this anniversary, every year the Bank of Italy and 
the other European Central Banks organize training courses for their 
staff� This year two main topics have been selected�
The first topic is the Banking Union, after the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) was established six months ago� The European Central 
Bank has taken on specific tasks relating to the prudential supervision of 
euro-area credit institutions, in cooperation with the national competent 
authorities of participating EU countries, within the  framework of 
harmonized rules� The objectives are manifold: to break the vicious 
circle of banks’ distress and sovereign risk, that is, the probability that a 
government would refuse to honour their debt; to contribute to financial 
integration of the euro area and of the single market as a whole; to 
ensure enhanced supervision of Europe’s banks in accordance with their 
increased cross-border activities and ensuing inter-dependencies� 
Since June 2012, when the Decision of the Council of the European 
Union was issued, the Bank of Italy has ensured full and continuous 
support to the project, making an independent and valuable contribution 
of proposals, resources, experience, and procedures to the new supervision 
framework�
The second topic chosen for the 2015 Europe Day is the cooperation 
in euro banknotes’ design, production, and circulation� It should be noted 
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that also in this activity the contribution of the Bank of Italy is significant: 
to the production process, with 1�16 billion notes yearly printed in our 
country, accounting for 14 per cent of the total euro-area production; to 
the design process, with the new, strongly innovative €20 note of “Europa 
series”, that is due to enter in circulation in November 2015 and has been 
developed with the participation of Bank of Italy’s experts�
The branches of the Bank of Italy play an important role in currency 
circulation� They manage and monitor the currency circuit (over 5 billion 
notes put into circulation or withdrawn in 2014), take part in the fight 
against counterfeiting and money laundering, exercise powers of control 
over professional cash handlers, and inform the public and professional 
users of the technical characteristics of the new banknote series�
Let me thank Professor Daniela Preda and Professor Guido Levi for 
choosing this branch as the conference location: today we are continuing 
with a fruitful, long-standing cooperation, which will bear even more 
fruit in the future�
Before giving the floor to the Dean of the University School of 
Social Sciences, I thank all the speakers for sharing their analyses and 
knowledge� Their contributions will be useful to every participant, 
especially to students, who have not witnessed the first steps of the 
Economic and Monetary Union and therefore may not fully perceive 
how beneficial the Union has been so far�
 Mario Venturi
 Manager of the Genova Branch
 Banca d’Italia 
Opening Address
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you all for your invitation, and a special 
heartfelt thanks to Professor Daniela Preda�
I bring you greetings from the School of Social Sciences, the 
coordinating structure of the Departments of Political Science, 
Economics, Law, and Teacher Education of the University of Genoa�
Also let me express my delight in seeing among the key participants in 
these days, along with some distinguished Italian and European scholars, 
many illustrious professors from our School�
At this difficult present time – in these years especially – we need a 
historical perspective in order to speak about Europe, and in particular 
about its economic and monetary policy�
We need this in order to attempt an objective evaluation of the 
development of the European project – one far removed from daily 
controversies and using the tools of critical analysis concerning, on the 
one hand, the ideas of the founding fathers (although these cannot always 
be integrated in a unitary picture) and, on the other, the issues connected 
with the recent global economic development� This last is distinguished 
by an interconnectedness of economies and cultures unprecedented in 
human history, as well as by the growth of the financial dimension in 
economic processes and, finally, by a severe crisis that began many years 
ago� A crisis of which it’s hard to see the end, especially in Europe and in 
our own country�
These are clearly very complex issues and difficult to grasp for a 
philosopher of law, as I am� But it’s precisely on these matters that you 
will focus your thoughts during these two days�
From my side, I can only relate a personal worry, which I have as a 
citizen and not as a scholar� Thinking about the starting-point of our 
history – of the intention that the majority, if not all, the authors of the 
idea of Europe had of creating strong political integration – I believe that 
politics should recover an awareness of its nature and of its responsibilities 
regarding the issues bound up with the economic and monetary system of 
our continent� It is necessary to regain the consciousness that “economic 
policy” is a very different thing from a political doctrine which wears 
the garb of economic theory� Even when its validity and its truth might 
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legitimate its primacy or hegemony in its own field, politics cannot for 
this reason modify its goals� Politics must strengthen, even in hard times, 
its mission of protecting the quality and dignity of citizens’ lives�
Eventually, politics must engage in thinking further, in the 
unquestionably more complex terms of the European political process, 
about the conditions of legitimacy that govern its actions – conditions 
that are prescribed, now as in the past, by the principles of liberal 
democracy�
Realino Marra 
Dean of the School of Social Sciences 
University of Genoa
Three Lessons from the Past
Monetary Unions in the 19th Century Europe 
Lara Piccardo
Department of Political Science, University of Genoa
At the beginning of the 19th century, Napoleon Bonaparte spread 
a single currency throughout the French Empire: the franc� In the 
Napoleonic monetary system (1808-1814) there was no central bank nor 
paper money and the system was based on the bimetallic franc and on the 
one to one exchange rate with lira and franc�
The Napoleonic idea was revived in 1865 by the nephew, Napoleon III, 
whose purpose was to defeat the growing power of the British pound: 
thus the Latin Monetary Union (1865-1926) was born� Two other similar 
experiments1, designed to equip large European single currency areas, 
appeared in the 19th century: the Germanic Monetary Union (1838-1871) 
and the Scandinavian Monetary Union (1872-1931)2�
These attempts met different outcomes, but still constitute a source 
of education and reflection� They show that monetary unions can take 
(and actually have taken) many forms� One of them, the Germanic 
1 About these three monetary unions please see Janssen, Albert E�, Les conventions 
monétaires, Paris, Alcan et Lisbonne, 1911; Krämer, Hans R�, Experience with Historical 
Monetary Unions, Kieler Diskussionsbeiträge, No� 5, 1970, available at https://www�
econstor�eu/bitstream/10419/48044/1/020009046�pdf (6 September 2016); Pollard, 
Sidney, European Economic Integration, 1815-1970, London, Thames & Hudson, 
1974; Mastrangelo, Fulvio, “Tentativi di unione monetaria in Europa dall’antichità 
al secolo XIX”, in Rivista di storia finanziaria, No� 6, gennaio-giugno 2001, p� 61-
76; Flandreau, Marc, Maurel, Mathilde, “Monetary Union, Trade Integration, and 
Business Cycles in 19th Century Europe”, in Open Economies Review, Vol� 16, No� 
2, April 2005, pp� 135-152; Depeyrot, Georges, Bregiannē, Catherine, Kovalchuk, 
Marina, Three Conferences on International Monetary History, Wetteren, Moneta, 2013�
2 Sometimes I found the expression “Scandinavian Currency Union”� However, as Lars 
Joung underlined, the official term was “den skandinaviska myntunionen” which is better 
translated as “Scandinavian Monetary Union”� Cf� Jonung, Lars, “The Scandinavian 
Monetary Union 1873-1924”, in Cottrell, Philip L�, Notaras, Gérassimos, Tortella, 
Gabriel (eds�), From the Athenian Tetradrachm to the Euro. Studies in European Monetary 
Integration, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007, p� 76-95, specifically p� 78�
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Monetary Union, has been successful, lasting and being folded into an 
even larger monetary union; the other two, the Latin Monetary Union 
and the Scandinavian Monetary Union, have come apart� Knowing their 
histories allows to draw many interesting historic parallels between them 
and the European Monetary Union3�
1. The Latin Monetary Union (LMU)
Between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century a new coinage 
appeared in Europe and the circumstances seemed to bring to pass, at least 
in a part of the Continent, the ancient dream of the single currency�
In 1795, in France, the revolutionary government shocked the 
currency system: no longer the traditional triad pound-shilling-penny4, 
created by Charlemagne, but a new currency, the franc, based on the 
decimal system5� It was a bimetallic monetary system, in which the gold 
3 Recent studies dealing with comparison among different monetary unions in history 
underline that the need for effective oversight of banking and financial systems at the 
level of the monetary unions is not enough because it is very important to analyse 
political economy considerations and political integration as well� Cf� Bordo, 
Michael D�, Jonung, Lars, The Future of EMU: What Does the History of Monetary 
Unions Tell Us?, NBER Working Paper No� 7365, September 1999, available on 
http://www�nber�org/papers/w7365�pdf (15 September 2016); Eichengreen, Barry, 
“European Monetary Integration with Benefit of Hindsight”, in Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol� 50, No� 1, March 2012, p� 123-136; James, Harold, Making 
the European Monetary Union, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2012; Lastra, 
Rosa M�, Loui, Jean-Victor, “European Economic and Monetary Union: History, 
Trends, and Prospects”, in Yearbook of European Law, March 2013, p�  1-150; 
O’Rourke, Kevin H�, Taylor, Alan M�, “Cross of Euros”, in Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol� 27, No� 3, Summer 2013, p� 167-192; Tache, Ileana, “Historical 
Record of Monetary Unions: Lessons for the European Economic and Monetary 
Union”, in Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Brasov, Vol� 6, No� 2, 2013, 
p� 161-170; Fendel, Ralf, Maurer, David, “Does European History Repeat Itself? 
Lessons from the Latin Monetary Union for the European Monetary Union”, in 
Journal of Economic Integration, Vol� 30, No� 1, March 2015, p�  93-120; Ryan, 
John, Forgotten Lessons for the Eurozone, Brussels, Egmont Royal Institute for 
International Relations, 2016�
4 In 779, Charlemagne established a new standard, the livre carolinienne (from the 
Latin libra, the modern pound), which was based upon a pound of silver – a unit of 
both money and weight – which was worth 20 sous (from the Latin solidus, which 
was primarily an accounting device and never actually minted, the modern shilling) 
or 240 deniers (from the Latin denarius, the modern penny)� The livre and the sou 
were counting units; only the denier was a coin of the realm�
5 The decimal system, introduced in France in 1793 following the French Revolution, 
replaced the duodecimal system monometallic created by Charlemagne� The 
effective use of the decimal system took place in 1803, with the issuance of the 
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currencies and the silver ones could be minted freely and had an unlimited 
liberating power� Between the monetary values of the two metals there 
was a legal and fixed ratio6�
The currency followed Napoleon in his conquests� The franc became 
the coinage of the Empire departments and the vassal States adopted a 
similar currency system�
The fall of the Empire partially compromised this monetary unification, 
because the franc continued to be used in many continental regions and 
some European countries adopted monetary rules that were inspired to the 
French system7: a little later, Piedmont adhered to the bimetallic system as 
Belgium (1832) and Switzerland (1850) did� So, in the mid-nineteenth 
century, four contiguous European States were to have a monetary model 
essentially based on the same guidelines, characterized by having welcomed 
with equal dignity monetary gold and silver in a fixed ratio of 1 to 15,58�
The bimetallism adopted by these countries worked until the mid-
nineteenth century, when it was challenged by appreciable fluctuations 
in the market prices of the two metals9�
To address this emergency, Belgium proposed to France, Italy and 
Switzerland to jointly solve the problem� However, it was the initiative of 
Napoleon III to break the deadlock� On 20 November 1865 he summoned 
in Paris a monetary conference, which resulted in the Paris Convention 
of 23 December: the Latin Monetary Union10 was born, so named by the 
franc by Napoleon Bonaparte who, as a result of his military campaigns, spread it 
throughout continental Europe�
6 Cf� Niveau, Maurice, Storia dei fatti economici contemporanei, Milan, Mursia, 1972, 
p� 224; Lesourd, Jean Alain, Storia economica dell’Ottocento e del Novecento, Milan, 
ISEDI, 1973, p� 30� See also Vilar, Pierre, Oro e moneta nella storia. 1450-1920, 
Bari, Laterza, 1971�
7 On the topic see, among the others: Marconcini, Federico, Vicende dell’oro e 
dell’argento dalle premesse storiche alla liquidazione della Unione monetaria latina, 
1803-1925, Milan, Vita e Pensiero, 1929; Olszak, Norbert, Histoire des unions 
monétaires, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1996�
8 See Marconcini, op. cit., p� 19-20�
9 On the monetary questions of this period please see, in particolar, Felloni, Giuseppe 
(ed�), Moneta, credito e banche in Europa: un millennio di storia, Genoa, Brigati, 1997�
10 Cf� de Cecco, Marcello, Moneta e Impero. Il sistema finanziario internazionale 
dal 1890 al 1914, Turin, Einaudi, 1979, p�  63-64� The text of the Convention 
is published in Marconcini, op.  cit., p�  338-341� On the birth and history of the 
Latin Monetary Union please see, among others: Parker Willis, Henry, A History 
of the Latin Monetary Union. A Study of International Monetary Action, Chicago, 
The University of Chicago Press, 1901; Flandreau, Marc, “The Economics and 
Politics of Monetary Unions: A Reassessment of the Latin Monetary Union, 
1865-71”, in Financial History Review, Vol� 7, No� 1, April 2000, p�  25-44; 
de Cecco, Marcello, “The Latin Monetary Union Revisited Once Again”, in From the 
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British press to emphasize the South-European nature of this association 
even if it was open to any other State that would accepted the obligations11�
Although the Conference had proposed a very ambitious program, 
which aimed to introduce a European monetary circulation, the results 
were much more limited and confined to the solution of purely technical 
problems12�
First of all, the four countries undertook the reduction of the title of 
silver coins, in order to make the real value of the currencies lower than 
the nominal one�
Secondly, they fixed the technical data relating to issues, in order to 
establish a complete list of authorized denominations with dimensions, 
intrinsic value and tolerances� The coins minted by the four States had 
such weight, fineness and common diameter, providing differences only 
in the inscriptions and effigies depending on the national mints13: in this 
way the coins could circulate freely and be accepted in the public purse 
of each country at an exchange rate of 1:1�
Finally, the free coinage of silver coins and the unlimited liberating power 
of silver coins among private citizens, which was reduced to 50 francs, were 
suspended� However, these measures did not imply the abandonment of 
bimetallism, because they did not apply to silver coins of 5 francs, which 
circulated freely in all the countries of the Latin Monetary Union14�
In 1867, during the French Universal Exposition, Napoleon III 
invited all European countries to Paris for a new monetary conference� 
The letter of invitation transmitted by the French government enclosed 
a copy of the LMU treaty, and suggested the holding of an international 
Athenian Tetradrachm to the Euro, cit�, p� 59-75, Bae, Kee-Hong, Bailey, Warren, “The 
Latin Monetary Union: Some Evidence on Europe’s Failed Common Currency”, in 
Review of Development Finance, Vol� 1, No� 2, April-June 2011, p� 131-149� 
11 Cf� Fauri, Francesca, L’ integrazione prematura. Le relazioni economiche europee dalla 
metà dell’Ottocento alla Grande Guerra, Forlì, Clueb, 2005, p� 23�
12 Cf� Olszak, op. cit., p� 38-39�
13 Ibidem�
14 In May 1866, Italy introduced the fiat, that is the inconvertibility of banknotes in 
metal currency, thus causing a de facto a devaluation of the Italian lira� As a member 
of the newly formed Latin Monetary Union, Italy tried to improve its financial 
situation coining silver coins, exporting mainly to France and asking the central bank 
to change the gold coin to the agreed rate� Italy obtained huge profits from such 
arbitrage transactions: the LMU countries were inundated with Italian silver coins 
so to induce them, in the following years come, to put limits to emissions of silver 
coins in order to curb the exports� With the adhesion of the Papal State to the Latin 
Monetary Union in 1868, France was invaded not only by about 80 million Italian 
coins, but also 30 million papal coins� Cf� Fauri, op. cit., p� 24-25�
conference “to consider the question of uniformity of coinage and to 
seek for the basis of ulterior negotiations”15� The conference assembled on 
17 June, under the presidency of Marquis Léonel de Moustier, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, the following named countries being represented: Austria, 
Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark, the United States, France, Great 
Britain, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Sweden 
and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and Würtemberg� The opposition 
of France to monometallism and that of Great Britain to the decimal 
monetary system prevented to reach an agreement16� The conference 
voted unanimously against the adoption by the countries represented by 
the silver standard exclusively, and unanimously, with the exception of 
the Netherlands, in favor of the single gold standard17� At the final session 
of the conference it was voted to refer these and other decisions reached 
to the several States for diplomatic action, and that information of the 
action of the States should be transmitted to the French Government, 
which should have power to reassemble the conference� The conference 
adjourned on 6 July, and was not reassembled18�
Meanwhile, on 26 September 1868, George I of Greece also joined 
the Latin Monetary Union19�
In the following decade20 two factors put in crisis the system created 
by the Paris Convention21�
15 Lalor, John J� (ed�), Cyclopædia of Political Science, Political Economy, and the Political 
History of the United States, Vol� III, Oath – Zollverein, New York, Maynard, Merrill, 
and Co�, 1899, p� 802� On the 1867 monetary conference see also Graham, Thomas, 
Levi, Leone, Report of the International Conference on Weights, Measures, and Coins: 
held in Paris, June 1867, London, Printed by Harrison and Sons, [1868]�
16 Cf� Schor, Armand-Denis, La monnaie unique, Paris, Presses universitaires de 
France, 1995, p� 15�
17 On the attempts to transform the Latin Monetary Union into a bigger and stronger 
monetary union please see the deep analysis of Einaudi, Luca, “From the Franc to 
the ‘Europe’: The Attempted Transformation of the Latin Monetary Union into a 
European Monetary Union, 1865-1873”, in The Economic History Review, Vol� 53, 
No� 2, May 2000, p� 284-308�
18 Schor, op. cit., p� 27�
19 In 1868, Spain also adopted a system which was similar to the Latin Monetary Union, 
although never formally acceding because of the difficulties in ensuring an adequate 
level of circulating money on function of the precious metal reserves available�
20 For a thorough review of the European monetary unification process of this period, 
see again Einaudi, Luca, Money and Politics. European Monetary Unification and the 
International Gold Standard, 1865-1873, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001�
21 On the problems affecting the Latin Monetary Union cf� Flandreau, Marc, “On the 
Inflationary Bias of Common Currencies: The Latin Union Puzzle”, in European 
Economic Review, Vol� 37, No� 2-3, April 1993, p� 501-506�
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At the end of the Franco-Prussian War, in 1871, the war compensation 
paid in gold from France to Germany led to a surplus of silver, so that the 
devaluation that followed was beyond redemption� The result was the shift 
of monetary systems toward convertibility of money exclusively in gold22: 
in particular Germany, the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries and the 
United States, having opted for the golden monometallic system, wanted 
to get rid of their silver reserves23� All of this changed the gold-silver ratio, 
which, went from 1 to 15�5 to 19 in 1876 and then to 33�3 in 1890�
Moreover, starting from 1873, the silver depreciated because new 
reserves were discovered in Nevada, while in the Far East and Europe the 
metal markets narrowed�
The new agreements, which succeeded in the following years (1874, 
1875, 1876, 1878 and 1885), first limited the free coinage of 5 francs 
silver coins and then, in 1878, suspended it� This restrictions in the LMU 
in 1878 on free coinage and the acceptance of silver as a form of payment, 
and the discontinuance in Spain in 1883 of the coinage of gold led to the 
so called “lame bimetallism”24�
The Latin Monetary Union was renewed in 1885 and in 1891 and was 
later tacitly extended each year, inching closer to a golden monometallic 
system (gold standard)25� De facto, it ended with the First World War, but 
its official dissolution was established on 24 December 1925 and entered 
into force on 1 January 192626�
History showed how the Latin Monetary Union’s attempt to 
establish rules allowing precise acceptance in one of the members of the 
currencies of other member countries failed not only under the pressure 
of international contingencies27, but also because of the absolute lack of 
22 Some other good instead of gold would have been used as exchange standards and 
means of payment, but gold has the advantage of being scarce, relatively indestructible 
and few industrial uses� Cf� Samuelson, Paul A�, Nordhaus, William D�, Economia, 
Milan, McGraw Hill, 1996, p� 719�
23 Cf� North, Michael, La storia del denaro: una storia dell’economia e della società 
europea di oltre mille anni, Casale Monferrato, Piemme, 1998, p� 194�
24 Cf� Schor, op. cit., p� 67; Pecorari, Paolo, La lira debole. L’Italia, l’Unione monetaria 
latina e il “bimetallismo zoppo”, Padua CEDAM, 1999�
25 The gold standard was formally introduced in the United Kingdom by the Peel 
Act (1844)� Between 1870 and 1913 it was extended to most of the continental 
economies, the United States and Japan� Cf� Fauri, op. cit., p� 39-44, 137�
26 The liquidation took place before 1 January 1927� See Droulers, Frederic, Histoire 
de l’ecu européen du moyen âge à nos jours et des précédentes unions monétaires, s�l�, 
Aria-Creations, s�d�, p� 68-70�
27 Moreover, it was not taken into consideration the economic imbalance between the 
members, nor the exchange policy based on a bimetallic system, which lent itself to easy 
speculations varying the ratio of commercial value and legal value of gold and silver�
common organisms coordinating the economic policies of the various 
States� For this reason, the weakest members of the Union could well 
take advantage of the inadequacies of the founding Treaty: the critical 
financial situation of Italy, Greece and the Holy Siege brought about 
various forms of excessive monetary creation� The incompleteness of the 
definitions of money taken by the Union allowed Italy extensive paper 
money emissions� The declining fortunes of bimetallism and the fall of 
silver prices then created the unstable financial conditions conducive 
to international speculation’s insertion in the process and amplify the 
impact� The economically stronger LMU countries, such as France 
and Switzerland, became victims of these abuses� They could curb 
these practices only through a complete control of monetary creation 
of the new LMU members (Greece) and adopting a more aggressive 
stance after 1870� This took the form of the expulsion of “free riders” 
(for the Holy Siege) and a tightening of LMU rules, imposed by the 
threat of financial sanctions (against Italy and Belgium)� Of course, this 
attitude could only preclude any extension of monetary cooperation, 
and prevented new LMU adhesions, in order to avoid the difficulties of 
monitoring of too many peripheral countries by the center (France)� All 
this narrowed gradually the scope of the Latin Monetary Union until 
its total extinction28�
2. The Germanic Monetary Union (GMU)
After the Congress of Vienna, the 35 princedoms and the four free 
cities of the German territory29 sovereignly administrated their customs 
duties, their weights and measures and their currency system30� Metallic 
coins in circulation were many, because those already numerous of the 
28 These considerations are presented by Einaudi, Luca, “Monetary Unions and Free 
Riders: The Case of the Latin Monetary Union (1865-78)”, in Rivista di storia 
economica, No� 3, dicembre 1997, p� 327-362�
29 The arrangement of the numerous German States was so complex that dragged 
on since the Congress of Vienna until 1819, when in Frankfurt the agreement 
was signed, ratifying the boundaries of the medium and small States, and setting 
up a German Confederation (which lasted, with some changes of members, until 
the Prussian victory over Austria in 1866), made up of 39 State entities against 
the previous 350� See, in particular: Mann, Golo, Storia della Germania moderna, 
Firenze, Sansoni, 1964; Carrié, René Albrecht, Storia diplomatica d’Europa, 1815-
1968, Rome-Bari, Laterza, 1978�
30 Cf� Bogart, Ernest Ludlow, Storia economica dell’Europa, 1760-1939, Turin, Unione 
tipografico-editrice torinese, 1968, p� 216�
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German Confederation States were added with English, Danish, French 
and Russian ones31�
Therefore, the metallic circulation was variegated� It prevailed the 
silver standard, but the weights and names of the coins were different 
and there were two units of reference adopted by a certain number of 
States: the thaler in the Northern States – including Prussia –, the florin 
in the Southern States – including Austria� Even within the two bench 
marks prevailed chaos: denominations or number of pieces which could 
be minted with the unit of weight of the referent fine metal fluctuated32�
This system created many difficulties for the process of industrialization 
that Germany was facing at that time, a process already hampered by 
the division of the country into many state entities� In particular, the 
Prussian territories as agreed by the Treaty of Vienna sprawled across 
Northern Germany, but their economic development was hampered by 
antiquarian tariff barriers� Within Prussia there were sixty-seven different 
tariffs and thirteen non-Prussian enclaves, each with a different fiscal 
system� Internal customs duties in Prussia were abolished in 1818: the 
customs union, the Zollverein, was born�
One of the enclaves was induced by the Prussian Finance Minister, 
Friedrich von Motz, to hand over its customs administration in 1819; 
six other small States followed suit in 1822� Other German States, 
perceiving the economic strength that was accruing to Prussia, formed 
unions of their owns in 1828, but, as the resources of the Prussian union 
were greater, they too were forced into the Zollverein by the end of 1833� 
More States joined in following eleven years, although the great seaports 
such as Hamburg and Bremen were strong enough to remain outside�
The problem of free movement of goods had already placed after the 
birth of the Confederation, in the wake of the ideas of the economist 
Friedrich List33, who was calling for the overthrow of the complex grid 
31 In the first half of the nineteenth century, a shortage of banknotes, which made 
up only 3% of the money circulating in Germany, was opposing to this variety of 
metallic money� Cf� De Simone, Ennio, Storia della banca: dalle origini ai nostri 
giorni, Napoli, Arte Tipografica, 1987, p� 175�
32 Cf� Schor, op. cit., p� 20�
33 Born in Reutlingen (Württemberg) in 1789, List taught at the University of Tübingen, 
a position he had to leave in 1818 because frowned upon by the government for its 
economic doctrines� In fact, he advocated the need to break down trade barriers 
among German States and abolish the doctrine of free trade in relations with foreign 
countries, saying that Germany could give rise to a domestic industry only through 
protectionism; once the industry had grown sufficiently to cope with international 
competition it could return to free trade� Cf� Fauri, op.  cit., p�  16-17� In 1819, 
the General Association of German Industrialists and Traders introduced, under 
made by dozens of customs duties, also present within a same country� 
Initiated by Prussia in 1818 with the goal of eliminating all internal barriers 
and enclosing the entire State into a single customs border, the Zollverein 
arrived to a final shape on 1 January 1834 and soon also standardizing 
weights, measures, and currencies within the States (excluding Austria) 
and thus forming the basis of a “quite national” economy34�
With the realization of the customs union, disadvantages arising from 
monetary fragmentation became evident35� The Southern States, related 
to florin, felt more than others the need to standardize their coinage: 
this is why on 25 August 1837 they promoted the Munich Convention, 
which led to the adoption of a common currency� The Munich Treaty 
among the States of Southern Germany adopted silver as the base of the 
agreement and the florin was used as a common count unit, omitting any 
rule about the circulating currencies�
On 30 July 1838, the Dresden Convention36, or Münzverein, was 
ratified: noting the common adoption of the thaler by the Northern States, 
the Dresden Convention recognized the persistence of two monetary zones 
at 1�75 gulden per thaler, creating the first monetary union covering most 
of German territory� The Union was of a traditional type, based on the silver 
standard, on independent local issues following common rules, and did 
not include paper money� A common coin of 2 thalers equaling 3�5 gulden 
was introduced, but was too cumbersome to become popular; it weighed 
37�12  grams and was the heaviest silver coin circulating in Europe at 
the time� Its failure was sealed by the nickname “Champagne thaler”37� 
his suggestion, a petition in favor of the Customs Union and the establishment of 
a common external tariff� In 1820, he was elected deputy, but was later expelled 
and forced to a temporary exile in America between 1825 and 1832� However, his 
theories were spread in the German Confederation, and were decisive for the birth 
of the Zollverein� Theoretician of the “economic nationalism”, in 1841 he published 
his most famous work, Das Nationale System der Politischen Ökonomie (Il sistema 
nazionale dell’economia politica, Turin, UTET, 1936; Milan, Isedi, 1972), in which he 
insisted on the close link between economics and politics and defended the national 
economic independence� He died in 1846 in Kufstein�
34 Cf� Hamerow, Theodore S�, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics 
in Germany, 1815-1871, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1958; Tilly, Richard 
H�, On the History of German Monetary Union, in From the Athenian Tetradrachm to 
the Euro, cit�, p� 42-58; Rössner, Philipp Robinson, “Monetary Instability, Lack of 
Integration, and the Curse of a Commodity Money Standard� The German Lands, 
c� 1400-1900 A�D�”, in Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol� 47, 
No� 2, 2014, p� 297-340�
35 Cf� De Simone, op. cit., p� 175�
36 Cf� Droulers, op. cit., p� 47-49�
37 Cf� Henderson, William O�, The Zollverein, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1939�
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A proposal by Saxony to adopt a single coinage based on the mark was 
rejected by the other German States wishing to retain the attributes, as 
well as the substance, of monetary sovereignty�
Therefore, the agreement did not unify the coinage in the Zollverein, 
but managed to keep it simple38: it set a permanently fixed exchange rate 
between the two monetary zones of the customs union, it imposed the 
silver standard, it adopted a system based on the dual currency, with 
fixed exchange rates between the currency of the customs union and 
the currency of each country and each country accepted the common 
currency of the Zollverein alongside its own currencies as a tool endowed 
with liberating power�
The immediate effect was the acceleration of the industrial process� 
Economic integration also strengthened the national consciousness in 
the German States, making the political unity a scenario much more 
likely� Germany began to exhibit all the characteristics of a nation-State�
The next step towards monetary unification of the German-speaking 
countries came with the Treaty of Vienna (January 1857): with that 
Treaty, Austria finally managed to become a member of the Münzverein, 
despite its weaker fiscal and monetary situation and its long-standing 
depreciated inconvertible paper currency� It had to accept the return to 
full convertibility into silver of its bank notes and the dominant role of the 
Prussian thaler in the Union39, the Vereinsthaler, at a rate of 1�75 gulden 
and 1�5 Austrian florins� Prussia had blocked the Austrian accession, as 
part of its bid for open supremacy over Germany, but Austria still held 
the presidency of the Diet of the Confederation40�
Divergent economic conditions and the war of 1859 with Italy forced 
Austria to suspend convertibility again after only one year� It could not 
stand the discipline of limited seigneurage income� After suffering defeat 
in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, Austria was given the opportunity 
to remain in the Münzverein, but the year after opted out in order to 
reach an agreement with France� Entering into the LMU seemed to offer 
access to the Parisian capital market, to a large international currency 
agreement, and was also part of a new military alliance against Prussia� 
The French government, however, never ratified the provisional Franco-
Austrian monetary convention of 1867, worried by the consequences of 
38 Cf� Schor, op. cit., p� 22-23; Bogart, op. cit., p� 216�
39 Cf� North, op. cit., p� 190; Olszak, op. cit., p� 28-29�
40 Cf� Einaudi, Luca, “‘The Generous Utopia of Yesterday Can Become the Practical 
Achievement of Tomorrow’: 1000 Years of Monetary Union in Europe”, in National 
Institute Economic Review, Vol� 172, 2000, p� 90-104, specifically p� 94-95�
Austrian inconvertibility and by the request to abandon bimetallism for 
the gold standard�
The GMU lasted only until 13 June 1867, when, following the 
defeat in the war against Prussia, Austria was forced to withdraw from 
the Treaty41�
The last step towards the currency union came in 1871, with the 
founding of the Reich and the appearance of a new monetary unit, the 
gold mark, accounting for one third of the Prussian thaler� Two years 
later, picking up the recommendations coming from the business world, 
it was adopted the gold standard� The fact was favored by the payment 
made by France to the Reich for the reparations of war amounting to 
5 billion gold francs42� It was decided the minting of a gold coin from 
20 brands, which became the main currency of the Reich, when, in 1873, 
it introduced the imperial gold currency and declared the old regional 
currencies out of circulation as of 1 January 187643�
Unlike what happened with the Latin Monetary Union, the Germanic 
Monetary Union was produced by the customs union and formed the 
basis for the political unification44�
3. The Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU)
Parallel to Latin and Germanic Monetary Unions, Europe experienced 
a third similar experience�
41 Cf� Droulers, op. cit., p� 53-54�
42 Cf� Luzzatto, Gino, Storia economica dell’età moderna e contemporanea, Vol� II, L’età 
contemporanea, Padua CEDAM, 1960, p� 337�
43 Cf� North, op. cit., p� 194�
44 On this question please see Holtfrerich, Carl-Ludwig, Did Monetary Unification 
Precede or Follow Political Unification of Germany in the 19th Century?, in European 
Economic Review, Vol� 37, No� 2-3, April 1993, p� 518-524; Vanthoor, Wim F� V�, 
European Monetary Union since 1848: A Political and Historical Analysis, London, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996� Both the authors insist and demonstrate how any 
monetary union would only succeed if supported by much closer political union 
among the member States�
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The Scandinavian Monetary Union45, activated from 1872 to 1931 
among Denmark, Norway46, and Sweden, gave rise to an integration that 
involved not only the metal currency as in the previous cases, but also 
the banknotes, which could freely circulate outside the issuing State� The 
largest cultural solidarity that united the three Nordic States allowed them 
to go farther than the Latin Monetary Union, which although had been 
their initial reference� Unfortunately, it did not prevent the emergence of 
economic and political differences and the SMU was already fragile when 
it had to face the indirect consequences of the First World War� The deep 
disruption of markets, caused by the conflict, did not spare these neutral 
governments and the Union came out dying47�
Like most of the European States, the three countries had experienced 
severe monetary disorder in the early 19th century� Their currency systems 
were based on silver, according to the model of the city of Hamburg, 
which they had close commercial relationships with� The unit was called 
everywhere “thaler”, but its equivalence in metal and its subdivisions 
varied: the Norwegian thaler was worth two Danish thalers or four Swedes 
thalers and it was divided into 120 shillings, while the Danish thaler 
corresponded to six marks, and each mark was worth 16 shillings; only 
the Swedish thaler had a decimal division in 100 øre� This complexity 
did not disturb a strong circulations in the three States� On average, one-
fifth of the circulation of each country was made up of the currencies of 
the others, and locally, in the border areas, the phenomenon was greater, 
as in the south of Sweden, where mainly Danish coins circulated� The 
45 On the history of the Scandinavian Monetary Union, please see, among the others: 
Lindgren, Raymond E�, Norway-Sweden: Union, Disunion, and Scandinavian Integration, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1913; Bergman, U� Michael, Gerlach, Stefan, 
Jonung, Lars, “The Rise and Fall of the Scandinavian Currency Union 1873-1920”, 
in European Economic Review, Vol� 37, No� 2, 1993, p� 507-517; Henriksen, Ingrid, 
Kærgård, Niels, “The Scandinavian Currency Union 1875-1914”, in Reis, Jaime (ed�), 
International Monetary Systems in Historical Perspective, London, Palgrave-Macmillan, 
1995, p� 91-112; Talia, Krim, The Scandinavian Currency Union 1873-1924: Studies in 
Monetary Integration and Disintegration, Stockholm, Stockholm School of Economics, 
2004; Jonung, Lars, The Scandinavian Monetary Union 1873-1924, cit�; Øksendal, 
Lars Fredrik, “The Impact of the Scandinavian Monetary Union on Financial Market 
Integration”, in Financial History Review, Vol� 14, No� 2, October 2007, p� 125-148; 
Sørensen, Anders Ravn, “Monetary Romanticism: Nationalist Rhetoric and Monetary 
Organisation in Nineteenth-Century Denmark”, in Scandinavian Economic History 
Review, Vol� 61, No� 3, 2013, p� 209-232�
46 From 1814 to 1905 Norway was an independent kingdom, with its own constitution 
and its own parliament, though the crown was held by the King of Sweden� Following 
the separation of the two countries, in 1906 Haakon VII, son of Frederick VIII of 
Denmark, was crowned King of Norway�
47 Cf� Olszak, op. cit., p� 67�
same situation was found in the reserves of the issuing banks, where the 
currencies of neighboring States accumulated48�
The three Scandinavian countries had participated at the 1867 Paris 
International Conference, which did not achieve practical results but 
created a lot of expectations for membership to the LMU�
Sweden seemed to be particularly interested, and since 1869 it began 
to adapt its monetary system to the French one� Sweden coined a new 
gold coin, called karolin, which was identical to the 10 French francs coin� 
The karolin had no legal tender, but it was used for commercial purpose� 
However, it should be noted that it was a gold coin, while LMU’s reference 
was rather silver, as it did, indeed, in the Scandinavian systems�
The 1867 Paris discussions had shown great hesitation among the 
three Nordic countries, who wondered if it was reasonable to join a 
bimetallic system in crisis, the LMU, while the main trading partners, 
such as Britain, used the gold standard, or, as the German States, were 
preparing to do so� The German unification in progress was another 
hesitation factor since attracted Norway and created hardships in 
Denmark, proven by the defeat of 186449� These fears were quickly wiped 
out by the results of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870� The victory of 
Germany weakened the positions of France, of silver and of bimetallism 
proponents and reaching the German system and aligning to its principles 
resulted political impossible for the Nordic States�
The development of a purely Scandinavian system was decided� 
For this purpose, a Currency Commission was established� It met in 
Copenhagen on 19 August 1872� The agreement for monetary union 
was signed in Stockholm on 18 December 1872, but the next Treaty was 
ratified on 27 May 1873 only by Christian IX of Denmark and Oscar II 
of Sweden� On the contrary, the Norwegian Parliament rejected it with a 
narrow majority, fearful that the monetary union would serve to reinforce 
political union with Sweden� However, in October 1875 Norway coined 
a new currency: the crown, divided into 100 øre, which respected the rules 
of the 1872 Agreement� This made possible the subsequent accession into 
the Scandinavian Monetary Union, thanks to a new treaty of 16 October 
187550�
48 Cf� de Cecco, Marcello, European Monetary and Financial Cooperation before the 
First World War, in Rivista di storia economica, 1992, No� 1-2, p� 55-76, specifically 
p� 66; Olszak, op. cit., p� 70-71�
49 Ivi, p� 72� In 1864, Austria and Germany declared war on Denmark� Defeating it, 
they obtained the administration of the duchy of Schleswig-Holstein�
50 Cf� Dowle, Anthony, Monnaies modernes de 1789 à nos jours, Fribourg, Office du 
Livre, 1972, p� 164�
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The text of the founding document of the Scandinavian Monetary 
Union was really inspired to the Monetary Agreement of 1865� First of 
all, it appeared as a list of technical requirements on the issue of the 
metallic money, corresponding to a new common unit, the crown, 
which was equal in weight and standard to the old Swedish gold coin� 
The pieces would have the same weight and size in each country and 
only effigies and inscriptions would have varied from country to country� 
Correspondence with previous coins was fixed as follows: a crown had 
the value of one Swedish thaler, of half Danish thaler and of one quarter 
of Norwegian thaler� In fact, the new common system was drawn on the 
old Swedish system, which was already a decimal system�
From a brief analysis, the Scandinavian monetary system seemed freer 
than Latin Monetary Union, because there was no limitation regarding 
both the minted quantities and the liberating power51� This lack of 
restriction was justified by the impossibility of fixing quotas since in 
each of the three countries the currency needs were difficult to estimate� 
However, this freedom was only apparent, because the Convention 
contained a clause of unlimited redemption: any issuer State undertook 
to resume all issued divisional coins at the request of another country 
and to encash them into gold� Thus excessive emissions by the individual 
States were discouraged� Nevertheless, it must be underlined that a 
similar redemption clause existed in the Latin Monetary Union, with the 
possibility of exchange in gold or silver shields, but it seemed inadequate 
and was supplemented by very strict quantitative restrictions, which were 
frequently contested afterwards52� Moreover, there was, another severe 
clause, according to which a member State could not conclude other 
agreements without the consent of the partners53�
Since the early years, the Scandinavian Monetary Union experienced 
the dominion of the fiduciary circulation, facilitated by the existence of 
small denomination banknotes� Since the start of the agreement, each 
central bank of the three countries accepted at par the banknotes issued 
by the others, even if for a long time there was no written commitment� 
The agreement between Norway and Sweden was signed only in 1894 and 
Denmark joined in 1901� Furthermore in 1885 started a Scandinavian 
51 Cf� Bartel, Robert J�, International Monetary Unions: The 19th Century Experience, in 
Journal of European Economic History, 1974, No� 3, p� 689-704, specifically p� 698�
52 Cf� Olszak, op. cit., p� 73-74�
53 This clause, which was intended to avoid any indirect and involuntary reunification 
to the German system or to the Latin Monetary Union’s system, contrasted with the 
remarkable opening of the 1865 Paris Convention, which provided nothing in this 
sense and allowed new adhesions without agreement of the founders� Cf� ibidem�
clearing agreement� The three central banks mutually opened current 
accounts, which functioned without interest or bank charges� The 
clearing was done every three months and the debit balances should be 
adjusted in gold54, but this favorable system was denounced by the Bank 
of Sweden in 1905, shortly after the political break with Norway�
None of the Scandinavian countries took part in the First World War; 
however, they were economically involved in the dramatic situation, so 
that the Scandinavian Monetary Union was suspended in 1914 for the 
duration of World War I and hardly began to work again after 1918� 
Sweden was the first country in Europe to re-establish convertibility 
of banknotes in January 1924; Denmark followed in December of 
1926; then Norway in May 1928, but the monetary rules were very 
different among the three countries and in Denmark, in particular, the 
free convertibility was done in very high value gold bars� Actually, the 
circulation of gold in Europe was almost over�
Following the crisis of 1929, the three Scandinavian countries 
abandoned one after the other the gold exchange standard, which had 
become untenable, and tried to enter the area of the pound: it happened 
in 1933� 1931 marked the end of the 1872 Convention55�
In fact, the cultural and economic similarities, albeit fundamental, 
were not able to guarantee the success and the duration of Scandinavian 
Monetary Union: the lack of a basic customs union, winning in the 
German case, and the persistence of different trade policies (which were 
liberal in Denmark and protectionist in Sweden and Norway) prevented 
in the Nordic countries the birth of a single market and led to the 
collapse of intra-community trade for the benefit of international trade 
with Great Britain and Germany56�
Finally, as for the Latin Monetary Union, even in the case of the 
Scandinavian Monetary Union the absence of a supranational body 
that could coordinate the monetary policy of the various States led each 
country to follow its own path, to the detriment of cooperation57�
54 Cf� de Cecco, European Monetary and Financial Cooperation, cit�, p� 67�
55 Cf� Olszak, op. cit., p� 81�
56 Cf� Fauri, op. cit., p� 29� The same consideration is presented by Bergman, U� Michael, 
“Do Monetary Unions Make Economic Sense? Evidence from the Scandinavian 
Currency Union, 1873-1913”, in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol� 101, 
No� 3, September, 1999, p� 363-377�
57 Ibidem�
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4. Conclusions
The history of these three experiences shows that national monetary 
unions in Europe have lasted only as long as centralized governments have 
been able to maintain national political union� In case of supranational 
monetary unions, the monetary link is weaker and unions can be terminated 
without the destruction of a nation state� So far, looking to nowadays, if 
the European Union remains as it is, not proceeding towards a federation 
or a single political entity, the euro will remain a “temporary” arrangement, 
which could last few or many years but will not be permanent58�
Monetary unions, however, tend to be rather persistent and dissolve 
only after very substantial economic or military shocks have created strong 
divergent political interests� From this historical analysis, it is clear that 
major economic shocks can destroy economic conditions for union: the 
economic divergence caused by the First World War deleted the Latin 
Monetary Union, while the Great Depression dissolved the Scandinavian 
Monetary Union� On the other hand, history teaches that successful 
monetary unions consolidate in a full political unification: the Münzverein 
becomes the German Monetary Unification (mark) after the creation of 
the German Empire in 187159�
Political unification followed by monetary unification has usually 
required a war, while supranational monetary unions have been the 
consequence of peace and free trade� Monetary unions alone, however, 
are not an absolute guarantee of peace and harmony� The political will 
to maintain a high level of cooperation remains crucial, and needs to be 
renewed continuously, without excessive confidence in the automatic 
development of institutional arrangements60�
58 Cf� Einaudi, “The Generous Utopia of Yesterday Can Become the Practical 
Achievement of Tomorrow”, cit�, p� 104�
59 Nuno, Valério, “Europe in the Mirror of Germany: To What Extent Does German 
Unification (1815-1888) Prefigure the Unification of Europe (1947-…)?”, in The 
Journal of European Economic History, Vol� 41, No� 2, Summer 2012, p� 117-146�
60 Cf� Einaudi, “The Generous Utopia of Yesterday Can Become the Practical 
Achievement of Tomorrow”, cit�, p� 104�
Robert Triffin et le processus d’intégration 
monétaire européenne
Ivo Maes1
«  Les pays dont la paix, le progrès et la prospérité sont intimement 
interdépendants doivent, dans leur propre intérêt, apprendre à utiliser ou 
limiter leur souveraineté nationale à la lumière de cette interdépendance » 
(Triffin, 1957 : 30)�
Robert Triffin (1911-1993) a joué un rôle important dans les débats 
monétaires internationaux qui ont eu lieu durant la période de l’après-
guerre� Triffin s’est fait connaître grâce à son ouvrage intitulé « L’or et la 
crise du dollar », publié en 1960, dans lequel il prédit la fin du système 
de Bretton Woods� L’attitude qu’avait Triffin en matière d’économie a été 
bien résumée par Jacques de Larosière : « À mes yeux, le plus remarquable 
dans le travail et la personnalité du Professeur Robert Triffin est la 
combinaison de trois aspects  : sa capacité d’analyse, son imagination 
dans le développement des institutions, et son pragmatisme en tant que 
praticien » (de Larosière, 1991 : 135)�
Aujourd’hui encore, Triffin est toujours très présent dans les débats 
portant sur le système monétaire international� Pour Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa (2010), l’analyse de Triffin a transcendé le système de Bretton 
Woods� Pour Triffin et Padoa-Schioppa, l’approche consistant à « mettre 
de l’ordre dans ses propres affaires  » (selon laquelle chaque pays vise 
l’équilibre  intérieur) ne suffisait pas à garantir la soutenabilité et la 
stabilité du système monétaire international� Triffin allait dès lors adopter 
un point de vue «  systémique  » du système monétaire international, 
toujours en quête de la « contrepartie » dans le mécanisme d’ajustement 
international�
Dans la présente contribution, nous nous pencherons sur le rôle de 
Triffin dans le processus d’intégration monétaire européenne� Nous 
avançons que son travail présente une continuité remarquable� Dès 
ses tout premiers écrits, Triffin a développé une vision selon laquelle le 
1 L’auteur souhaite remercier tous ceux qui ont contribué à ce projet� Les réserves 
d’usage s’appliquent�
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processus d’ajustement international ne fonctionnait pas conformément 
aux mécanismes classiques� Cette vision se fondait sur des analyses 
empiriques très fouillées de l’économie belge durant la Grande Dépression, 
mettant l’accent sur les déséquilibres et la période de transition� Sa thèse 
de doctorat sur la théorie de la concurrence imparfaite à Harvard ainsi 
que ses missions en Amérique latine pour le compte de la Réserve fédérale 
ont encore renforcé cette vision fondamentale� Comme de nombreux 
économistes de sa génération, Robert Triffin a été profondément marqué 
par la Grande Dépression des années  1930� À ses yeux, la conclusion 
de politique économique qu’il fallait en tirer était de placer alors la 
liquidité au cœur du système monétaire international et de coordonner 
les politiques économiques�
Les propositions que formulait Triffin en matière d’intégration 
monétaire suivaient une approche à deux niveaux, qui se préoccupait 
à la fois de la dimension internationale et de la dimension européenne� 
À cet égard, il a été fortement influencé par le début de l’après-guerre, 
notamment par l’échec du retour à la convertibilité ainsi que par le 
succès de l’Union européenne des paiements (dont il se réclamait aussi 
l’un des architectes)� Il a ainsi avancé des propositions de réformes du 
système monétaire international� Cependant, face à ses doutes quant à 
leur réalisation future, il s’est également attaché à formuler des pistes 
d’intégration monétaire régionale, particulièrement en Europe� À ses 
yeux, ces deux approches présentaient une forte complémentarité et 
visaient l’instauration d’un système monétaire international multipolaire, 
dont la Communauté européenne serait un pilier fondamental� Il s’est 
ainsi érigé en fervent défenseur de l’intégration monétaire européenne�
Dans cet article, nous commencerons par évoquer les années de 
formation de Triffin avant de nous intéresser à ses écrits consacrés au 
système monétaire international, en particulier «  L’or et la crise du 
dollar »� Nous nous intéresserons ensuite à l’analyse de Triffin ainsi qu’à 
ses propositions sur les politiques à adopter en matière d’intégration 
monétaire européenne�
1. Études et début de carrière 
Robert Triffin a accompli ses études supérieures à l’Université de 
Louvain, où il a obtenu une licence en sciences économiques en 1935� Il a 
entamé sa carrière au sein de l’Institut des sciences économiques� Durant 
l’entre-deux-guerres, l’Institut est devenu un des premiers centres modernes 
de recherche économique dans le monde francophone (Maes, 2008)� La 
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figure de proue y était à cette époque Léon-H� Dupriez, lui aussi diplômé 
d’Harvard et membre de la Banque nationale de Belgique� Dupriez était 
un éminent érudit dans l’analyse des cycles conjoncturels au sens large, 
à savoir l’interaction entre la croissance et les différents types de cycles 
dans l’économie� L’accent était surtout placé sur les différents secteurs 
industriels de l’économie, lesquels étaient alors au cœur du processus 
de croissance économique� Dupriez (1959 : 468) décrivait la révolution 
industrielle comme « une grande aventure prométhéenne de l’humanité » 
(souligné par l’auteur)� De plus, selon lui, l’argent et la finance occupaient 
une place centrale dans l’économie� Dupriez a également été l’un des 
premiers à introduire des méthodes statistiques d’analyse conjoncturelle 
en Europe� Dupriez se singularisait par deux éléments� Premièrement, 
il fondait son analyse sur des recherches empiriques approfondies (en 
accordant beaucoup d’attention aux méthodes statistiques descriptives, 
ainsi qu’aux graphiques et aux tableaux)� Il la décrivait lui-même comme 
« une théorie conjoncturelle “collant aux faits” » (Dupriez, 1959 : VIII)� 
Deuxièmement, il n’était pas partisan des nouvelles écoles de pensée 
économique, comme l’économie keynésienne� L’approche théorique de 
Dupriez s’inspirait très largement de la théorie de l’équilibre général de 
Walras� À ses yeux, il était crucial que la théorie économique revienne 
aux décisions économiques individuelles� 
En tant que petite économie ouverte, la Belgique a été durement 
touchée par la Grande Dépression des années  1930, surtout par la 
vive contraction du commerce mondial ainsi que par la chute des prix 
internationaux, soulevant d’âpres débats� Au printemps 1934, Dupriez 
présentait la dévaluation comme unique solution� En mars  1935, la 
Belgique a connu un profond remaniement politique� Paul van Zeeland, 
un collègue de Dupriez nommé premier ministre, a immédiatement 
procédé à une dévaluation du franc de l’ordre de 28 %, un pourcentage 
que l’on doit aux calculs du jeune Robert Triffin�
En 1935, Triffin a écrit un article statistique se fondant sur les calculs 
effectués pour la dévaluation, dans lequel il avançait que les écarts 
de prix, surtout la rigidité des coûts intérieurs, entraînait de lourdes 
pertes pour l’industrie belge et, partant, la fermeture d’entreprises  : 
« Et des prix de vente apparemment favorables constituaient pour nos 
industriels des prix de famine, qui, en 1934, mettaient en perte la moitié 
des entreprises du pays » (Triffin, 1935 : 290)� Il convient de noter par 
ailleurs que Triffin est arrivé à la conclusion que les prix des produits 
agricoles étaient bien plus sensibles aux fluctuations de la conjoncture 
(Maes, 2013)� Ce constat allait devenir un thème majeur de son œuvre, 
utilisé pour illustrer le fait qu’une politique déflationniste au cœur du 
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système économique entraînerait des effets déflationnistes encore plus 
importants dans la périphérie de l’économie mondiale�
En 1937, alors étudiant de troisième cycle à l’Université de Harvard, 
Triffin a publié l’article intitulé « La théorie de la surévaluation monétaire 
et la dévaluation belge  », expliquant aussi les contextes théorique et 
empirique de la dévaluation du franc belge� L’article de Triffin s’ouvrait 
sur une critique virulente de la théorie de la parité de pouvoir d’achat de 
Cassel, estimant en particulier qu’elle ne convenait pas aux situations 
de déséquilibre (Maes, 2012)� La critique fondamentale que formulait 
Triffin, dans la continuité de son article précédent, était que Cassel 
ne considérait pas la structure des prix dans un pays� Suivant en cela 
Dupriez, Triffin opérait une distinction entre les secteurs « protégés » et 
les secteurs « non protégés » de l’économie� Dans ces derniers, les prix 
de vente devaient être alignés sur les prix en vigueur sur les marchés 
internationaux� Cela étant, les coûts dans les secteurs non protégés étaient 
largement déterminés par des facteurs nationaux, induisant une pression 
sur les bénéfices, une contraction de la production et une augmentation 
du chômage� 
Triffin a intégré Harvard en  1935, où il a obtenu son Ph�D� en 
économie� Il s’y est pris de passion pour Joseph Schumpeter et la théorie 
économique pure� Comme il l’a écrit dans un article autobiographique : 
« Quelques semaines à Harvard ont toutefois suffi pour me convaincre 
que ce qui m’avait le plus manqué, c’était une bonne formation à la 
théorie pure, qui était alors enseignée à Harvard par le professeur 
Schumpeter, dont l’immense connaissance dans ce domaine, et dans 
bien d’autres, était aussi unique que son sens de la mise en scène devant 
ses étudiants  » (trad� de Triffin, 1981  :  241)� Au centre de la théorie 
économique se trouvait, d’après Schumpeter, la théorie de l’équilibre 
général� Sous la direction de Schumpeter, ainsi que de Leontief et 
Chamberlin, Triffin a rédigé une thèse intitulée « General Equilibrium 
Theory and Monopolistic Competition » (« Théorie de l’équilibre général 
et concurrence monopolistique  ») (trad� de Triffin, 1941)� Il s’efforçait 
d’y concilier la théorie de la concurrence imparfaite, qui tire ses origines 
de la théorie de l’équilibre partiel de Marshall, avec celle de l’équilibre 
général� Ce faisant, Triffin est ainsi devenu un expert de la théorie de la 
concurrence imparfaite, une théorie qui allait également imprégner sa 
perception des phénomènes monétaires internationaux�
Après avoir obtenu son Ph� D, Triffin est rentré en Belgique (Wilson, 
2015)� Ne parvenant toutefois pas à trouver un emploi qui lui convienne, 
il est retourné à Harvard en 1939� De 1942 à 1946, Triffin a travaillé au 
Conseil des gouverneurs du Système fédéral de réserve à Washington, 
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où il s’est principalement consacré à l’Amérique latine� Les missions qu’il 
a menées dans cette région ont constitué un épisode remarquable dans 
la diplomatie financière américaine et ont marqué une rupture avec les 
approches précédentes� Les dirigeants de la banque centrale américaine se 
sont non seulement détournés des politiques libérales classiques, mais ils 
se sont aussi « évertués à consulter leurs contreparties latino-américaines 
et à apprendre à les connaître, ainsi qu’à modeler et à ajuster leurs conseils 
aux besoins spécifiques de chaque pays » (trad� de Helleiner, 2009 : 24)� 
Triffin lui-même a insisté sur le fait que son but était de placer les 
politiques monétaire et bancaire au service des « immenses objectifs de 
développement qui avaient jusque-là été ignorés par la réglementation en 
matière de banque centrale » (trad� de Triffin, 1981)�
Pour Triffin, le cycle économique des économies d’Amérique latine 
n’était pas déterminé tant par l’épargne et les investissements nationaux 
que par les flux entrants et sortants des échanges commerciaux� Triffin se 
montrait par ailleurs critique envers le recours aux ajustements des taux 
de change à titre d’instrument de politique économique dans ces pays� 
Il a émis des doutes quant à l’efficacité de la dévaluation dans l’optique 
d’induire un réajustement de la balance des paiements, sachant que ces 
pays présentaient un degré élevé de spécialisation, proposant peu de 
produits à l’exportation et faisant face à une demande inélastique� Nul 
doute que l’analyse de Triffin était imprégnée de sa formation dans le 
domaine de la théorie de la concurrence imparfaite� Comme il l’affirmait, 
«  cette situation rappelle le cas de la concurrence oligopolistique dans 
laquelle aucun vendeur n’est généralement en mesure de tirer bien 
longtemps profit d’une politique de réduction des prix » (trad� de Triffin, 
1944 : 112)�
2. Triffin et le système monétaire international
Durant cette période passée à la Réserve fédérale, Triffin a également 
commencé à s’intéresser au processus d’ajustement international� Il a écrit 
un premier et important essai sur le système monétaire international, 
intitulé «  National central banking and the international economy  » 
(« Les banques centrales nationales et l’économie internationale ») (trad� 
de Triffin, 1947)� 
Paolo Baffi, ancien gouverneur de la Banque d’Italie, a longuement 
évoqué cet article� Il faisait remarquer que Triffin était le premier 
économiste à insister sur la contradiction fondamentale entre la stabilité 
du système monétaire international et la souveraineté nationale en 
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matière de prise de décisions économiques, « Triffin a été le tout 
premier à souligner que les épisodes récurrents de crise et de trouble qui 
entachent les relations économiques extérieures résultent d’un dilemme 
fondamental entre la souveraineté nationale qui préside aux décisions 
de politique économique et la dose d’incompatibilité internationale 
inhérente à de telles “décisions atomistiques” » (trad� de Baffi, 1988 : 16 ; 
voir également Montani, 1989)�
L’objectif de l’article de Triffin était d’examiner la manière de concilier 
les politiques monétaires nationales avec les conditions préalables à 
l’équilibre international� Cette question ne se posait pas à l’époque de 
l’étalon-or puisque la masse monétaire nationale échappait au contrôle 
des autorités nationales� Cependant, dans la nouvelle configuration du 
monde de l’entre-deux-guerres, cette option n’était plus à l’ordre du jour, 
vu que les pays étaient désormais nettement plus attachés aux objectifs 
de politique économique nationaux�
Triffin a par ailleurs soulevé la question de savoir si le système monétaire 
international de l’entre-deux-guerres reposait sur l’étalon-or ou sur 
l’étalon de change-sterling� À son estime, dans la mesure où la Grande-
Bretagne constituait le principal centre commercial et financier du 
monde, toute modification du taux d’escompte britannique exerçait une 
incidence significative sur les mouvements de capitaux� Par conséquent, la 
politique d’escompte britannique influençait immédiatement l’économie 
et les prix non seulement en Grande-Bretagne mais aussi dans d’autres 
pays, répercutant ainsi les fluctuations conjoncturelles britanniques� 
Une politique monétaire restrictive en Grande-Bretagne entraînerait 
donc une amélioration des termes de l’échange et de la balance des 
paiements britanniques, les prix à l’étranger étant plus touchés que les 
prix britanniques� Le principal résultat de l’orthodoxie de l’étalon-or 
a été d’étendre au monde entier les perturbations conjoncturelles qui 
naissaient dans les grandes nations industrialisées� Eichengreen (1992) a 
baptisé ce phénomène l’« effet Triffin »� 
Pour Triffin, les conclusions à tirer sur le plan des politiques à adopter 
étaient importantes  : il fallait suivre le plus scrupuleusement possible 
des politiques compensatoires� Cela plaçait la liquidité internationale au 
cœur du système monétaire mondial� Triffin avait établi un classement 
des instruments de politique, préférant les contrôles de change à la 
dévaluation� «  Si les réserves s’avèrent insuffisantes, il faut recourir à 
l’assistance étrangère ou internationale – telle celle envisagée sous l’égide 
du Fonds monétaire international� Sinon, il faut se servir du contrôle 
des changes comme troisième ligne de défense, afin de poursuivre 
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des politiques compensatoires et d’éviter les pires maux inhérents à la 
déflation ou à la dévaluation de la monnaie » (trad� de Triffin, 1947 : 80)�
En 1960, Triffin a publié L’or et la crise du dollar, l’ouvrage qui lui a 
valu sa notoriété� Dans le droit fil de ses écrits précédents, il s’y intéressait 
à la liquidité internationale et à la vulnérabilité du système monétaire 
international� Triffin a souligné la fragilité du système de l’étalon de 
change-or, mettant en exergue la contradiction d’un étalon de change 
« dont le fonctionnement dépend de plus en plus d’un nombre limité 
de devises nationales qui constituent les composantes fondamentales des 
réserves monétaires internationales » (Triffin, 1962 : 21)�
Triffin distinguait deux  catégories de déficits de la balance des 
paiements à financer par les réserves internationales : premièrement, des 
déficits temporaires et, deuxièmement, des déséquilibres plus profonds, 
dont la correction prendrait un certain temps (Triffin, 1962 : 37)� Pour 
une personne très affectée par l’expérience des années 1930, l’alternative 
n’augurait rien de bon  : « Dans les deux cas, un niveau insuffisant de 
réserves forcera le pays déficitaire à recourir à des mesures qui n’auraient 
pas été indispensables, telles que déflation, dévaluation ou restrictions » 
(Triffin, 1962 : 37-38)�
Triffin a avancé que les besoins mondiaux de liquidités étaient de plus 
en plus souvent couverts par l’accroissement des réserves de change, en 
particulier les « balances-dollars », ce qui le préoccupait fortement� Cela lui 
rappelait la période d’entre-deux-guerres et l’épisode de l’étalon-sterling� 
Pour Triffin, il s’agissait d’une construction particulièrement fragile, 
les fonds pouvant entrer et sortir sous l’effet de changements dans les 
rapports entre taux d’intérêt et/ou dans les perspectives d’évolution des 
taux de change� En outre, le retour à l’or au taux d’avant-guerre fragilisait 
sérieusement la livre sterling� La dévaluation de la livre sterling en 
septembre 1931 avait eu des conséquences dévastatrices pour le système 
monétaire mondial et les liquidités internationales� Elle avait sonné 
le glas de l’étalon de change-sterling et provoqué une implosion de la 
liquidité à l’échelle mondiale� « La conversion de livre sterling en or et 
en dollars avait été accompagnée puis suivie de conversions similaires de 
dollars en or� Les devises composant les réserves monétaires mondiales 
avaient pratiquement disparu dans l’opération » (Triffin, 1960 : 57)� La 
chute de la liquidité monétaire internationale avait contribué à la Grande 
Dépression�
À la fin des années 1950, Triffin a témoigné une inquiétude croissante 
concernant la situation des réserves internationales des États-Unis en 
raison des pertes d’or subies par ce pays et de la hausse des engagements en 
dollars� Selon lui, la détérioration continuelle de la situation des réserves 
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nettes du pays allait saper la confiance des étrangers dans le dollar, en 
tant que moyen d’accumulation de réserves� Aux yeux de Triffin, la 
conclusion à tirer de la liquidité internationale était claire : « On ne peut 
donc pas compter sur des accroissements ultérieurs des balances dollars 
pour contribuer d’une façon substantielle et indéfinie à la solution du 
problème mondial que pose le défaut de liquidité » (Triffin, 1962 : 71)�
Dès lors, Triffin estimait que l’étalon-or n’était pas tenable, ce qui a 
conduit à son célèbre dilemme : 
«  L’étalon de change or peut aider […] à faire face à une pénurie des 
réserves monétaires mondiales� Il n’agit ainsi que dans la mesure où les 
pays à devise clef consentent à laisser la situation nette de leurs réserves se 
détériorer par des accroissements de dettes à court terme non compensés 
par des accroissements de leurs réserves brutes� S’ils laissent ceci se passer 
et se poursuivre, ils tendent toutefois à amener un effondrement du système 
lui-même par l’affaiblissement progressif de la confiance des étrangers dans 
les devises clefs » (Triffin, 1962 : 76)�
Triffin, comme Keynes, s’est donc attelé à la recherche d’une solution 
plus « internationale » au problème de la liquidité mondiale, « une véritable 
“internationalisation” des devises composant les réserves internationales 
mondiales, protégeant ainsi le système monétaire international de 
l’instabilité résultant de déplacements arbitraires d’une devise vers une 
autre, ou d’une devise vers l’or »�
3. Triffin et l’intégration monétaire européenne
De toute évidence, Triffin a été un fédéraliste européen convaincu� 
Il a fait connaissance avec Jean Monnet en  1948 et est devenu très 
actif au sein du Comité d’action pour les États-Unis d’Europe, fondé 
par Monnet� Triffin (2010 : 95) raconte qu’initialement, Monnet et lui 
n’étaient pas d’accord sur la tactique à adopter en vue de la poursuite 
de l’intégration monétaire européenne : «  Mes premiers  contacts avec 
Jean Monnet remontent à  1948 et furent marqués par un désaccord 
total sur la tactique à suivre pour promouvoir le but ultime sur lequel je 
partageais son enthousiasme  : le parachèvement de l’Union monétaire 
européenne comme élément essentiel de son union politique dans ce qu’il 
appelait les États-Unis d’Europe� Je négociais alors à l’OECE mon projet 
d’Union européenne des paiements (UEP) […] accepté intégralement en 
septembre 1950 contre l’opposition forcenée du département du Trésor 
des États-Unis »� Mais Monnet était sceptique vis-à-vis du projet d’UEP, 
«  jugé beaucoup trop modeste et insuffisant »� Néanmoins, constatant 
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le succès de l’UEP, Monnet est devenu un ardent partisan du Fonds de 
réserve européen : 
« Le succès de l’UEP dépassa rapidement toutes les espérances et balaya le 
scepticisme initial de Jean Monnet et les objections de nombreux autres 
économistes et dirigeants financiers et politiques� C’est avec conviction et 
enthousiasme que Monnet appuya en 1957 mes propositions de développer 
l’UEP en un Fonds de réserve européen auprès duquel les banques centrales 
de pays de la Communauté détiendraient en une monnaie commune, 
baptisée écu, une proportion grandissante de leurs réserves d’or et de 
devises� »
Dans le prolongement de sa collaboration avec Jean Monnet, 
Triffin s’est également engagé dans le Mouvement fédéraliste européen 
(cf� Montani, 2015 pour la participation de Triffin à ses activités en Italie)�
3.1 L’Union européenne des paiements (UEP)
En instaurant le Plan Marshall, proposé en juin 1947, le gouvernement 
américain a reconnu la nécessité d’une approche de la reconstruction 
économique en Europe fondée sur un retour aux échanges sur une base 
multilatérale� En tant que membre de l’administration (américaine) du 
programme de reconstruction européenne, Triffin a influé sur la création 
de la dimension monétaire du Plan  Marshall, inscrite dans l’UEP� 
Eichengreen (trad� de 1993 : IX) décrit même Triffin comme l’« architecte 
de l’UEP »�
Selon Triffin, le processus de réintégration de l’Europe dans 
l’économie internationale ne pouvait être que progressif et recourir à 
la « multilatéralisation des échanges et des paiements », en opposition 
flagrante aux «  techniques bilatérales et discriminatoires  » toujours 
utilisées à la fin des années 1940 (Péters, 2001)� Si Triffin a admis la 
nécessité d’imposer des restrictions sur les transferts commerciaux 
et monétaires, il a également souligné que les restrictions bilatérales 
étaient de loin les plus néfastes et qu’elles devaient être traitées en 
priorité (Maes et Pasotti, 2017)�
Triffin a par ailleurs mis en exergue qu’il convenait de considérer 
la libéralisation des échanges dans sa pleine dimension économique, 
administrative et politique : 
« Des engagements mutuels, portant sur un vaste domaine de la politique 
économique, sont indispensables à la réussite et à la consolidation des 
mesures de libéralisation des échanges […] Nous assistons actuellement au 
développement progressif de zones transfrontalières de libre-échange – ou, du 
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moins, d’échange plus libre –, qui s’appuie sur des engagements réciproques 
relevant de différents degrés de souveraineté économique nationale�  » En 
outre, Triffin a insisté sur les avantages d’une approche régionale : «  J’ai 
bien plus confiance dans le maintien des considérations pratiques quant 
aux intérêts nationaux de chaque participant et à la faisabilité de la mise en 
œuvre administrative et politique que dans les accords universels basés sur 
des idéologies économiques abstraites et extrêmement difficiles à négocier 
et à gérer effectivement dans la pratique� L’intégration économique est 
un processus de croissance qu’un aménagement global et prématuré peut 
facilement étouffer au lieu d’accélérer » (trad� de Triffin, 1954 : 537)�
Par ailleurs, l’idée d’une convertibilité universelle qui avait prévalu 
à Bretton Woods a entravé les progrès dans le domaine monétaire� Le 
FMI s’est vu imposer des objectifs et des instruments qui ne s’accordaient 
qu’avec le long terme� En outre, son mode de fonctionnement s’est avéré 
inadapté pour gérer les transitions et s’attaquer aux problèmes spécifiques 
aux régions�
Toutefois, pour faire fonctionner tant le mécanisme de compensation 
que la multilatéralisation des engagements nets ou des créances nettes, 
l’Union européenne des paiements avait besoin d’une unité monétaire 
(dans laquelle tous les comptes pussent être libellés)� L’accord de l’UEP a 
donné naissance à une unité de compte spécifique à l’UEP, initialement 
définie par une teneur en or équivalente à celle du dollar des États-Unis 
de 1950� Cette teneur en or pouvait être modifiée à tout moment par 
décision du Conseil de l’OECE� Mais la règle de l’unanimité applicable 
aux décisions de l’OECE rendait une telle modification hautement 
improbable : les créanciers auraient toujours intérêt à opposer leur veto à 
une dévaluation, et les débiteurs à opposer leur veto à une appréciation de 
l’unité UEP (Triffin, 1957 : 173)� Il a dès lors été stipulé qu’aucun pays ne 
pouvait opposer son veto à une modification équivalente (ou inférieure) 
à l’appréciation ou à la dépréciation de sa propre monnaie� Cela revenait 
à définir l’unité de compte UEP en fonction de la monnaie des États 
membres qui demeurait la plus stable (par rapport à l’or)�
Dans une note de bas de page de son ouvrage intitulé Europe and the 
Money Muddle, Triffin revendique la paternité de cette formule et signale 
sa pertinence pour l’avenir de l’intégration monétaire européenne  : 
« L’objectif que je poursuivais en proposant et en défendant cette formule 
[…] consistait également à définir une forme de garantie de taux de change 
qui pourrait ultérieurement être utilisée pour encourager la reprise des 
mouvements de capitaux en Europe, et une unité monétaire qui pourrait 
être adoptée dans les futurs accords sur l’intégration économique 
européenne  » (trad� de Triffin, 1957  : 173)� Par la suite, Triffin allait 
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personnellement être associé de manière active à ce processus (voir ci-
dessous)�
Triffin estimait que le système UEP, qui reposait sur un accord 
international, était largement supérieur à l’étalon-or : 
« Il n’y avait jamais eu d’accord entre les pays utilisant l’étalon-or, tandis 
que l’UEP est un système d’engagements simultanés� Cette caractéristique 
essentielle explique pour une bonne part son succès� Il serait extrêmement 
difficile, sinon impossible, d’amener un pays quelconque à renoncer aux 
pratiques restrictives, que ce soit sur le plan monétaire ou commercial, s’il ne 
bénéficiait pas en retour d’une certaine assurance que les autres pays allaient 
faire de même […] Je ne puis m’empêcher de penser, par conséquent, que 
ce système d’engagements réciproques et simultanés est très prometteur » 
(trad� de Triffin, 1954)�
3.2  Le bilan du Traité de Rome aux yeux de Triffin
Au milieu des années  1950, les six «  pays Schuman  » qui avaient 
présidé à la création de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de 
l’acier ont suivi deux chemins assez différents sur la voie de l’intégration 
économique� Les six ont opté pour l’intégration régionale des marchés 
des biens, avec la création de la Communauté économique européenne 
(CEE)� Mais la coopération monétaire a quant à elle été considérée 
d’un point de vue planétaire, avec le rétablissement de la convertibilité 
externe totale dans le cadre du système de Bretton Woods (Abraham et 
Lemineur-Toumson, 1981)�
Le traité CEE était de facto d’ordre constitutionnel et allait transformer 
les règles économiques et juridiques dans les pays de la Communauté 
européenne� Mais il laissait les décisions macroéconomiques et monétaires 
entre les mains des différents États membres� Les responsabilités de la 
Commission portaient principalement sur l’orientation et la coordination 
des politiques nationales� Triffin (1958 : 1) a décrit à l’époque la dimension 
monétaire limitée du traité CEE comme « un Hamlet dans lequel le rôle 
du prince du Danemark est presque totalement ignoré »�
Les dispositions concernant les questions macroéconomiques et 
monétaires se trouvent, dans le Traité de Rome, au chapitre consacré à la 
« balance des paiements »� Il en ressort que les thèmes macroéconomiques 
et monétaires étaient abordés sous l’angle du «  marché commun  », 
au motif que d’éventuels déséquilibres dans la balance des paiements 
menaceraient la création et le fonctionnement du marché commun (Maes, 
2006)� Conformément à l’article  104 du traité, chaque État membre 
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« pratique la politique économique nécessaire en vue d’assurer l’équilibre 
de sa balance globale des paiements et de maintenir la confiance dans sa 
monnaie, tout en veillant à assurer un haut degré d’emploi et la stabilité 
du niveau des prix  »� Cette disposition reflétait très bien l’approche 
que défendait l’Allemagne quand elle préconisait de « mettre sa propre 
maison en ordre »�
L’article 108 du traité portait sur la situation d’un État membre en 
proie à de graves déséquilibres de sa balance des paiements susceptibles 
de menacer le fonctionnement du marché commun� Il prévoyait que la 
Commission devait procéder à un examen de la situation et l’autorisait 
à recommander des mesures à prendre par l’État membre� En outre, 
l’article prévoyait la possibilité d’accorder le « concours mutuel »�
Après la création de la Communauté économique européenne, 
le 1er  janvier  1958, Robert Triffin est devenu conseiller officiel à la 
Commission� Il a entretenu des liens très étroits avec le vice-président 
Marjolin, chargé des affaires économiques et financières� Ils s’étaient 
rencontrés pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, à l’époque où ils 
étaient tous deux à Washington� Ils avaient par ailleurs été à Paris 
ensemble au début des années  1950, lorsque Marjolin inaugurait le 
poste de secrétaire général de l’Organisation européenne de coopération 
économique (OECE) et que Triffin était à la tête du bureau européen 
du FMI� Lorsque Triffin venait à Bruxelles, les deux hommes restaient 
généralement jusqu’aux petites heures à discourir de l’Europe et des 
problèmes monétaires mondiaux�
Les relations entre Robert Triffin et Raymond Barre, qui avait succédé 
à Marjolin en 1967, étaient nettement moins étroites� Barre avait une 
approche beaucoup plus « pragmatique » et « réaliste », en porte-à-faux 
avec la vision plus « utopique » qu’avait Triffin de l’intégration monétaire 
européenne� Plus tard, lorsque la présidence de la Commission est 
revenue, en  1977, à Roy Jenkins, lui aussi plus «  monétariste  » et 
volontariste, Triffin a repris de l’importance� Jenkins souligne dans ses 
mémoires sur le volet européen de sa carrière (trad� de European Diary, 
1989 : 296) que Triffin « nous a été grandement utile dans le cadre du 
lancement du SME »�
Au sein de la DG II, la direction générale des affaires économiques 
et financières, Triffin était très proche de Frédéric Boyer de la Giroday, 
directeur des affaires monétaires� Ils s’étaient côtoyés comme collègues 
au FMI à la fin des années 1940 et œuvraient tous deux activement en 
faveur de l’intégration monétaire européenne� Dans une lettre à Triffin, 
Boyer reconnaît ses dettes à l’égard du « Triffin Treasury of smart ideas » 
(lettre de Boyer à Triffin, 2 août 1967, RTA, 8557)�
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3.3 Un Fonds de réserve européen
Dans la seconde moitié des années 1950, Monnet a commencé 
à s’intéresser de près à l’intégration monétaire européenne� C’était 
également une conséquence de la crise financière française de l’époque, 
qui menaçait la participation de la France au projet de marché commun� 
Fidèle à lui-même, Monnet a placé le problème français dans un contexte 
européen et s’est tourné vers son réseau de connaissances pour recueillir 
des conseils d’ordre technique� Les réponses lui sont venues de Uri, de 
Delouvrier, de Marjolin, et, « surtout », de « l’ami belge de Marjolin » 
(trad� de Duchêne, 1994)�
La situation macro-économique et monétaire de la France 
préoccupait aussi sérieusement la Commission européenne, l’amenant à 
réfléchir à la manière dont elle pourrait remplir son rôle dans le domaine 
macroéconomique et monétaire (Maes et Buyst, 2004)� En étroite 
collaboration avec Triffin, Marjolin a élaboré une proposition visant à 
mettre en place un Fonds de réserve européen� Ce projet de Fonds de 
réserve européen allait devenir l’un des grands sujets d’analyse de Robert 
Triffin au cours de sa carrière de conseiller à la Commission européenne�
Triffin critiquait sévèrement la portée limitée de l’Accord monétaire 
européen (AME) signé en 1955� Dans le cadre de l’AME, un Fonds 
européen avait été créé qui donnait aux membres de l’AME l’accès à des 
facilités de crédit non automatiques en cas de difficultés temporaires dans 
l’équilibre de la balance des paiements� De l’avis de Triffin, les dispositions 
de l’AME, qui allaient devenir opérationnelles après la dissolution de 
l’Union européenne de paiements, n’étaient pas assez ambitieuses� 
Il préconisait de tirer parti de la prochaine révision de l’UEP pour 
transformer l’Union des paiements en une chambre de compensation 
pour l’ensemble des banques centrales européennes, et de requérir de ces 
dernières de détenir toutes leurs réserves monétaires européennes – voire 
une partie déterminée de l’ensemble de leur réserves d’or et de devises – 
sous la forme de dépôts auprès de l’UEP » (trad� de Triffin, 1957 : 285)� 
Cette chambre de compensation européenne utiliserait ces réserves 
pour intervenir sur les marchés de changes internationaux, réalisant 
ainsi de manière plus ou moins équivalente les opérations d’open market 
habituellement effectuées par les banques centrales nationales sur leurs 
marchés domestiques (Triffin, 1957  : 292)� Cela préparerait le Fonds 
de réserve européen à se muer naturellement en «  Autorité monétaire 
européenne » : 
« Tous les paiements entre banques centrales, au sein de la Communauté, 
s’opéreraient par simple transfert obligatoire sur le compte de dépôt 
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que chaque banque centrale serait tenue de détenir auprès du Fonds de 
réserve européen� La constitution de ces dépôts doterait le Fonds d’une 
vaste «  masse de manœuvre  » qui pourrait être utilisée pour assurer le 
financement du concours mutuel prévu par le traité de Rome, pour orienter 
l’évolution de la politique monétaire globale de la Communauté et pour 
ouvrir progressivement la voie, sur le plan tant pratique que fonctionnel, à la 
création d’une autorité monétaire européenne capable de « mener le navire » 
et d’assurer en fin de compte l’intégration monétaire complète entre les six 
pays de la Communauté » (Triffin, 1958 : 9)�
Le Fonds de réserve européen pourrait ainsi être constitué en mettant 
en commun 10 à 20 % des réserves internationales des banques centrales 
des États membres (une proposition qui allait forcément s’attirer les 
foudres des banquiers centraux)� Le Fonds pourrait accorder différents 
types de prêts, tant pour assister les pays confrontés à des difficultés 
en matière de balance des paiements que pour soutenir la croissance 
économique� Triffin (1989 : 9) prétendait même que le Fonds pourrait 
jouer un rôle utile lors des crises bancaires�
Cette idée selon laquelle la Communauté devrait disposer de 
ressources permettant de faciliter la solidarité financière allait devenir 
un thème récurrent des propositions de la Commission� On observe ici 
une certaine ressemblance avec le mécanisme européen de stabilité� L’un 
des principes de base en est que de tels mécanismes, par l’adoption d’une 
orientation commune, constituent une manière plus efficace d’éviter la 
spéculation que des mesures nationales isolées� Ils permettent également 
d’offrir des «  carottes  » aux pays qui ont dû adapter leurs politiques, 
accroissant ainsi l’influence des recommandations de la Commission�
Triffin préconisait par ailleurs d’introduire une unité de compte 
européenne  : « Les comptes de dépôt du Fonds Européen […] seraient 
libellés en une unité de compte européenne, définie de manière à lui assurer 
une stabilité égale à celle de la plus stable des monnaies participantes » 
(Triffin, 1958 : 10)� Dans une note de bas de page, il faisait de nouveau 
référence à l’exemple de l’Union européenne des paiements : « La définition 
légale d’une telle unité de compte serait similaire à la formule employée 
pour la définition de l’actuelle unité de compte U�E�P� »�
Comme on l’a dit plus haut, Triffin établissait un lien très étroit entre 
ses propositions de système monétaire international et l’intégration 
monétaire européenne� Il était convaincu que l’intégration monétaire 
régionale contribuerait à une plus grande stabilité du SMI� De son 
point de vue, le Fonds de réserve européen permettrait également de 
renforcer le système monétaire international : 
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«  Le double mécanisme de compensation et de crédits d’un Fonds 
Européen de Réserve contribuerait d’autre part à la solution d’un problème 
paradoxalement négligé ou même ignoré aujourd’hui  […]  :  celui de la 
liquidité nécessaire au fonctionnement satisfaisant du système monétaire 
international lui-même » (Triffin, 1958 : 12)�
La Commission européenne a discuté du projet de Fonds de réserve 
européen en sa séance du 20  novembre  1958� Elle a donné son accord 
de principe sur le projet, mais a reporté le débat sur la mise en œuvre 
à une réunion ultérieure (Minutes de la réunion de la Commission du 
20  novembre, COM(58) PV  38, partie secrète, CECA)� Triffin a par 
ailleurs activement défendu cette idée à Paris (Triffin, 1958)� Mais en 
décembre 1958, De Gaulle a dévalué le franc français et a instauré des 
mesures de politique économique orthodoxe� Les pays participant à 
l’Union européenne des paiements ont rétabli la convertibilité externe de 
leurs monnaies dans le cadre du système de Bretton Woods� La proposition 
de créer un Fonds de réserve européen a dès lors perdu sa raison d’être 
(même si Monnet a tenté de la relancer au début des années 1960)�
L’idée a été remise à l’ordre du jour en 1969, lorsque Willy Brandt a été 
élu chancelier� Brandt était membre du Comité d’action pour les États-
Unis d’Europe de Jean Monnet, qu’il a consulté en vue de se préparer 
pour le sommet de La Haye� Monnet a fait appel à Robert Triffin, qui a 
rédigé une nouvelle proposition de Fonds de réserve européen (Monnet, 
1976 : 610)� Le sommet de La Haye de décembre 1969 s’est clôturé sur 
un accord selon lequel «  au sein du Conseil, un plan par étapes sera 
élaboré au cours de l’année  1970 en vue de la création d’une union 
économique et monétaire »� Le communiqué précisait que les chefs d’État 
ou de gouvernement étaient « convenus de faire examiner la possibilité 
d’instituer un Fonds de réserve européen auquel devrait aboutir une 
politique économique et monétaire commune »� Le sommet de La Haye 
a marqué une rupture fondamentale dans le processus d’intégration 
européenne, l’UEM figurant désormais officiellement à l’ordre du jour�
3.4 Une monnaie européenne
L’approche « monétariste » adoptée par Triffin en matière d’intégration 
monétaire européenne apparaît clairement dans son plaidoyer pour la 
création d’une monnaie européenne et dans ses propositions de faire de cette 
monnaie européenne une monnaie parallèle, qui circulerait aux côtés des 
monnaies nationales existantes, à la fois dans les circuits monétaires officiels 
(par exemple entre banques centrales) et dans les circuits commerciaux 
(par exemple sur les marchés obligataires)� Il est en outre remarquable que 
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Triffin soit intervenu non seulement dans le secteur officiel (par exemple 
en qualité de conseiller auprès de la Commission européenne), mais 
également dans le secteur privé (par exemple en tant qu’administrateur 
de la Kredietbank Luxembourgeoise, qui était la principale banque sur 
le marché des obligations libellées dans l’unité de compte européenne, 
notamment grâce aux conseils de Triffin)�
Comme on l’a déjà évoqué, la création d’une unité monétaire 
européenne était au cœur des propositions de Triffin, à la fois pour 
l’Union européenne des paiements et pour un Fonds de réserve européen� 
L’effondrement du système de Bretton Woods au début des années 1970 
allait donner un nouvel élan à ses idées� Triffin préconisait d’agir à deux 
niveaux, à la fois à l’échelle mondiale et à l’échelon européen� Sur le plan 
mondial, il recommandait de créer un étalon international inspiré des 
DTS, d’instaurer des règles d’ajustement plus symétriques et de mettre 
en place un système permettant de recycler les excédents�
Pour Triffin, le SME, créé en mars  1979, était un aspect essentiel 
d’un SMI réformé, plutôt qu’une stratégie isolée, ou même en opposition 
au dollar (Bussière et Feiertag, 2012)� L’écu nouvellement créé devait 
être l’instrument qui servirait à la coopération entre les monnaies 
européennes, et il jouerait un rôle plus étendu sur le plan régional� À 
l’échelle mondiale, il émergerait un système décentralisé au sein duquel 
l’écu jouerait son rôle aux côtés du dollar, et cela deviendrait un système 
adapté à un «  monde hétérogène et diversifié  »� Triffin a contribué à 
promouvoir son modèle en organisant des conférences rassemblant des 
universitaires, des praticiens et des représentants officiels� En juin 1981, 
une conférence organisée à Louvain-la-Neuve a réuni des représentants 
de la Commission européenne, de la Banque nationale de Belgique et 
des secteurs bancaire et de l’assurance, qui ont esquissé les grandes lignes 
d’un programme d’élargissement des utilisations de l’écu par les acteurs 
de l’économie (RTA, 17�2, Séminaire international sur les utilisations 
privées de l’Ecu, Louvain, 13-14 juin, CR)�
Le report de la création d’un Fonds monétaire européen (la phase 
dite institutionnelle du SME), à la fin de 1980, a été un moment 
déterminant� Triffin a défini les objectifs et les voies à suivre : instauration 
de l’écu comme monnaie parallèle pour les pays de la Communauté 
européenne, utilisation par le secteur privé en tant qu’alternative 
au marché des eurodevises, des dispositifs de soutien monétaires et 
financiers, multilatéralisation des accords de swap avec les États-Unis et 
dénomination en écu, et l’association du Fonds monétaire européen aux 
interventions intramarginales sur les marchés des changes (nombre de 
ces idées ont également été développées par la Commission européenne, 
Robert Triffin et le processus d’intégration monétaire européenne  53
et en particulier par Padoa-Schioppa, qui était alors directeur général 
pour les Affaires économiques et financières)� 
Dès les années 1950, Triffin avait promu l’idée d’utiliser l’unité 
de compte de l’Union européenne des paiements pour les émissions 
d’obligations sur les marchés financiers� Cette idée a été reprise par la 
Kredietbank en 1961, sous l’impulsion de Triffin qui a été directeur de 
la Kredietbank Luxembourg de  1961 à  1988� Comme l’a observé De 
Beckker : 
«  La première émission en unités de compte européennes (UCE) peut 
facilement prétendre à être considérée comme la toute première émission 
d’obligations, précédant ce qui est conventionnellement considéré comme 
la première émission par Autostrade en 1963� Si l’on considère la définition 
généralement acceptée d’une émission d’une euro-obligation, c’est-à-dire 
une émission souscrite et placée par un syndicat international de banques 
et libellée dans une devise qui n’est pas la devise de l’emprunteur, alors la 
première émission d’euro-obligations a été lancée en 1961 par la Kredietbank 
SA luxembourgeoise pour l’emprunteur portugais SACOR »� (trad� de De 
Beckker, 1984 : 129)� 
Après la création du SME, Triffin a été très actif dans la promotion 
de l’Écu commercial� En juin  1980, Triffin a organisé une conférence 
sur «  l’utilisation privée de l’écu  » pour les participants aux marchés 
commerciaux (Triffin et Swings, 1980)� Alfonso Iozzo (2012 : 137), qui 
a assisté à la conférence, l’a qualifiée de «  serment solennel  »� Après la 
réunion, de nombreuses initiatives ont été prises, de l’ouverture de comptes 
courants libellés en Écus à l’émission de chèques de voyage� Dans deux 
secteurs en particulier, les opérations en Écus ont fait un bond prodigieux : 
a) l’émission d’obligations, d’abord de banques et de sociétés, ensuite 
d’États, en particulier l’Italie; et b)  l’établissement d’un système de 
compensation quotidienne� Triffin a également joué un rôle actif dans le 
développement du système de compensation en Écus� Padoa-Schioppa 
(1987) nous raconte comment, lorsqu’il était directeur général à la DG II à 
la Commission, « incité par Robert Triffin et Paul Caron, j’ai convoqué en 
février 1982 les banques qui opéraient alors sur le marché de l’Écu et les ai 
invitées à mettre sur pied un groupe d’études pour la création d’un système 
de compensation multilatéral »�
Le succès de l’Écu privé a créé une dynamique pour d’autres 
initiatives en matière de politiques à adopter� Comme le soutient Iozzo : 
« parallèlement au flux d’obligations en Écus émises en volumes croissants 
qui avaient atteint des parts importantes du marché mondial et étaient 
«  officiellement  » enregistrées dans les statistiques internationales, les 
promoteurs du Système monétaire européen, l’ancien Président français 
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Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et l’ancien chancelier allemand Helmut 
Schmidt, ont repris l’initiative en 1986 en mettant sur pied le « Comité 
pour l’Union monétaire européenne  », qui comprenait des hommes 
politiques importants, des industriels et des représentants du secteur 
financier des principaux pays européens�  » (trad� d’Iozzo, 2012  : 138)� 
Néanmoins, sous l’influence de Renaud de la Genière, ancien gouverneur 
de la Banque de France, ils ont rejeté l’approche d’une monnaie parallèle, 
comme le ferait ultérieurement le Comité Delors�
4. Conclusion
Triffin a été l’une des personnalités dominantes des débats monétaires 
internationaux durant la période d’après-guerre� Ses analyses étaient 
basées non seulement sur une large compréhension théorique et historique 
du système monétaire international mais également sur des observations 
empiriques avisées de la situation économique et financière� 
Triffin a été l’un des principaux critiques de l’approche de « la maison 
en ordre » (house in order) du système monétaire international� Comme le 
fait observer Baffi, « les propositions de Triffin sont basées sur la conviction 
profonde que « garder sa maison bien en ordre » sans remplir les obligations 
complémentaires à l’échelon international n’est pas une condition suffisante 
pour garantir la stabilité monétaire » (trad� de Baffi, 1988 : 16)� Aux yeux 
de Triffin, un système monétaire international soutenable dépendrait 
également d’une fourniture appropriée de liquidité internationale, pour 
financer les déséquilibres temporaires, et d’une coordination de la politique 
économique� 
Dans les débats sur l’intégration monétaire européenne, Triffin était 
certainement un « utopiste », développant des propositions de politique 
qui étaient souvent trop ambitieuses au regard des réalités économiques 
et politiques� C’était certainement l’une de ses faiblesses, et cela lui a fait 
perdre de l’influence sur des responsables plus pragmatiques� Néanmoins, 
avec ses propositions plus « utopistes », comme celles de l’Écu comme 
monnaie parallèle, il a façonné les débats sur l’intégration monétaire 
européenne, préparant les esprits à l’introduction de l’euro� De plus, 
le mécanisme de stabilité européen récemment créé présente une série 
de similarités par rapport aux propositions de Triffin sur un Fonds de 
réserve européen� Mais, comme Triffin assimilait largement l’UEM à un 
système de taux de change stables, il n’accordait pas beaucoup d’attention 
aux conditions (économiques et politiques) préalables pour une UEM 
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soutenable, et il a largement sous-estimé les interdépendances complexes 
qu’une telle union allait faire naître� 
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Le Plan Werner et la découverte  
de l’Europe monétaire
Andreas Wilkens
Le Plan Werner représente la première tentative cohérente des pays 
de la Communauté européenne pour tracer le chemin vers une « Union 
économique et monétaire » (UEM)� L’initiative ne surgit pas au hasard, 
en ce moment historique au début des années 1970� On sait que les 
réflexions et les travaux pratiques sur une meilleure coordination en 
matière monétaire remontent plus loin dans le temps et prennent une 
forme systématique à partir de l’année 1968� La faiblesse du Dollar, le 
déclin du système de Bretton Woods, l’achèvement du Marché commun, 
les tensions déjà sensibles entre les monnaies européennes – tous ces 
facteurs favorisent, vers la fin des années 1960, les initiatives en vue d’une 
meilleure coopération monétaire au niveau de l’Europe des Six�
La spectaculaire crise monétaire de l’automne 1968 renforce la prise 
de conscience plus large et plus profonde des défis désormais posés� Les 
économies européennes évoluaient selon des rythmes fort différents  : 
reprise vigoureuse en Allemagne fédérale, crises économiques et 
monétaires en France et en Grande-Bretagne� Des dollars commençaient 
à inonder les marchés de devises, des mouvements spéculatifs d’une 
ampleur jusqu’alors inconnue accentuaient les déséquilibres� Dans ce 
désordre croissant, la plupart des gouvernements européens et américain 
demandaient une forte réévaluation du mark ce qui était catégoriquement 
refusé par le gouvernement allemand1� L’échec éclatant de la conférence 
du « groupe des Dix », en novembre 1968, agit ainsi comme révélateur : à 
l’évidence, une meilleure concertation entre les politiques monétaires était 
nécessaire afin de pouvoir mettre en place les mécanismes manifestement 
indispensables�
À regarder de près, le sujet monétaire fut abordé sous divers angles, 
tout au long de l’année 1968� Il en est ainsi, par exemple, de l’« initiative 
européenne » présentée par Bonn, au Conseil des ministres à Bruxelles, 
1 Wilkens, Andreas, «  L’Europe et sa première crise monétaire� Bonn et Paris en 
novembre 1968  », Journal of European Integration History / Revue d’Histoire de 
l’ intégration européenne 18 (2012), 2, p� 221-243�
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au mois de septembre 1968� À cette occasion très précoce, un premier 
projet du ministère allemand de l’Économie trace les grandes lignes d’une 
évolution vers une Union économique et monétaire� L’esquisse, déjà, ne 
laisse aucun doute sur la nécessité d’une « harmonisation » des politiques 
économiques des pays européens, préalable à toute harmonisation 
ultérieure de la politique monétaire2� La fixation d’objectifs concrets en 
matière de croissance et de stabilité des prix devait, par la suite, permettre 
le passage à une «  politique commune  », comprenant la libéralisation 
des mouvement des capitaux et l’élimination progressive des marges de 
fluctuation� À Bruxelles, cette initiative fut rapidement mise de côté3�
Quelques mois plus tard, le plan présenté par le vice-président de la 
Commission européenne, Raymond Barre, en février 1969, était – somme 
toute – assez proche des conceptions allemandes4� Selon les termes du Plan 
Barre, le renforcement de la coordination des politiques économiques 
était le préalable de la mise en œuvre d’un mécanisme communautaire de 
coopération monétaire� Devant le Parlement européen, dès octobre 1968, 
Raymond Barre avait ainsi affirmé qu’une union monétaire ne pourrait 
être conçue que comme le « couronnement » de l’union économique5� 
Cette expression était désormais une référence, elle correspondait 
largement à la vision allemande�
Toutefois, certains représentants de la Bundesbank s’interrogeaient 
avec scepticisme sur la possibilité d’attendre des partenaires européens 
qu’ils reprennent à leur compte « nos propres conceptions de stabilité »6� 
Dans les discussions en cours, au sein du « comité monétaire », Français, 
Allemands, Italiens, Belges avaient déjà pu mesurer combien leurs idées 
sur les avantages d’une monnaie commune stable n’étaient pas toujours 
exactement les mêmes�
2 Ministère de l’Économie, « Aufzeichnung zur deutsch-französischen Konsultation 
am 27� September 1968 », 24 septembre 1968, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (par la suite : 
BArchK), B 102 (ministère de l’Économie), Vol� 51042�
3 Compte rendu de la réunion du Conseil par le représentant allemand Sachs, 
27 septembre 1968, Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(par la suite : AAPD), 1968, doc� n° 315�
4 Cf� les propos de Schiller au Conseil des Communautés européennes (Conseil de la 
politique conjoncturelle), le 12 décembre 1968, compte rendu, Historisches Archiv 
der Deutschen Bundesbank (Francfort ; par la suite : HA Bundesbank), B 330, Vol� 
10851�
5 Discours du 2 octobre 1968, Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, septembre/
octobre 1968, p� 148�
6 Selon les termes d’Otmar Emminger, représentant de la Bundesbank au Comité 
monétaire, « Stichworte zur Aufwertungsfrage », 8 mai 1969, HA Bundesbank, N 2, 
K 578 ; cf� idem, « Bilanz der Währungskrisen », Außenpolitik 20, mars 1969, p� 135-
147�
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Sur un plan général, force est de constater que les réflexions sur 
l’avenir monétaire de l’Europe sont déjà engagées quand la césure 
importante de l’année 1969 accélère le cours des événements : en France, 
Georges Pompidou succède au général de Gaulle, Willy Brandt accède 
à la chancellerie à Bonn et la conférence de La Haye, début décembre 
1969, était destinée à projeter l’Europe dans une nouvelle phase de son 
développement�
Du côté allemand, Brandt entendait faire de ce premier « sommet » 
européen un marqueur important du début de son gouvernement7� Le 
7 novembre 1969, il reçoit Jean Monnet qui l’encourage en particulier 
à prendre l’initiative en matière monétaire8� Brandt s’y montre très 
favorable� Le chancelier retient en particulier l’idée de la mise en place 
d’un fonds monétaire européen susceptible de présenter un certain 
nombre d’avantages : ce serait un moyen pour abréger «  le débat entre 
la poule et l’œuf », à savoir la préséance entre des mesures d’intégration 
monétaire et la convergence des économies nationales9�
Brandt notait aussi qu’un tel fonds monétaire européen aurait 
valeur de symbole sur le plan de la « politique extérieure générale  », 
dans la mesure où le gouvernement allemand « donnerait l’impression 
convaincante que nous sommes prêts – à partir d’une position 
relativement forte – à faire une contribution essentielle  »10� Pour 
discuter de ce projet, Brandt se disait prêt à convoquer une conférence 
dédiée à Bonn, à brève échéance�
Si Jean Monnet enfonçait des portes ouvertes auprès du chancelier, 
d’autres responsables allemands se montraient beaucoup plus prudents� 
Ce fut le cas, en particulier, de l’influent ministre de l’Économie, Karl 
Schiller, mais aussi des services de l’Auswärtiges Amt, sans même parler de 
la Bundesbank� Les mises en garde répétées de Schiller, dès cette époque, 
se dressaient contre toute tentative tendant à réaliser «  la convergence 
économique à travers la politique monétaire »11�
7 Brandt, Willy, Begegnungen und Einsichten. Die Jahre 1960-1975, Hambourg, 
Hoffmann & Campe, 1976, p� 320-322  ; idem, Erinnerungen, Francfort/M�, 
Propyläen, 1989, p� 454� 
8 Compte rendu du 10 novembre 1969 établi par Sanne (chancellerie), BArchK, 
B 136, Vol� 6410�
9 Notes manuscrites de Brandt, 9 novembre 1969, Willy-Brandt-Archiv im Archiv der 
sozialen Demokratie de la Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Bonn), fonds Bundeskanzler, 
Vol� 91�
10 Ibidem�
11 Cit� : note de l’Auswärtiges Amt (III A1-81) à l’attention du chancelier, 6 novembre 
1969, BAK, B 136, Vol� 6410 ; note de Weinstock (chancellerie), 24 novembre 1969, 
« Betr� : Europäischer Reservefonds », BArchK, B 136, Vol� 6410�
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Cependant, Brandt tenait fermement à obtenir des avancées concrètes, 
et il avisa personnellement le Président Georges Pompidou de ce qu’il 
s’apprêtait à proposer la mise en place d’un fonds monétaire européen à 
l’occasion de la conférence de La Haye12�
À la vérité, lors de l’ouverture du sommet, le 1er décembre 1969, 
Brandt fait un exposé assez équilibré en matière monétaire� Il met l’accent 
sur la nécessité de développer « une politique économique commune », 
incluant, entre autre, « un comportement convergent des grands groupes 
sociaux »13� Si le fameux fonds européen de réserve est bien mentionné, il 
se trouve relégué à l’arrière-plan et intégré dans un programme beaucoup 
plus complexe d’une future Union économique et monétaire� Celle-ci, 
par ailleurs, devait avoir les traits – selon la formule empruntée à son 
ministre de l’Économie – d’une « communauté de stabilité ouverte au 
monde » (« eine weltoffene Stabilitätsgemeinschaft »)�
On sait que la conférence de La Haye n’entra pas dans une discussion 
détaillée mais retint, dans son communiqué final (point 8), l’objectif 
de l’élaboration, «  au cours de l’année 1970 », d’un plan en vue de la 
création d’une Union économique et monétaire� Si le principe général fit 
l’unanimité entre les Six, les chemins pour y parvenir restaient à définir� 
Toute la difficulté était d’ores et déjà contenue dans une affirmation 
sèche du communiqué qui précisait, bien dans l’esprit de l’approche 
allemande  : «  Le développement de la coopération monétaire devrait 
s’appuyer sur l’harmonisation des politiques économiques »14�
Au lendemain de la conférence de La Haye, les travaux préparatoires 
s’intensifiaient� Schiller faisait établir, à partir des travaux antérieurs, 
un mémorandum qui devait servir de base de discussion au sein du 
futur Comité Werner15� Les grandes lignes de ce texte du 12 février 
12 Lettre de Brandt à Pompidou, 27 novembre 1969, AAPD 1969, doc� n° 380�
13 Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 2 décembre 1969, 
n° 146, p� 124-126 ; pour le contexte, du point de vue de la politique allemande : 
Wilkens, Andreas, « Dans la logique de l’histoire� Willy Brandt et la césure européenne 
de 1969/70 », in idem (dir�), Willy Brandt et l’unité de l’Europe. De l’objectif de la paix 
aux solidarités nécessaires, Bruxelles, P�I�E� Peter Lang, 2011, p� 247-282�
14 Avec de nombreux documents en lien avec le plan Werner, le communiqué de La 
Haye figure dans le corpus de recherche mis en ligne par le « Centre virtuel de la 
connaissance sur l’Europe » (Luxembourg) : Une relecture du rapport Werner du 
8 octobre 1970 à la lumière des archives familiales Pierre Werner : www�cvce�eu  ; 
pour l’ensemble, cf� aussi Danescu, Elena, Muñoz, Susana (dir�), Pierre Werner et 
l’Europe. Pensée, action, enseignements, Bruxelles, P�I�E� Peter Lang, 2015 ; Danescu, 
Elena, « Le ‘Comité Werner’ : nouvelles archives », Histoire, économie et société 30 
(2011), 4, p� 29-38�
15 «  Memorandum  : Grundlinien eines Stufenplanes zur Verwirklichung der 
Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion in der EWG », 12 février 1970, Politisches Archiv 
Le Plan Werner et la découverte de l’Europe monétaire   63
1970, coordonné avec les autres ministères intéressés et la Bundesbank, 
étaient bien conformes aux conceptions des « économistes » allemands : 
il prévoyait d’abord d’accomplir deux étapes «  d’harmonisation et de 
coordination  » afin d’éliminer les plus grands déséquilibres entre les 
politiques économiques et financières des pays participants� Une fois 
cette condition remplie, les économies européennes devraient converger 
vers des objectifs communs à moyen terme, condition indispensable 
pour procéder ensuite, également en deux temps, à la mise en œuvre 
progressive de mesures d’intégration monétaire, à savoir la réduction 
des marges de fluctuation, l’accord préalable des partenaires à tout 
changement de parité et la mise en place du Fonds européen de réserve� 
Le début de l’étape finale était envisagé pour l’année 1978 !
L’ensemble du processus était donc sujet à caution  : le passage 
d’une étape à l’autre était conditionné par la réalisation effective de 
l’essentiel des mesures prévues à l’échelon précédent� Ce n’était qu’en 
pointillé qu’apparaissait, in fine, la fixation définitive des taux de change, 
voire l’introduction d’une unité monétaire européenne, ainsi que la 
transformation du Comité des gouverneurs en véritable Banque centrale 
européenne qui déciderait à la majorité des voix�
Si le projet reflétait bien la conception monétaire allemande, il avait 
été conçu comme une contribution sérieuse à la politique européenne et 
proposait aux partenaires de parvenir à l’UEM au cours de la décennie� 
Cependant, les deux phases initiales de « convergence » prévues du côté 
allemand semblaient reléguer le rapprochement monétaire proprement 
dit à une échéance relativement lointaine� Or, l’articulation entre 
« l’harmonisation » économique et « solidarité » monétaire constituait la 
question clé de toutes les discussions� S’il était hors de question, pour les 
« économistes » allemands, de prévoir la mise en commun des réserves 
ou un soutien monétaire à moyen terme dès la phase initiale, Schiller ne 
récusait pas, en principe, l’idée du « parallélisme »� Seulement : selon lui, 
il devait s’agir d’un « parallélisme effectif » qui prendrait en compte le 
fait que des mesures d’harmonisation économique mettent du temps à 
produire leurs effets, tandis que des décisions d’ordre monétaire ont un 
effet immédiat16�
des Auswärtigen Amts (Berlin ; par la suite : PAAA), B 20, Vol� 1555 ; le texte a été 
publié à l’époque : Tagesnachrichten du Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 27 février 
1970, n° 6122  ; reproduit in  : Zentralbankrat der Deutschen Bundesbank (éd�), 
Hans Tietmeyer – Währungsstabilität für Europa. Beiträge, Reden und Dokumente 
zur europäischen Währungsintegration aus vier Jahrzehnten, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
1996, p� 88-94�
16 Résumé de la position allemande par Robert (Auswärtiges Amt) 25 février 1970, 
PAAA, B 20, Vol� 1555� Cf� aussi Tietmeyer, Hans, « Europäische Wirtschafts- und 
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La réunion des ministres des Finances des Six à Paris, les 23 et 
24  février 1970, fut l’occasion d’une première confrontation des 
différentes conceptions en présence17� Les projets belge et luxembourgeois 
mettaient l’accent sur l’importance du fonds de réserve ainsi que sur le 
rétrécissement des marges de fluctuation dans une phase relativement 
précoce18� De son côté, Schiller, soutenu par le néerlandais Witteveen, 
soulignait de nouveau la nécessité d’un « rapprochement des objectifs de 
politique économique et de la politique économique réelle » avant toute 
mesure spécifiquement monétaire� Conformément aux principes de son 
plan en quatre étapes, la phase de « l’institutionnalisation communautaire 
progressive » ne devait débuter qu’avec la troisième étape� Surtout, seul 
le progrès effectivement réalisé devait déterminer le passage d’une étape 
à l’autre�
Le ministre italien Colombo, en insistant sur l’intérêt du maintien 
de la flexibilité des taux de change pendant la phase de transition, 
semblait vouloir occuper une position à part� Pour la France, Giscard 
d’Estaing ne présenta pas de plan propre, laissant ainsi planer le doute 
sur les intentions de Paris� Tout au plus Giscard évoqua-t-il « l’identité 
monétaire » européenne qui devrait émerger dès la deuxième étape (sur 
les trois, prévus dans le schéma présenté par la Commission européenne)�
Les termes du débat étant ainsi posés, l’élaboration d’un projet 
commun (« rapport ») devait être entamée et concrétisée dans le cadre 
d’un « groupe de travail ad hoc », officiellement installé par le Conseil 
le 6 mars 1970 et dont la présidence fut confiée au Premier ministre du 
Luxembourg, Pierre Werner19�
Dès l’entrée des négociations, Hans Tietmeyer, haut fonctionnaire 
au ministère allemand des Finances et membre suppléant du groupe 
Werner, faisait état, en interne, de son scepticisme quant aux réelles 
chances de succès, compte tenu des « contrastes assez profonds » entre les 
Währungsunion – eine politische Herausforderung », Europa-Archiv, n° 26, 1971, 
p� 409-420�
17 Compte rendu de la conférence dans la note de Tietmeyer, 25 février 1970, 
« Ergebnisse der Beratungen auf der Wirtschafts- und Finanzministerkonferenz in 
Paris am 23�/24�2�1970 », PAAA, B 20, Vol� 1555�
18 Cf� aussi le tableau comparatif des différents projets établi par la Commission 
européenne en mars 1970, reproduit in Dierikx, Marc et al. (ed�), Common Fate, 
Common Future. A Documentary History of Monetary and Financial Cooperation in 
Europe, 1947-1974, Den Haag, Luxembourg, Huygens ING, CVCE, 2012, p� 123-
142�
19 Cf� aussi la présentation de l’intéressé : Werner, Pierre, Itinéraires luxembourgeois 
et européens. Évolutions et souvenirs, 1945-1985, Vol� 2, Luxembourg, éd� Saint-
Paul, 2e éd�, 1992, p� 123-131�
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partenaires20� En tout cas, telle était l’impression que la première réunion 
du comité Werner, le 20 mars 1970, au Luxembourg, lui avait laissée� Son 
compte rendu fait état de préoccupations assez différentes exprimées lors 
de ce premier tour d’horizon21� Comme on pouvait s’y attendre, certains 
participants (le Français Clappier, le Belge Ansiaux) se montraient surtout 
intéressés par la coopération monétaire à courte échéance, tout en se 
divisant sur l’utilité de définir d’emblée l’aboutissement de l’ensemble 
du projet� L’Allemand Schöllhorn mettait en garde contre le risque d’une 
pure «  coordination verbale  » de la politique économique, tandis que 
les mécanismes monétaires, eux, seraient «  communautarisés  »� Avec 
le Néerlandais Brouwers, Schöllhorn soulignait sans ambages que la 
dernière étape du processus impliquerait d’importants transferts de 
droits souverains�
En fait, aux «  cultures monétaires  » traditionnellement différentes 
s’ajoutait, à l’époque, une situation conjoncturelle qui inquiétait les 
responsables allemands� L’Allemagne commençait à connaître une 
hausse des prix spectaculaire  : en 1971, le taux d’inflation de 5,2  % 
équivalait presque à celui de la France (5,5 %) et était même supérieur 
à celui de l’Italie (4,9  %)22� Juguler l’inflation et éviter la surchauffe 
économique devint ainsi le leitmotiv du discours tenu en Allemagne� 
Dans ces conditions, comment concevoir – du point de vue allemand – 
une Union économique et monétaire dont l’objectif structurant ne serait 
pas la « stabilité » ?
Par contre, la priorité du côté du gouvernement français n’était pas la 
lutte contre l’inflation mais, au contraire, le soutien massif à la croissance 
et à l’exportation� Or, en l’absence d’un projet français élaboré, les cinq 
partenaires européens étaient forcément réduits à des spéculations sur 
l’attitude réelle de Paris23�
Malgré les conceptions différentes, les discussions au sein du groupe 
Werner ne devaient pas connaître de blocage� Lors de la conférence des 
ministres des Finances à Venise, les 29 et 30 mai 1970, Pierre Werner 
pouvait une fois de plus constater que les participants étaient tous 
20 Note de von Staden (Auswärtiges Amt), « Höflichkeitsbesuch von Herrn Ti[e]tmeyer 
am 25�3�1970 », PAAA, B 20, Vol� 1555� 
21 Tietmeyer, «  Zusammenfassender Kurzbericht  über die 1� Sitzung der ‘Werner-




22 Chiffres d’après Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschäftsbericht 1972, p� 13�
23 Note de Tietmeyer, 25 février 1970 (cf� note 17)�
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unanimes sur l’objectif à atteindre même si les moyens pour y parvenir 
« divergeaient partiellement »24� Un assez large consensus se dégageait aussi 
sur la nécessité de renforcer, dans la phase initiale d’une durée d’environ 
trois ans, les efforts en vue de la coordination et de l’harmonisation 
des politiques économiques� Les divergences se cristallisaient autour 
de la question du rétrécissement des bandes de fluctuation et du fonds 
européen de devises – deux éléments qui constituaient toujours la priorité 
des représentants français et belge�
Selon le compte rendu allemand, ce fut Schiller qui insista 
particulièrement sur les conséquences institutionnelles à prévoir au 
niveau européen : au minimum, deux organes communautaires devraient 
être créés : « une instance centrale exerçant la responsabilité politique en 
matière de politique conjoncturelle  » ainsi qu’un « organe autonome » 
pour la prise de décision dans le domaine monétaire� Ces organes 
communautaires auxquels seraient transférés des droits souverains 
nationaux devraient s’appuyer sur une légitimité parlementaire25�
Il faut dire que cette question des implications politiques et de 
leur traduction institutionnelle suscita étonnamment peu d’intérêt au 
cours des discussions� Sans doute était-elle particulièrement de nature à 
provoquer des dissensions� Se dessinait ainsi un schéma selon lequel les 
dispositions institutionnelles à prévoir pour la deuxième phase resteraient 
entourées d’un certain flou�
Pour sa part, le chancelier Brandt, au cours des négociations du 
comité Werner, intervint parfois directement pour appeler les tenants 
de la politique monétaire allemande à une plus grande souplesse� Au 
milieu des pourparlers, Brandt fit ainsi remarquer au Président de la 
Bundesbank, Karl Klasen, qu’un « esprit de compromis » était nécessaire 
de tous les côtés pour aboutir « à une solution acceptable pour toutes les 
délégations »26�
Mais Brandt était aussi conscient des contraintes et des limites de 
l’exercice� Il le montra face à l’insistance du gouvernement belge de 
prévoir, dès la première étape de l’Union économique et monétaire, un 
« Fonds européen d’égalisation des changes »� S’adressant directement à 
Brandt, le Premier ministre belge, Gaston Eyskens, en vantait « le grand 
24 Compte rendu de la conférence, ministère des Finances, sans date, «  Vermerk 
über das 35� Treffen der EWG-Finanzminister am 29�/30� Mai 1970 in Venedig », 
PAAA, B 20, Vol� 1555�
25 Ibidem  ; cf� aussi le compte rendu des discussions de Tietmeyer, 1er juin 1970, 
« Ergebnisbericht », ibidem�
26 Lettre de Brandt à Klasen, 18 juin 1970, HA Bundesbank, N 2, Vol� 156�
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intérêt politique et psychologique » qui s’y attacherait27� Dans sa réponse, 
Brandt insista plutôt sur l’importance de « l’harmonisation de la politique 
économique  » et ne souhaita prendre aucun engagement précis28� Au 
même moment, il demandait à son ministre Schiller d’examiner «  la 
possibilité d’un compromis » sur cette question d’importance29�
Au total, c’était forcément un compromis équilibré que le Plan 
Werner, adopté par le « groupe ad-hoc » le 8 octobre 1970, devait mettre 
au point� La « formule magique » qui permit, à ce stade, de concevoir 
le plan d’ensemble pour la création d’une UEM en trois étapes fut 
sans doute toujours celle du « parallélisme effectif  » entre les mesures 
de «  rapprochement économique  » et celles impliquant la «  solidarité 
monétaire »� La formule permettait cependant bien des interprétations, 
si bien que le Président français et le chancelier allemand n’eurent aucun 
mal à l’adopter, entre eux, lors de leurs consultations bilatérales au mois 
de juillet 197030�
On sait que la première des trois étapes prévues par le Plan Werner 
consistait à mettre en place une « coordination » et une « harmonisation » 
des politiques budgétaires, mais aussi – à titre expérimental – une 
limitation des fluctuations des cours entre les monnaies communautaires31� 
La deuxième étape verrait une coordination plus étroite encore, y compris 
en matière de politique conjoncturelle� Moyennant une «  convergence 
suffisante des politiques économiques », un Fonds européen de coopération 
monétaire serait, si possible, constitué au cours de la première phase, au plus 
tard pendant la phase intermédiaire� Enfin, la « fixation irrévocable des 
rapports de parité » ou – éventuellement – l’introduction de la « monnaie 
unique » était prévue comme couronnement du processus, à l’horizon de 
l’année 1980� Sur le plan institutionnel, le plan préconisa, également pour 
l’étape finale, la mise en place d’un « centre de décision pour la politique 
économique » qui serait « politiquement responsable devant un Parlement 
européen  » ainsi que la création d’un «  système communautaire des 
banques centrales »�
En Allemagne, l’agencement du Plan Werner rencontra des réactions 
très largement favorables dans les milieux politiques et un écho 
27 Lettre d’Eyskens à Brandt, 15 mai 1970, PAAA, B 20, Vol� 1555�
28 Lettre de Brandt à Eyskens, 27 mai 1970, ibidem�
29 Lettre de Brandt à Schiller, 27 mai 1970, ibidem�
30 Entretien Brandt-Pompidou à Bonn, 3 juillet 1970, matinée, AAPD 1970, doc� 
n° 291 (p� 1079-1080)�
31 Rapport au Conseil et à la Commission concernant la réalisation par étapes de 
l’Union économique et monétaire dans la Communauté (« Rapport Werner »), in : 
Bulletin des Communautés européennes, supplément n° 11, 1970�
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prudemment positif du côté des responsables économiques et monétaires� 
Il en allait tout autrement en France�
Le Chancelier Brandt fut le premier à souligner l’importance historique 
du projet� La signification du plan pour l’ensemble de l’intégration 
européenne « ne pourra guère être surestimée », faisait-il comprendre, par 
écrit, à son ministre de l’Économie32� L’adoption définitive du plan par le 
Conseil des ministres – si possible avant la fin de l’année – constituerait 
« très probablement la décision la plus importante depuis la signature des 
traités de Rome »�
Devant le Bundestag, le 6 novembre 1970, Brandt faisait preuve du 
même enthousiasme en qualifiant le Plan Werner de rien de moins que 
de « nouvelle Magna Charta » de la Communauté européenne33�
Le 22 octobre, Schiller présentait le Plan Werner au Conseil des 
ministres allemand qui exprimait le souhait de voir adopter le projet avant 
l’expiration de la présidence allemande du Conseil, à la fin de l’année34� 
En pratique, on envisageait que la réunion du Conseil du 23 novembre 
puisse prendre la décision de faire débuter la première phase de l’UEM 
dès le 1er  janvier 1971� C’est dire qu’à ce moment, l’optimisme était 
visiblement de mise�
De son côté, l’évaluation finale du ministère de l’Économie arrivait 
à la conclusion que le gouvernement fédéral pouvait «  entièrement 
souscrire » aux dispositions prévues par le Plan Werner35� Même si des 
compromis avaient dû être négociés, le résultat correspondrait «  dans 
une large mesure aux objectifs allemands en matière économique et 
européenne »� Le principe du « parallélisme effectif » entre des avancées 
économiques et monétaires ainsi que l’ancrage de l’objectif général 
de stabilité réduirait considérablement les risques impliqués par une 
« communautarisation précoce »� Si le satisfecit fut ainsi donné, on répétait 
à l’envie que la barre était désormais placée très haute : le chemin vers 
l’Union économique et monétaire ne pourrait être emprunté avec succès 
qu’à condition de transférer d’importantes compétences économiques et 
32 Lettre de Brandt à Schiller, 21 octobre 1970, HA Bundesbank, N 2, Vol� 156�
33 Brandt, déclaration sur la politique européenne du 6 novembre 1970, Deutscher 
Bundestag, Stenographische Berichte, 6e législature, p� 4268-4271 (p� 4269)�
34 Note de Herbst (Auswärtiges Amt), 23 octobre 1970, «  Betr� Sitzung des Staats-
sekretärsausschusses für Europafragen am 28� Oktober 1970  », PAAA, B  20, 
Vol� 1556�
35 Note du département d’Europe du ministère de l’Économie, E 1/IA1 (sans 
signature, mais sans doute de Tietmeyer), 27 octobre 1970, 8 pages, PAAA, B 20, 
Vol� 1556  («  […] sich voll-inhaltlich anschließen  »)  ; la note était à la base à la 
directive de l’Auswärtiges Amt du 30 octobre 1970, AAPD 1970, doc� n° 503�
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financières à l’échelon communautaire et aussi de compléter l’UEM par 
une Union politique� La préoccupation principale était invariablement 
que l’intégration monétaire risquait de progresser alors que les leviers 
de la politique économique resteraient en fait durablement sous contrôle 
national�
On ne s’étonnera guère que les discussions au sein du Zentralbankrat 
de la Bundesbank aient rendu un autre son de cloche� Toutefois, force est 
de constater que les banquiers centraux ne montraient pas d’hostilité de 
principe mais se bornaient à demander des précisions ultérieures, 
voire certains durcissements du dispositif proposé� Deux exigences se 
trouvaient particulièrement mises en avant :
– Premièrement, la réduction des marges de fluctuation des monnaies 
européennes et, à plus forte raison, leur élimination ne devaient intervenir 
qu’après une « véritable harmonisation » des politiques économiques et 
financières36;
–  Deuxièmement, le futur Conseil des Présidents des banques 
centrales devait être responsable, dès le départ, des orientations de la 
politique monétaire « et ceci indépendamment du Conseil des ministres, 
bien qu’en tenant compte des lignes directrices élaborées par le Conseil 
de la politique économique  »37� Se trouvait ainsi posée la question de 
la responsabilité effective de la future politique monétaire qui, selon les 
dirigeants de la Bundesbank, devait incomber pour l’essentiel au collège 
des banquiers centraux européens�
Ce fut également l’approche défendue par le ministère allemand 
de l’Économie� Lors d’une importante réunion entre Schiller et le 
Zentralbankrat de la Bundesbank, le 17 novembre 1970, le ministre 
soulignait l’intention du gouvernement de Bonn «  de préconiser la 
banque centrale autonome comme modèle pour la future banque centrale 
européenne »38�
Si des appréciations partiellement différentes s’exprimaient ainsi, 
le responsable des questions monétaires internationales au sein de la 
Bundesbank, Otmar Emminger, ne cachait pas son scepticisme de fond 
à l’égard du « long chemin » à parcourir pour réaliser l’union monétaire� 
À son avis, point n’était besoin de nouvelles consultations et 
36 Deutsche Bundesbank, 315e séance du Zentralbankrat, le 3 juin 1970, compte 
rendu, p� 12-15, HA Bundesbank�
37 Deutsche Bundesbank, 325e séance du Zentralbankrat, le 4 novembre 1970, compte 
rendu, p� 13, HA Bundesbank�
38 Deutsche Bundesbank, 326e séance du Zentralbankrat, le 17 novembre 1970, 
compte rendu, p� 20, HA Bundesbank�
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d’institutions  : la question décisive serait la convergence réelle des 
priorités et des objectifs en matière monétaire� Or, selon lui, la France 
était déjà en train de pousser à la croissance malgré un taux d’inflation 
entre 5 et 6 % […] ce qui augurait mal de la « volonté de stabilité » dans 
certains pays partenaires39�
L’aval donné au Plan Werner par les responsables de la politique 
monétaire allemande était conditionné au respect de dispositions 
et formules très précises� Ainsi, les propositions que la Commission 
européenne fit au Conseil sur la base du Plan Werner provoquaient, 
elles, de promptes et vives critiques40� Aux yeux de Schiller, de 
l’Auswärtiges Amt comme de la Bundesbank, la Commission semblait 
vouloir privilégier les avancées en matière de coopération monétaire au 
détriment de l’harmonisation économique et, sur le plan de la répartition 
des compétences, porter atteinte à l’autonomie des banques centrales 
nationales dès la première étape de la mise en œuvre de l’UEM41� On 
s’étonna d’autant plus du positionnement de la Commission que la réaction 
au Plan Werner, dans cinq capitales européennes, avait été largement 
« positive »� Il était évident que la Commission faisait délibérément un 
pas en direction des dispositions françaises42� En tout cas, du côté de 
Bonn, on ne souhaitait pas que le Plan Werner soit « dilué  », selon le 
terme employé par Schiller43� Au demeurant, la position allemande était 
sans ambiguïté : on préconisa l’application du Plan Werner « tel quel »44� 
Nul doute par ailleurs, du côté allemand, que « la future banque centrale 
européenne » devait être calquée sur le modèle d’une « banque centrale 
autonome »45
39 Emminger, Otmar, «  Bemerkungen zum Werner-Bericht über die europäische 
Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion », HA Bundesbank, N 2, Vol� 153�
40 Communication de la Commission sur le Plan Werner, 30 octobre 1970, en ligne : 
www�cvce�eu�
41 Secrétaire d’État Rohwedder (ministère de l’Économie), « Schnellbrief », 4 novembre 
1970, avec note de Tietmeyer, 3 novembre 1970, PAAA, B  20, Vol�  1556  ; 
télégramme d’Emminger à Tietmeyer, 4 novembre 1970, n° 470, HA Bundesbank, 
N 2, Vol� 153�
42 Note de Ruyter (Auswärtiges Amt), 4 novembre 1970, «  Beurteilung der 
Kommissions-Papiere in rechtlicher und taktischer Sicht », PAAA, B 20, Vol� 1556�
43 Intervention au Bundestag, 6 novembre 1970, Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographische 
Berichte, 6e législature, p� 4295�
44 L’expression employée dans la note de von Bismarck-Osten (Auswärtiges Amt), 
9 novembre 1970, PAAA, B 20, Vol� 1556 ; dans le même sens la « Kabinettsvorlage » 
du ministère de l’Économie, 12 novembre 1970, E 1/IA1-030000/10, ibidem�
45 Deutsche Bundesbank, 326e séance du Zentralbankrat, le 17 novembre 1970, 
compte rendu, p� 20, HA Bundesbank�
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Concernant les réactions aux principes du Plan Werner, le contraste 
était saisissant entre l’accueil largement favorable dans les capitales de 
l’Europe des « cinq » et celui réservé à Paris� Dans des réunions internes, 
le Président Georges Pompidou ne trouvait pas de mots assez durs contre 
le principe même du transfert de compétences monétaires importantes sur 
des instances communautaires� On sait que le Président français donna 
la consigne explicite à ses négociateurs de ne pas finaliser le projet lors du 
dernier Conseil des ministres avant la fin de l’année, prévu à Bruxelles, 
le 14 décembre 1970� Il entendait ainsi manifester son rejet et envoyer 
un signal aux «  farceurs » européens – des « buffoni » européens, selon 
son expression� Il croyait les distinguer en particulier parmi les hommes 
politiques des pays du Benelux46�
Dans ces conditions, bien que le projet de l’UEM ait maintenu, sur le 
papier, l’objectif de l’intégration monétaire à moyen-long terme, l’accord 
effectif entre les partenaires européens, au début de l’année 1971, n’allait 
en réalité pas au-delà de la première phase, censée enclencher le processus 
d’une coopération renforcée�
De son côté, Schiller demanda et obtint, lors des négociations de 
Bruxelles, l’introduction d’une «  clause de prudence  » permettant de 
suspendre les mesures d’intégration monétaire à l’issue de la première 
phase si le degré de convergence des économies était alors jugé insuffisant47� 
Le risque était donc réel que l’action engagée ne fut pas irréversible mais 
permit un retour en arrière�
Au même moment, Willy Brandt s’employait à préserver la perspective 
d’ensemble du processus� Il cherchait d’abord un accord avec le Président 
français sur « une vision plus claire de ce qu’il arrivera quand la première phase 
sera accomplie »48� Il insistait aussi sur la nécessité de mettre les instances 
de la Communauté en mesure « d’agir efficacement et rapidement », une 
manière de dire qu’il fallait renforcer le dispositif institutionnel, y compris, 
si nécessaire, par une modification des traités� Par une lettre du 1er février 
1971, Brandt s’adressait également, dans le même esprit, à Pierre Werner� 
L’essentiel semblait être la recherche d’une solution « de rattrapage  » au 
cas où, à l’issue de la 1re phase, l’harmonisation économique n’aurait pas 
46 Compte rendu de la réunion restreinte du mercredi 9 décembre 1970 sur les affaires 
européennes, Archives nationales (Paris), 5 AG 2, Vol� 1044� Cf� aussi Bossuat, 
Gérard, « Le Président Georges Pompidou et les tentatives d’Union économique 
et monétaire  », in Georges Pompidou et l’Europe, éd� par l’Association Georges 
Pompidou, Bruxelles, Complexe, 1995, p� 405-447�
47 Cf� les déclarations de Schiller devant le Bundestag, 29 janvier 1971, Deutscher 
Bundestag, Stenographische Berichte, 6e législature, p� 5174-5176�
48 Entretien Brandt-Pompidou, Paris, 25 janvier 1971, AAPD 1971, doc� n° 27 
(p� 115-116)�
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été jugée satisfaisante� Pouvait-on prévoir – c’était sa demande – un délai 
supplémentaire pour les pays « en retard » ?49
Lorsque le Conseil des ministres de la Communauté entérina 
officiellement le projet de l’UEM, le 22 mars 197150, l’accord était certes 
salué� Mais le doute s’était installé quant aux capacités réelles des Six de 
respecter la trajectoire esquissée�
La suspension de la cotation du mark, réponse donnée par le 
gouvernement allemand, le 9 mai 1971, à un afflux spectaculaire de 
dollars, équivalut à la suspension de la première étape de l’UEM51� Dans 
un premier temps, l’espoir du gouvernement allemand fut de retourner, 
dans un délai rapproché, au régime de taux fixes afin de pouvoir reprendre 
le projet de l’UEM ultérieurement� L’instabilité persistante du système 
monétaire international fit vite comprendre qu’il faudrait beaucoup plus 
de temps pour adapter le projet monétaire européen à des circonstances 
politiques, économiques et monétaires turbulentes�
L’établissement du Plan Werner porte la marque d’un certain 
optimisme européen prévalant au tournant des années 1960-1970� Les 
différences des cultures monétaires – aux antipodes celles de la France 
et l’Allemagne – sont bien connues et discutées dans cette période� Ce 
qui est frappant de constater, c’est que les acteurs de l’époque semblent 
néanmoins très largement sous-estimer les difficultés – en vérité énormes 
– à les dépasser et à opérer les rapprochements nécessaires�
Malgré la suspension du Plan Werner (ou plutôt du projet d’Union 
économique et monétaire) au lendemain de son adoption et en dépit 
des doutes déjà présents sur les chances de sa réalisation, il s’agit d’une 
étape essentielle voire indispensable sur le chemin de la construction de 
l’Europe monétaire� Les gouvernements européens avaient commencé à 
se pencher sérieusement sur les enjeux d’un rapprochement des monnaies 
nationales et ce sujet ne devrait plus quitter l’agenda européen dans les 
temps à venir� Un processus d’apprentissage à longue distance a été 
enclenché, avec ses avancées et ses échecs�
49 Lettre de Brandt à Werner, 1er février 1971, Archives familiales Pierre Werner, 
Luxembourg, mise en ligne  : http://www�cvce�eu/recherche/unit-content/-/
unit/ba6ac883-7a80-470c-9baa-8f95b8372811/d045dbbd-b33c-4274-b889-
68b0f49e89d8/Resources#650fb497-ca9f-45c7-a158-d42472d0e702_fr&overlay 
(1er juillet 2016)� 
50 Résolution du Conseil concernant la réalisation par étapes de l’Union économique 
et monétaire dans la Communauté, 22 mars 1971, www�cvce�eu�
51 Pour les préoccupations de la Bundesbank, cf� Emminger, Otmar, D-Mark, Dollar, 
Währungskrisen. Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Bundesbankpräsidenten, Stuttgart, 
DVA, 1986, p� 186-195� 
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En même temps, on peut rester perplexe sur le décalage manifeste 
entre le bon diagnostique concernant la condition de base d’une Union 
économique et monétaire – à savoir une certaine convergence des 
politiques économiques et budgétaires – et le manque d’engagement 
politique réel pour mettre en œuvre cette même convergence jugée 
indispensable� Partant du Plan Werner et à travers toute l’histoire de 
la construction monétaire européenne, les gouvernements européens 
allaient se retrouver devant le même défi pendant plusieurs décennies et 
ne guère trouver de réponse réellement satisfaisante�

The End of Bretton Woods  
and the Setting up of the Snake
Maria Eleonora Guasconi
The Nixon Administration’s decision to suspend the dollar’s 
convertibility into gold, announced on August 15, 1971, determined 
the collapse of the international monetary system, created at the Bretton 
Woods Conference of September 1944, which linked the dollar to gold 
at the fixed price of 35 dollars an ounce and established a gold-dollar 
standard system, based on fixed exchange rates� 
Nixon’s decision to close the gold window represented, together 
with the energy crisis and the failure of Kissinger’s “Year of Europe” in 
1973, a turning point in transatlantic relations and identified a period 
of turmoil and disagreements between the US and Western Europe that 
affected European attempts to establish a European and Monetary Union 
(EMU)�1
It would initiate a period of uncontrollable currency fluctuations, 
which coincided with the decline of the European economy and an 
increase in inflation, thus threatening EC cohesion and confounding 
European efforts to maintain monetary stability� The Werner Plan 
of 1970 would be wiped away by the “Nixon shock”, and the “snake” 
represented only a pale attempt to relaunch the EMU goal established at 
the Hague Conference of 1969�2
1 Basosi, D�, Il governo del dollaro. Interdipendenza economica e potere statunitense 
negli anni di Richard Nixon 1969-1973, Florence, Polistampa, 2006; E� Bussière, 
“France, European monetary cooperation and the international monetary system 
crisis, 1968-1973”, in H� Haftendorn, G�  H�, Soutou, S� Szabo & S� Wells Jr 
(eds�), The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany and the United States in the Shaping 
of the New Europe, Washington, DC, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006, p� 171-
88; H� Zimmermann, “Unraveling the ties that really bind”, in M�  Schulz  & T� 
Schwarz (eds�), US-European Relations from Nixon to Carter, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p� 125-44� 
2 Basosi, D�, “The US, Western Europe and a changing monetary system 1969-1979”, 
in Varsori, A� & Migani, G� (eds�), Europe in the International Arena in the 1970s: 
Entering a Different World, Brussels, P�I�E� Peter Lang, 2011, p� 99-116�
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In spite of the partial restoration of fixed parities agreed in Washington 
with the Smithsonian Agreements of December 1971, the international 
monetary system would never return to dollar convertibility and fixed 
exchange rates, but would slowly move towards a flexible exchange rate 
system, set up with the Jamaican agreements of November 1976, with 
the dollar continuing to hold a pivotal role as a reserve currency�3
Starting from the historic decision of the Nixon administration to end 
the dollar’s convertibility into gold, this essay aims at analyzing the debate 
that developed among the European countries and inside the European 
institutions by the end of Bretton Woods, evaluating its consequences for 
the project of European Monetary Union, and focusing in particular on 
the establishment of the “snake”�
1. The Nixon Shock
The US had profited enormously from the Bretton Woods system, 
as the American currency became the linchpin of the international 
monetary system, where major commodities, such as oil, and trade in 
currencies were conducted in dollars� 
By the end of the 1960s, the costs of the Vietnam War, the widening 
of the US balance of payment deficits, and the decrease in US gold 
reserves threatened the Bretton Woods stability� In particular, as soon 
as the increasing American balance of payment deficits signaled that 
the dollar could be overvalued, the gold reserves of the Federal Reserve 
shrunk rapidly, because dollar holders preferred to convert dollars to 
gold, at the guaranteed price of 35 dollars an ounce, instead of running 
the risk of a dollar devaluation�4
The increasing US difficulties in maintaining parity between the 
dollar and gold seemed to render material the paradox elaborated by the 
Belgian economist Robert Triffin in 1960, which pointed out that the use 
of the dollar as a global reserve currency would soon create imbalances 
in the American balance of payments, as the number of US dollars in 
circulation exceeded the amount of gold that was backing them�
On the other side of the Atlantic, the Western European countries were 
at the peak of their postwar economic growth� They were not involved in 
3 Harold, J�, Rambouillet, 15 novembre 1975. La globalizzazione dell’economia, Bologna, 
Il Mulino, 1999; Basosi, D�, “The US, Western Europe and a changing monetary 
system 1969-1979”, p� 99-116�
4 Zimmermann, H�, “Unraveling the ties that really bind”, p� 128-9�
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expensive conflicts like the Vietnam War, they were benefiting from the 
stability of the international monetary system, and a large burden of their 
defense costs was financed by their strongest ally, the US� Since the end 
of the 1960s, the EC member countries have been particularly interested 
in strengthening their monetary cooperation as a way of preserving 
stability, especially after the monetary crisis of 1968, which forced the 
French franc to devalue and the deutschmark to revaluate� Maintaining 
the fixed exchange rate system alive was considered a necessity, in order 
to safeguard the Common Market and its achievements, in particular its 
main common policy, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which 
benefited France in particular�5
So, the debate on the stability of the international monetary system 
deeply affected US–Western European relations� From the European 
point of view, the US had abused its exorbitant privilege of having the 
dollar as the world’s main currency� One of the favorite themes of Charles 
de Gaulle’s challenge to the US was the overrated role of the dollar as a 
legacy of the Bretton Woods system and his decision in 1965 to convert 
600 million dollars into gold�6
Charles de Gaulle’s resignation as French President in April 1969 
raised new expectations among the advocates of European integration� 
His successor, Georges Pompidou, decided to relaunch the European 
integration project and to convene a conference at the Hague in 
December 1969, with the aim to solve the thorny issue of the UK’s entry 
into the European Community�7 
Pompidou summarized the objectives of the conference in the so-called 
“triptych”: “completion, deepening and enlargement” of the integration 
process� Concerning deepening, one of the most important results of 
the Hague Conference was the agreement to set up the EMU step by 
step, a proposal put forward by the German Chancellor Willy Brandt, 
which was enthusiastically accepted also by the French President Georges 
Pompidou�8 At the Hague, the Six decided to work out for October 
1970 a plan for the setting up of the EMU, as a means of deepening the 
5 Basosi, D�, “The US, Western Europe and a changing monetary system”, p� 100�
6 Bussière, E�, “France, European monetary cooperation and the international 
monetary system crisis 1969-1973”, p� 171-88: Vaïsse, M�, La grandeur. Politique 
étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958-1969, Paris, Fayard, 1998, p� 400-7�
7 On the Hague Conference see Guasconi, M� E�, L’Europa tra continuità e cambiamento. 
Il vertice dell’Aja del 1969 e il rilancio della costruzione europea, Florence, Polistampa, 
2004, and the monographic number of the Journal of European Integration (Vol� 9, 
No� 2, 2003), ed� J� Van der Haarst�
8 Zimmermann, H�, “Unraveling the ties that really bind”, p� 134�
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Common Market and safeguarding the achievements of the integration 
process from the turmoil of monetary instability, due to speculation on 
the dollar, which had put the deutschmark under pressure� 
Germany considered EMU essential for assuring a Community of 
stability and economic growth for the EC countries, and gave priority 
to the harmonization of economic policies before moving to monetary 
cooperation�9 Despite insurmuntable differences of opinion among the 
governments, the Werner Plan was worked out in October 1970 and 
enlisted the steps to achieve EMU for 1980� 
The plan was the result of an intense effort to mediate between the 
divergent positions of the “monetarist” countries, headed by France, 
which considered as a priority the establishment of common constraints 
on monetary policies, and the “economist” ones, headed by West Germany 
and the Netherlands, which instead gave priority to the harmonization of 
economic policies before moving to monetary cooperation� It proposed 
proceeding in parallel with economic and monetary union within ten 
years, through a gradual and flexible process, marked by a series of steps 
that included the harmonization of economic policies, budget and taxes, 
the reduction of fluctuations in exchange rates, and the setting up of a 
European monetary cooperation fund�10
On the other side of the Atlantic, Richard Nixon, who entered the 
White House in January 1969, inherited from the Johnson administration 
a “lost war, a deteriorating trade balance, a collapsing currency and 
domestic stagflation”�11 Following its first weeks in office, the Nixon 
administration debated the issue of pursuing a unilateral monetary policy, 
as a way of solving the economic problems threatening the US economy� 
It was an option which was highly criticized by the State Department and 
by Henry Kissinger, at that time National Security Adviser, who warned 
that such a decision “would trigger currency speculation and damage 
relations with the Europeans, who would have to cope with the effects”�12
As regards the US attitude towards European integration, the Nixon 
administration displayed an ambivalent feeling and an increasing 
uneasiness towards the European relaunch promoted at the Hague� 
9 Heipel, C�, “In search of the greatest common denominator� Germany and the Hague 
Summit Conference 1969”, in Van der Haarst, J� (ed�), p� 79�
10 Fauri, F�, L’ integrazione economica europea, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006, p� 150-1�
11 Calleo, D�, The Imperious Economy, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 
1982, p� 5�
12 Zimmermann, H�, “Unraveling the ties that really bind”, p� 135�
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In a speech given in Bonn to the German Foreign Policy Association 
on February 12, 1970, Robert Schaetzel, at that time US representative to 
the European Community in Brussels, described the development of an 
increasingly critical attitude towards European integration, shared by the 
economic Departments inside the Nixon administration� “Unfortunately, 
conventional wisdom in America”, affirmed Shaetzel,
has judged the Community protectionist and inward-looking� There is an 
exact correlation between awareness of the Community and awareness of 
a European agriculture policy that had reduced American exports to the 
Community and has led to massive subsidies of surpluses to compete our 
traditional markets elsewhere in the world�
He concluded:
In sum the wide enthusiasm for the Community in America of the Eisenhower 
and Kennedy periods, the rosy expectations of rapid and brilliant progress 
towards unity has largely evaporated and been replaced by irritation, frustration 
and a brooding sense of apprehension as to what the future will hold�13
In October 1970, a European delegation, headed by Ralph Dahrendorf, 
European Commissioner in charge of Foreign Relations and Foreign Trade, 
visited Washington and met with US officials from the State Department 
and the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury and Commerce� The 
consultations focused mainly on trade legislation, EC enlargement, 
agriculture and preferential EC arrangements towards the Mediterranean, 
but did not cover monetary issues, a signal that the US probably did not 
believe that European efforts to increase monetary cooperation would 
succeed and that Washington did not intend to negotiate with the 
Europeans the reform of the international monetary system�14
During the visit, it was clear that, in spite of the traditional political 
support towards European integration, shared by the State Department, 
the economic sphere of the Nixon administration viewed the European 
Community as a rival, not as a partner, an inward-looking bloc that was 
trying to erode US market shares�15
13 National Archives, Kew Gardens, London, Prime Minister Records 13/3542, 
Remarks by Robert Schaetzel, US representative to the European Communities, 
before the German Foreign Policy Association, February 12, 1970�
14 National Archives (NA), College Park, USA, Nixon Presidential Material staff, 
National Security Council (NSC) Files, European Common Market, Box 322, 
Memorandum for the President, October 20, 1970, limited official use� See also 
Grygowski, D�, “Les États-Unis et l’unification monétaire de l’Europe”, in Journal 
of European Integration History, No� 1, 2007, p� 111-31�
15 Basosi, D�, “The US, Western Europe and a changing monetary system”, p� 103�
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This increasing criticism of the Common Market reflected the 
Nixon administration’s strong preoccupations with European policies 
in the field of agriculture and trade and was made explicit in April 1971 
during the visit of the President of the European Commission, the Italian 
Franco Maria Malfatti, to the US� Malfatti visited Washington, his goal 
being to “propose a constructive dialogue” to the Nixon administration 
in order to solve these transatlantic misunderstandings�16 The journey, 
preceded by an explorative mission headed by Renato Ruggiero, did 
not achieve the aimed-for results� 
Malfatti, unlike his predecessor Jean Rey, was received by Richard 
Nixon and had important meetings with the secretary of State, William 
Rogers, and with members of the Council on International Economic 
Policy� Nonetheless, the US officials expressed their concerns over the high 
level of agricultural protectionism implemented by the Community and 
criticized the conclusion of preferential trade agreements with a widening 
circle of countries in the Mediterranean, such as Israel and Spain�17 As 
Hubert Zimmermann has argued, “The Bretton Woods system fell victim 
to the doubts about Europe prevailing in Washington”�18
In March 1971, the Europeans adopted the first measures to reduce the 
currency fluctuations and tighten their exchange rates as suggested by the 
Werner Plan, but two months later, in May, an enormous flux of foreign 
currencies, especially dollars, forced the German government to close the 
foreign exchange markets and to float the deutschmark, a decision that 
threatened the achievement of the Werner Plan and showed how difficult 
the goal of strengthening European monetary cooperation was�
In the same period, the Nixon administration was slowly moving 
towards its monetary breakthrough, strongly advocated by the new 
secretary of the Treasury, John Connally� Connally, a former Democrat 
governor of Texas, had been appointed secretary of the Treasury a few 
months earlier, in December 1970, with the task of ameliorating the 
problems of growing rates of inflation (6%) and unemployment (6�2%) 
which were threatening the US balance of payments� Described as “an 
elephant in a china shop”,19 Connally gave voice to the critical anti-
European perspective existing inside the Nixon administration and played 
16 Guasconi, M�  E�, “La Commissione Malfatti e le sfide degli anni Settanta”, in 
Morelli, U� & Pistone, S� (eds�), L’Italia e l’unità europea dal Risorgimento a oggi. 
Idee e protagonisti, Padua, CEDAM, 2015, p� 321-38�
17 Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence, Franco Maria Malfatti Papers, 
Folder 23, Visit to the United States, Entretien Rogers-Malfatti, April 4, 1971� 
18 Zimmermann, H�, “Unraveling the ties that really bind”, p� 137�
19 Basosi, D� Il governo del dollaro, p� 162-5�
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a relevant role in the decision-making process aimed at abandoning the 
Bretton Woods system�20
In late July and early August, another dollar crisis forced Nixon and 
Connally to move quickly� During a secret meeting held at Camp David 
on August 13, Richard Nixon, John Connally and a group of top financial 
and economic advisers, including the President of the Federal Reserve 
Bureau Arthur Burns, the undersecretary to the Treasury Paul Volcker, 
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget George Shultz 
and the assistant for International Economic Affairs Peter Peterson, 
decided, without consulting the Europeans, to close the gold window 
and to impose a 10% surtax on all imports to the US�21 The decision 
was announced by the President on August 15, a Sunday evening and a 
holiday in most of Europe (with no newspapers), with a carefully crafted 
televised address�22 
2. The European Response
Nixon’s speech shocked the European governments, which were taken 
by surprise, not even being able to coordinate a diplomatic reaction while 
their currencies started to float in a disorderly fashion� The first reaction 
was strong resentment and a sense of frustration over the unilateral 
character of the decision, taken without any consultation with European 
allies� Probably a better formula to express the feeling of frustration 
shared by the Europeans was that used by the Japanese press, which called 
the American decision to close the gold window “the Nixon Shock”�
European governments had two unpleseant choices to make: they 
could hold unconvertible dollar reserves, or sell them in the currency 
markets, with a forced revaluation of their currencies� A devalued dollar 
helped American exports, and the balance of payments problems would 
be helped by the temporary 10% border tax, a measure which proved to 
be particularly irritating for the European governments�
The floating of the dollar created wild fluctuations among the European 
currencies, wiping out the Werner Plan and the planned monetary union, 
with severe consequences also for the European integration process� The 
Brandt government tried to propose a joint float against the dollar, with 
20 Becker, W�, “The US and the search for a new monetary system”, in Haftendorn, H�, 
Soutou, G�-H�, Szabo, F� & Wells, S� (eds�), The Strategic Triangle, p� 199-201�
21 Basosi, D�, Il governo del dollaro, p� 162-5�
22 Becker, W�, “The US and the search for a new monetary system”, p� 199-201�
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the aim of creating a European bloc against the US, but France insisted 
on a return to fixed exchange rates and tried with all means possible to 
avoid a revaluation of the franc� Italy found itself in the difficult position 
of chairing the EC Council of Ministers and developed a strategy aimed 
at finding a compromise between the US and the Europeans, with the 
goal of promoting an international monetary negotiation covering trade 
issues also�
Only on September 13, following strenous debate, did the Council of 
Ministers publish a communiqué very critical of the US, which requested, 
as a condition prior to starting negotiations inside the International 
Monetary Fund and the Group of Ten leading industrialist countries, 
dollar devaluation, the lifting of the surcharge on imports, a renewed role 
for gold, the alignment of currencies, and, last but not least, a return to 
a fixed exchange rate� 
At the same time, the Europeans opened a channel for negotiations: 
a European delegation visited Washington, headed by Renato Ruggiero, 
Sicco Mansholt and Ralph Dahrendorf� In the debate that developed 
inside the Commission on October 6, which focused on the results 
of the visit, Sicco Mansholt, at that time European Commissioner for 
Agriculture, stressed the need for stronger coordination among the 
European countries, a suggestion which was encouraged also by Raymond 
Barre, in charge of Economic and Monetary Affairs, who pointed out the 
American strategy of negotiating bilaterally with each Government with 
the aim of pitting one against the other without making concessions�23 
In spite of the European efforts, the US government did not propose 
any solution, apart from stating the need for a massive improvement in 
its trade account� As Henry Kissinger noticed, “Connally’s strategy was 
to put forward no specific American proposal to resolve the crisis”�24 The 
government stopped supporting the exchange rate of the dollar, which 
started to float against the other major currencies� 
In the debate which developed inside the Nixon administration on 
the best strategy to pursue in the following months, the US decided “to 
bring maximum pressures on the more instransigent negotiating partners, 
including the French (with regard to monetary issues) and the Common 
Market (on trade issues)� This would be achieved by presenting the 
possibility of a package that might provide the basis for a modus vivendi 
23 Historical Archives of the European Union, Emile Noël Papers, Folder 1050, Compte 
rendu sommaire de la discussion de la Commission, October 6, 1971�
24 Kissinger, H�, The White House Years, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1979, p� 753�
The End of Bretton Woods and the Setting up of the Snake   83
by Christmas�”25 The absence of convertibility was considered “central 
to the US position”, not only for the financial risks, but for the desire 
to maintain a strong hand in future negotiations about the monetary 
system�
However, maintaining such an assertive position for a long time could 
be dangerous� A memorandum worked out by Robert Hormats for Henry 
Kissinger warned of the risks of playing France off against Germany and 
stressed the fact that Secretary Connally could not fully appreciate the 
political implications of attempting to divide Common Market nations 
on economic and monetary issues�26
In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger awarded himself kudos for having 
understood the limit beyond which this disagreement would generate a 
dangerous rift in transatlantic relations, which could be exploited by the 
Soviet Union, and for having convinced John Connally not to cross it� 
“We would”, wrote Kissinger,
have to tread a narrow path between maintaining enough pressure to provide 
an incentive for the adjustments we were seeking, and evoking a trade war as 
well as jeopardizing political relationships built up over decades� I sought to 
make my contribution in finding that balance�27
Despite Kissinger’s words, the wish to repair such a dangerous cleavage 
was also European� Georges Pompidou did not want to start a monetary 
battle against the dollar and, thanks to the friendship which tied Michel 
Jobert, at that time General Secretary at the Élysée, to the American 
Ambassador in Paris, Dick Watson, decided to engage a deal with the 
Nixon administration�28
A compromise was found at the meeting in the Azores between Nixon 
and Pompiduou, which took place on December 13 and 14, 1971� Before 
the meeting, the French President had met the German Chancelor, Willy 
Brandt, in Paris at the beginning of December, and had agreed on a 
common scheme of a concerted floating of European currencies vis-à-vis 
the dollar, which represented the basis of the deal� The new monetary 
order agreed in the Azores established that most of the major currencies 
25 National Archives, College Park, USA, Nixon Presidential Material Staff, National 
Security Council (NSC) Files, Box 356 Monetary Matters, Memorandum for Henry 
Kissinger, Lunch with President, Connally, Shultz, November 24, 1971� Secret�
26 National Archives, College Park, USA, Nixon Presidential Material Staff, National 
Security Council (NSC) Files, Box 356 Monetary Matters, Memorandum for Henry 
Kissinger from Robert Hormats, Economic Policy at the Summit, December 9, 
1971� Secret�
27 Kissinger, Henry, White House Years, p� 755�
28 Roussel, E�, Georges Pompidou, Paris, Lattes, 1994, p� 462�
84 The History of the European Monetary Union
would appreciate against the dollar, while the US would lift the 10% 
surtax on imports and would adopt more flexible margins for exchange 
rates� 
In spite of the triumphalistic press communiqué released at the 
end of the summit, Pompidou was not able to obtain from the Nixon 
administration a return to dollar convertibility into gold, and was 
perfectly aware that the deal was particularly favorable to the US�29 
Richard Nixon, during a Cabinet meeting held on December 15, declared 
that the Azores meeting could be considered “a good deal”�30 And really 
it was a good deal for the US, which had unleashed the dollar from the 
Bretton Woods constraints, maintaining at the same time its centrality in 
the international monetary system�
On December 18, the US, Western European governments, and Japan 
came to an understanding via the so-called Smithsonian agreement, which 
adopted the Azores deal� To salvage a semblance of fixed exchange rates, 
the participants agreed to widen the band within which the currencies 
could fluctuate: the range was extended to 2�5% from the 1% allowed by 
Bretton Woods� 
3. The Setting up of the “Snake”
In spite of the fact that the Smithsonian agreements were hailed as a 
new founding treaty for the international monetary system, they would 
very soon prove to be illusory� 
At the beginning of February 1972 Georges Pompidou wrote a letter 
to Richard Nixon, complaining that the US was not defending the 
agreement as promised in the Azores�31 During a meeting held at the 
end of March in Washington, the German State Secretary Egon Bahr 
expressed to Henry Kissinger the need to avoid any further currency 
crisis in 1972, since the Europeans “would move away from the dollar 
completely and establish a separate reserve basis”�32
29 Guasconi, M� E�, L’Europa tra continuità e cambiamento, p� 137-8�
30 Ibid�, p� 138�
31 National Archives, College Park, USA, Nixon Presidential Material Staff, National 
Security Council (NSC) Files, Box 356 Monetary Matters, Letter from Georges 
Pompidou to Richard Nixon, February 4, 1972�
32 National Archives, College Park, USA, Nixon Presidential Material Staff, National 
Security Council (NSC) Files, Box 685, Germany, Memorandum of a conversation 
between Egon Bahr, Rolf Pauls, Henry Kissinger, Martin Hillenbrand and Helmut 
Sonnenfeldt, March 28, 1972� Secret�
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In the following months the goal of achieving monetary cooperation 
became for the Europeans the “priority of priorities”, whose realization 
would condition the Common Market’s survival�33 At the Paris summit 
of October 1972, the EC heads of state and government once again 
affirmed their determination to achieve the goal of establishing a 
European Monetary Union�
However, the achievement of stronger monetary cooperation was not 
around the corner� In spite of European efforts towards greater monetary 
cooperation, in the following months the Americans did very little to 
defend the new parities and the Smithsonian agreements, so that most 
of the efforts to resist speculation had to stem from the Europeans, in 
particular from West Germany� In July 1972, the German Minister of 
Finance, Helmut Schmidt, expressed very clearly to Henry Kissinger 
German concern and disappointment at the monetary policy pursued by 
the US� “Billions of dollars are floating about the world and Germany is 
taking in too many of them”, affirmed Schmidt� In particular Bonn was 
very worried about the risk of inflation and firmly asked the US to defend 
the Smithsonian agreements�34
The instability of the international monetary system and US passivity 
in the international monetary area convinced the European governments 
to achieve an agreement on monetary cooperation�35 In April 24, the six 
EC members decided to establish a “snake”, which linked their currencies 
and their central banks, in a common attitude towards the US� The snake 
represented a commitment by the Six to keep their exchange rates within 
2�25% of each other by using periodic exchanges of assets linked to gold 
and to foreign exchange� This range of fluctuations reduced the range of 
flexibility among the EC currencies as well as between the EC currencies 
and the dollar�36 In addition, the candidate countries which would enter 
the EC in January 1973, the UK, Denmark and Ireland, took part in 
the “snake”� One year later, in April 1973, a European reserve fund was 
established which required regular contacts between monetary decision-
makers to coordinate their policies� The central banks of the snake 
members were bound to intervene and grant short term credit facilities 
in order to defend the exchange parities�
33 Guasconi, M� E�, L’Europa tra continuità e cambiamento, p� 140� 
34 National Archives, College Park, USA, Nixon Presidential Material Staff, National 
Security Council (NSC) Files, Box 685, Germany, Memorandum of conversation 
between Helmut Schmidt and Henry Kissinger, July 20, 1972� Secret�
35 National Archives, College Park, USA, Nixon Presidential Material Staff, National 
Security Council (NSC) Files, Box 356 Monetary matters, Memorandum for Henry 
Kissinger from Robert Hormats, August 2, 1972� Secret�
36 Bussière, E�, “International monetary system crisis”, p� 181�
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As a consequence, one of the major problems of the snake was the 
organization of solidarity among the European countries and their 
central banks� With the Americans which did very little to defend the 
new exchange parities, the burden to resist speculation weighed mainly 
on European and in particular on German’ shoulders� For weak-currency 
countries, such as Italy, participation in the snake was simply too 
expensive, in terms of reserves to be spent to defend the parities and a 
heavy constraint in their domestic economic policy37� 
4. Conclusions
In a conversation with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger held on 
October 1, 1973, a few days before the Yom Kippur War, the President 
of the European Commission, François Xavier Ortoli, affirmed: “I think 
that the monetary question hangs above us like an atomic cloud� And it 
is very important that it be resolved, not just for us but for the rest of the 
world�”38 
Ortoli’s words expressed very clearly the worries shared by the 
European governments about the instability of the monetary system� In 
fact, the life of the snake proved to be very difficult� In June 1972 the 
British pound left the snake, followed by the Italian lira in February 1973 
and the French franc in 1974� Only the deutschmark, the Dutch guilder 
and the Belgian franc remained inside the snake� In March 1973 the EC 
members (excluding Italy) decided on a joint float and on ceasing to buy 
dollars� Inflation was rampant and the commodity market was in chaos 
well before the oil shock of October 1973� 
However, the final blow to the snake’s life was represented by the oil 
crisis of October 1973, which diminished hope for a quick reform of the 
international monetary system and forced France to leave it in January 
1974, thus transforming it in a deutschmark zone�
In spite of the snake’s short and difficult life, this experiment 
represented a turning point for European monetary cooperation� The goal 
of stronger monetary cooperation would now be pursued energetically by 
the European leaders, especially by the two former Finance Ministers, 
37 Kreile, M�, The search for a New Monetary System, in Haftendorn, H�, Soutou, G�-H�, 
Szabo, F�  & Wells, S� (eds�), The Strategic Triange, p� 163.
38 National Archives, College Park, USA, Nixon Presidential Material Staff, National 
Security Council (NSC) Files, Box 322, European Common Market, Memorandum 
of conversation between Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger and François-Xavier 
Ortoli, October 1, 1973� Secret�
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the German Helmut Schmidt and the French Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, 
who would play a dominant role in the establishment in 1978 of the 
European Monetary System, which can be considered the first nucleus of 
the monetary union launched in 1999�

The European Monetary System1
Giovanni Battista PittaluGa
The European Monetary System has been an exchange rate 
agreement between the main European countries, in force from 1979 
to 1992� The reasons for its creation were mainly political� With its 
establishment the founders wanted to give new impetus to the political 
cohesion among European countries and make a further step towards a 
European political union�
The initiative of the project was essentially Franco-German� The other 
founding countries, primarily Italy, joined this project mainly because 
they were linked to the two promoting countries by economic ties (the 
Customs Union) and foreign policy (the Atlantic Alliance)�
Within the EMS two phases are usually identified� The one between 
1979 and 1986, called the “flexible” EMS and marked by numerous 
realignment of parity, and that between 1987 and 1992, called the “rigid” 
EMS, in which realignments were substantially absent� 
In this paper we try to give answers to two main questions: the EMS 
has been a success or a failure? What were the causes of the 1992 crisis of 
the EMS and its substantial collapse? 
The first section discusses the reasons for the setting up of the EMS 
and its institutional architecture� The second section describes how the 
EMS actually worked� In the third section we try to answer the question 
whether the EMS has been a successful historical experience� The reasons 
of the 1992 crisis are dealt with in the fourth section� In the conclusion 
we briefly retrace the arguments made in the preceding sections and draw 
some policy indications� 
1 I want to thank Elena Seghezza for the comments on the first version of this 
contribution�
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1. EMS Setting-up and Institutional Architecture
The idea of a monetary integration is already present in the Treaty of 
Rome of 1957 where, in art� 108, the policy of exchange rates is defined 
as a “matter of common concern”� In the late 1960s and early 1970s the 
Barre Plan and the subsequent Werner Report put forward the proposal 
to form a European monetary union� 
This proposal was not implemented because, after the oil crisis, 
European countries faced this shock adopting very different economic 
policies� Because of these differences, the so-called currency snake, which 
included limits on exchange rate fluctuations, failed� 
The first impetus to the establishment of the EMS came from Roy 
Jenkins, President of the European Commission from 1977 to 1981� In 
a Jean Monnet lecture delivered in October 1977, he asked for a new 
Community initiative in the monetary sphere�2
Such a solicitation was endorsed by French President Giscard 
d’Esteing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt who started contacts 
and negotiations in order to initiate this project�3 The EMS became 
operational on March 13, 1979� The countries that at the beginning 
gave their adhesion to this exchange rate agreement were eight (France, 
Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Netherland, Germany and 
Italy)� 
The EMS have been given different interpretations� A first 
interpretation leads back the monetary agreement to the desire of 
European countries to anchor their currencies to the Deutschmark and 
import the German anti-inflation credibility�4 
The hypothesis just mentioned does not explain the wide support given 
by Germany, in particular by Chancellor Schmidt, to the establishment 
of the EMS� Why this country, with high anti-inflation credibility, should 
have had an interest in promoting an exchange rate agreement in order 
to reduce domestic inflation? Similar considerations can be done for the 
other founding countries who enjoyed a low inflation rate� 
A second interpretation of the EMS leads back its creation to 
interest groups’ pressures� According to Frieden (2002) cross-border 
investors, financial actors and export-competing producers of specialized 
manufactured goods are in favor of fixed exchange rates� These interest 
2 See Jenkins (1977)�
3 See Ludlow (1982)�
4 On this aspect see Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), Weber (1991), Broz (2002) and 
Fratianni and Von Hagen (1992)� 
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groups exerted pressure in European countries for the establishment of 
a fixed exchange rate system that in some way, at least in a limited area, 
subrogate the Bretton Woods system ended in 1971�
This interpretation, however, does not explain why the pressures of 
the interest group just mentioned were higher than those of producers 
of standardized import-competing and export goods� Moreover, it does 
not take into account politicians and governments� The latter, of course, 
being interested in elections, care about the consequences of a particular 
exchange rate regime on output growht and on the distribution of income� 
They, however, besides to be subject to pressures, generally are political 
entepreneurs: they have ideals and projects to pursue and realize� In a few 
words, their choices do not reflect in any way the preferences of interest 
groups� 
A third interpretation of the EMS gives a primary role to political 
factors, in primis to international relations� In a phase of substantial 
retreat of USA compared to the growing influence of the USRR in 
different theaters of the world, it was felt by the major European powers 
the need to make progress towards a political union of Europe� 
This behaviour would have allowed to deal with four main problems:5 
i� counter the military threat of the Soviet Union at a time of relative 
weakening of the United States;
ii� consolidate the European economy, and thus its political and 
military force, by encouraging intra-European trade with the 
adoption of a fixed exchange rate system;
iii� finde a solution to the German question, anchoring the renewed 
economic strenght of Germany to western Europe, in a context of 
friendly relations with France, its traditional enemy� This process 
would be facilitated by a fixed exchange rate system, which would 
have protected Germany from policies of beggar-thy-neighbour 
from the other European partners;
iv� favoring a higher political stability in countries such as France 
and Italy, marked by a pronounced distributive conflict and high 
inflation�
The political hypothesis just illustrated seems the most convincing 
explanation, even though on the founding countries’ adhesion decision 
also other factors, such as those evoked in the other interpretations, may 
have played a role�
5 See De Vries (1980)�
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It should, finally, be remarked how in the political hypothesis, the 
exchange rate agreement was promoted by Germany and France not so 
much with the intention of encouraging the emergence of a third Power, an 
alternative to the United States and Soviet Union, but rather to strenghten 
the Atlantic Alliance’s role in Europe at a time of weakening US�
The validity of the political hypothesis is confirmed when one considers 
the way in which Italy decided to join the EMS� The debate in our 
country was very eager�6 A large part of the political parties, trade unions, 
entrepreneurs and economists7 believed that Italy had no convenience to 
join the EMS� This opinion was shared by the government led by Giulio 
Andreotti� 
Also the governor of the Bank of Italy, Paolo Baffi, believed that Italy, 
given the high growth in labor costs and the heavy imbalances in the 
public finances, was not able to maintain a fixed exchange rate with 
countries, such as Germany, marked by a low rate of inflation�8
In early November 1978, however, Chancellor Schmidt met the Italian 
Prime Minister in Siena� The terms of that meeting are still unknown� The 
fact is that after this meeting Andreotti changed his mind, and in this way 
also changed the government line�9 The result was a upheaval in the Italian 
political equilibrium, and a change of the majority political coalition�10
The above arguments lead us to conclude that the underlying political 
reasons for the construction of the EMS were dominant over economic 
ones� 
The decision to set up the EMS, taken at a European Council meeting 
in Brussels in December 1978, foresaw a system of fixed, but adjustable, 
exchange rates (Exchange rate mechanism, ERM)� 
The main components of ERM were four pillars:11
a� parity grid;
b� mutual support;
6 A survey of the debate among economists can be found in Masini (2004)� Some 
important contributions were by Andreatta (1978), Modigliani (1978), Ossola 
(1978) and Masera (1980)� 
7 See, for example, Monti (1978) and Padoan and Rodano (1978)� Spaventa (1978) 
in an important parliamentary speech gave expression to the point of view of the 
political opposition, arguing that EMS would have determined in Italy a slow-down 
of GDP growth and an increase in the unemployment rate� 
8 See Baffi (1978a; 1978b)�
9 See Ludlow (1982) and Varsori (2004)�
10 See Gualtieri (2004: 189)�
11 A description of the way the EMS worked can be found in Gros and Thygesen 
(1992)�
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c� joint management of exchange rate realignments;
d� the European currency unit�
The parity grid was a matrix-like table collecting all pairwise central 
parities and their associated margins� 
All currencies were fixed to each other, with a band of fluctuation of 
±2�25 around the central parity (ECU)�
The responsability of maintaining the bilateral parity was equally 
divided between the two countries concerned� With the mutual support, it 
was expected that when the bilateral parity of a currency is threatened the 
central banks of both countries would undertake unlimited interventions 
to defend the fixed parity� 
In order to avoid “beggar-thy-neighbour” behaviours, EMS member 
countries committed to a joint management of exchange rate realignments. 
In this way it was categorically excluded the possibility of unilateral 
realignments� 
The last pillar was represented by the creation of a unit of account, the 
ECU� The latter was a basket of the currencies of all countries participating 
in the EMS� Each currency was weighted with the GDP and the share of 
trade of the country� 
2. The Way the System Worked
The EMS, at the time of its constituency, was in many ways similar 
to the Bretton Woods system�12 As the latter, it was a a system of fixed, 
but adjustable, exchange rates, that, thanks to the existence of limits on 
capital movements, allowed a fair monetary autonomy�13 As the latter, 
it was the result of an agreement among countries that undertook to 
respect certain rules�
Compared to the Bretton Woods system, however, it presents some 
important differences� First, none of the member countries’ currency 
was pegged to a commodity money� As known, in the Bretton Woods 
system, the dollar was pegged to gold, and the other currency to the 
dollar� This put the dollar in a privileged position compared to other 
currencies and gave the opportunity to the United States to enjoy the 
right of seigniorage� The EMS, being based on bilateral parities, posed 
no currency in a privileged position compared to others� 
12 See Giavazzi et al� (1988), “Introduction”�
13 On the structure of Bretton Woods system see Gazzo and Seghezza (2012)�
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Second, the parity realignment, while in the Bretton Woods system 
could be decided by a single country (given the IMF consent), in the 
EMS it had to be shared by all member countries� 
Apart from these differences, the analogy between the EMS and the 
Bretton Woods system was high, particularly in the first phase of the 
EMS, that from 1979 and 1986� The phase was called by Giavazzi and 
Spaventa (1990) the “flexible” EMS� 
In this phase, in fact, member countries, given the existence of 
restrictions on capital movements, enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy 
in monetary policy� These margins were then increased by the fact that at 
this stage frequent reallignments of exchange rates were possible�
The situation gradually changed after the removal of capital controls 
required by the Treaty of 1986 on the Single Market� 
In the late Eighties and early Nineties all member countries liberalized 
capital markets� In the new situation, it was difficult to reach multilateral 
agreements on parity realignments without arousing currency speculation 
and encourage financial market tensions� 
This helps to explain why, between 1987 and 1992 (that is in the 
“rigid” EMS phase),14 it was decided not to conduct realignments despite 
significant changes in the real exchange rates of some countries� 
In this context, EMS member countries saw gradually shrink their 
monetary policy discretion and emerge a leader country, Germany, 
which, enjoying lower inflation than the others, was able to impose its 
monetary policy� 
In a nutshell, the so-called “n-1 problem” faced by fixed exchange rate 
regimes came out� This problem implies that, since there are only n-1 
exchange rates among the n countries participating in an exchange rate 
agreement, either a country becomes the leader and sets monetary policy 
for all, or monetary policy is set by all countries together, in a cooperative 
way�15
The consolidation of the leadership of the mark meant a strong 
squeeze of other countries’ monetary sovereignty�16
Since the convergence process of infation rates was not completed, this 
would inevitably favored the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances 
and the final collapse of the system� 
14 According to the definition given by Giavazzi and Spaventa (1990)�
15 On this aspect see De Grauwe (1997)�
16 See Fratianni and Von Hagen (1990; 1992)�
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It was the awareness of this problem and its negative consequences that 
led the Authorities of European countries to think about the adoption of 
a single currency and to design the institutional architecture that would 
allow a collective management of the monetary policy� 
3. Was the EMS a Success or a Failure? 
Behind the establishment of the EMS there was the intent to 
strenghten Europe’s political unity, by stabilizing the exchange rates of 
the European countries�
In fact, as shown by several scholars,17 the variability of exchange rates 
among EMS countries plummeted� By contrast, non-EMS exchange rate 
variability increased significantly after the establishment of the EMS�
The reduction in the exchange rate volatility within EMS countries 
was mainly due to the reduction of inflation differentials (Table 1)�
Table 1 – Consumer price inflation
1978 1983 1987 1992
Germany 2�7 3�3 0�2 4�0
France 9�1 9�6 3�3 2�4
Italy 12�1 14�7 4�7 5�3
UK 8�2 4�6 4�1 3�7
Source: Banca d’Italia (1988; 1993)�
The decrease in the inflation rate between 1978 and 1987 was 
particularly high for countries that, at the time of their adhesion to the 
EMS, were suffering from high inflation rates� 
In these countries the rate of inflation decreased a lot between 1983 
and 1987, i�e� when the effects of the second oil shock were finished� 
In this span of time, for example, the inflation rate was reduced by 
10 percentage points in Italy and 6�2 percentage points in France� 
There is a debate, not yet conclusive, on the question whether the 
EMS has been a determining factor in encouraging the reduction of 
inflation for those member countries characterized by high inflation� 
Some empirical studies confirm this hypothesis,18 others reject it�19
17 See, among others, Ungerer et al� (1986) and Artis and Taylor (1989)�
18 See among others Giavazzi and Giovannini (1988), Gressani et al� (1991) and Bini 
Smaghi (1994)� 
19 See Ungerer et al� (1986), De Grauwe (1990) and Eichengreen (2000)� 
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The fact remains that by joining the EMS countries marked by high 
inflation rates could adopt an exchange-rate based stabilization process�20 
They could, therefore, benefit from the advantages that a disinflation 
process of this type involves, in particular, of the gradualism with which 
it acts on output�21
The relatively low costs in terms of output loss that accompany an 
exchange-rate based disinflation policy imply lower political costs than 
those involved by a money-based disinflation policy�
Countries characterized by a high social conflict and uncertain 
political majorities may find it difficult to undertake a money-based 
disinflation process, i�e� to take responsibility for decisions that involve a 
drastic reduction in output and rising unemployment� 
As shown by the cases of France and Italy, at least in the short-term, 
the costs of disinflation in terms of decrease of real GDP22 were limited 
and, in any case, much lower than those suffered by the UK, which used 
a money-based disinflation process (Table 2)�
Table 2 – Output growth since the beginning of disinflation(1)
In the following 
three years
In the following 
four years
In the following 
eight years
Italy +1�1 +2�4 +11�8
France +2�8 +6�0 +13�0
UK -3�3 +1�3 +14�6
(1) Sum of outuput growth in the period after the peak of inflation of 1979�
Source: Banca d’Italia (1988)� 
We have to wonder if the comparison between the costs of the 
two different disinflation processes considered, i�e� money-based and 
exchange-rate based, should only relate to the loss of output and not 
even to changes in the production structure they entail� 
For example, it is likely that an exchange-rate disinflation process, 
when it determines a protracted appreciation of the real exchange 
rate, significantly penalizes the producers of import-competing and 
export goods� In the “flexible” phase of the EMS this distorting effect 
20 Generally we distinguish between two different paths of disinflation: the money-based 
stabilization (MBS) and the exchange-rate-based stabilization (ERBS)� The difference 
between these mechanisms of stabilization lies in the selection of the nominal anchor 
to bring inflation down� 
21 See among others Calvo and Vègh (1994)� 
22 See Okun (1978)�
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was avoided thank to frequent realignments of exchange rate parities 
(Table 3)� 











































































Legend: - = % devaluation; + = % revaluation; B% = new band; En% = entry band� 
Despite these frequent realignments, between 1978 and 1986, and 
even more between 1978 and 1992, the structure of the productive 
apparatus of our country has changed profoundly�23 The share of services 
in GDP and even more the share of employed in this sector on total 
employment increased significantly (Table 4)�
Table 4 – Employment by sector in Italy (in percentage)
Self-employed Employees Total
Agricolture Industry Services and 
other activities
Total
1979 28�3 5�5 32�2 34�1 71�7 100
1987 29�4 3�8 26�7 40�0 70�6 100
1992 28�3 3�5 26�4 41�8 71�7 100
Source: Banca d’Italia (1988; 1993)�
The pronounced increase in the employment share of not-for-
sale services suggests that the public sector has absorbed part of the 
employed expelled from the industrial sector� This suggest that part of the 
23 See Pittaluga and Seghezza (2012: 128-129)�
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disinflation costs have been absorbed in our country through an increase 
in current public spending� 
The process of convergence of inflation rates within the EMS has been 
accompanied by a similar process in monetary growth (Table 5)�
Table 5 – Money growth (1) during the “flexible” EMS phase
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Germany 11�0 5�7 6�2 5�0 7�2 5�5 4�5 7�8 6�8 6�0
France 13�4 13�1 8�2 13�6 11�9 13�6 9�5 5�9 4�0 4�3
Italy 22�6 20�8 12�7 10�0 18�1 12�3 12�1 11�0 9�4 8�4
UK 15�5 12�5 18�3 25�6 8�9 11�1 10�0 13�2 20�4 22�8
(1) For France and Italy M2; for Germany and UK, M3� 
Source: Banca d’Italia (1988)�
Because of the Fisher effect,24 the process of convergence of money 
market real interest rates was slower than that of the inflation rate� 
In particular, in countries like France and Italy, characterized by high 
inflation rates upon entry into the EMS, these interest rates have become 
positive and growing since 1981 (Table 6)� 
Table 6 – Money market real interest rates(1)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Germany 1�4 5�4 4�7 4�5 1�3 2�2 3�4 2�6 5�0 3�4
France -2�4 1�8 -1�9 1�9 0�9 2�6 3�3 3�2 5�4 5�5
Italy -0�3 0�9 -4�2 3�6 2�6 2�3 3�9 3�9 4�4 7�0
UK 4�2 3�4 -3�3 3�6 1�9 3�8 4�8 5�7 7�0 4�6
(1) Deflationated using the Consumer price index inflation� 
Source: Banca d’Italia (1988)�
Based on the considerations and evidence discussed in this section we 
conclude that the EMS was an exchange rate arrangement which drew 
benefits to all participating countries� It created an area of stable exchange 
rates, prevented beggar-thy-neighbours policies, and, thus helped to 
consolidate the EU, while preserving the Common Agricultural Policy� 
In addition, countries characterized by high inflation rates at the time 
of the establishment of the EMS, anchoring their exchange rate to the 
mark (i�e� the currency of a virtuous country under the inflation profile), 
could disinflationate their economies� 
24 See Ungerer et al� (1986)�
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The costs of disinflation were relatively low because it was an exchange-
rate-based stabilization and because of the frequent realignments that 
occurred between 1979 and 1987� 
4. The Crisis of 1992
At its establishment several scholars were skeptical regarding the 
long-term viability of the EMS�25 This viability was severly undermined 
by institutional developments that came in after 1986 and mainly by 
the liberalization of capital movements and the decision not to proceed 
further realignments of exchange rates� 
The approval of the Single Market Agreement in 1986 was a step to 
build a single European capital market� That agreement provided, among 
other things, the removal of controls on capital movements� Because 
of that, realignments of exchange rates became problematic� In fact, as 
soon as a rumor was leaked that authorities of member countries were 
negotiating an adjustment of parities, a speculative attack on the weak 
currencies would have developed�
It is primarily for this reason that between January 1987 and August 
1992 there were no realignments� By contrast, between January 1979 
and December 1986 there were eleven realignments� These two different 
periods of the EMS, therefore, have been defined “soft” and “hard” EMS�26
The first turbulences within the EMS came out in June 1992, when 
Denmark in a referendum decided not to join the EMU project� The 
outcome of this referendum induced a public perception that the 
project to complete the monetary union of Europe would have been 
stranded� 
The exchange rate of the currencies of the weaker countries of EMS,27 
in primis the Italian lira, reached the lower limit of the oscillation band� 
Currency tensions increased as a result of the uncertain outcome of the 
French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, established on September 20� 
An Ecofin meeting was held in Bath in early September to give a 
coordinated response to these tensions� The outcome of this meeting was, 
however, a failure, since, during the meeting, it emerged that member 
countries had very different positions� 
25 See De Grauwe and Peeters (1979), Vaubel (1979) and Cohen (1981)� 
26 See Giavazzi and Spaventa (1990)� 
27 That is the Italian lira, sterling, the peseta and the escudo� 
100 The History of the European Monetary Union
In particular, Germany refused to reduce its domestic interest 
rate, raised after 1989 to counter the inflation rate acceleration due to 
unification� In most other countries, given the economic slowdown, an 
adjustment of the interest rate to the German one became unsustainable�
This stalemate of the negotiations, together with the event just 
described, led to a change in investor expectations�
In the presence of large outflows of currency induced by this change 
of expectations and the deregulation of capital movements, the exchange 
rates of the weaker countries were pushed to the relevant intervention 
margins� The authorities of these countries decided to counter speculative 
attacks bringing interest rates to unusual levels (Figure 1)�28















Source: Banca d’Italia (1993)�
This rise in interest rates had limited effects� On September 13 the 
German and Italian authorities proposed a realignment of parities� The 
Bundesbank undertook to simultaneusly reduce domestic interest rates� 
None of the other countries participating in the EMS accepted the 
proposal� 
Despite on September 14 the German Central Bank reduced the 
official interest rate, the weaker countries of the system, in particular UK 
and Italy, were affected by large capital outflows� 
28 For a narration of the 1992 crisis see Eichengreen (2000)�
The European Monetary System  101
Two days after UK decided to abandon the exchange rate arrangement� 
Following this decision, Italy decided to suspend interventions to defend 
the lira� Such interventions, since the beginning of the crisis, had cost to 
our country the depletion of 29 billion liras of foreign reserves�
On August 2, 1993, the countries still part of the EMS decided to 
widen the allowed fluctuation range of the exchange rate from ± 2�25 to 
±15 per cent, leaving central parities unchanged� To this date can be 
traced the effective conclusion of the experience of the EMS� Starting 
from January 1, 1994, began the second phase of the European Monetary 
process, as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty� 
Prevailing interpretations of the 1992 EMS crisis are essentially two 
and make reference to the currency crisis models of first and second 
generation�29 
As it is known, in the first generation of models, foreign exchange crisis 
are traced back to macroeconomic imbalances, in particular persistent 
current account deficits, generated by wrong policy choices�30
In the second generation models, currency crisis is attributed to self-
fulfilling expectations:31 the expectation of the currency depreciation 
forces authorities to counter the outflow of capital and foreign reserves 
through a rise in the domestic interest rate� At some point, however, 
further increases in the interest rate become unviable given the economic 
and social costs that they entail� 
Those who interpret the 1992 crisis on the basis of the first generation 
models, insist on the fact that several countries pursued through the EMS 
an exchange-rate stabilization process� In processes of this type, since the 
nominal exchange rate is fixed and the deceleration of inflation is slow, 
the real exchange rate tends to appreciate� Consequently, a country that 
pursues an exchange-rate based stabilization loses competitiveness: its 
trade balance goes in deficit� 
Between 1987 and 1992 the real exchange rate32 of Italy appreciated 
by 8�5 per cent� An analogous appreciation happened in UK (8�1 per 
cent) (Table 7)�
29 A survey of these interpretations is in Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993)�
30 See Krugman (1979)�
31 See Flood and Garber (1994) and Obstfeld (1986)�
32 Measured with respect to unit labor costs�
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Table 7 – Real exchange rates(1)
France Germany Italy UK
1983 96�9 85�1 104�4 117�1
1984 98�0 83�8 102�4 112�1
1985 100�0 82�5 99�9 113�2
1986 101�0 89�6 101�2 103�7
1987 100�0 100�0 100�0 100�0
1988 95�3 100�3 99�3 106�4
1989 90�7 99�5 105�6 105�5
1990 92�8 103�3 110�0 109�5
1991 91�1 101�8 111�3 112�6
1992 92�2 105�5 108�5 108�1
(1) Based on unit labor costs�
Source: Banca d’Ialia (1993)�
Always between 1987 and 1992, Italy and UK had persistent and 
sizeable current account deficits (Table 8)�
Table 8 – Current account balances (billions of dollars)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
France -5�2 -0�9 - 2�4 -4�4 -4�8 -5�6 -13�8 -6�1 2�4
Germany 5�4 9�6 17�0 40�1 46�3 50�6 57�6 46�3 -19�5 -25�1
Italy 1�5 -2�4 -3�4 2�8 -1�5 -5�9 -10�9 -14�4 -21�4 -25�4
UK 5�5 2�1 3�9 - -7�6 -28�8 -35�6 -29�4 -11�4 -20�9
Source: Banca d’Italia (1993)�
If it is true that both Italy and UK between 1987 and 1992 were 
affected by a significant appreciation of the real exchange rate, it is equally 
true that in other countries, then hit by the crisis, this phenomenon did 
not occur�
Uncertainties about the validity of the interpretations of the 1992 
crisis based on first generation models led some economists to believe 
that this crisis can best be interpreted in the light of the second generation 
models� 
In this perspective, they emphasize that, between 1987 and 1991, 
countries such as Italy and Spain, marked by an inflation rate higher than 
EMS countries’ average inflation, having higher nominal interest rates, 
were affected by strong capital inflows� 
The negative outcome of the Danish referendum led to a change in 
expectations regaring the completion of monetary union� The weaker 
countries were affected first by a decline in capital inflows, and then by 
capital outflows� 
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Attempting to counter these outflows with increases in domestic 
interest rates proved, beyond a certain limit, impractical� The defence of 
the exchange rate would require interest rates so high as to compromise 
the solidity of the economy and social cohesion� This intolerable cost 
explains the collapse in 1992 of the EMS� 
5. Conclusions
In the introduction it was said that this contribution is meant to 
answer two questions� At the first of these questions, namely whether 
the EMS has been a success, we are given a substantially positive answer� 
The exchange rate arrangement, in fact, strenghtened the cohesion 
among member countries along two lines� On the one hand, providing 
for fixed, although adjustable, exchange rates, it encouraged a growth of 
within Europe trade and eliminated the risk of competitive devaluations 
and their negative impacts on the custom union� 
On the other hand, the EMS fostered a process of convergence of 
inflation rates in member countries, facilitating the subsequent monetary 
integration�
To the second question, that is the causes of the 1992 crisis and 
the EMS collapse, we are given an answer within the first generation 
currency crisis models� In fact, the crisis of the pound, and especially that 
of the lira, seem to be mainly derived from macroeconomic imbalances, 
particularly by persistent current account deficits� This does not mean 
that the crisis of these currencies then resulted in a lack of confidence in 
the wholse system and in its collapse� 
The 1992 crisis has clearly highlighted the limits of fixed exchange 
rate regimes� In particular, it showed that the policy of “tie one hands” by 
adopting a fixed exchange rate has short-run effects, since it constrains 
a country marked by high inflation to adopt the monetary policy of the 
virtuous country� This policy, however, is not able to promote appropriate 
convergence of the institutional structure and the “culture” of different 
countries� 
Beyond the short term, the persistence of institutional and cultural 
differences between countries determines the emergence of real exchange 
rates different from the equilibrium ones and, consequently, current 
account imbalances� Therefore, as Loureiro (1996; p� 128) writes, in the 
medium-long period “the hope that pegging the exchange rate do makes 
good intentions credible remains an illusion”� 
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The Role of Giulio Andreotti in the Birth  
of the EMS and of the Monetary Union
Daniela Preda
Giulio Andreotti played an important role in the European monetary 
unification process, whose key moments occurred when he was head 
of the Italian government� He was Prime Minister in two consecutive 
governments, from 1972 to 1973, at the time the Snake was born and 
during the instability of the Bretton Woods system and the international 
monetary disarray following the Nixon Administration’s decision to 
suspend the convertibility of the U�S� dollar into gold in August of 1971� 
He was Prime Minister again from July 1976 to August 1979, when the 
EMS was born, as well as foreign Minister during the Craxi governments 
and the successive Fanfani, Goria and De Mita governments, from 
August 1983 to July 1989, during the negotiation and approval of the 
Single European Act� Finally, he was Prime Minister from July 1989 to 
June 1992, when the Economic and Monetary Union was launched� 
He was a key player as both Prime Minister and foreign Minister in 
the various European negotiations leading to the creation of the EMS; 
while steadfastly defending Italy’s interests, he gave priority to European 
political integration, remaining faithful to De Gasperi’s line, even though 
he adopted different methods and strategies�
This paper will focus on Andreotti’s role in the birth of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) – including an appendix on the inception 
of the Monetary Union – emphasizing the relations with Europeanist 
and federalist economic study groups and bringing to light the close 
connection afforded monetary, political and economic integration by the 
Italian government�
1.  Toward the EMS. The Contribution of the Study Groups
The decision by Andreotti’s centrist government to withdraw 
the lira from the monetary Snake in February 1973 led to growing 
misunderstandings between Italy and its European partners, opening the 
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way for the practice of “competitive devaluations”, which was unpopular 
in Brussels� The commitment of the Europeanists, who, after Italy had left 
the Monetary Snake had doubled their efforts to gain the government’s 
support for the monetary issue, was in vain�1 
After the Paris Summit midway through the Seventies, the prospects 
for the direct election of the European Parliament appeared to make 
politically feasible an institutional development that would achieve and 
manage monetary unification, thereby guaranteeing the strengthening 
of the mechanisms of community solidarity needed to allow the weaker 
countries to abandon exchange rate maneuvers in an attempt to compete 
with stronger ones� It was a hectic moment that presaged important 
changes in Europe� In February 1976, the European Movement, under 
the presidency of Jean Rey, convened a “Congress of Europe” in Brussels, 
participating in which were the most renowned Europeanist figures, 
among whom Andreotti� During the Congress, Willy Brandt stated that 
the Parliament “should view itself as the permanent constituent assembly 
of Europe”�2
As often occurred during the European unification process, several 
forces in favor of re-launching European unification had for some 
time been preparing fertile ground for European initiatives regarding 
monetary unification through an effective action of ‘tillage’� Ties were 
established among the most important economists through their common 
participation on official committees; in addition, informal groups were 
created at the European level, thereby creating a continual flow of ideas 
and proposals and focusing the attention of the political authorities and 
public opinion on the topics of monetary integration�
Beginning at the end of the Fifties, one of the most influential forums 
for the economic-monetary debate was Jean Monnet’s Comité d’Action 
pour les États-Unis d’Europe,3 which included distinguished members 
1 Among these efforts was the national convention organized by the Italian Committee 
of the European Movement in 1973, led by Petrilli Giuseppe� Cf� Orsello, Gian 
Piero, I movimenti per l’unità europea, in I movimenti per l’unità europea 1970-1986, 
edited by Ariane Landuyt and Daniela Preda, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000, p� 1035-
1051�
2 Willy Brandt’s speech to the Congress of Europe organized by the European 
Movement in Brussels on 5-7 February 1976, in L’Unità europea, III (1976), No� 25, 
p� 9-12�
3 On the activities of the Monnet Committee see Dumoulin, Michel, Robert Triffin, 
le CAEUE de Jean Monnet et les questions monétaires européennes (1969-1974). 
Inventaire des papiers Triffin, Louvain-la Neuve,-Ciaco, 1988; Fontaine, Pascal, 
Le Comité d’Action pour les États-Unis d’Europe de Jean Monnet, Lausanne, Centre 
de Recherches européennes, 1974; Yondorf, Walter, “Monnet and the Action 
Committee� The Formative Period of the European Communities”, International 
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such as Triffin4, Uri, Delouvrier, Marjolin, Clappier and Carli� Another 
highly active, though less well-known network on monetary issues, in 
particular the topic of the “parallel currency”, was the Villa Pamphli 
group,5 created in 1976 through the efforts of Giovanni Magnifico� 
The Group included Lord Cromer, Geoffrey Denton, Armin Gutowski, 
Norbert Kloten, Alexandre Lamfalussy, Andrei Shonfield, Pierre Uri, 
Robert Triffin, Conrad Oort6 and J� Van Ypersèle� In 1977, the European 
Commission brought together an independent group of economists, 
under the leadership of MacDougall, including among others Michael 
Emerson and Francesco Forte�7
These groups are already known to historiography�8 Other initiatives 
could be added in this regard in which the Italian presence is significantly 
scarce, in particular the group of young economists that gravitated 
Organization, 19  (1965), p�  885-912; Meynaud, Jean, Sidianski, Dusan, “Le 
Comité d’Action pour les États-Unis d’Europe”, in Annuaire européen, 13 (1965), 
p�  3-27; Varsori, Antonio, “Jean Monnet e il Comitato d’Azione per gli Stati 
Uniti d’Europa dalle origini ai Trattati di Roma (1955-1957)”, in Ciampani, 
Andrea (ed�), L’altra via per l’Europa. Forze sociali e organizzazione degli interessi 
nell’ integrazione europea (1947-1957), Milan, FrancoAngeli, 1995, p�  139-170; 
Id�, Jean Monnet e il Comitato d’Azione per gli Stati Uniti d’Europa tra MEC ed 
Euratom, in I movimenti per l’unità europea 1954-1969, edited by Sergio Pistone, 
Pavia, PIME, 1996, p� 349-371; Melchionni, Maria Grazia, “Le Comité d’Action 
pour les États-Unis d’Europe  : un réseau au service de l’union européenne”, in 
Bossuat, Gérard et Wilkens, Andreas (dir�), Jean Monnet, l’Europe et les chemins 
de la paix, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999, p� 221-251�
4 On Triffin see Koeune, Jean Claude, Lamfalussy, Alexandre (eds�), In search of a New 
World Monetary Order, Bruxelles, P�I�E� Peter Lang, 2012; Montani, Guido, “Robert 
Triffin and the Economic Problem of the 20th century”, in Il Federalista, Vol� XXXI 
(1989), No� 3� See also the essay by Ivo Maes in this book�
5 In 1977 the Group published a Manifesto� Cf� Balossa, B�, “Riforme monetarie e 
Mercato Comune Europeo� Manifesto di Villa Pamphili”, in Moneta e Credito, 
No� 118, 1977, p� 131-148� See also Masini, Fabio, SMEmorie della lira. Gli economisti 
italiani e l’adesione al Sistema monetario europeo, Milan, FrancoAngeli 2004�
6 Oort, Conrad J�, Steps to International Monetary Order, Washington D�C�, Per 
Jacobsson Foundation, 1974�
7 The Group is also responsible for the famous Mac Dougall Report – The Role of Public 
Finance in European Integration – published in 1977� An advisor of Jenkins and of the 
Treasury, Mac Dougall was head economic advisor of the British industrial federation� 
Members of the committee included professors Dieter Biehl, Arthur Brown, Francesco 
Forte, Yves Fréville, Martin O’Donoghue, Theo Peeters, and the collaborators Wallace 
Oates and Russell Mathews, in addition to several executives from the European 
Commission’s Directorate General of Economic and Financial Affairs, including the 
director, Paul Van den Bempt, and Michael Emerson, the division head�
8 See in particular Ludlow, Piers, The Making of the European Monetary System, 
London, Butterworth Scientific, 1982; Ludlow, Piers, Spaventa, Luigi, The Political 
and Diplomatic Origins of the European Monetary System: July 1977-March 1979, 
Florence, European University Institute, 1979�
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toward the President of the Union européenne des fédéralistes (UEF),9 
Mario Albertini:10 professors Guido Montani, Alberto Majocchi, Dario 
Velo, the director of planning and management control of Holding Fiat, 
Antonio Mosconi, the head of the research service of the Istituto Bancario 
San Paolo of Turin, Alfonso Jozzo, and Domenico Moro, an executive in 
the economic studies group of Fiat�
Already in 1969 federalists had raised the issue of how to respond to the 
crisis in the Bretton Woods system, organizing two conventions in Turin, 
where the proposal was made to create a European reserve system�11 In 
December of 1976, the European Federalist Movement (EFM) organized 
a convention in Pavia12 on the topic of “A currency for Europe”, in which 
supporters and detractors of the single currency participated, among 
whom the Director General of the Ministry of Finance in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Manfred Lahnstein, who at that time was among 
the sceptics, and the economic advisor of the Bank of Italy, Giovanni 
Magnifico, who was among the supporters�13 Two other federalist 
conventions would follow: the first in Turin on March 24, 1977, and the 
second in Paris on March 26 of the same year� In Turin, the supporters 
of the single currency included, in addition to Magnifico, Robert Triffin, 
Cesare Romiti and the Treasury Minister, Gaetano Stammati� In Paris, 
Pierre Werner joined Magnifico and Triffin among the supporters�
The support of federalists for the EMS was based on the conviction 
that this represented a fundamental break with the disintegrative 
tendency exemplified by the dangerous rise of economic and monetary 
nationalism in Europe in the seventies� With the direct election of the 
9 On the UEF see Pistone, Sergio, The Union of European Federalists: from the foundation 
to the decision on direct elections of the European Parliament (1946-1974), Milan, 
Giuffré, 2008�
10 See Albertini, Mario, Tutti gli scritti, edited by Nicoletta Mosconi, 9 volumes, 
Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006-2009; Terranova, Flavio, Il federalismo di Mario Albertini, 
Milan, Giuffré, 2003; Preda, Daniela, Per una biografia di Mario Albertini: la 
formazione, la scelta europea e l’autonomia federalista, Pavia, Jean Monnet Centre of 
Pavia, 2014�
11 See Montani, Guido, The action of the European federalist movement for the European 
currency, in this volume� Presented to the conferences was a document drafted by 
Alfonso Jozzo and Antonio Mosconi entitled “Pour un système européen de réserve”, 
subsequently published in Le Fédéraliste, 1969, No� 2, p� 71-78� Among those present 
at the second convention were Robert Triffin and Rinaldo Ossola�
12 The proceedings of the conference, which took place on December 10 and 11, 1976, 
were published in Thema – Quaderni di Economia e Finanza dell’Istituto bancario 
San Paolo di Torino, 1977, No� 1, under the title “L’unione monetaria europea nella 
prospettiva dell’elezione europea”�
13 Magnifico, Giovanni, L’Europe par la monnaie – Une nouvelle approche, preface by 
Guido Carli, Paris-Limoges, Lavanzelle, 1974�
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European Parliament, the EMS could represent a solid foundation for 
the creation of true monetary unification�
Given the prospects that a relaunching of the European integration 
process could be favored by the monetary initiative, the President of the 
IRI (the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction), the Christian-Democrat 
Giuseppe Petrilli,14 in his role as President of the Italian Committee of 
the European Movement, organized a convention in Rome on June 17-
18, 1977, with European repercussions� Among those participating at 
the convention were Giulio Andreotti, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Leo 
Tindemans� The topic was: “The economic union and the problem of the 
European currency”�15 Prepared by working groups of economists from 
the EFM and introduced by reports by Petrilli, Werner and Majocchi, 
the convention saw the participation of a founding father of Europe, 
Dirk P� Spierenburg, along with a numerous turnout of academics and 
politicians involved in European actions, such as the President of the 
European Parliament, Emilio Colombo, the Minister of the Treasury, 
Gaetano Stammati, the Hons� Luigi Granelli, Mario Ferrari Agradi, 
Silvio Leonardi, Luciano Barca, and three representatives from the Bank 
of Italy: the economic advisor Giovanni Magnifico, the head of the office 
of monetary and financial issues, Rainer Masera,16 and the vice-director 
of the research service, Ercole Tuccimei� 
To underscore the harmony and common commitment to struggle 
of the Federalists, in November of 1977 the President of the European 
Commission, Roy Jenkins, gave a speech at the re-unified UEF Congress 
in Brussels�17
2. Italy on the Eve of the EMS
In this climate, which saw a strong convergence of views among 
academics, experts and politicians on the topic of Economic and Monetary 
Union, Roy Jenkins, the President of the European Commission, decided 
14 On Petrilli’s position see Caraffini, Paolo, Un grand commis e la dimensione 
internazionale: Giuseppe Petrilli e il processo di integrazione europea (1950-1989), 
Milan, Guerini e Associati, 2015� In particular, regarding the EMS, see p� 169-176� 
15 The proceedings of the conference are found in L’unione economica e il problema 
della moneta europea. La moneta come elemento di divisione o di unità dell’Europa, 
edited by the European Movement and the European Federalist Movement, Milan, 
FrancoAngeli, 1978� 
16 Masera, Rainer, L’unificazione monetaria e lo SME, Bologna, il Mulino, 1980�
17 See L’Unità Europea, 1977, No� 45 (November)�
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to become the leader of the group in favor of a single currency�18 On 
October 27, 1977, during Jean Monnet’s by-now historic lecture at the 
European University Institute in Florence,19 Jenkins re-launched the 
political debate on the advantages of a monetary union, which would 
have forced the governments to undertake stricter economic policies, 
slowed down inflation and favored price stability� Jenkins re-affirmed his 
convictions during both a lecture in Bonn20 the following December and 
before the European Parliament in January 1978, emphasizing also that 
a monetary union could represent a potent stimulus to growth, and thus 
to employment, allowing Europe to avoid an excessive dependence on a 
dollar in clear crisis�
The prospects for a re-launching of Europe came at a time when Italy 
was experiencing deep political and institutional instability during the 
dark days of terrorism� After Andreotti resigned, there was a succession of 
three governments between 1973-74 – the fourth and fifth governments 
led by Rumor, and Moro’s fourth government – in which Rumor and 
Moro alternated as Foreign Minister, while Andreotti strengthened his 
competence in the monetary area as Budget Minister from 1974 to 
1976 in Moro’s government� The economic situation in the country 
was dire: a spiral of recession was leading to the closure of thousands of 
companies, inflation was continually growing (reaching 17% in 1976), 
youth unemployment had reached its maximum levels, and there was 
a strong deficit in the trade balance� Economists agreed that inflation 
was a necessary means for maintaining high levels of employment, 
while currency devaluation was viewed as the most valid instrument for 
guaranteeing competitiveness�
In 1976, Giulio Andreotti was charged with forming a government, 
and on July 23 he presented the “Ideas for the Government program”, 
which held that the “community bond” created “an intertwining of rights 
and duties not to be underestimated”� The abstention of the Communist 
18 On the launching of the EMS see Ludlow, Piers, The Making of the European Monetary 
System, cit�; Ludlow, Piers, Roy Jenkins and the European Commission Presidency, 
1976-1980. At the Heart of Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016; de Vries, Tom, On the 
meaning and future of the European Monetary System, International Finance Section, 
Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1980; Mourlon Druol, Emmanuel, 
A Europe made of Money: the Emergence of the European Monetary System, Ithaca and 
London, Cornell University Press, 2012�
19 Jenkins, Roy, Europe’s Present Challenge and Future Opportunity, the First Jean Monnet 
Lecture, Florence, October 27, 1977�
20 Jenkins, Roy, “The integration of the Community in the Face of Enlargement”, 
speech to the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn, December 8, 
1977, in Europa-Archiv, 1, 1978, p� 1�10�
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group21 allowed Andreotti to form a one-party government: the ‘non-
no-confidence government’, which would govern from July 29, 1976, 
to January 16, 1978,22 with Arnaldo Forlani as Foreign Minister� For the 
PCI, the Communist Party, which had reached 34�4% of the vote in the 
June elections, reducing to a historical minimum the gap with respect 
to the DC (the Christian Democrats) in the polarized party alignment, 
it was the end of the conventio ad excludendum� On March 11, 1978, a 
few days before Aldo Moro’s kidnapping by the Red Brigades, the new 
Andreotti government (the fourth) received a vote of confidence� In this 
government, Forlani remained as Foreign Minister, Pandolfi became the 
Treasury Minister, and the Europeanist Franco Maria Malfatti became 
Finance Minister� Once again the votes of the PCI were decisive�
The Governor of the Bank of Italy from August 1975 until October 
1979 was Paolo Baffi,23 who played a key role in the design and carrying 
out of the economic and currency measures that led to the overcoming 
of the crisis of 1976, restoring a balance in Italy’s current account� 
Nevertheless, Baffi was against the ‘external constraint’, which he felt 
would have dampened the growth of salaries and forced Italy to undertake 
a deflationary policy, convinced as he was that Italy was not ready to 
enter into a common monetary system without appropriate economic 
convergence policies with the other countries� Even the Confindustria, 
a large number of economists, trade unions, and vast assisted economic 
sectors, fearful of losing the competitive advantage from exchange rate 
maneuvers, opposed monetary unification and fixed exchange rates�24 
Between 1976 and 1978 Italy took advantage of the operating space 
afforded by the absence of exchange rate constraints to improve its balance 
of payments, at the same time reducing internal monetary instability, 
although the worry existed that an inflationary-currency depreciation 
spiral could be triggered�
Therefore, the conditions for Italy’s participation in the new 
agreements was a radical inversion of the tendencies in economic policies 
and a real change in its mentality toward inflation and devaluation, and 
their consequences, as well as a re-launching of productivity as the engine 
of competitiveness and employment�
21 The federalist Altiero Spinelli would instead vote against this, contesting Andreotti’s 
government program� 
22 The Foreign Minister was Arnaldo Forlani, the Finance Minister Filippo Maria 
Pandolfi, and the Treasury Minister Gaetano Stammati�
23 See Baffi, Paolo, Testimonianze e ricordi, Milan, Scheiwiller, 1990�
24 See Spaventa, Luigi, Italy joins the EMS. A political History, in Research Institute, The 
John Hopkins University, Bologna Center, Occasional Papers, No� 32, 1980�
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3. Andreotti’s Role in the EMS Negotiations
Jenkins’ statements were shortly followed by the decision by the nine 
Heads of Government of the EC, meeting in Copenhagen in April of 
1978, to create a zone of European monetary stability, thereby beginning 
the rapid process that would lead in a few months to the birth of the 
European Monetary System�25 At Copenhagen, Andreotti, who also had 
a one-on-one meeting with Schmidt,26 had a wait-and-see attitude�27
It is known that the most important decisions were taken – after a 
meeting between Giscard d’Estaing and Jenkins at the Élysée Palace on 
June 22 and one between Giscard d’Estaing and Schmidt on June 23 in 
Hamburg, where the content of a common unit of measure was defined 
as an “embryon d’une future monnaie européenne”28 – at the European 
Council in Brema on July 6-7, where a “scheme for the creation of a 
closer monetary cooperation (European monetary system) leading to a 
zone of monetary stability in Europe”29 was discussed� In addition to the 
focus on exchange rates with narrow margins of fluctuation, the Scheme 
called for the creation of both an initial fund containing a significant 
part of the central bank reserves of the European countries, destined to 
become the initial nucleus of a European central reserve, which would be 
the basis for a European monetary unit – the European Currency Unit 
(ECU) – as well as a European Monetary Fund, to be created within two 
years of the start of the System�30 The currencies outside the Snake were 
25 The European Council in Copenhagen, The Presidency’s Conclusions concerning 
the Economic and Social Situation, Draft, April 7-8, 1978, ASILS, AGA, Europa, 
b� 355, cart� “Consiglio Europeo (Copenhagen, April 7-8, 1978)”�
26 Anonymous note for Andreotti, ASILS, AGA, Europa, b� 355, cart� “Consiglio 
Europeo (Copenhagen, April 7-8, 1978)”�
27 “The long discussion […],” he notes, “focused almost exclusively on the monetary 
issue� […] Giscard hinted at a return to the Snake, though without insisting� He 
appeared quite interested in Schmidt’s own proposals� The crux of Schmidt’s ideas 
is the pooling together of the reserves of the nine countries, with the creation of 
a European Monetary Fund”� This was a hand-written note of Andreotti’s on the 
evening of the conversation at Copenhagen, in ASILS, AGA, Europa, b� 355, cart� 
“Consiglio Europeo (Copenhagen, April 7-8,1978)”� See also Varsori, Antonio, 
La Cenerentola d’Europa? L’Italia e l’integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi, Soveria 
Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2010�
28 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, Europa: la dernière chance de l’Europe, preface by Helmut 
Schmidt, Paris, XO Éd�, 2014�
29 The Results of the European Council in Bremen, in “Bulletin of the European 
Communities”, 1978, No� 6� See also Conclusioni del Consiglio europeo di Brema, 
July 6-7, 1978, in ASILS, AGA, Europa, b� 356� 
30 In reality the EMS would never reach the second stage of fixed exchange rates decided 
at Brussels within two years of the inception of the System� 
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invited to gradually reduce their fluctuations ahead of their entry into 
the new System�
At Bremen, Andreotti asked for clarification regarding the link 
between currencies and economic policy� He explained that for some 
time the situation in Italy would remain unfavorable compared to the 
other member states of the Community and that “corrections” would be 
necessary to compensate for the difference in the average inflation rates 
of the nine countries� Moreover, his opposition to Giscard d’Estaing’s 
proposals to set specific dates and deadlines for the EMS was clearly 
evident� “We have come here,” he stated, “with several indications 
from Clappier (and from Schmidt personally)� However, we also have a 
document from the Monetary Committee that has not been discussed� 
The Finance Ministers must examine everything and make conclusive 
proposals”�31 In response to Schmidt’s question: “What would you 
propose?”, he answered: “The Council, viewing the indispensability of a 
system of closer monetary cooperation for the growth of the Community, 
charges the Finance Ministers with drafting concrete proposals by July 
which take into account both the discussions in the European Council 
of April 7-8 and July 4 and Ecofin’s recent conclusions”� To Giscard 
d’Estaing, who insisted on giving clear instructions to the Finance 
Ministers, Andreotti responded: “If the document received tonight is 
published, it will seem as if the decision has already been made, making 
it difficult to gain the participation of other countries, which needs to be 
done gradually”�32
The concluding speech by Schmidt finally led to a compromise: the 
following day the nine countries would approve a concrete and precise 
document, which, however, would be considered only as a commitment 
to study the issue, while the Irish representative Lynch would be charged 
with overseeing the drafting of a Scheme of Resolution which would 
include the commitment to the economic changes needed in the weakest 
countries�33 Italy thus succeeded in getting the project to be considered as 
“modifiable”� It was also decided at Bremen that before the next meeting, 
planned for July 24, the Finance Ministers would draft a mandate to the 
Monetary Committee and the Board of Governors of the central banks 
31 Notepad with Andreotti’s original notes, in ASILS, AGA, Europa, b� 356, “Brema 
6-7-1978”�
32 Ibidem�
33 “There will be – stated the conclusions at Bremen – concurrent studies of the action 
needed to be taken to strengthen the economies of the less prosperous member 
countries in the context of such a scheme; such measures will be essential if the 
zone of monetary stability is to succeed”� The Results of the European Council in 
Bremen, cit�
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to develop a European Monetary System (EMS) project by October 31, 
to be voted on by the European Council in Brussels at the beginning of 
December�
Some days after the Bremen Summit, at a meeting of the Italian cabinet 
presided over by Andreotti, the Foreign Minister, Forlani, explained that 
at Bremen Italy had reaffirmed its allegiance to the Community and its 
wish for a strengthening of the economic and monetary union, so long as 
this occurred under acceptable conditions for those countries which, for 
a certain period of time, would have differentiated growth and inflation 
rates�34 Re-proposing one of the main topics in Europe’s political debate 
beginning with the Hague Conference in 1969 – the opportunity for 
a country to go it alone in the monetary area or in the monetary and 
economic areas contemporaneously – Forlani added that, along with the 
monetary proposals, at Bremen the need was recognized to also work 
toward economic cooperation, in particular as regards employment and 
energy policies and the reduction in regional imbalances�
Therefore, the Italian government’s interpretation of the proposal for 
the creation of a European Monetary System was clearly wide-ranging, 
leaving ample room for considerations regarding the link between 
monetary, economic and political unification in the hope for new impetus 
in the Community’s construction� This interpretation was confirmed on 
July 20 by the relations presented by the Foreign Minister Forlani and 
the Treasury Minister Pandolfi to the joint Foreign Affairs and Finance 
committee, under the presidency of the staunch Europeanist Carlo Russo�35 
Forlani spoke of an “ambitious and concrete project to relaunch Europe’s 
construction, supported by a firm political will”�36 Pandolfi spoke of a 
process aimed at creating a more integrated economic zone, a European 
monetary policy, and greater political cohesion, adding that “the Italian 
government has stated that it attributes great importance, even political, 
to increased efforts to achieve closer economic and monetary cohesion”�37 
34 Minutes of the Council of Ministers meeting of July 14, 1978, in the historical 
archives of the Luigi Sturzo Institute (ASILS), and the Giulio Andreotti archives 
(AGA), Serie Europa�
35 Russo was a staunch Europeanist member of both Monnet’s Comité d’Action pour 
les États-Unis d’Europe and the European Federalist Movement� See Preda, Daniela, 
“L’Europa di Carlo Russo”, in Preda, Daniela and Levi, Guido (eds�), Genova, Liguria, 
Europa. Protagonisti del federalismo nel secondo dopoguerra, Genoa, Genoa University 
Press, 2015, p� 87-101�
36 Chamber of Deputies, “Bollettino delle Commissioni”, July 20, 1978, Joint Foreign 
Affairs and Finance and Treasury Committee, presided over by the President of the 
Committee, Carlo Russo, p� 8� 
37 Ibidem, p� 10�
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Pandolfi emphasized that, in order to avoid the age-old quarrel between 
‘monetarists’ and ‘economists’ it was necessary to adopt a “pragmatic 
approach” and show “strong political will”, at the same time� He added 
that “the real heart of the question is the fact that the Italian government 
views its decisions within the community structure favoring monetary 
discipline as part of its general internal economic policy”�38 Therefore, 
the European option was directly linked to the domestic economic one�
A document drafted by the Government on August 31 succinctly 
stated: 
“Everything, cultural tradition, popular sentiment, political orientation, 
leads us toward Europe� However, much of our economic reality tends 
to push us toward the perimeter� This represents a contradiction we must 
resolve� The road that leads us toward Europe is the same one that leads us 
toward the objectives of growth with stability […]� To remain in Europe it 
is necessary to reduce the gap between the increase in prices and the cost of 
labor that exists between us and the other Community countries”�39 
Not by chance, in August the Treasury Minister would present a 
draft proposal that would become, with the appropriate changes, the 
1979-1981 Three-Year Plan, known as the Pandolfi Plan�
During the summer the discussions on European monetary integration 
continued at a brisk pace� On October 26, during a joint meeting of the 
finance and treasury committee, Central Bank Governor Baffi spelled out 
Italy’s position in a blueprint pamphlet distributed by the Bank of Italy 
on October 2 to the other EEC governors, “aimed at the construction 
of an exchange-rate system which was able to adapt to  the specific 
conditions of our country and usefully contributed to the convergence 
process”40 of the Italian economy toward the conditions prevailing in the 
other member countries� Three priorities were indicated: the rigorousness 
of exchange rates, the centrality of the ECU System, and the possibility 
for countries outside the Snake to take advantage of wider margins of 
fluctuation during an initial transitional phase�
Fundamental to convincing the Italian government to join the new 
monetary system was a meeting in Siena on November 1-2, 1978, 
between Andreotti and the German Chancellor Schmidt�41 On that 
38 Ibidem�
39 This document is mentioned in Pandolfi’s speech to the Senate on December 7, 
1978, 345th and 346th session, summary account�
40 Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Italy, Paolo Baffi, to the joint session of the 
Senate finance and treasury committee, October 26, 1978, in ASILS, AGA, Europa, 
1/A/8, b� 399�
41 On the Siena meeting, see ASILS, AGA, Europa, b� 451�
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occasion, during an event organized by the Federalists Andreotti received 
a delegation led by the Tuscan regional secretary, Gastone Bonzagni, and 
the regional secretary of Emilia, Marco Bondesan� The Federalists were 
also received by the Minister Pandolfi, who would later write an article 
significantly entitled Non possiamo perdere l’autobus dei Nove (We Cannot 
Miss the Bus of the Nine)42� After the meeting of the Federal Committee 
of the UEF on November 4-5, 1978, the European federalists would also 
write to Andreotti through Caterina Chizzola, urging him to accept the 
EMS “as a transitional phase toward an economic and financial union”, 
through an increase of at least 2�5% of Community GDP, as called for in 
the Mc Dougall Report, “in order to make possible the support measures 
needed to reduce the structural imbalances among the European states”�43
 Nevertheless, at the beginning of November Italy’s disappointment 
at the results of the Committee’s activities was tangible, as shown by the 
“political observations on the European monetary discussion under way” 
preserved in the Andreotti archives, a part of which is handwritten�44 
The Prime Minister mentions that the Bremen proposal to stabilize 
the currencies of the European countries had been “presented with the 
prospect of a leap in quality for an authentic policy of equal distribution 
among the various economies and situations”� Emphasis had been placed 
“in general on the transfer of resources, obtainable in different ways (a 
substantial increase in the Regional Fund and the Social Fund, loans 
by the European Bank, etc�)”, and the creation of a sizeable Guarantee 
Fund had been called for, one that would represent an important 
technical as well as symbolic element� This point now seemed less 
clear-cut to Andreotti� Moreover, also envisaged were elastic margins of 
fluctuation, which would take into account the different starting points 
of the countries involved� After Bremen, despite the fact the political 
importance of a step forward for Europe toward the unification of the 
monetary system was not questioned, all the political features had been 
de-emphasized, with everything boiling down to a re-proposal of the 
Snake� Andreotti underscored, on the one hand, the pressure by Germany 
and France for Italy to participate in the new Monetary System (given the 
42 Pandolfi, Filippo Maria, “Non possiamo perdere l’autobus dei Nove”, Corriere della 
Sera, December 3, 1978� The article was first published in Jozzo, Alfonso (ed�), 
Thema. Quaderni di Economia e Finanza dell’Istituto bancario San Paolo di Torino, 
1978, No� 2�
43 Resolution on the European Monetary System by the Federal Committee of the UEF, 
sent to Andreotti in a letter by Caterina Chizzola, November 7, 1978, in ASILS, 
AGA, Europa, b� 400, cart� “Movimento federalista europeo”�
44 Political observations on the European monetary discussion under way, November 8, 
1978, in ASILS, AGA, Europa�
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fact it was a founding state), and on the other Italy’s interest in Britain’s 
participation�45 In fact, if all the countries did not participate in the new 
system, then how could the Community take on the burden of loans 
from the European Bank to redistribute resources?
The prospects were clear: Italy could not stay out of the EMS without 
admitting its weakness, and the repercussions of this on the lira in terms 
of speculation were easy to imagine� It was necessary to make an effort to 
find a solution satisfying all of the countries�
In order to find allies to support Italy’s position, meetings were soon 
organized with representatives of the Benelux countries, and immediately 
afterwards with Ireland and Denmark� At the same time, the hope was 
that, in advance of the meeting in Brussels, Italy’s political parties could 
agree on a common stance� 
The preparatory notes for the meeting with the Benelux Prime Ministers 
showed the central importance of Italy’s concerns about the proceedings 
for the creation of the EMS� In particular, the need to avoid a tapering 
off of the ‘political plan’ to relaunch European construction that was 
foreseen in Bremen was reaffirmed, along with the need for this plan to 
entail diverse starting points for the various countries�46 Italy was clearly 
concerned that, under the hypothesis of a “two-speed Europe”, it would 
be relegated to the second group� It was thus essential “to find solutions 
for the Community which would allow our country to participate in the 
EMS right from the start”, while at the same time undertaking “all that was 
necessary for a similar participation by Britain”,47 in part to avoid political 
and psychological divisions within the Community, with its attendant 
weakening� The EMS could not be considered “a simple exchange-rate 
accord, accompanied by a strengthening of the credit system”, but instead 
“the start of a renewal of the European integration process”�48 This accounts 
for Italy’s disappointment with the technical solutions called for up to that 
point, based on the reduced amount of credit resources made available for 
the transitional phase and the scarce progress regarding economic measures 
in support of the weakest economies�
45 Pandolfi and Baffi went to London, where a close relationship developed between 
Hearley and Pandolfi, marked by daily phone calls� In addition, a meeting between 
Andreotti and Callaghan was set for November 22�
46 Foreign Ministry, classified� Notes on the meeting with the Benelux Prime Ministers 
in Luxembourg on November 11, 1978, “Sistema monetario europeo e misure 
economiche per aiutare le economie meno prospere nel quadro di tale sistema”, in 
ASILS, AGA, Europa 1/A/8, b� 399�
47 Ibidem�
48 Ibidem�
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An additional element of concern also emerged, which cannot be 
ignored� If the will of the partners to correct the budget imbalances and 
undertake the needed transfer of resources to favor the convergence of 
the economies was not clear, not only would the prospects of support 
by all the national political parties be undermined, but it would also be 
difficult to explain to the public that the EMS sought to strategically 
strengthen the Community, with clear-cut consequences regarding 
consensus for the plan�
The notes in preparation for Giscard d’Estaing’s visit also reaffirmed 
that the EMS was to represent an occasion for strengthening the entire 
Community, thus making it a serious problem if, on the contrary, the 
system impeded the participation of some countries, thereby isolating 
them, or the proper measures were not taken to ensure the weakest 
countries were not forced to abandon the EMS after they had joined� 
Evidently still vivid for Italy was the memory of the monetary Snake, 
which the government did not want repeated� Moreover, it was emphasized 
that the EMS should not compromise the national plans for economic 
recovery but instead support these through ad hoc economic measures 
in favor of the less-well-off economies� Such measures would aim at 
producing an effective economic convergence and should be adopted by 
the European Council at the same time as the EMS� Fundamental among 
the plans to be safeguarded was the medium-term plan for economic 
recovery prepared by the Treasury Minister, Filippo Maria Pandolfi, 
which aimed at reducing the budget deficit and maintaining the real 
cost of labor, thereby keeping down the inflation rate� Currency reserves 
would be needed for Italy’s economic recovery, which would risk being 
compromised by too rigid a monetary mechanism� Therefore, Italy was in 
favor of a wider band of fluctuation than that proposed under the snake 
during a transition period of adequate length; the adoption of a flexible 
procedure for the exchange-rate parities, in which exchange rates would 
reflect real economic disparities and could be modified before strong 
speculative movements occurred; and the creation from the system’s 
inception of a European Monetary Fund�
On November 28, at Palazzo Chigi, Pandolfi illustrated the technical 
difficulties that still needed to be overcome in the negotiations under way 
for the EMS� For his part, Andreotti added a report on the contacts he had 
had, the last of which, with President Jenkins, had occurred that very same 
morning�49 He positively reflected that, during his November 22nd meeting 
49 Minutes of the Council of Ministers meeting of November 28, in ASILS, AGA, 
Europa�
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with British Prime Minister Callaghan,50 an agreement had been reached 
between Italy and Britain regarding the text of a final communiqué on 
parallel economic measures that could be adopted by the European Council� 
The Council expressed the hope for a positive crowning achievement to the 
negotiations from all the Community countries�
The preparatory notes of the Ministry of Italian Foreign Affairs for the 
European Council debate in Brussels on December 4-5 underscored that 
the hoped for achievement of measures to strengthen the less prosperous 
economies implied a gradual increase in the Community budget, to the 
point of reaching “the critical mass necessary to support and accelerate 
in an incisive manner”51 the efforts these countries would have to make� 
In other words, Community policies would have to contribute to the 
convergence of economic results� On this point Italy sought a clear 
commitment from the European Council� In the near future it requested 
the strengthening of existing financial instruments, in particular the 
“Ortoli facilitation”52, in order to distribute 15-year loans, the increase 
of the Regional Fund’s endowment for 1979, and the adjustment of the 
Community’s structural funds (the Social Fund and the Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund)�
4. Italy’s Participation in the EMS
As is widely known, at the European Council meeting in Brussels Italy 
decided not to immediately join the EMS, due to the fact that several 
“parallel measures”53 had not been adopted (in particular, the decision 
50 Ministero degli Affari Esteri (MAE), Direzione generale Affari Economici (DGAE), 
Rome 29 November 1978, Notes, “meeting with a British delegation on the European 
Monetary System”� The meeting is also mentioned in the European Monetary 
System Talks, Hansard, 28 November 1978, http://hansard�millbanksystems�com/
lords/1978/nov/28/european-monetary-system-talks�
51 MAE, Notes from 30 November 1978, classified, in advance of the European Council 
meeting in Brussels, 4-5 December 1978, on “Parallel measures to strengthen the 
less prosperous countries in the European Monetary System framework”, in ASILS, 
AGA, Europa, b� 355�
52 This was a new loan instrument to finance projects for industrial restructuring, large 
infrastructures and energy projects, which was thought to be useful for dealing with 
several specific problems in the Mezzogiorno (the South)�
53 On this question, there was a true division in the Council between Andreotti and 
Giscard d’Estaing, while Schmidt had a more open attitude� See Extracts from the 
statements by Chancellor Schmidt to the Bundestag, in ASILS, AGA, Europa, 
b� 400, cart� “SME Partiti”� See also the “Schmidt Helmuth, Correspondence with 
Giulio Andreotti” folder in b� 310�
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not to increase the Regional Fund) and the delicate situation regarding 
internal politics� Italy asked to be allowed a brief period for reflection�
The reservation was withdrawn by the time of the next European 
appointment on December 18� In order to understand Italy’s position, it 
is useful to examine several comments made to the Italian Prime Minister 
on December 9th regarding the outcome of the European Council meeting, 
which are preserved in the Andreotti archives�54 These clearly show Italy’s 
support for the EMS, even with the reservations discussed above� In fact, 
the first point to emphasize is that the creation of a zone of monetary 
stability was an objective shared by all member countries as well as all the 
Italian political parties: “We need a strong Community to emerge from the 
economic crisis,” it was stated� Italy had to deal with unemployment and 
industrial restructuring only “through Community solidarity”; otherwise, 
protectionist and nationalist impulses would be strengthened in both 
the economic and political areas� The EMS was to be seen as part of “a 
strategy aimed at combating stagnation and the involution in Europe’s 
construction”� It was emphasized that Italy’s joining the EMS was coherent 
with the Government’s commitment to the country’s economic recovery� 
“If we do not immediately join,” it was feared, “our very own will to achieve 
the objectives we have been fighting for will be doubted”�55 Of course there 
were concerns, but the decision to join had to objectively and clearly take 
into account the results achieved by Italy during the negotiations� Given 
the prospect that all countries would be allowed to join the EMS in a 
lasting manner, Italy had supported the need for the System to be flexible, 
thereby obtaining for itself a wider band of fluctuation (6%) than the snake 
allowed�56 The request was made that, unlike the snake, there should be “a 
balance between the responsibilities of the strong currencies and those of 
the weaker ones” through the creation of “an indicator of divergence based 
on the shield that indicated the currency which deviated from the weighted 
average of the other currencies, in order to determine whose responsibility 
it was in the first place to intervene on the exchange-rate market, to adopt 
economic measures and to change the central rate”�57 This objective was 
also achieved� Other requests that were granted were that the short-and 
medium-term credit system resources be set at 25  billion ECU; that 
54 To the Hon� President of the Council, “Creazione del Sistema monetario europeo� 
Risultati del Consiglio Europeo� Elementi di intervento”, Rome, 9 December 1978, 
in Asils, AGA, Europa�
55 Ibidem�
56 It was Paolo Baffi who, during a discussion with Giscard d’Estaing, obtained the 
6% band� 
57 “Creazione del Sistema monetario europeo� Risultati del Consiglio Europeo� Elementi 
di intervento”, cit�
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15 billion of this amount go to short-term credit (granted unconditionally) 
and 10 billion to medium-term financial aid (granted conditionally, and 
with the actual sums amounting to 14 and 11 billion, respectively); and 
that the regulations among the Central Banks for the very short-term 
mechanism (unlimited in amount) occur 60 days after the end of the month 
in which the intervention took place (the agreement settled on 45 days)� 
Italy, along with Britain, had also sought a precise commitment on the 
measures to support the less prosperous economies, which were defined 
as “essential” at Bremen, in order to ensure that the Community policies 
as a whole, including the Common Agricultural Policy, contributed to the 
convergence of the economic results� The text prepared by Callaghan was 
not adopted in this case� Nevertheless, the question was still open since the 
European Council, in its final communiqué, had delegated the Commission 
“to study the relationship between a greater convergence of the economic 
results of the member states and the use of Community instruments, in 
particular the funds aimed at reducing the structural imbalances� The 
results of these studies were to be discussed at the next European Council 
meeting”�58 Moreover, acting on strong pressure from Italy for an increase 
in the credit availability of the Community’s financial instruments, in 
particular in favor of the Mezzogiorno, the European Council decided 
to request that the Community’s institutions and the European Bank for 
Investment make available in Italy (⅔) and Ireland (⅓), over a five-year 
period, additional loans on special terms, for a maximum of a billion units 
of account per year� However, agreement was not reached on an increase 
to the Regional Fund� Finally, the document brought to light that, after 
the British decision not to participate in the EMS, in the event Italy also 
decided not to join, the alternative would be the creation of a Monetary 
System of six states, which would in fact have created a two-speed Europe, 
which Italy had always fought against� In conclusion, after reaffirming 
that there was no contradiction between the creation of the EMS and the 
stability of the dollar, promptly joining the EMS was defined as “an act of 
faith in ourselves”�59
On December 7, in preparation for the debate in the Chamber of 
Deputies on the EMS, a meeting was held at the Christian-Democrat 
Senate Group headquarters,60 introduced by Minister Pandolfi, in which 
two alternatives emerged: seize the opportunity on December 18 to 
58 Ibidem�
59 Ibidem�
60 Notes on the meeting held on December 7, 1978, at the Christian-Democrat Senate 
Group headquarters in preparation for the debate on the European Monetary System, 
in A�A� 
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join the EMS as an essential condition both for behaving in a manner 
coherent with domestic policies and for facing the economic crisis 
with the support of international solidarity, or note the absence of the 
domestic conditions for participation and thus identify the necessary 
binding pre-conditions regarding economic policy� Supporters of the 
first alternative emphasized that non-participation might appear to have 
been conditioned by the behavior of the PCI, as a result weakening the 
position of the Christian-Democratic government; the supporters of 
delaying participation emphasized the fact that the EMS could have 
represented a healthy impetus toward more rigid anti-inflation measures, 
a precondition for subsequent participation and for the immediate taking 
on of unilateral commitments� In the event of an immediate participation 
in the EMS which was not tied to stringent domestic agreements, the 
danger that the Christian-Democrats could be held responsible for any 
future devaluation was underscored�
Between December 11-13 the final hectic meetings were held 
between Andreotti and Baffi, Pandolfi and Forlani, along with telephone 
conversations with Giscard d’Estaing (on the 11th) and Schmidt, who 
promised his support (the 13th)� On December 12, Andreotti and 
Pandolfi gave a lengthy report61 on the results of the Brussels meeting 
and on the subsequent contacts and meetings� The report was approved 
by the Council of Ministers� Debate on the EMS began in Parliament on 
December 12, with a report by Pandolfi in which the economic policy 
proposal was firmly tied to the Europe option� The “new monetary 
system,” Pandolfi stated, “is the point of arrival for the objective of greater 
integration among the Community members”�62 Andreotti stressed the 
link between joining the EMS and the government’s commitment to 
restoring the economy� On the same day the EFM approved a motion 
of support for Italy’s immediate entry in the EMS,63 at the same time 
requesting that Baffi step down�64 A rally was held that day in Rome, 
during which Andreotti received a delegation of Young European 
61 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers, December 12, 1978, in A�A� 
62 Debate in Parliament on the EMS, Atti parlamentari, 382° session, 12 December 
1978, in ASILS, AGA, Europa 1/A/8, b� 399, p� 22050�
63 Motion of the European Federalist Movement “L’Italia e il Sistema monetario 
europeo”, 12 December 1978, in ASILS, AGA, Europa, b� 400, cart� “Movimento 
federalista europeo”�
64 The President of the EFM sent a telegram to Andreotti which contested the policies 
of the Governor of the Central Bank of Italy in light of the expression used by Triffin 
to define the EMS: “the most important monetary agreement after Bretton Woods”� 
Telegram of the President of the EFM to Giulio Andreotti, December 11, 1978, in 
ASILS, AGA, Europa, b� 400�
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Federalists of Italy that included Domenico Moro, Franco Spoltore and 
Maria Teresa Brigazi�
Carlo Russo played a fundamental role in gaining support from the 
DC deputies for the monetary agreement� This support allowed Andreotti 
to formally bring Italy into the EMS�65 At the end of the discussion the 
Chamber of Deputies assented to Italy’s immediate entry in the EMS 
with 270 votes in favor, 228 against and 53 abstentions� The PCI, in a 
moment of complex transition to Europeanism,66 voted against entry, 
while the Socialists abstained� The EMS came into effect on January 1, 
1979, while the adoption of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) would take effect on March 13, 1979� A European Currency 
Unit (ECU) was created, to be used as a means of regulation among 
the Central Banks� A system of fixed, though adjustable parities was also 
created among the currencies� The member states were granted the right 
to vary their central exchange rates after consulting with and gaining 
the approval of the other participatory members� The EMF thus limited 
monetary sovereignty� A very short-term mechanism of unlimited amount 
was created and a common reserve fund was to be instituted (though 
this never came to fruition) in the final stage, made up of 20% of the 
gold and dollar reserves of the member-state Central Banks� It was thus 
clear that a monetary agreement of this breadth could only be sustained 
through a broad strategy to improve the prospects of economic growth 
which intensified the convergence of the economic policies of the various 
states in the attempt to produce greater stability� Therefore, measures in 
support of the weaker currencies were also called for, including loans at 
favorable conditions�
For Italy, joining the EMS from the start would have represented a 
significant change from past monetary policies, enabling the country, 
through the persuasive action resulting from its being obliged to follow 
the virtuous model of “external constraint”, to adopt unpopular policies 
for economic recovery� 
65 Testimony from Duccio Grassi, in Preda, Daniela and Levi, Guido (eds�), L’europeismo 
in Liguria. Dal Risorgimento alla nascita dell’Europa comunitaria, Bologna, Il Mulino, 
2002, p� 412-417�
66 On the CP’s transition to Europeanism, see Maggiorani, Mauro, L’Europa degli 
altri: comunisti italiani e integrazione europea, 1957-1969, Rome, Carocci, 1998; 
Maggiorani, Mauro and Ferrari, Paolo (eds�), L’Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer: 
testimonianze e documenti, 1945-1984, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005, with an afterword 
by Giorgio Napolitano�
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5.  From the EMS to the Single Currency: Elements 
of Continuity 
If Andreotti’s role was fundamental in Italy joining the EMS, it would 
be equally so in the country’s entry into the monetary union�
Historiography has in large part reconstructed the main stages 
that led the Italian government to join the single currency�67 However, 
in concluding this paper, it is useful to recall a couple of important 
episodes that place Andreotti’s actions regarding the EMS within the 
context of a vaster and lengthier project of his for the economic and 
monetary unification of Europe�
An important decision in the negotiations for the EMU was taken at the 
extraordinary session of the European Council in Rome in October 1990� 
The meeting was called by Andreotti to determine the contemporaneous 
start of two intergovernmental conferences: one on the economic union, 
the other the political union� As in the case of the EMS, the objective 
here was clear: maintain a close connection between supranational progress 
in the area of economic and monetary authority and transfer the relative 
powers of management and control to the political union� In particular, 
Foreign Minister De Michelis,68 supported by Andreotti, asked for a 
broadening of the European Parliament’s powers and the extension of the 
majority vote to the Council�69
At Rome Andreotti succeeded in getting the entire substance of the 
Delors Report to be considered in the Council’s concluding statement� 
The strongly supranational approach of the Italian government was 
manifested by the repeated request for the creation of an independent 
European Bank� However, the Italian presidency pushed above all for 
the monetary unification process to become automatic and irreversible, 
thereby laying a solid basis for setting a precise date (1994) for 
67 Varsori, Antonio, L’Italia e la fine della guerra fredda. La politica estera dei governi 
Andreotti (1989-1992), Bologna, Il Mulino, 2013; Neri Gualdesi, Marinella, L’Italia 
e la CEE: la partecipazione italiana alla politica d’ integrazione europea, 1980-1991, 
Pisa, ETS, 1992; Neri Gualdesi, Marinella, “Il contributo dell’Italia alle riforme 
istituzionali� Dall’Atto Unico al Trattato di Lisbona”, in Morelli, Umberto and Preda, 
Daniela (eds�), L’Italia e l’unità europea dal Risorgimento a oggi. Idee e protagonisti, 
Padua, CEDAM, 2014, p� 447-468; Id�, “L’Italia e l’Europa negli anni Ottanta: tra 
ambizioni e marginalità”, in Craveri, Paolo and Varsori, Antonio (eds�), L’Italia nella 
costruzione europea. Un bilancio storico (1957-2007), Milan, FrancoAngeli, 2009, 
p� 79-108�
68 See Giulio Andreotti’s letter to Jacques Delors, 24 October1990, in Asils, AGA, 
Europa – Consiglio Europeo di Roma, 27-27 October 1990, b� 383�
69 Letter from Gianni De Michelis to Giulio Andreotti, 23 October 1990, in ibid�
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transitioning to the second stage of monetary unification (which it held 
had to be decided by majority, not unanimous vote) and succeeding in 
getting the Council to recognize in the end the objective of the “single” 
currency, as opposed to the “common” currency, as many had suggested�70
In this regard, it is worth mentioning an episode recounted by 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa that is not well known� On the morning 
of the approval, Andreotti re-opened a chapter which apparently had 
been closed: the dilemma, long discussed in the preceding weeks 
by the representatives of the European countries during numerous 
meetings, of having to choose between the “common currency” and 
the “single currency”� The Italians had sought to get the latter accepted, 
but to no avail� During a meeting of the Italian delegation before the 
summit, Andreotti again raised the question: “What does common 
currency mean? Let’s use single currency� You say you have already tried 
unsuccessfully? No matter; I’ll speak with Kohl”� And so he did� When 
he arrived at the summit, Andreotti read the conclusions sentence by 
sentence� “When he came to the word “single”, the meticulous Prime 
Minister said: “Why ‘single’? Hadn’t we decided on ‘common’?”� 
Andreotti said nothing, making only a small gesture by spreading out 
his hands and tightening his lips, as if to say: ‘What does it matter; we 
won’t discuss such things here!’� The text was approved”�71 
During the negotiations leading to the accord, Italy fought “for a 
full political union that included justice, internal affairs and foreign and 
defense policy, and which would give greater powers to the Assembly at 
Strasburg�72 Moreover, in April 1991 it promoted, along with Germany, 
a declaration in favor of strengthening the powers of the European 
Parliament through a legislative co-decision-making procedure regarding 
a limited number of questions�
Of significant importance even when the Maastricht Treaty was 
signed on December 1991 were actions by economists from the 
federalist school to clarify the situation� As well-reconstructed by Alfonso 
Jozzo in an interview, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, who along with the 
Governor of the Bank of Italy, Ciampi, was part of the Italian delegation 
70 Dyson, Kenneth and Featherstone, Kevin, The Road to Maastricht: negotiating 
Economic and Monetary Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p� 514-517�
71 Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso, “La costituzione economica europea”, Il Federalista, 
XLIV (2002), No� 3, p� 200� On the EMU, see also Id�, The Road to Monetary Union 
in Europe, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994�
72 Fagiolo, Silvio, L’ idea dell’Europa nelle relazioni internazionali, Milan, FrancoAngeli, 
2009, p� 163�
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led by Andreotti, met a friend, Gianni Ruta,73 finance director of the 
STET telephone company, in front of the Central Bank headquarters 
in Rome� Ruta, who was very active in the EFM, heading the Rome 
section of the organization, indicated the decisive point to work on in 
the negotiations: the setting of the date for transition to the third stage, 
which was not included in the preparatory documents� During the flight 
to Maastricht, Padoa-Schioppa spoke of this with Andreotti: without the 
date the project would not have survived� Once he had arrived in the 
Netherlands, Andreotti spoke of this first with Mitterand and then again 
the following morning at breakfast with  Kohl, before the start of the 
meeting� The German Chancellor agreed with Andreotti, but asked both 
his interlocutors: “Do you know what the date means to you?”� “It was 
clear,” Jozzo commented, “that he would say that we would have to begin 
to balance our trade accounts”� Andreotti answered: “Yes, I understand”�74 
At the meeting shortly afterward the date would be set for 1997, in any 
event, no later than 1999� Jozzo also recalls that, at around 9 p�m� on the 
evening the Maastricht Treaty was drafted, Padoa-Schioppa telephoned 
him to say that the federalist line had passed�75
73 Secretary of the federalist section in Rome, Ruta conceived of and carried out the 
first issuance of ECU-denominated bonds, an important step toward the European 
currency� See Europa moneta sviluppo. Scritti di Gianni Ruta, Rome, Cisu, 1991�
74 Interview by Renaud Dehousse with Alfonso Jozzo, 16 October 2012, in www�
CVCE�eu�
75 Ibidem�
La présidence Mitterrand, fer de lance  
de l’Union monétaire européenne (1988-1992) ?
Jean-Marie Palayret
Maastricht a marqué le terme d’une longue bataille pour l’Union 
monétaire initiée avec le sommet de La Haye en décembre 1969 et 
intensifiée à partir de 1988 suite aux pressions françaises exercées sur une 
Allemagne réticente� 
L’Union monétaire, telle qu’elle avait été définie dans le rapport 
Werner, exigeait des parités de change fixes et la mise en œuvre d’une 
politique monétaire commune gérée par une Banque centrale européenne 
indépendante des gouvernements� Quelles motivations ont pu induire 
les socialistes français alors au pouvoir à accepter des concessions qui 
s’écartaient ainsi de la tradition « interventionniste » et keynésienne ? Les 
dirigeants français avaient plusieurs raisons de souhaiter une telle union� 
En premier lieu, ils voyaient en elle un élément indispensable à une 
politique de croissance économique au niveau européen ; en second lieu, 
ils l’estimaient utile pour se mettre à l’abri des mouvements erratiques du 
Dollar sur le marché des changes ; en troisième lieu, ils l’envisageaient 
comme un moyen de briser la position dominante dont la République 
fédérale d’Allemagne et la Bundesbank disposaient de facto dans les 
processus de décision monétaire en Europe occidentale1�
Les efforts répétés des Français en faveur d’une réforme du SME se 
heurtaient à une forte résistance de la part des Allemands qui n’avaient 
pas grand’ chose à gagner d’une union monétaire� Les réticences des 
autorités de Bonn résultaient de la crainte ancestrale d’un modèle 
«  institutionnaliste  » d’union, synonyme à leurs yeux d’inflation et 
de laxisme budgétaire,  ainsi que de l’attitude intransigeante de la 
Bundesbank, dont les directeurs ne voyaient aucune raison de réduire 
leur liberté de manœuvre2� L’élite économique et politique d’Outre-Rhin 
marquait un attachement indéfectible au Mark, monnaie forte devenue 
1 Szasz, André, The Road to European Monetary Union, London, Macmillan Press, 
1999, p� 147�
2 Loth, Wilfried, « Negotiating the Maastricht Treaty », Journal of European Integration 
History, 1-2013, p� 67-83�
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le symbole de la prospérité retrouvée du pays et à la stabilité monétaire, 
considérée comme un élément important de la Soziale Marktwirttschaft� 
L’indépendance de la Banque centrale du processus politique était 
une composante essentielle de cette culture de  stabilité� Suivant les 
principes de l’ordo-libéralisme, seule une Banque centrale indépendante 
des gouvernements, fédéral et régionaux, était en mesure de garantir la 
stabilité des prix� Le financement de déficits publics par des crédits de 
Banque centrale était prohibé par la Bundesbankgesetz3. 
1. Premières escarmouches franco-allemandes  
sur la voie de l’UEM
Sur le plan de la stratégie, la politique française au sein du SME 
était en effet soumise, à la charnière des deux septennats de François 
Mitterrand, à la forte domination de la «  zone Mark  » en Europe et 
à une dépendance croissante à l’égard des décisions prises à Francfort� 
Les fréquents réajustements monétaires montraient les limites du SME 
tel qu’il fonctionnait depuis 1979� La baisse du Dollar se traduisant, 
sur les marchés internationaux, par une hausse du Deutsche Mark, la 
devise allemande était sans cesse tirée vers le haut, toute réévaluation de 
la monnaie allemande risquait de se traduire, sur les marchés européens, 
par une dévaluation des monnaies les plus faibles, sans rapport avec la 
situation macro – économique des pays concernés� Ce fut ainsi que neuf 
mois à peine après une dévaluation de 6% en avril 1986, le 12 janvier 
1987 le Franc était à nouveau déprécié de 3% par rapport au Marc et au 
Florin� Face à une opinion publique qui assimilait « le moindre ajustement 
du Franc par rapport au Mark à une défaite nationale  »4, les autorités 
françaises se sentaient chaque jour plus dépendantes des décisions de la 
Bundesbank� En outre, l’injection – par la nouvelle équipe dirigeante 
RPR conduite par Jacques Chirac – d’une certaine dose de libéralisme 
dans l’économie nationale, l’intérêt accru porté aux mécanismes du 
marché, firent de la stabilité des prix l’un des objectifs prioritaires du 
gouvernement de cohabitation et le conduisirent à envisager l’opportunité 
d’accepter la libéralisation des mouvements de capitaux réclamée par 
Bonn et par Londres, sans renoncer pour autant à protéger les intérêts 
3 Thiemeyer, Guido, « Economic Models in France and Germany and the Debates on 
The Maastricht Treaty », Journal of European Integration History, 1-2013, p� 85-103�
4 Fonteneau, Alain, Muet, Pierre-Alain, La Gauche face à la crise, Paris, Presses de la 
Fondation nationale des Sciences politiques, 1985�
nationaux5� Ceci accrût la crainte de devoir conformer plus encore la 
politique économique française à l’orientation monétaire de la monnaie 
d’ancrage6� 
Aussitôt après ce qui s’avéra être la dernière dévaluation française 
au sein du SME, le gouvernement français réagît� Il réclama un 
réaménagement du Système monétaire européen visant à le rendre moins 
asymétrique� Au Conseil ECOFIN de Bâle – Nyborg de septembre 1987, 
les Allemands acceptèrent le principe d’une meilleure coordination sur 
le plan des interventions intra-marginales, c’est-à-dire une politique 
d’interventions précoces, pratiquées conjointement par les pays à monnaie 
forte et par ceux dont la monnaie faisait l’objet d’attaques spéculatives� 
Les Allemands avaient toutefois subordonné leur aide à la suppression 
par la France des contrôles financiers aux frontières� Mais cet ajustement 
technique « n’impressionna guère le marché financier et la spéculation 
contre le franc continua de plus belle »7� Paris essaya ensuite de porter 
la question au niveau politique� Le 22 juin 1988, à l’occasion de la visite 
officielle du Chancelier allemand à Paris, et sur l’insistance du Premier 
ministre Jacques Chirac, François Mitterrand et Helmut Kohl signèrent 
des protocoles au Traité de l’Élysée de 1963, établissant un Conseil de 
Défense et un Conseil économique et financier franco-allemands� Ce 
dernier était censé examiner périodiquement les politiques monétaires 
menées dans chacun des deux pays dans le contexte national, européen 
et international en vue de leur rapprochement et de leur coordination, 
l’accent étant mis sur la réforme du Système monétaire européen8� 
L’initiative jeta l’alarme à Francfort, où l’on craignit qu’un organe tirant 
ses prérogatives du Traité n’empiétât sur l’autonomie de la Bundesbank 
5 En France, la politique monétaire fut menée par l’élite politique et technocratique� 
Les milieux économiques étaient favorables, mais peu actifs eu égard à l’UEM : les 
directeurs de certaines grandes entreprises, dont Rhône-Poullenc, avaient bien créé 
une association pour une Union monétaire européenne en 1987, mais le CNPF ne 
produisit aucune étude d’impact sur l’EMU avant le sommet de Maastricht� Pour 
les groupes exportateurs, le développement d’une UEM était jugé moins important 
que la réalisation d’un Marché unique, cf� Howarth, David, « EMU, Integration 
Theories, and the Annoying Complexities of French policy Making », in Verdun, 
Amy (ed�), The Euro. European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary Union, 
Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, p� 179-199�
6 Archives nationales de France (ANF) Archives de la présidence François Mitterrand 
(AG5) 4/86/EG (Elisabeth Guigou) d�3, Compte-rendu de réunion de l’« Atelier 
Europe  », Groupe d’experts (François Auvigne, Géraud Guibert) sur l’union 
monétaire européenne, 14 mars 1987� 
7 Howarth, David J�, The French Road to European Monetary Union, London, 
Macmillan, 2006, p� 91�
8 ANF, AG5 4/86/EG d�3, Note d’Elisabeth Guigou a/s « Conseil franco-allemand 
économique et monétaire », 1987�
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inscrite dans la Grundegesetz. Après quelques tiraillements entre Francfort 
et Bonn, le Bundestag trancha la question en adoptant un préambule 
au décret d’application du protocole, stipulant que le Conseil n’aurait 
qu’un rôle consultatif et que ses recommandations n’affecteraient en rien 
l’autonomie de la Bundesbank9� 
Les efforts déployés par Paris pour influencer la politique monétaire 
de la RFA par des mesures techniques ou par la coopération politique 
apparaissaient donc vains� Pour la France, la seule possibilité desserrer 
l’étau du Mark résidait désormais dans le transfert du processus de 
décision monétaire du niveau national au niveau européen, en d’autres 
termes dans la création d’une Union économique et monétaire� 
De ce point de vue, l’adoption en 1986 de l’Acte unique qui prévoyait 
un important train de mesures destinées à achever le grand espace sans 
frontières favorisait le déploiement de la nouvelle stratégie française� 
Le marché unique agissait comme un levier en faveur de l’UEM, car 
sa réalisation supposait des parités fixes entre les devises des Douze� La 
levée des derniers obstacles à la libre circulation des capitaux créait une 
dynamique encourageant l’UEM tout en levant le préalable posé par 
Bonn à l’ouverture de négociations sur le sujet10� Le 8 Janvier 1988, sans 
avoir consulté au préalable l’Élysée11, le ministre de l’Économie et des 
Finances Édouard Balladur adressait un mémorandum à ses partenaires 
de la Communauté européenne� Se référant aux tensions qui avaient 
récemment agité les marchés financiers (Lundi noir) il écrivait : « En 
1992, l’Europe sera un espace économique complètement intégré […] 
La logique voudrait qu’une zone à monnaie unique soit alors créée […] 
dans laquelle il y aurait une institution centrale commune et des banques 
fédérales dans chaque pays »12� Deux jours auparavant, il avait porté le 
sujet sur la place publique en déclarant à l’émission télévisée « L’heure 
de vérité » : « Le moment est venu d’examiner la possibilité de créer une 
9 Dyson, Kenneth, Kevin Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating Economic 
and Monetary Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p� 324�
10 James, Harold, Making the European Monetary Union, The Role of the Committee 
of Central Banks Governors and the Origins of the European Central Bank, Londres, 
Harvard University press, 2012, p� 214 ; Howarth, « EMU, Integration Theories, and 
the Annoying Complexities of French policy Making », in Verdun (ed�), The Euro. 
European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary Union, cit�, p� 179-199�
11 ANF (AG5) 4/86/EG d�3, Note d’Elisabeth Guigou pour le Président « Observations 
sur le mémorandum de Monsieur Balladur  », 10 Février 1988� Dans cette note, 
E� Guigou dénonce l’attitude du ministre des Finances en ces termes : « M� Balladur 
ne vous a pas consulté, ce qui est inadmissible� Il vous a envoyé son mémorandum 
au moment où il était publié dans Le Monde »�
12 ANF, AG5 (4) 86 EG d�3, Edouard Balladur, « Mémorandum sur la construction 
monétaire européenne », 8 janvier 1988, p� 17-20�
Banque centrale européenne qui contrôlera une monnaie commune, 
l’ECU  »13� En lançant cette idée, Balladur contournait l’obstacle de 
la symétrie  : une union monétaire donnerait aux autorités françaises 
une possibilité accrue d’intervenir contre la spéculation facilitée par la 
libéralisation des mouvements de capitaux à l’intérieur de l’Europe14� 
Elle permettrait de partager le pouvoir de décision monétaire avec les 
Allemands et de fixer collectivement les taux d’intérêts à des niveaux 
moins élevés, compatibles avec les besoins de la croissance économique 
française15� 
2. Stratégie française et réactions allemandes  
face au projet d’UEM
La conversion personnelle de François Mitterrand à l’idée d’une plus 
grande intégration monétaire datait de la décision qu’il avait prise en 
mars 1983 de ne pas sortir le franc du SME� Ce fut d’abord l’instabilité 
du système monétaire international qui, pour le chef de l’État, justifia 
«  la création d’un organisme monétaire européen chargé simplement 
de gérer les parités extérieures des monnaies européennes, et de lutter 
contre l’emprise hégémonique du dollar  »16� Il écarta en un premier 
temps l’idée de créer une Banque centrale européenne de type fédéral 
qui aurait supposé une remise en cause de l’assujettissement de la 
Banque de France au pouvoir politique� Deux évènements infléchirent 
cependant les idées du Président sur la question : la négociation de la 
conférence intergouvernementale de 1985, qui aboutît à la signature de 
l’Acte unique en 1986, et la crainte que l’Allemagne ne se laissât séduire 
par l’Union soviétique de Gorbatchev et n’acceptât de troquer son 
engagement à l’ouest en échange de la réunification� Mitterrand en vint 
ainsi à établir progressivement un lien entre le grand marché européen, 
l’union monétaire et l’union politique européenne, dans cet ordre� Cette 
vision historique le convainquit que le leadership européen dépendait de 
sa capacité à saisir toutes les occasions d’aller de l’avant dans l’intégration 
et de maintenir l’élan communautaire� Concernant la négociation, 
Mitterrand entendait agir en « animateur » inspirant les négociateurs par 
une vision historique des intérêts français en Europe et de la coopération 
13 Balleix-Banerjee, Corinne, La France et la Banque centrale européenne, Paris, PUF, 
1997, p� 27-28�
14 Ibidem�
15 Howarth, The French Road to European Monetary Union, cit�, p� 118�
16 Ibid�, p� 34�
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franco-allemande, et en observateur d’un processus dont le contenu 
technique lui échappait en grande partie� Il refusait toutefois de se laisser 
enfermer dans le conformisme de la «  technostructure  »� Il entendait 
exploiter l’expertise des technocrates tout en minimisant leur pouvoir : 
d’où son attitude méfiante à l’égard des fonctionnaires du Trésor dont il 
critiquait l’orthodoxie ou de Jacques Delors qu’il considérait comme un 
piètre promoteur des intérêts français ; d’où aussi sa tendance à confier 
la négociation à des intimes ou à de proches conseillers de la présidence : 
Roland Dumas, Jacques Attali ou Élisabeth Guigou17� Un autre thème 
récurrent se caractérisait par sa détermination d’intégrer une dimension 
sociale à l’Union économique et monétaire� 
Pour les fonctionnaires et le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Roland 
Dumas, la stratégie française devait être subtile et indirecte� L’UEM 
ne devait pas procéder d’une proposition française� C’est à Bonn qu’il 
revenait de prendre l’initiative� Une première composante de la stratégie 
du Quai d’Orsay consista donc à encourager les Allemands à avancer 
des propositions, en identifiant le point le plus réceptif au sein du 
gouvernement Fédéral, en l’espèce le ministre allemand des Affaires 
étrangères, Hans Dietrich Genscher, qui avait appuyé la proposition de 
Conseil économique franco-allemand et voyait en l’UEM un pas essentiel 
sur la voie de l’unification de l’Europe18� Un autre élément tactique consista 
à appliquer le principe « diviser pour régner » entre Bonn et Francfort� 
Un troisième élément de la stratégie du ministère des Affaires étrangères 
consista enfin à « lier » la Bundesbank par des engagements préalables 
dans un système irréversible comportant un calendrier préétabli� Cette 
stratégie fut accompagnée par une politique des « dominos », c’est-à-
dire par une démarche progressive visant à des gains partiels et successifs 
susceptibles d’éroder petit à petit l’indépendance de la Bundesbank�19� 
À la différence de Mitterrand et de Dumas, le nouveau ministre français 
des Finances, Pierre Bérégovoy (en fonctions depuis mai 1988) ne cachait 
pas son scepticisme à l’égard du projet d’UEM� Bien que préoccupé 
par les taux d’intérêts élevés et le coût économique qu’impliquait déjà 
l’inféodation de la France à la zone Mark, en raison de l’impact négatif 
de celle-ci sur la politique nationale en matière de croissance et d’emploi, 
Bérégovoy doutait de la volonté allemande de pousser la transition vers 
l’UEM jusqu’à son terme� Pour le locataire de la rue de Rivoli, le danger 
17 Dyson, Kenneth, Featherstone, Kevin, The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating Economic 
and Monetary Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p� 97-98 et 207�
18 Ibid� p� 329�
19 Stark, Hans, Kohl, l’Allemagne et l’Europe. La politique d’ intégration européenne de 
la République fédérale 1982-1998 Paris, L’Harmattan, 2004, p� 79�
aurait été de faire des concessions, en cédant sur les préalables de la libre 
circulation des capitaux ou de l’harmonisation fiscale puis en acceptant 
l’indépendance de la Banque centrale européenne, sans être assurés que 
la République fédérale consentît au final à la mise en place d’une monnaie 
unique� Ces réserves s’atténuèrent au cours des négociations, sans jamais 
disparaître totalement� Bérégovoy était également partisan d’un « pôle 
politique  » fort (gouvernement économique) capable d’équilibrer le 
pouvoir du «  pôle monétaire  » constitué par l’institution bancaire 
supranationale� Dans son esprit, une Banque centrale européenne 
n’était acceptable que si elle était coiffée par le Conseil des ministres 
de l’Économie et des Finances (ECOFIN)20� Cette position était fondée 
sur l’idée républicaine de contre-pouvoir� Bérégovoy entendait enfin 
contrebalancer le leadership de la RFA par l’adhésion du plus grand 
nombre possible de pays membres – Royaume-Uni compris – au SME, 
avant d’envisager le passage à l’UEM� Les vues des fonctionnaires du 
Trésor prévalurent parfois au cours des négociations, mais résolument 
fidèle au Président, le ministre se soumit en dernier ressort aux volontés 
de ce dernier, et les répercuta au sein des conseils ECOFIN�
La tactique française dans la négociation de l’UEM consista à 
« surveiller de près » l’Allemagne et à chaque étape s’assurer de disposer 
d’un accord solide avec ce pays� L’affaire pouvait être délicate dans la 
mesure où la RFA pouvait prendre des postures contradictoires21� 
Entraînés par la dynamique déclenchée par l’Acte unique, Kohl et 
Genscher soutenaient le projet� Le 26 février 1988, sous la forme d’un 
document de travail pour le Parti libéral, (FDP), Genscher proposa 
que le Conseil européen qui devait se tenir à Hanovre sous présidence 
allemande les 27-28 juin donnât «  un signal en faveur de la création 
d’un espace monétaire et d’une Banque centrale européens »� Il devrait 
confier à un comité de 5 à 7 « sages » la charge d’étudier, dans un délai 
d’un an, les contours d’une union monétaire, le statut d’une institution 
monétaire centrale et l’établissement d’un calendrier comportant une 
période de transition22� Pour Helmut Kohl, le lancement de l’UEM 
rendrait l’union politique européenne irréversible� En 1987, avec l’arrivée 
de Gorbatchev au pouvoir en Union soviétique, les relations Est-Ouest 
changeaient, offrant à l’Allemagne de l’Ouest de nouvelles opportunités; 
20 La Tribune de l’Expansion, 8 février 1989�
21 Saunier, Georges, « La négociation de Maastricht vue de Paris », Journal of European 
Integration History, 1, 2013, p� 45-65�
22 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, Diskussion Grundlage : Memorandum fùr die Schaffung eines 
europäischen Währungräumes und einer europäischen Zentralbank, Bonn, 26 février 
1998, 6 p�
La présidence Mitterrand, fer de lance de l’Union monétaire européenne  135
136 The History of the European Monetary Union
les initiatives du gouvernement fédéral en direction de l’Est exigeaient 
le soutien de l’Occident et la coopération avec la France en matière de 
sécurité et de défense constituait l’une des clefs de ce soutien� Mais le 
ministre allemand des Finances Gerhard Stoltenberg ne l’entendait pas 
de cette oreille et l’UEM était loin d’avoir les faveurs du Président de la 
Bundesbank Karl-Otto Pöhl : s’il ne rejetait pas en bloc la progression 
vers l’union monétaire, ce dernier estimait que la future BCE devrait 
être dotée du même degré d’indépendance que la Buba et qu’il fallait 
que la future gestion monétaire assurât avant tout la stabilité des prix� 
Fidèle à la «  thèse du couronnement  » le Président de la Bundesbank 
soulignait également la nécessité d’aboutir à une plus grande convergence 
économique entre les pays membres de la Communauté avant de songer 
à la création d’une Europe monétaire� Il exigeait un ferme engagement 
sur ces points dès le départ, refusant de procéder par petits pas, sans 
objectif clairement défini23� Quant à la population, elle n’était pas prête 
à abandonner le Deutsche Mark, symbole fondateur de la République 
fédérale »24�
L’arrivée de Jacques Delors à la présidence de la Commission 
européenne s’avéra décisive� Delors, homme politique combinant une 
véritable vision pour l’Europe à un sens inné du compromis, avait été, 
comme ministre des Finances, l’un des leaders socialistes qui avaient, 
en mars 1983, convaincu un François Mitterrand hésitant à «  faire le 
choix de l’Europe  » en maintenant le franc dans le SME25� Devenu 
Président de la Commission, il avait multiplié les incitations à compléter 
le programme du grand marché par des mesures visant à parfaire 
l’intégration� C’est dans cette perspective qu’il avait adopté – pour 
la Commission et pour son pays – l’objectif de la libéralisation totale 
des mouvements de capitaux, réclamée par les banquiers centraux et 
23 «  Karl Otto Pöhl, Die Vision eines Europäischen Wärungsraums  », Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 mai 1988�
24 Brand-Crémieux, Marie-Noëlle, « Une grande Allemagne au coeur de l’Europe », 
Relations internationales, 126, été 2006, p� 26-27�
25 Au sein du parti socialiste, Delors était partisan d’une politique économique modérée, 
qualifiée de « troisième voie » qui permettrait au gouvernement de maintenir le franc au 
sein du SME, que le ministre des Finances considérait comme un utile garde-fou contre 
les tendances inflationnistes excessives� Cette politique visait à trouver un compromis 
entre la croissance économique, la redistribution des ressources et le contrôle strict de 
l’inflation� Il s’opposa aux options défendues par d’autres conseillers du Président qui, 
tels l’industriel Jean Riboud et l’économiste Jean Denizet, prétendaient « mettre les 
contraintes extérieures entre parenthèses » et songeaient à une importante dévaluation 
à l’extérieur du SME dans le but d’améliorer la compétitivité de l’industrie française 
vis-à-vis de la concurrence extérieure et de permettre d’abaisser sensiblement les taux 
de change�
fait insérer subrepticement un sous-titre à l’article 20 de l’Acte, faisant 
explicitement référence à une Union économique et monétaire, présenté 
dans ses Mémoires comme « un petit caillou blanc  »26� Il avait réalisé 
très vite que l’intégration monétaire aurait plus de chance d’aboutir si 
l’on parvenait à impliquer au moins partiellement la Bundesbank dans le 
processus� Il rechercha des appuis politiques en RFA� Les liens d’amitié 
qu’il avait tissés au temps de l’École Nationale d’Administration avec 
certains hauts fonctionnaires de la Chancellerie, comme Hans Bitterlich 
ou Johannnes Ludewig, facilitèrent le rapprochement27�
Dans le fil du mémorandum Genscher, Delors et le Chancelier Kohl 
coopérèrent étroitement pour préparer le terrain à un accord permettant 
d’avancer sur l’UEM au Conseil de Hanovre� Fraîchement réélu pour 
un second mandat, Mitterrand fut « briefé » par Delors sur l’importance 
qu’il y avait à saisir l’occasion offerte par l’initiative du ministre allemand 
des Affaires étrangères� Au sommet franco-allemand d’Évian le 2 juin 
1988, le Président, passant outre aux craintes de la majorité du Parti 
socialiste sur les risques de fuite de capitaux et aux réserves exprimées 
par le ministère des Finances sur l’impossibilité d’influer désormais sur 
les taux de change, se rallia à l’idée d’accepter la complète libéralisation 
des mouvements de capitaux, de manière à faciliter la tâche à Kohl dans 
sa volonté de progresser sur le projet d’UEM28� Lors du sommet de 
Hanovre – sous présidence allemande – qui suivit (27 et 28 juin 1988) 
les Chefs d’État et de gouvernement de la Communauté européenne 
décidèrent de s’engager sur cette voie en donnant leur aval à la création 
d’un comité d’experts qui aurait pour tâche « d’étudier et de soumettre, 
à l’occasion du sommet de Madrid en juin 1989, des propositions 
relatives aux étapes concrètes devant mener à la réalisation progressive 
de l’union monétaire  »29� Sa composition, différente de celle envisagée 
à l’origine par les Allemands, associait une majorité composée par les 
douze gouverneurs des banques centrales (qui fourniraient l’expertise 
technique), trois économistes de renom, nommés par les chefs d’État 
et de gouvernement30, et le Président de la Commission (qui assurerait 
26 ANF, AG5 (4) 86 EG d�3, Intervention de Jacques Delors au Parlement européen, 
20 février 1986 ; Delors, Jacques, Mémoires, Paris, Plon, 2004, p� 221�
27 Szasz, André, The Road to European Monetary Union, Londres, Macmillan Press, 
1999, p� 95-96�
28 Dyson, Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, cit�, p� 178�
29 Voir CEE, Conclusions du Conseil de Hanovre, Documents d’actualité internationale, 
n° 16, 15 août 1988, p� 310-311�
30 Miguel Boyer, Président de la Banque extérieure espagnole, Alexandre Lamfalussy, 
directeur général de la Banque des règlements internationaux et Niels Thygesen, 
professeur d’économie à l’Université de Copenhague�
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la direction politique)� Les ministres des Finances étant écartés, Kohl 
et Delors eurent l’habileté d’impliquer les banquiers centraux ce qui 
accrût la crédibilité du projet� Au contraire de Margaret Thatcher, dont 
la stratégie consista à compter sur les gouverneurs de banques centrales 
pour tuer le projet sur les fonts baptismaux, celle mise en œuvre par Kohl 
et Delors eut le mérite de fonctionner31� 
Le 17 avril 1989, au terme de huit réunions tenues à Bâle, le comité 
Delors [Comité pour l’étude d’une union économique et monétaire] 
présentait à l’unanimité un dispositif en trois étapes à partir du 1er juillet 
1990 : au stade 1, renforcement de la coopération en matière monétaire et 
adhésion des devises de tous les pays membres au mécanisme de change 
du SME ; le stade 2 était subordonné à la révision du traité de Rome et 
consisterait en une période transitoire au cours de laquelle coexisteraient 
des éléments du nouvel ordre monétaire européen (Système européen 
de banques centrales ou SEBC)et de l’ancien, puisque les autorités 
monétaires nationales seraient maintenues; le stade 3 serait celui du 
transfert de compétences en matière macroéconomique et monétaire des 
États membres à l’Union, de l’instauration irrévocable de parités fixes et 
de l’introduction d’une monnaie unique (et non « parallèle » circulant 
conjointement avec les monnaies nationales comme proposé par le 
gouvernement britannique)� Le Comité insistait sur le fait que la création 
d’une union économique et monétaire devait être considérée comme un 
processus continu et irréversible� La décision d’entrer dans la première 
étape devait être considérée comme une décision de poursuivre le processus 
jusqu’à son terme32� Bien que les objectifs auxquels souscrivait la France y 
fussent clairement réaffirmés (parvenir le plus rapidement possible à une 
troisième étape caractérisée par une politique monétaire commune mise 
en oeuvre par une banque centrale commune (Eurofed) au service d’une 
monnaie unique, l’ECU) le rapport Delors reflétait en grande partie les 
positions et préoccupations allemandes� Ainsi soulignait-il la nécessité de 
poursuivre de façon strictement parallèle la coopération monétaire et la 
convergence des politiques économiques des Douze, en particulier sur le 
plan budgétaire� Le SEBC proposé par le rapport s’inspirait clairement 
du modèle de la Bundesbank�
31 Margaret Thatcher avait insisté pour que les gouverneurs de banques centrales 
soient seuls chargés du rapport, sans doute dans l’espoir de voir ainsi enterrer le 
projet� Elle comptait surtout sur le gouverneur de la Banque d’Angleterre Sir Leigh-
Pemberton et sur «  le sceptique Herr Pöhl pour mettre un frein sur les roues du 
véhicule singulier de l’intégration européenne »� 
32 Pour la Bundesbank cet engagement était essentiel pour s’assurer que la perspective 
de créer une UEM dans un avenir indéfini ne serait pas uniquement un leurre pour 
éroder son indépendance dans le présent�
La voie « maximaliste » choisie par le Comité Delors contrastait avec 
les ambiguïtés (volontaires ou non) de ceux qui, en France en particulier, 
avaient relancé le processus d’union monétaire� Le gouverneur de la 
Banque de France, Jacques de Larosière, avait joué un rôle important dans 
les travaux du comité� Il avait plaidé en faveur d’un projet d’institution 
monétaire supranationale et proposé la création, dès la première étape du 
processus menant vers l’union monétaire, d’un Fonds de réserve européen 
qui préfigurerait le futur Système Européen de Banques Centrales� Si le 
gouverneur de la Banque de France partageait l’avis de ses homologues, 
notamment celui de Karl Otto Pöhl, en faveur d’une «  institution 
monétaire indépendante » qui interpréterait la stabilité monétaire de façon 
très stricte et restreindrait le financement des déficits publics, il souhaitait 
cependant la doter de prérogatives très larges dans les domaines des 
interventions sur le marché des changes vis-à-vis des devises extérieures 
(reflétant l’intérêt de Bérégovoy pour la dimension extérieure de l’EMS) 
et de la surveillance monétaire� De Larosière considérait également que le 
rôle du Conseil des ministres devrait être décisif pour la fixation des taux 
de change, susceptibles d’affecter les relations commerciales – et donc 
politiques – entre États� Il était convaincu que la préparation immédiate 
d’un Traité révisé restait le cœur du projet33�
De Larosière avait maintenu ses distances avec le ministère des 
Finances� Au sein de celui-ci prévalait le sentiment, partagé par la 
puissante direction du Trésor, que le rapport, en mettant l’accent sur la 
stabilité des prix et sur la création d’une Banque centrale européenne, 
reflétait beaucoup trop les vues allemandes34� Si le Trésor acceptait avec 
réticence que le gouvernement français ne s’opposât pas au principe 
d’une BCE indépendante35, il se demandait si la Bundesbank constituait 
33 Balleix-Banerjee, La France et la Banque centrale européenne, cit�, p� 77-79� 
34 Le 27 avril, au cours d’une réunion au Trésor, de Larosière s’était vu reprocher 
par Bérégovoy et Trichet d’avoir signé un rapport dont ils considéraient le contenu 
comme «  trop germanique  »� Selon eux, Larosière s’était prononcé, durant les 
travaux du Comité, systématiquement en faveur des formulations les plus radicales 
sur l’indépendance de la future Banque centrale européenne�
35 De Larosière avait obtenu un semblant d’aval de François Mitterrand au cours d’un 
entretien privé le 1er décembre 1988 : « Je dis [au Président] que si la France voulait 
un accord avec les Allemands, nous devrions accepter que la politique monétaire fut 
une politique unique, et que les banques centrales devinssent membres d’un système 
de banques centrales où elles devraient toutes être indépendantes des gouvernements� 
La Banque centrale européenne ne pourrait fonctionner que si sa politique n’était 
pas sujette à des négociations entre gouvernements� Subsidiairement, c’était une 
condition cruciale pour nos partenaires allemands� Le Président Mitterrand ne me 
répondit pas précisément� Ce n’était pas dans sa nature� Je craignais qu’il ne dise : 
“c’est hors de question”� Mais il ne le dît pas� Il me fit un commentaire compliqué 
sur la façon dont le monde évoluait vers des systèmes de régulation qui n’étaient 
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le modèle le plus approprié pour assurer la gouvernance démocratique 
de l’intégration monétaire�36 Le ministère des Finances souhaitait qu’on 
établît un contre-pouvoir politique face à celui de l’autorité monétaire 
au sein de l’UEM : il devait y avoir un « gouvernement économique » 
capable d’assurer un « policy-mix » au niveau de la Communauté� Pour 
tenir ce rôle, Trichet, De Forges, Hannon et les autres fonctionnaires 
du Trésor songeaient à un ECOFIN renforcé qui gèrerait les rapports 
entre les politiques structurelles, fiscales et sociales� Bérégovoy accordait 
d’ autre part une attention particulière à la dimension extérieure du SME 
qu’il voulait protéger des turbulences provoquées par les fluctuations 
du Dollar et du Yen� Il soulignait donc l’importance d’une gestion 
communautaire de la politique des taux de changes37� Enfin, pour le 
ministre promoteur du « Franc fort », la BCE et l’ECU comme monnaie 
unique européenne, n’étaient pas des perspectives à court terme� Il 
envisageait plutôt une évolution pragmatique, pas à pas, vers une politique 
monétaire commune, intégrant en un premier temps le Royaume-Uni 
dans le SME (pour éviter le face-à-face avec une Allemagne surpuissante) 
puis en renforçant l’ECU comme monnaie commune européenne sur 
les marchés mondiaux, en confiant sa gestion a un « Fonds de réserve 
européen » dont la première mission serait d’administrer les réserves de 
devises nationales et de veiller à la parité de l’ECU face au dollar et 
au yen� Le Président Mitterrand passa finalement outre aux objections 
de son ministre� Comme l’ont observé Dyson and Featherstone  : « Il 
fit valoir à Bérégovoy l’intérêt vital qu’il y avait à gagner le soutien de 
l’Ecofin pour une application sans réserve du rapport Delors, pour la 
plus directement sous le contrôle des gouvernements� Ce n’était pas une réponse 
technique; c’était une réflexion sociologique sur la gouvernance mondiale� Je me dis 
“Je vais prendre cela comme un feu vert de sa part” »� Interview de de Larosière, cité 
in Marssh, David, The Euro. The Battle for the New Global Currency, London, Yale 
University Press, 2009, p� 129�
36 Mitterrand avait fait part de ses hésitations sur le degré d’autonomie de la Banque 
centrale européenne au Premier ministre italien Ciriaco de Mita à Taormina le 
30 mars 1989 : « Je ne suis pas hostile à la Banque centrale, mais à certains de ses modes 
opératoires� La Bundesbank est totalement hors du contrôle des gouvernements� 
Notre Banque centrale est indépendante, mais c’est le gouvernement qui définit 
la politique économique et monétaire […] J’hésite à faire cette concession� Il est 
dangereux que la Banque centrale puisse, en l’absence d’une autorité politique, 
disposer d’un pouvoir souverain� Le système monétaire européen est déjà une 
zone allemande� Mais la République Fédérale d’Allemagne n’a pas autorité sur nos 
économies, Avec la Banque centrale européenne, elle l’aurait », in Institut François 
Mitterrand, Mitterrand et la réunification allemande – Une histoire secrète, 1981-95.
37 Dyson, Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, cit�, p� 181-182�
fixation d’une date pour la première étape et pour la convocation rapide 
d’une conférence intergouvernementale sur l’UEM� »38
Pourtant, l’ambiguïté de la position française se manifesta au 
Sommet européen de Madrid (26-27 juin 1989) qui examina le rapport 
Delors� Si la délégation donna son accord à l’ouverture de négociations 
intergouvernementales en vue de la signature d’un nouveau traité 
d’intégration monétaire européenne «  une fois que la première étape 
aura[it] commencé  »39 et demanda une convocation rapide de la CIG, 
elle se montra beaucoup plus circonspecte sur d’autres propositions 
comme l’automaticité du processus devant conduire à la création de 
la Banque centrale commune ou le rejet de l’option d’un ECU conçu 
comme monnaie parallèle (parallel currency)� Ainsi, comme le soulignait 
Élisabeth Guigou  : «  Bien que la délégation française se montre 
favorable au projet d’intégration monétaire européenne, elle apparaît 
[…] indéterminée quant à son objectif final »40� A Madrid, en dépit de 
l’opposition vigoureuse de Margaret Thatcher, Mitterrand obtînt ce qu’il 
voulait : les chefs d’État et de gouvernement adoptèrent le rapport Delors 
comme « base de négociation » et demandèrent aux organes compétents 
(Conseil des ministres, Commission, Comité des gouverneurs de banques 
centrales et Comité monétaire) d’adopter les mesures nécessaires pour le 
lancement de la première étape d’une Union économique et monétaire le 
1er juillet 1990 et d’engager les travaux préparatoires pour l’organisation 
d’une GIG censée établir les étapes ultérieures� Manquait toutefois 
une date pour la convocation de la CIG� Répondant aux instances de 
Bérégovoy qui prônait l’instauration d’un « pôle politique fort » au sein 
de l’UEM, le Conseil européen mit l’accent sur le renforcement de la 
coordination de la politique économique et de la surveillance mutuelle 
pour promouvoir la convergence� Mais les fonctionnaires du Trésor se 
montrèrent moins satisfaits lorsque le Conseil décida, sous la pression des 
Allemands, de fixer des critères de convergence pour évaluer les déficits 
excessifs et assurer une saine discipline financière� Le Conseil rejeta aussi 
le Fonds de réserve européen que de Larosière et Bérégovoy proposaient 
d’instaurer pour permettre des interventions communes vis-à-vis du 
Dollar ou du Yen41�
38 Ibid�, p� 188�
39 Conseil européen de Madrid des 26-27 juin 1989, Conclusions de la présidence, 
Bulletin des Communautés européennes, n° 6, 1989, Bruxelles, Commission, p� 8-18�
40 ANF, AG5 (4) 88 EG d�1, Note d’Elisabeth Guigou pour le Président a/s 
« Préparation de Madrid », 29 mars 1989 ; Corinne Balleix-Banerjee, cit�, p� 58-59�
41 ANF, AG5 (4) 88 EG d�1, Note d’Elisabeth Guigou pour le Président a/s « Appréciation 
du rapport Delors », 10 mai 1989 ; Ibid, « Conclusions de la présidence du Conseil 
européen de Madrid », 27 juin 1989 ; Agence Europe, Bulletin, 30 juin 1989�
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La France, qui présidait les institutions communautaires durant le 
second semestre de 1989, souhaitait accélérer le processus et fixer aussi 
rapidement que possible la date de la Conférence intergouvernementale� 
Cet activisme français résultait de la pression constante que François 
Mitterrand exerçait pour s’assurer que la présidence française (de la CE) 
recevrait un mandat clair permettant d’amorcer la marche vers l’Union 
monétaire42� Il pouvait compter sur l’appui de la Commission et des 
pays méditerranéens (Italie et Espagne)� Mais les dirigeants allemands, 
inquiets de voir le passage à l’UEM s’accompagner de l’abandon de la 
culture de la stabilité monétaire et provoquer, à l’échelle européenne, 
une politique monétaire laxiste, faisaient preuve d’une grande retenue et 
refusaient de s’engager sur un calendrier définitif� Mitterrand et Dumas 
entendaient rétablir le leadership politique sur l’UEM et neutraliser 
l’inclination de Pöhl à se dissocier du rapport Delors� Grâce au soutien de 
Genscher, ils obtinrent, à la réunion d’Antibes en septembre, la création 
d’un Groupe de hauts fonctionnaires pour entr’ouvrir la porte à la future 
conférence intergouvernementale� Composé de représentants des Douze, 
le Groupe, placé sous la présidence d’Elisabeth Guigou, conseillère 
spéciale du Président français, et piloté par Tomaso Padoa-Schioppa, 
Jean-Claude Trichet et Pierre de Boissieu, était censé aplanir le terrain 
dans la perspective du Conseil européen de Strasbourg en décembre 
qui aurait à se prononcer sur la convocation d’une CIG pour la révision 
du traité, qui devrait s’ouvrir avant la fin de 199043� Le 27 octobre le 
Groupe Guigou recensa une liste de questions qui devraient être traitées 
par la CIG : trois questions-clé devraient être traitées en priorité  : le 
parallélisme entre politiques monétaires et politiques économiques  ; 
la cohésion économique et sociale; le statut et la structure de la future 
Banque centrale européenne et ses relations avec les banques centrales 
d’une part, avec le Conseil des ministres et le Parlement européen 
d’autre part44� Composé essentiellement de fonctionnaires des ministères 
des Finances et des ministères des Affaires étrangères, le Groupe se 
montra plus réticent que ne l’avait été le comité Delors – « qui portait 
la marque des banquiers centraux [et] était excessivement dominé par 
42 ANF, AG5 (4) 86 EG d�1, Note de Roland Dumas pour le Président a/s « UEM : 
Procédure proposée par M� Dumas  », 7 juillet 1989� Dans une rencontre avec 
Margaret Thatcher le 4 septembre François Mitterrand avait déclaré qu’«  il avait 
l’intention de mettre le train sur les rails  », in ANF, AG5 (4) 88 EG d�1� Note 
d’Elisabeth Guigou à Roland Dumas a/s «  Rencontre entre le Président de la 
République et Mme Thatcher: UEM », 4 septembre 1989�
43 Financial Times, 6 novembre 1989�
44 ADMAE, Europe – CE, 1986-90, 1935 Inva, d� 5896, Tel� 18881, Boissieu à MAE 
a/s : « Réunion du Groupe à Haut niveau sur l’UEM », Bruxelles, 19 septembre 1989� 
la Commission  »  – sur le principe d’une banque centrale largement 
indépendante et sur celui d’une coordination des politiques budgétaires 
au seul service de la stabilité monétaire45� 
3. La réunification allemande et les pressions  
françaises en faveur de l’UEM
Mais, à l’automne 1989, la perspective d’une réunification allemande 
plus rapide que prévue compliqua le processus� La soudaineté de la 
désagrégation des régimes communistes à l’Est prit Mitterrand, Dumas 
et le Quai d’Orsay par surprise46� Les dirigeants français craignaient 
que le projet de construction européenne ne perdît de son attrait aux 
yeux des décideurs de l’Allemagne réunifiée� Confronté à l’évolution de 
la situation en Hongrie et en Pologne et à l’effondrement probable du 
régime en RDA, Helmut Kohl était décidé à faire admettre la nécessité 
de l’Union politique comme corollaire de l’Union monétaire� En 
proposant, dans ses dix points sur la réunification présentés au Bundestag 
le 28 novembre une union monétaire entre les deux Allemagnes sans 
consulter ses partenaires européens, le Chancelier ouest-allemand 
donna quelque temps l’impression d’un recul substantiel sur le dossier 
de l’UEM  ! Or, plus que jamais, on misait à Paris sur l’intégration 
européenne pour encadrer et contrôler la renaissance de la puissance 
allemande  : l’UEM, parce qu’elle créait justement un engrenage vers 
une véritable union politique, prenait valeur de test� Dumas et le Quai 
d’Orsay convainquirent alors François Mitterrand d’exiger de Bonn des 
contreparties à la réunification et à faire levier sur l’Union monétaire47� 
L’effet fut de raidir la position du Président français et de lui faire 
accentuer sa pression sur Helmut Kohl afin d’obtenir qu’au sommet de 
Strasbourg, prévu en décembre, une date fut fixée pour l’ouverture de 
45 « Offensive française sur l’union monétaire », Libération, 7 novembre 1989 ; ANF, 
AG5 (4) 88 EG d�2, Note d’Elisabeth Guigou pour le Président a/s « Résultats des 
travaux du groupe Guigou sur l’UEM », 1er novembre 1989 ; Balleix – Banerjee, cit�, 
p� 82, 192-196�
46 A l’évidence, Mitterrand et ses conseillers envisageaient la transition en cours à l’Est 
comme un phénomène très progressif� Rappelant à Bush en mai 1989 sa conviction 
que l’empire soviétique s’effondrerait tôt ou tard, rendant la réunification allemande 
possible, le Président français estimait que ces deux événements « n’arriveraient pas 
avant dix ans », cf� Bozo, Frédéric, « Mitterrand’s Vision and the End of the Cold 
War », in Bozo, Frédéric, Rey, Marie-Pierre, Ludlow, Piers (eds�), Visions of the End 
of the Cold War in Europe, 1945-1990, Oxford, Berghahn, 2012, p� 293�
47 L’Express, « Union monétaire et suspense allemand », 10 novembre 1989 ; Dyson, 
Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, cit., p� 195�
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la CIG sur l’UEM� Lors d’un échange téléphonique avec le Chancelier 
l’après-midi du 28 novembre, Mitterrand se fit menaçant  : la France 
n’accepterait le plan Kohl de réunification que si l’Allemagne prenait 
auparavant trois engagements distincts : l’ouverture de négociations sur 
l’Union monétaire, la reconnaissance définitive de la frontière germano-
polonaise, la confirmation du renoncement par l’Allemagne fédérale aux 
armes nucléaires48� Le 30 novembre Mitterrand fut encore plus rude 
avec Genscher  : il considérait désormais l’Allemagne non plus comme 
un moteur, mais comme un frein à l’unification européenne� Il appelait 
l’Allemagne à engager des négociations sérieuses sur l’UEM avant la fin 
de 1990, allant jusqu’à pointer le risque de reconstitution d’une « triple 
alliance » qui isolerait l’Allemagne en Europe49� 
Kohl et Genscher multiplièrent les déclarations rassurantes sur 
leur attachement inébranlable à la construction européenne� Pour le 
Chancelier, la réunification allemande et la construction européenne 
étaient «  les deux faces d’une même médaille  »� Il réaffirma son 
intention d’avancer en parallèle vers l’union monétaire et vers l’union 
politique50� Pour marquer sa solidarité avec Paris, le gouvernement de 
Bonn renonça début novembre à plaider en faveur d’une réévaluation 
unilatérale du Mark qui aurait constitué un affront pour Bérégovoy dont 
toute la politique s’articulait autour de la stabilité de la parité Franc-
Mark� Une semaine après la chute du Mur de Berlin en novembre 
1989, le Chancelier annonça son intention de débuter la CIG avant la 
fin de 199051� À Strasbourg, lors du déjeuner des Douze le 8 décembre, 
Helmut Kohl approuva une proposition franco-italienne, demandant 
au Conseil de prendre un engagement ferme sur la date d’ouverture 
de la conférence intergouvernementale sur l’UEM à la fin de l’année 
1990, indépendamment des résultats des travaux préparatoires� Le 
lendemain, François Mitterrand fit rédiger par Dumas et Genscher un 
texte, approuvé plus tard par les Douze, reconnaissant aux Allemands le 
droit à l’autodétermination tout en l’inscrivant dans le respect de l’esprit 
d’Helsinki (respect des frontières) et dans la perspective de l’Union 
européenne52� Aucune décision ne fut prise concernant l’Union politique, 
48 Attali, Jacques, Verbatim, t� 3, Paris, Fayard, 1995, p� 349�
49 Attali, Jacques, C’était François Mitterrand, Paris, Fayard, 2005, p� 321�
50 Tietmeyer, Hans, «  L’Europe de la Bundesbank  », Limes, numéro  La France en 
question, p� 297-316�
51 ANF, AG5 (4) 88 EG d�2, Note d’E� Guigou pour le Président « Calendrier UEM », 
dans laquelle la chargée d’Affaires française faisait état du message qu’elle reçut de 
Bitterlich l’informant que Kohl pourrait accepter de fixer la date de l’IGC au second 
semestre 1990, 13 octobre 1989�
52 Stark, Kohl, l’Allemagne et l’Europe, op. cit�, p� 155-156�
Mitterrand craignant que des divergences de vues sur la configuration 
institutionnelle ne retardent la mise en place de l’Union monétaire�
Ce ne fut que le 19 avril 1990, sur les instances de Jacques Delors et 
d’Élisabeth Guigou53, que Mitterrand accepta de se joindre à Kohl pour 
adresser une lettre publique commune à leurs homologues européens, 
proposant la convocation, à la fin de l’année, de deux conférences 
intergouvernementales, l’une sur l’UEM, l’autre portant sur la création 
d’une Union politique54� Au Conseil européen de Rome I les 27 et 28 octobre 
1990, les chefs d’État et de gouvernement s’accordèrent sur le mandat 
de deux CIG parallèles sur l’UEM et l’UP (Union politique)� Bénéficiant 
de la préparation soignée de Tomaso Padoa-Schioppa et Umberto Vattani, 
et fort du plein appui de la délégation française, Giulio Andreotti parvint 
à faire en sorte que le sommet ne soit pas paralysé par le veto britannique, 
et à fixer le début de la seconde étape de l’UEM au 1er janvier 199455� Il 
écartait ainsi la menace d’une « Europe à deux vitesses » en ménageant la 
possibilité de périodes transitoires� Les Italiens furent cependant moins 
heureux sur l’objectif de la mise sur pied d’une « institution monétaire 
forte » dès la seconde étape, les gouvernements de La Haye et de Bonn 
n’acceptant à ce stade qu’une institution aux pouvoirs limités56� Le rapport 
Carli, qui fixait comme objectifs à la CIG l’adoption d’un programme 
conduisant à la création d’une Banque centrale européenne et d’une 
monnaie unique, fut approuvé par onze États sur douze, le Royaume-
Uni, représenté par John Major, s’abstenant� Les conférences parallèles 
débutèrent le 15 janvier 199157�
53 ANF, AG5 (4) 35 GH (Guillaume Hannezo) Mémorandum d’Élisabeth Guigou 
pour le Président, 6 février 1990� La conseillère du Président y faisait valoir la 
nécessité «  d’inventer rapidement une armature institutionnelle susceptible de 
redimensionner et contenir le fait allemand de manière à ce que l’Allemagne 
détermine ses orientations à l’intérieur d’un cadre communautaire et non de façon 
autonome »�
54 ANF, AG5 (4) 22 CDM (Caroline de Margerie), d�3, Essai d’E� Guigou dans la 
Revue des Affaires étrangères, qui inclut la «  Déclaration commune du Président 
Mitterrand et du Chancelier Kohl », 19 avril 1990. 
55 La première étape de l’UEM connaissait au même moment ses premiers succès� En 
juin 1989, l’Espagne adhérait au SME� Huit pays libéraient ensuite les mouvements 
de capitaux, avant que le Royaume-Uni n’adhère à son tour au SME�
56 James, Harold, « Designing a Central Bank in the Run-Up to Maastricht », Journal 
of European Integration History, 1, 2013, p� 105-122  ; ADMAE, Europe – CE, 
1986-90, 1935 Inva, d� 5914, « Conseil Européen, Conclusions de la présidence », 
Rome, 27 et 28 octobre 1990�
57 ANF, AG5 (4) 21 CDM, d�2, « Communication de M� Pierre Bérégovoy devant le 
Conseil des ministres » à propos du conseil européen de Rome 4 décembre 1990�
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4. Négocier l’Union économique et monétaire : la France 
se rallie à la Banque centrale européenne et aux 
critères de convergence, mais rend l’UEM irréversible
Ouverte à la fin de la présidence italienne (Rome II, 13 décembre 
1990), la conférence intergouvernementale sur l’UEM se poursuivit 
durant les présidences suivantes du Luxembourg et des Pays-Bas jusqu’à 
son heureuse conclusion à Maastricht en décembre 1991� 
Le 28 janvier 1991, la délégation française présenta un projet de 
Traité sur l’intégration monétaire� Il avait été préparé par le ministère 
des Finances58, qui avait profité d’un moment où l’attention de la 
présidence était détournée par la Guerre du Golfe� Présenté comme 
une « alternative » au projet présenté par la Commission européenne, 
le document réaffirmait la vision de Pierre Bérégovoy59 et du Trésor : il 
était basé sur trois principes : l’union économique à créer devrait être 
« crédible, démocratique et européenne »� 
Sa crédibilité découlerait du renforcement des instruments politiques 
dont se verrait doté un ECOFIN renforcé pour assurer la convergence 
économique� Ces dispositions incluraient des sanctions en cas de déficits 
budgétaires excessifs, l’interdiction du financement monétaire des 
déficits publics, et l’obligation de garantir la stabilité des prix, placée 
sous le contrôle d’un Système européen des banques centrales (SEBC)� 
Elles reflétaient la position traditionnelle du Trésor, partisan d’une ferme 
discipline monétaire intérieure60� Les chapitres 4 et 5 du document 
stipulaient l’engagement d’installer un SEBC dès le début de la période 
de transition� Il serait doté par les États membres du capital nécessaire 
à ses missions, et se verrait confier des tâches opérationnelles, incluant 
le renforcement de la coordination des politiques monétaires des États 
membres, la gestion des réserves de change extérieures et la supervision 
58 Dans une lettre à Roland Dumas, écrite quelques semaines avant la CIG, Pierre 
Bérégovoy déclarait  : «  Pour moi, les conclusions de Rome sont une grande 
déception� À mon sens, une UEM où nous n’aurions pas un pouvoir exécutif fort 
et démocratiquement légitime assurant la cohérence du bloc de souveraineté ne 
serait pas acceptable », in ANF, 5AG (4) 21 CDM, d�2, lettre de P� Bérégovoy à 
R� Dumas, 14 novembre 1990� 
59 Le ministre des Finances français avait partiellement changé d’avis lors du conseil 
économique franco-allemand de Tegernsee les 24-25 août 1989, grâce à une 
extraordinaire alchimie personnelle développée avec Théo Waigel et où, facteur 
décisif, Karl Otto Pöhl l’avait convaincu du sérieux des intentions de la Bundesbank 
à propos de l’UEM� Ancrer une Allemagne élargie à l’Europe devint un objectif 
prédominant de la politique de Bérégovoy à l’égard de l’UEM�
60 Dyson, Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, cit., p� 240�
du développement de l’ECU� A noter que lors d’un entretien dramatique 
à l’Élysée le 26 janvier, Mitterrand avait enjoint Bérégovoy d’abandonner 
l’idée de garder à tout prix les Britanniques dans le processus et tout 
soutien à l’idée d’un ECU fort : « Il ne doit y avoir aucun retournement 
d’alliance� Notre alliée c’est l’Allemagne ! Les Britanniques sont alignés 
sur les États-Unis »61�
La légitimité démocratique de l’UEM dépendrait d’un « gouvernement 
économique » : le Conseil européen établirait les orientations générales 
des politiques de l’Union tandis qu’un « Conseil ECOFIN renforcé » (et 
non la Commission) déterminerait les lignes directrices de la politique 
des taux de change dans le respect du principe de stabilité des prix� En 
agissant ainsi, «  les Français faisaient pression en faveur d’un modèle 
intergouvernemental de coordination des politiques économiques »62� 
Le caractère européen s’incarnait dans le principe suivant lequel l’UEM 
devait être « une UEM à douze »� Pour Pierre Bérégovoy, si « aucun pays 
ne devait pouvoir bloquer le passage à la monnaie unique, aucun pays 
ne devait être exclu à l’avance »� Les autorités françaises, soucieuses de 
favoriser une participation aussi large que possible, défendaient fermement 
l’idée que le passage en phase institutionnelle de l’UEM fût décidée à 
douze, et non à six ou à sept États, pour éviter la constitution, au sein 
du SEBC, d’un « noyau dur » dominé par les pays de la zone Mark, d’où 
l’importance accordée par le ministre des Finances au vote à l’unanimité 
pour décider si et quand les États membres devraient entrer dans la 
2e étape� L’un des différends majeurs avec la délégation allemande portait 
en effet sur la transition et sur le contenu de la 2e étape� Les Allemands 
avaient cherché à imposer des conditions drastiques à l’entrée des États 
membres dès la période de transition – en particulier le respect de critères 
de convergence� Les Français souhaitaient que le passage de la 1re à la 2e 
étape fût automatique au 1er janvier 1994 et qu’il n’exclût aucun des États 
membres� Bérégovoy préférait des conditions moins contraignantes pour le 
passage à la 2e étape, quitte à prévoir une plus longue période de transition 
qui permettrait aux pays ne satisfaisant pas encore aux critères requis de 
s’adapter à une discipline de convergence rigoureuse63� Le ministre des 
Finances ne voulait pas courir le risque d’être isolé au sein d’une zone 
Mark élargie� 
61 Quatremer, Jean, Klau, T�, Ces hommes qui ont fait l’Euro. Querelles et ambitions 
européennes, Paris, Plon, 1999, p� 202-203�
62 Dyson, Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, cit., p� 236�
63 Agence Europe, Bulletin n° 5441, 28 février 1991 ; Howarth, David J�, The French 
Road to European Monetary Union, cit., p� 123�
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Ces prises de position reflétaient les préoccupations françaises 
traditionnelles à propos de l’UEM : une 2e étape d’un contenu substantiel, 
la nécessité d’un pôle politique contrebalançant le pôle monétaire 
représenté par le SEBC, le refus d’une UEM « à deux vitesses »64� 
Bérégovoy et Trichet prirent la mesure de l’intransigeance allemande 
lorsque Theo Waigel et Hans Tietmeyer présentèrent les éléments 
d’un projet de traité (nonpaper) au Conseil ECOFIN de Luxembourg 
le 26 février� Le ministre des Finances et le nouveau gouverneur de la 
Bundesbank refusaient tout transfert de compétences au profit d’un 
SEBC avant que celui-ci ne se vît confier la conduite de la politique 
monétaire et avant l’achèvement du processus devant aboutir à 
l’indépendance des banques centrales nationales, c’est-à-dire au moment 
du passage à la 3e étape� La nouvelle institution monétaire ne devait 
pas être « une coquille vide  »65� En outre, les Allemands continuaient 
d’insister sur l’application rigoureuse de critères de convergence pour 
déterminer le passage à la 2e étape� Ce passage à la 2e étape ne serait 
effectif que lorsque le Conseil européen, décidant à l’unanimité, aurait 
certifié que ces conditions étaient remplies par «  la majeure part des 
États membres  »66� Les Allemands semblaient ainsi remettre en cause 
le principe de l’« automaticité » de l’entrée en vigueur de la 2e étape de 
l’UEM au 1er janvier 1994 et vouloir repousser aux « calendes grecques » 
l’entrée dans la 3e étape� Ils semblaient n’envisager que la réalisation d’une 
« petite Europe monétaire  » englobant les seuls pays à monnaie forte, 
c’est-à-dire la RFA, la France et le Benelux� Les États les plus pauvres 
(Espagne, Irlande, Grèce) et l’Italie dénoncèrent des mesures qui visaient 
selon eux à créer “une Europe monétaire à deux vitesses” » et insistèrent 
pour que les États membres procèdent du même pas ou pas du tout� Pour 
les Français, le vote à l’unanimité présentait également l’inconvénient 
d’offrir aux Britanniques l’occasion d’exercer leur droit de veto67� 
Entre le début du mois de mars et la fin du mois de juin 1991, les 
questions relatives à la transition et aux compétences de l’institution 
monétaire durant la phase 2 firent l’objet d’une intense diplomatie 
bilatérale franco-allemande� Bérégovoy et Waigel travaillèrent de concert 
64 Agence Europe, Bulletin n° 5419, 28-29 janvier 1991  ; ANF, AG5 (4) 21 CDM, 
d�2, Tel� n° 69, DELFRA, Bruxelles (Vidal) à Roland Dumas, «  Intervention de 
M� Bérégovoy à la CIG sur l’UEM du 28 janvier », 29 janvier 1991�
65 ANF, AG5 (4) CDM 21, d�2, Tel� Bonn n° 545, DELFRA (Boidevaix) à Roland 
Dumas a/s « Réactions à Bonn après le dernier projet allemand du 26 février 1991 », 
4 mars 1991�
66 Agence Europe, Bulletin n° 5441, 28 février 1991�
67 ANF, AG5 (4) CDM 21, d�2, Note de Guillaume Hannezo pour le Président 
« Position allemande sur l’Union économique et monétaire », 6 mars 1991�
à Paris et à Lille68  ; Roland Dumas et Élisabeth Guigou se rendirent à 
Bonn et à Francfort pour des échanges de vues avec les représentants 
de la Bundesbank et de la Chancellerie� Mitterrand rencontra Kohl à 
Lille le 25 juin dans le cadre de la préparation du Conseil européen de 
Luxembourg pour discuter de l’ordre du jour de la CIG69� Ces échanges 
discrets confirmèrent que le malentendu portait davantage sur des 
questions de détail que sur l’objectif commun, partagé par les deux 
gouvernements70� Les Français reprirent la main lorsque la question de 
la transition vers la 2e étape fut abordée à la CIG le 23 avril et le 6 juin : 
Jean-Claude Trichet insista alors sur l’« irréversibilité de la transition vers 
la 2e étape » et proposa que le passage soit régi par trois principes : « Pas 
de veto, pas de contrainte, pas d’exclusion arbitraire », destinés à la fois à 
éviter un veto britannique en leur concédant une éventuelle dérogation et 
à s’assurer – à l’opposé – qu’aucun État membre ne serait exclu « a priori » 
de l’union monétaire� Sur le plan institutionnel, les dirigeants allemands 
refusaient de voir dans l’Institution monétaire opérant dans la deuxième 
phase plus que la simple continuation du Comité des gouverneurs des 
banques centrales� La position française était diamétralement opposée� 
Ils y voyaient un embryon de l’Institution monétaire supranationale 
finale qui disposerait de réserves propres, d’autant plus nécessaire que la 
seconde étape serait courte71� 
Au conseil ECOFIN d’Apeldoorn le 23 septembre, les Allemands 
donnèrent leur agrément à la demande française de passage automatique 
à la 2e étape, dont le début était fixé au 1er janvier 1994� Mais ils 
autorisèrent seulement la création à ce stade d’un Institut monétaire 
européen (IME) « préfigurant » le SEBC� L’IME, sorte de « conseil des 
gouverneurs institutionnalisé », veillerait à la coordination des politiques 
monétaires entre les États membres et favoriserait la coopération entre 
les banques centrales� Il était censé préparer le passage à la 3e étape 
en soumettant des opinions et recommandations à l’ECOFIN dans 
différentes matières  –  incluant l’utilisation et le développement de 
l’ECU– mais la mise en commun des réserves resterait facultative� À 
Apeldoorn les Français étaient également parvenus à faire admettre 
68 Ibid. Note Boidevaix (Bonn) to Roland Dumas «  Compte-rendu du sommet 
Franco-Allemand  : entretiens Bérégovoy – Waigel à Lille les 29-30 mai 1991  », 
31 mai 1991�
69 ANF, AG5 (4) CDM 21, d�2� Note de Jean-Claude Trichet à Pierre Bérégovoy a/s 
« Rencontre entre le Président Mitterrand et le Chancelier Kohl, 25 juin 1991 », 
24 juin 1991�
70 Ibid., Note de Pierre de Boissieu à Roland Dumas, « UEM: les ambiguïtés franco-
allemandes », 14 mars 1991�
71 Dyson and Fatherstone, The Road to Maastricht, cit�, p� 395�
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par leurs partenaires que la décision du Conseil européen de passer à 
la 3e étape comporterait, dans l’interprétation des critères économiques 
objectifs, un élément de jugement politique72�
Les débats devenaient plus âpres également en raison de l’hostilité 
manifeste du Royaume-Uni à l’égard de tout mécanisme pouvant conduire 
à l’union monétaire� L’irritation française fut portée à son comble à la fin 
d’octobre 1991, lorsque la présidence néerlandaise du Conseil (le ministre 
des Finances Wim Kok) présenta les éléments d’un futur traité qui 
semblaient être basés sur la tentative de jouer les « honnêtes courtiers » en 
vue de satisfaire à la fois les Britanniques et les Allemands� Ils offraient la 
possibilité pour les États récalcitrants (Royaume-Uni et Danemark) d’user 
d’un « opt-out » général : durant les six mois suivant la décision du Conseil 
de passer à la 3e étape, tout État pourrait s’exempter lui-même d’entrer dans 
la troisième phase et seule une « masse critique » de six pays sur douze serait 
requise pour ce passage� Ces dispositions furent ressenties à Paris à la fois 
comme une capitulation à l’égard des prétentions britanniques (s’agissant 
du principe de « non contrainte  », le gouvernement français était d’avis 
qu’il pourrait être satisfait par l’ « opt-out » concédé à certains pays et non 
par un « opt-in » généralisé) et comme la voie ouverte à une UEM à deux 
vitesses à l’allemande73� 
Le 28 novembre, Édith Cresson présida le seul comité interministériel 
consacré à la préparation du Sommet de Maastricht : concernant l’UEM, 
Mitterrand y imposa son arbitrage sur une initiative française alternative 
pour le passage à la 3e étape, susceptible de briser l’opposition allemande 
et d’assurer simultanément la participation de l’Italie et de l’Espagne à 
l’UEM74� Cela signifiait, d’une part, la résolution d’accepter les demandes 
allemandes sur les critères de convergence  ; la possibilité, d’autre part, 
d’impliquer le plus grand nombre de pays possible tout en empêchant les 
États les moins rigoureux de bloquer ceux qui souhaitaient poursuivre 
vers la 3e étape� Le ministère des Finances et le Président n’avaient 
pas d’objections de fond à l’égard des critères de convergence� Leur 
application était incontournable, non seulement parce qu’ils donnaient 
72 Dyson, Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, cit., p� 244�
73 Agence Europe, Bulletin n° 5599, 30 octobre 1991; Europe Documents, 1740/1741 ; 
ANF, 5 AG (4) PHB (Philippe Bastelica) 10, d�3, Note de Caroline de Margerie 
pour le Président a/s « Entretien avec M� Lubbers », 27 novembre 1991�
74 Lors d’une rencontre avec Carli à Viterbo les 17-18 octobre, Bérégovoy lui avait fait 
part de ses inquiétudes à propos de l’affaiblissement de la Lire� Il avait également 
insisté sur la nécessité, pour les Italiens, d’accepter des règles de convergence 
claires de manière à assurer un accord sur l’UEM avec les Allemands� Un signal 
similaire fut donné lorsque Mitterrand rencontra Andreotti à Pérouse ; cf� Dyson, 
Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, cit�, p� 511�
un certain contenu à la 2e étape, mais également en qualité de test décisif 
de la capacité des États candidats de passer à la 3e étape� L’acceptation 
de critères clairs et rigoureux manifestait aussi l’engagement de la France 
aux côtés des États pratiquant la stabilité monétaire, et sa prétention 
d’être au moins aussi « vertueuse » en matière de contrôle de déficit et 
de dette publics que ne l’étaient les Néerlandais ou les Allemands75� 
Mais en même temps Bérégovoy était décidé à se prévaloir de la 
solidarité communautaire en recherchant une formule qui n’exclût pas à 
l’avance l’Espagne et l’Italie, ce afin d’éviter que l’ECU ne fût composé 
essentiellement de marks allemands� Les Français acceptèrent donc sans 
difficulté les critères de Maastricht exigés pour accéder à la 3e étape de 
l’union monétaire : déficit n’excédant pas 3 % du produit national brut, 
dette publique n’excédant pas 60 % du produit intérieur brut, intérêts à 
long terme non supérieurs de 1,5 à 2 % à ceux des trois premiers pays de 
la Communauté� Bérégovoy était plus intéressé à la procédure d’accession 
à la 3e étape qu’à la fixation d’une échéance� Mais l’Élysée et le Quai 
d’Orsay, soucieux de rendre l’UEM irréversible, regrettaient l’absence 
d’engagement juridique ferme� Fixer un calendrier s’avérait essentiel� À 
ce point, Élisabeth Guigou et Pierre de Boissieu soulevèrent la question 
d’une date butoir, à fixer au 31 décembre 1998, pour déterminer si une 
majorité d’États membres remplissaient les critères de convergence� 
Un accord direct entre Mitterrand et Andreotti à la veille du Conseil de 
Maastricht le 8 décembre 1991 sur le mécanisme aboutissant au lancement 
de la 3e phase régla les derniers détails� Les deux hommes s’entendirent 
sur une idée simple : en séance plénière, le lendemain, ils proposeraient de 
fixer, dans le traité, une date butoir à partir de laquelle les États membres 
respectant les critères de convergence passeraient, quoi qu’il arrivât, à la 
troisième phase, et ceci indépendamment de tous autres considérations 
ou votes76� Au Sommet, le 9 décembre, la proposition franco-italienne 
emporta l’adhésion des autres délégations, notamment de l’Allemagne qui 
avait été prévenue à l’avance� Il fut décidé d’ajouter aux conditions à remplir 
pour la participation, deux dates pour le démarrage de la 3e étape� Il aurait 
lieu en 1997 si une majorité de pays se qualifiaient (les chefs d’État et de 
75 Dans une note adressée au Président datée du 11 décembre 1991, intitulée « UEM, 
La France est prête », Guillaume Hannezo fixait comme suit la position de la France 
vis-à-vis de ses partenaires pour chacun des critères de convergence : inflation: 
France en troisième position avec 2,5  %, déficit budgétaire  : troisième position 
avec 1,6 % du PIB, dette publique : seconde position avec 37 % du PIB, stabilité 
monétaire à long terme: aucune dévaluation depuis 1987, taux de change à long 
terme: troisième position ; in ANF, 5 AG (4) CDM 21, d�2� 
76 ANF, 5 AG (4) CDM 14, d�1, Sujets de Maastricht� Abordés entre le Président de la 
République et M� Andreotti� Résumé des discussions, 8 décembre 1991�
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gouvernement en décideraient à la majorité qualifiée) ; dans l’hypothèse 
où, à la fin de 1997, la date de démarrage de la 3e étape n’aurait pas été 
fixée, ce démarrage s’effectuerait au 1er janvier 1999, la « masse critique » de 
sept États n’étant alors plus exigée77� Les chefs d’État et de gouvernement 
manifestaient ainsi leur intention d’imposer des délais à la réalisation de 
l’intégration monétaire, renforçant la crédibilité du projet tant vis-à-vis 
de l’opinion publique que des marchés financiers78� Mitterrand et Dumas 
cherchèrent également à restreindre le nombre de pays autorisés à choisir 
l’opting-out pour la participation à la phase 3� Ils s’opposèrent vivement 
aux propositions néerlandaises, britanniques et danoises qui visaient à 
étendre l’opting-out optionnel à l’ensemble des pays membres, ce qui 
aurait affaiblit l’automaticité du processus que la France souhaitait graver 
dans le marbre du traité� Si la délégation française acceptait que les pays 
ne pussent être contraints à participer à la 3e étape, ils devaient pour le 
moins être découragés d’exercer un tel droit : d’où l’inclusion d’une clause 
dans le traité de Maastricht exigeant des États membres qui remplissaient 
déjà les critères mais optaient pour la non participation à la 3e étape de 
l’UEM, de justifier leur décision79� Lors du marathon final de négociations 
à Scheveningen début décembre, l’opting-out généralisé fut finalement 
retiré et le projet de protocole français sur l’irréversibilité, qui bénéficiait 
du soutien des délégations de l’Italie (Giulio Andreotti) et de six autres 
pays membres, accepté� 
Si l’acceptation du modèle de la Bundesbank avait constitué pour 
la délégation française une concession majeure, elle n’empêcha pas une 
réaction d’arrière-garde au moment de la rédaction des statuts de la 
Banque centrale : bien que le principe de l’indépendance de celle-ci et 
de la priorité de la stabilité des prix aient été clairement énoncés dans 
le traité, les termes étaient suffisamment ambigus pour donner prise à 
interprétation� La France tenta de limiter l’indépendance de la Banque 
centrale dans le domaine de la politique monétaire extérieure� Arguant 
de l’exemple des États-Unis, Bérégovoy et les membres français du 
comité monétaire prétendirent que la compétence de la BCE fût limitée 
à la politique monétaire intérieure, tandis que la politique monétaire 
extérieure demeurerait de la responsabilité des gouvernements� Pour les 
autorités monétaires allemandes et néerlandaises, une telle division des 
77 ANF, 5 AG (4) CDM 21, d� 2, Note de Caroline de Marjerie et Guillaume Hannezo 
pour le Président a/s « UEM: projet de traité résultant des discussions des ministres 
des Finances », 5 décembre 1991�
78 Szasz, André, The Road to European Monetary Union, cit�, p� 161�
79 ANF, 5AG (4) 21 CDM, d�2, Note de P� Bérégovoy pour le Président : « Négociations 
sur l’UEM », 26 novembre 1991�
compétences était inacceptable� Il en résulta un compromis, figurant à 
l’art�109 du traité : le Conseil européen pourrait formuler des « orientations 
générales » (et non des directives) pour l’adoption ou la modification de 
la politique en matière de taux de change extérieurs80� Theo Waigel et 
Horst Köhler parvinrent cependant à vider l’article de toute substance en 
faisant préciser que les deux compétences impliqueraient la consultation 
préalable de la BCE et qu’elles seraient  «  sans préjudice de l’objectif 
prioritaire qui restait la stabilité des prix  » (article 109�3)� Au final, la 
future BCE se voyait reconnaître une indépendance supérieure à celle 
dont jouissait la Bundesbank81�
5. Le débat français sur la ratification  
du Traité de Maastricht
Les chefs d’État et de gouvernement donnèrent leur accord pour 
amender le traité de Rome en y incorporant l’Union économique et 
monétaire les 10 et 11 décembre 1991� Le 7 février 1992, le traité fut 
signé à Maastricht� Le jour suivant le rejet du traité par les Danois, le 
Président Mitterrand annonça son intention de soumettre le traité à 
référendum� Celui-ci eut pour effet de réactiver un débat traditionnel en 
France depuis les années 1950� La « menace allemande » figura en effet 
parmi les thèmes de campagne récurrents et fut utilisée aussi bien par 
les partisans du « oui » que par les tenants du « non »� Pour les premiers, 
le traité représentait une garantie contre une Allemagne dominante, 
libre d’agir à sa guise ou de négliger l’Europe des Douze au profit de la 
Mitteleuropa. Pour les seconds, le traité transformerait la Communauté 
en un instrument au service de l’hégémonie allemande sur le continent� 
Mais, une fois encore, le fossé qui séparait les élites de la population était 
évident� Interrogés après le référendum, la majorité de ceux qui avaient 
voté en faveur du traité assurèrent que l’Allemagne n’avaient joué qu’un 
rôle marginal dans leur choix� Les principaux motifs invoqués étaient la 
paix en Europe et la poursuite de l’intégration� Parmi les opposants à la 
ratification, 41% évoquèrent la peur de l’Allemagne et surtout leur crainte 
que le traité ne se solde par un grave abandon de souveraineté de la part de 
la France� Les travailleurs de secteurs d’activité en déclin et les chômeurs 
représentèrent la majorité des opposants : ils nourrissaient un sentiment 
80 ANF, 5AG (4) PHB 10, d�3, Note de Guillaume Hannezo pour le Président : « Projet 
de modification du traité sur l’union économique et monétaire », 5 décembre 1991�
81 Szasz, The Road to European Monetary Union, cit�, p� 151  ; James, Making the 
European Monetary Union, cit� p� 291�
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de suspicion persistant à l’égard de la puissance économique allemande 
et de crainte face à une union économique et monétaire placée sous son 
contrôle� Le discours sur l’influence politique respective de la France et 
de l’Allemagne resta au niveau des élites et du gouvernement� L’étroite 
majorité en faveur du « oui » issue des urnes embarrassa énormément 
le Président et les cercles gouvernementaux, d’autant qu’elle n’avait été 
obtenue que grâce à l’appui des leaders de l’opposition�
6. Conclusion
Dans le processus de relance de l’UEM, les intérêts français ne furent 
jamais perdus de vue� Aux yeux des décideurs français, l’UEM fut d’abord 
conçue comme un moyen de rétablir partiellement l’équilibre dans les 
relations franco-allemandes, affecté par la puissance monétaire de Bonn� 
Les autorités françaises poursuivaient essentiellement deux objectifs  : 
échapper à une dépendance croissante vis-à-vis de la Bundesbank et 
participer davantage aux décisions de politique monétaire en transférant 
les compétences à une institution monétaire européenne� Un autre 
avantage résidait dans la possibilité de fixer collectivement les taux 
d’intérêts à un niveau moins élevé et correspondant mieux aux besoins de 
la croissance économique du pays� Ces facteurs expliquent l’importance 
de l’enjeu que représenta pour les dirigeants français la création d’une 
union monétaire et l’étendue des concessions qu’ils étaient disposés à faire 
pour satisfaire les Allemands quant aux garanties nécessaires pour mener 
le projet à terme� Mettre une telle politique en pratique exigeait toutefois 
une dilution considérable du contrôle gouvernemental français sur la 
politique monétaire nationale : outre l’obligation de partager ce contrôle 
avec les autres pays adhérents, elle impliquait un transfert de compétences 
du plan gouvernemental à celui des gouverneurs des banques centrales 
indépendantes, et serait exécutée dans le cadre contraignant des bonnes 
pratiques macroéconomiques et financières figurant dans le nouveau 
traité� 
Au sein des milieux décisionnels français, ces conditions furent plus 
ou moins bien acceptées� Durant la plus grande partie de la période 
considérée, Mitterrand et Bérégovoy (Bérégovoy plus longtemps que 
Mitterrand) s’opposèrent à l’indépendance de la Banque de France et à 
celle de la Banque centrale européenne et militèrent pour la limitation 
des compétences de cette dernière� Cependant, on doit distinguer les 
déclarations publiques du Président de ses objectifs stratégiques� Pour 
regagner quelque influence en matière de politique économique et 
monétaire, Mitterrand décida, dès le début de son second septennat, de 
faire de l’UEM une priorité� Il calcula dès lors soigneusement les avantages 
qu’il pourrait tirer de l’évolution rapide des rapports internationaux en 
Europe et s’efforça d’exploiter au mieux les opportunités favorables à ce 
dessein� Soucieux de défendre les intérêts français, il n’était cependant 
pas disposé à permettre à l’intransigeance du ministère des Finances de 
bloquer l’avancée du projet� Bérégovoy et le Trésor soutinrent le projet 
mais se montrèrent beaucoup plus réticents que l’Élysée à accepter les 
contraintes générales qu’il impliquait� Il s’employèrent à limiter autant 
que possible les transferts de souveraineté monétaire et à éviter les 
risques de « vertige monétaire » par l’instauration d’un contrepouvoir 
politique à la Banque centrale supranationale� Ils s’évertuèrent également 
à soutenir l’approche – surtout mise en avant par Londres – en faveur 
d’une monnaie parallèle� Leurs efforts furent contrecarrés par de 
Larosière et les autres banquiers centraux qui estimèrent dès le rapport 
Delors que la stratégie consistant à étendre l’usage de l’ECU comme 
monnaie parallèle était problématique� Au cours des négociations de la 
CIG en janvier 1991, Mitterrand, conscient qu’un refus des Français 
de se conformer sur ce point aux recommandations des gouverneurs de 
banques centrales bloquerait la négociation, mit fin à toute opposition au 
sein du gouvernement� Bérégovoy et le Trésor ne purent plus plaider en 
faveur d’une monnaie parallèle� Ceci ne les empêcha pas de réintroduire 
une proposition similaire dans leur projet de traité de janvier 1991� 
Évitant l’usage des termes « monnaie parallèle », ils prônèrent désormais 
la mise en place d’une « monnaie forte et stable » constituant un premier 
jalon vers l’adoption d’une monnaie unique� La logique qui sous-tendait 
cette posture restait celle d’assurer l’extension la plus rapide possible de 
l’usage de l’ECU, afin de réduire l’importance économique du Mark 
et de prolonger la durée de 2e étape� C’est dans cette perspective que le 
ministère des Finances insista constamment pour que l’on installât un 
SEBC dès le début de la 2e étape (1er janvier 1994)� Celui-ci aurait en 
effet eu, entre autres compétences, celle de promouvoir et développer 
l’utilisation de l’ECU� 
Tout au long de la conférence intergouvernementale, la relation 
privilégiée entretenue avec le partenaire allemand a constitué un atout 
pour les négociateurs français� Les deux délégations ont « pré-négocié » 
avec trois à quatre semaines d’avance sur les réunions de la CIG, des 
compromis qu’elles purent ensuite faire accepter par les autres pays 
membres� L’hypothèse d’un marchandage par lequel l’Allemagne aurait 
sacrifié le D-Mark en échange de la réunification est sans fondement� 
Mitterrand était convaincu dès le départ que la réunification allemande 
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était inévitable� Sa volonté était de la contrôler, pas de l’empêcher� Toutefois, 
la fusion des deux Allemagnes et la naissance d’une monnaie unique 
furent étroitement corrélées� En premier lieu parce que, si la réunification 
ne s’était pas réalisée, il eût été hautement improbable que Paris ait pu 
convaincre Kohl d’agréer le calendrier remplaçant le D-Mark par l’Euro� 
En second lieu parce que la réunification donnait de nouvelles raisons au 
Président d’imposer ses vues et de supprimer les dernières oppositions82� 
En effet, les effets économiques de la réunification et de la politique des 
changes allemande qui en découla renforcèrent les motivations françaises 
: les responsables de la politique financière française se montrèrent très 
préoccupés par les choix monétaires de Bonn et la montée consécutive 
des taux d’intérêts dans toute l’Europe� Le partage du pouvoir monétaire 
devenait plus que jamais le moyen privilégié d’empêcher les Allemands 
de poursuivre une politique perçue comme « irresponsable » à Paris83� Les 
archives françaises suggèrent que Bérégovoy et d’autres représentants du 
parti socialiste eurent dès lors moins de réticence à accepter l’idée d’une 
Banque centrale européenne indépendante (la loi établissant la pleine 
indépendance de la Banque de France fut signé en juin 1992) et d’autres 
garanties jugées jusque là indésirables, en raison de la nouvelle dynamique 
politique engendrée par la réunification� Bérégovoy et les fonctionnaires 
du Trésor avaient aussi été déçus par la décision britannique de rester 
en dehors de l’union monétaire et par leur opposition à l’« imposition » 
d’une monnaie unique au terme de la 3e étape� Ils comprirent alors que le 
projet d’« ECU fort » menait à une impasse84� 
82 Balleix-Banerjee, La France et la Banque centrale européenne, cit�, p� 174�
83 Agence Europe, bulletin n° 5425, 6 février 1991, Déclaration d’Edmond Alphandéry, 
Président de la délégation parlementaire française chargée du « monitoring » de la 
CIG-UEM�
84 Dyson, Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht, cit�, p� 232�
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The time between the end of the common market’s transitional period 
and the EU draft treaty, or Spinelli project, which culminated in the 
major demonstration at the European Council in Milan on 28-29 June 
1985, was probably the MFE’s peak period of intellectual fervour and 
political engagement� The European and global political events of those 
years, along with the initiatives of the MFE, are presented in a well-
informed essay1 by Sergio Pistone� I do not therefore wish to make a 
second historical reconstruction of those events, just to illustrate a 
number of crucial theoretical innovations in federalist strategy which 
developed in parallel in the arena of political action, and which remain 
relevant to the federalist cause today�
Although I do not intend to reconstruct the historical background 
to federalist ideas and political engagement in that period, I would like 
to mention one symbolic episode, when the decisions taken by heads of 
state and government intersected with the initiatives of the federalists, 
and the former were obliged to acknowledge and respond to this� The 
episode in question was the Hague Summit of 1 and 2 December 1969� 
This Summit signalled the resumption of the integration process, which 
had been stalled for many years after de Gaulle blocked any institutional 
progress� The EDC initiative failed in 1954 and the federalists had 
responded with the campaign for the European People’s Congress, which 
was an attempt to arrive at a European constituent assembly by means 
of an elected European Congress� Yet by the early 1960s the MFE was 
forced to acknowledge that this attempt too had failed, and it was time to 
prepare for a long march in the wilderness� The ‘Census of the European 
federal people’ was a vehicle for this difficult transition� It was not until 
* I would like to thank for their input regarding an early version of this article: 
Domenico Moro, Giovanni Vigo, Sergio Pistone, Dario Velo�
1 Pistone, S�, “I movimenti per l’unità europea in Italia”, in Landuyt, A� and Preda, D� 
(eds�), I movimenti per l’unità europea 1970-1986, Vol� I, Bologna, Il Mulino, p� 39-
119�
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the second half of the 1960s that a more specific initiative took shape: the 
direct election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage, starting 
with elections for national delegates, given that while de Gaulle was in 
power it would have been unthinkable to succeed in getting all European 
citizens to elect the European Parliament in Strasbourg2� The Italian 
MFE was in the front line of the fight for European democracy, thanks 
to the fact that the Italian Constitution enabled laws to be proposed by 
popular initiative� Indeed a popular initiative signed by 65,000 citizens 
was presented to the Italian Senate on 11 June 1969� It was a remarkable 
achievement in terms of popular mobilization, which had a direct effect 
on the Hague Summit, convened by the new French President Pompidou� 
At the Summit, Italy was represented by the Prime Minister Rumor and 
the Foreign Minister Moro� Both called for the direct election of the 
European Parliament, accepting in return, with reservations, the Franco-
German proposal for an economic and monetary union3� While these 
discussions were going on in the Ridderzaal, outside it the first counter-
summit was being held by the young federalists� This was a “remarkable 
event”, specifically “the biggest federalist rally ever to take place”, as one 
surprised historian of European integration commented� This is how 
he describes it: “Close to the venue of the Council meeting – avant 
la lettre  – a group of about a thousand European federalists marched 
through the centre of the Hague, clashing with police and shouting for 
the need to revitalise Europe after years of stagnation� To attract attention 
to their cause, they carried a coffin with them: Europe was dead, and 
waited for resuscitation�”4 What the historian does not say is that the 
young federalists, from Italy, Germany and Holland, had presented a 
motion at the Summit which stated that they “were no longer prepared to 
tolerate Communities becoming technocratic superstructures,” and for 
this reason they “solemnly requested the heads of state and government 
gathered in The Hague, to finally give the people of Europe the power to 
decide their own destiny, giving citizens the right to vote directly for the 
European Parliament�”5 The federalists’ protest caused an immediate stir, 
and The Times devoted its front-page editorial to the event�
2 With regard to the campaign for the direct election of the European Parliament, and 
its political significance, see Majocchi, L� V� and Rossolillo, F�, Il Parlamento europeo. 
Significato storico di un’elezione, Naples, Guida, 1979�
3 Guasconi, M� E�, “Italy and the Hague Conference of December 1969”, Journal of 
European Integration History, Vol� 9, No� 2, 2003, p� 101-116�
4 van der Harst, J�, “The 1969 Hague Summit: a New Start for Europe?”, in Journal of 
European Integration History, op. cit�, p� 5-9, p� 5�
5 Federalismo Europeo, III, No� 6, December 1969�
The terse final communiqué of the Summit included both “the 
issue of direct elections” for the European Parliament, and the decision 
to produce a study, by 1970, for “a phased plan to create an economic 
and monetary union”� The process towards European democracy, a 
European currency and a European economic government, set to be 
longer and more arduous than anyone could have imagined back then, 
was finally under way� The demonstration in The Hague also deserves 
to be remembered for other reasons� The young people who organised 
it went on to produce a series of economic and political studies of an 
academic calibre much higher than would be expected for members of a 
voluntary political movement� They belonged to a generation of activists 
recruited in previous years, during the “long march in the wilderness”, 
drawn on by Mario Albertini to form a group of federalist leaders capable 
of challenging the dominant culture and academic perspective� Normally 
the struggle for power on a national level gives rise to a conformist 
mindset, the so-called Europeanism, which claims that the existing level 
of integration is the best of all possible worlds, and relegates the idea of 
a European federation into the realm of utopian thinking, a pipe dream 
far removed from political realism� By now the MFE was ready for the 
decisive battle� 
In the following paragraphs, after examining Albertini’s strategic 
turning point (section 2), we will explore the crucial stages in the federalist 
battle for the European currency (section 3)� In section 4 we will attempt to 
show how the strategy for the European currency and European democracy 
was bungled by the various governments, and the consequences of this on 
the current crisis of the EU; lastly (in section 5) we will draw a few critical 
conclusions, in light of federalist thinking on the relationship between 
economic theory and political theory, the modern origins of which date 
back to the birth of the sovereign nation-states, within whose sacrosanct 
boundaries they are still intellectually imprisoned�
1. Mario Albertini’s Strategic Turning Point:  
Constitutional Gradualism
In the battle for the EDC, the constituent strategy theorized by Altiero 
Spinelli was aptly applied and lucidly implemented, also thanks to the 
strong support of the Italian government led by De Gasperi6� After the 
6 For an exhaustive analysis of the federalist struggle for the EDC see Preda, D�, Sulla 
soglia dell’Unione. La vicenda della Comunità Politica Europea (1952-1954), Milan, 
Jaca Book, 1993� 
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failure of the EDC, we should not, therefore be surprised if the relaunch 
of the integration process, decided by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, was 
harshly criticised by the federalists� In an article of September 1957 
entitled The Joke of the Common Market, Spinelli wrote that: “to make the 
European common market we need a European political technique and 
political soul: in simple terms we need a European government, equipped 
with all the tools a government requires to be obeyed, and European laws 
according to which that government would act� The Common Market 
Treaty ignores this basic notion� The implementation of the Treaty is 
entrusted to the good will and harmony of six sovereign governments� 
[…] Currency, legislation, the armed forces and diplomacy all remain in 
the hands of the individual states�”7 In 1965, on occasion of an important 
stage in the creation of the Common Market, namely establishing a 
single price for grain, Albertini spoke in the same terms that Spinelli had 
used in 1957� Despite the observation that “the agreement on agriculture 
is probably a sign that Europe really has crossed the threshold of 
irreversibility with regard to the integration process,” Albertini maintained 
that: “economic integration now concerns not only the issue of currency, 
but also the general question of planning on a European level�”8 Yet for 
Albertini this advanced level of integration was a sign that a European 
government was now necessary, and that national political forces could 
no longer sidestep the challenge� National governments had followed a 
tortuous path� “Turning the question on its head, they reasoned in this 
way: as there can be no common market without a common currency, 
and no common currency without a common government, let’s gradually 
build the market and the common currency and common government 
will follow� Now most of the work has been done, it is time to take them 
at their word�”9 This therefore lent weight to the Federalists’ claim for 
the constituent power of the European federal people, supported by the 
citizens’ endorsement of the Campaign for the Census� Ultimately, the 
construction of the European market had reached the point where it 
was necessary to have a European currency and a European government: 
the European constituent represented the appropriate response to the 
contradictions within the process of integration�
Even when the campaign for the direct election of the European 
Parliament was launched, the MFE did not waver from its original 
7 Spinelli, A�, “La beffa del Mercato Comune”, in L’Europa non cade dal cielo, Bologna, 
Il Mulino, 1960, p� 282-287�
8 Albertini, M�, Tutti gli scritti, Mosconi, N� (ed�), Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006-2010, 
Vol� V, p� 108-9 (hereinafter referred to as TS)�
9 Ibidem, p� 111�
objective, namely the constituent assembly� In 1967, Albertini presented 
the Campaign merely as a change of direction with respect to the criticism 
previously directed at the European Parliament� He reasoned as follows: 
“The federalists have always maintained that, in order to found a European 
federal state it is necessary to convene a Constituent Assembly, and until 
recently they have taken a fairly sceptical view of the idea of European 
election of a parliament like that of Strasbourg, with no real powers�” 
Now it was time to acknowledge that: “with the European elections, the 
parties will have to take a stand on a supranational level, and that fact 
alone will transfer power from the national to the European level�” Given 
that the Common Market had reached the threshold of irreversibility 
due to the large number of interests involved, it was time for “the fuse 
to be lit�” The starting point could not be the Constituent Assembly; 
the endpoint, “albeit difficult to predict at present, would necessarily be 
constituent in nature�”10 The image of the “fuse” seamlessly connected the 
immediate action for direct elections to the European Parliament with 
the overall objective, namely the constituent Assembly�
It was only after the Hague Summit and its decision to formulate a 
project for economic and Monetary Union (EMU), that Albertini was 
forced to rethink the federalist strategy� The aim of creating a European 
currency could not be regarded as a political priority for the federalists, 
without first clarifying the links with the crucial aim of creating a 
European Federation and the constituent role of the European people� At 
a 1970 meeting, Albertini succinctly presented the strategic turning point, 
which later became known as constitutional gradualism� In economic 
terms, Albertini commented, “It was a question of transforming a group 
of national currencies, with limited opportunities on the international 
scene, into a national currency that would cover the entire area in question� 
In political terms the aim was to create a constitutionally defined public 
will in the same area� This can be summed up with the idea that we 
cannot plan for European monetary unification without planning for 
a European federal state”� However, this connection between economic 
and political issues was not permitted to develop in a linear way in the 
process of integration, due to the inability, or unwillingness, of the 
political class to call the framework of national power into question� It 
was therefore necessary to “shake up the mental torpor that makes people 
believe it is impossible to achieve things they are not aware of or don’t 
want to think about�” This was the way used to win over the reluctant 
political class and ensure it could not reject the final objective, a European 
10 Albertini, M�, “Il significato politico della campagna per l’elezione diretta unilaterale 
dei membri del Parlamento europeo”, TS, Vol� V, p� 351-355, cit� p� 352-353�
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Federation� “One of the decisive points,” Albertini asserted, “is that we 
have to go against logic and propose a gradual operation of monetary 
union, prior to and not following the creation of a European political 
power, constitutionally defined, because those involved in process, on 
an executive level […] do not behave according to logical criteria� It is a 
ruse to get those involved onto an “inclined plane” – as federal activists 
put it  – towards the creation of a European power� If you can make 
someone do something that implies a precondition, that person might 
find themself needing to create it�”11
Albertini clarified the concept of the “inclined plane”, namely a 
situation brought about more by circumstances than the will of political 
forces, and the relationship between European elections, European 
currency and European government in an essay of 197612� Firstly he 
tackles the issue of the European constituent, which could not be likened 
to the constituent assembly of an existing state, in which it is possible to 
reorder the political basis of consensus without radically rethinking the 
foundations of the state, such as defence, justice, public administration, 
etc� As Albertini stated, “By its very nature, the European constituent 
cannot coincide with the work of a constituent Assembly, tasked with 
drafting a permanent Constitution in the space of a few months� In Europe 
there is no existing European state waiting to be given a constitutional 
form� In Europe the very state itself has to be created, in literal terms, 
which is why we need to appoint an authority to do it� And the one thing 
that the events of European integration should have taught us by now is 
that it is only with an initial form of European state (to be established by 
a dedicated constituent assembly) that the process of forming a definitive 
European state can be started� The paradox of ‘creating a state to create a 
state’ should not be cause for concern� Kant himself encountered a similar 
paradox (a state of states), but that did not stop him from using that 
very paradox as the basis of perpetual peace�”13 The historical situation of 
Europe, with an advanced level of economic integration and the prospect 
in the near future of citizens directly electing the European Parliament, 
meant that the issue of a European constituent could, and should, be 
addressed in a new way� “To decide whether the creation of a European 
state is possible,” Albertini wrote, “it is not a question of seeing whether 
it is possible to convene a constituent assembly in the traditional sense, 
11 Albertini, M�, “Aspetti politici dell’unificazione monetaria”, TS, Vol� V, p� 775-786, 
cit� on p� 777-779�
12 Albertini, M�, “Elezione europea, governo europeo e Stato europeo”, TS, Vol� VII, 
p� 159-171�
13 Ibidem, p� 162�
but whether a process like the one I have described, which should consist 
of individual constituent acts that strengthen the level of the constituent 
process, making further constituent acts possible and so on (with a 
European Parliament which would effectively play the role of ‘permanent 
constituent assembly,’ in the words of Willy Brandt), is about to begin or 
has already begun�”14
Albertini also clarified the close connection between the three 
objectives: the election of the European Parliament, the European currency 
and the European government� “As has been said and as was shown by 
the failure of the Werner Plan, the idea of creating a European currency 
before creating a European power capable of introducing a European 
economic policy is a contradictory one� Holding a European election 
for a powerless European Parliament is meaningless, just as a Union not 
represented by a genuine European government is meaningless� And it 
is wrong to take these three issues separately� In actual fact all three refer 
to the same thing: the current state of play of European integration� 
Together, they represent the platform for relaunching Europe�”15 The 
conclusion is that: “a Union which has already been given the right to 
vote for the Union, and not only for the states, is practically a federation, 
that is a constitutional system that determines the existence of a people� 
On the other hand, on this basis, i�e� on the path toward federation, the 
aim of creating a European currency and a real European economy ceases 
to be contradictory�”16
2. How the Action Developed
The action taken by the MFE towards a European currency was also 
made possible by working closely with Robert Triffin� It can be said 
that in the MFE Triffin found a political movement willing to back his 
proposals, and in Triffin the MFE found an authoritative international 
voice in favour of monetary reforms in a federalist perspective, both in 
Europe and worldwide� Robert Triffin was the economist who designed 
and directed the European Payments Union (EPU), an institution that 
was inspired by the Clearing Union proposed by Keynes in view of the 
Bretton Woods negotiations� The EPU, which was active from 1950 to 
1958, made European currencies convertible, a precondition for the 
economic reconstruction of Europe and the functioning of the IMF� 
14 Ibidem, p� 164�
15 Ibidem, p� 168�
16 Ibidem, p� 169�
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Triffin is also known for his Dilemma, which predicted the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system�
With regard to European monetary integration, Triffin himself 
succinctly described his relationship with Jean Monnet, as initially 
characterised by “total disagreement�” In 1950 Jean Monnet was 
designing the ECSC and Robert Triffin was launching the UEP, which 
he considered superior to the subsequent EMS (European monetary 
system)� Here, in summary, is the structure and the political effects of the 
monetary institutions created by Triffin: “The success of the EPU – recalls 
Triffin – quickly surpassed all hopes and defeated the initial scepticism of 
Jean Monnet and the objections of many other economists and financial 
and political executives� In 1957 Monnet enthusiastically supported my 
proposals to transform the EPU into a European fund of reserves where 
the central banks from each country in the Community would hold a 
common currency called the ECU, a growing proportion of their gold 
reserves and foreign currencies� In the final stage, the total conversion 
of their reserves into ECU would lead to the creation of the Central 
Federal Bank of the monetary, economic and political Union of Europe�” 
In 1969 Monnet phoned Triffin, then in Yale, to ask him to come to 
Paris urgently� In Paris, as Triffin recalls: “Monnet explained that he had 
convinced the Chancellor Willy Brandt to present our proposal to create 
a European fund of reserves at the first summit conference in The Hague� 
We had to get a move on and give the Chancellor all the documentation 
and economic statistics that the Ministry of Finance and the Bundesbank 
were stubbornly holding back”17� This brief summary given by Triffin of 
the role Monnet and he himself played at the summit in The Hague, is 
confirmed in Jean Monnet’s Memoirs in which he relates that despite the 
fact that currency “was still viewed as an almost magical expression of 
national sovereignty”, Brandt understood the proposal and “ensured that 
the proposal for Economic and Monetary Union and a European fund of 
reserves was accepted in The Hague,” as put forward by the Committee 
for the United states of Europe�18
The federalists of Turin were the first to react to the signs of crisis in 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates� In a conference held in 
Turin in 1969, they presented a document entitled For a European system 
of reserves19 by Alfonso Iozzo and Antonio Mosconi� The same document 
17 Ferrante, C� and Sloover, J�, Robert Triffin Conseiller des Princes, Bruxelles, Editions 
Ciaco, 1990, p� 95-96� 
18 Monnet, J�, Memoirs, Paris, Fayard, 1976, p� 583�
19 Jozzo, A� and Mosconi, A�, “Pour un système européen de reserve”, in Le Fédéraliste, 
No� 2, October 1969, p� 71-78�
was the basis for a conference, in 1970, in Turin, which was attended by 
Robert Triffin, Rinaldo Ossola and Mario Albertini20� This was followed 
by a growing corpus of individual and collective theoretical contributions 
from “expert” federalists, up till the creation of the EMS (European 
Monetary System) in 1979� I will list the main ones here: the special 
edition of Le Fédéraliste in 1974, with texts by D� Velo, A� Majocchi, 
D� Moro, G� Montani; the conference “A currency for Europe”, held 
in Pavia in 1976, based on a preparatory document by G� Montani 
and D� Velo, with the participation of Giovanni Magnifico, economic 
adviser to the Bank of Italy and Manfred Lahnstein, director general of 
the Ministry of Finance of the FRG, Emil Claasen, economics professor 
at the University of Paris, Antonio Mosconi, director of the Fiat holding 
company, Giandomenico Celata from the CGIL trade union and Mario 
Albertini; the conference entitled “Monetary union with the prospect 
of a European election”, held in Turin in 1977, with the participation 
of Giovanni Magnifico, Robert Triffin, Gaetano Stammati (Treasury 
Minister), Cesare Romiti (CEO of FIAT), Paolo Savona (Director of 
Confindustria), and Luciano Barca (PCI); the conference organized by 
the French section of the UEF, in Paris in 1977, with Robert Triffin, 
Giovanni Magnifico, Pierre Werner, Boyer de la Giroday, Rainer Masera 
and Michele Fratianni, and the conference organized in 1978 by the 
Dutch section of the UEF in Eindhoven on “A United and Democratic 
Europe, Now or Never”, with the participation of Henry Brugmans, 
John Pinder, Martin Bangemann, Pierre Werner, H� Vredeling and 
G� Montani�
This long list is by no means an exhaustive one, as can be seen looking 
through past issues of Unità Europea for that period, during which a 
host of initiatives were organised by local chapters of the MFE� Federalist 
pressure on the European political class culminated in the conference in 
Rome on 17-18 June 1977, entitled “Economic union and the question 
of the European currency” – organized by the MFE in collaboration 
with the European Movement, and chaired by Giuseppe Petrilli – by 
which time the direct election of the European Parliament had been 
decided� The personal relationship and mutual esteem between Albertini 
and Petrilli made for an outstanding collaboration between the two 
organizations, without which it would have been impossible to make the 
initiative a success� Over several months the two movements discussed 
both the topics and the guest list, which meant taking lengthy journeys 
abroad to present the aims of the conference to the various speakers� After 
the strategic success achieved with the direct election of the European 
20 All the reports were published in The Federalist, No� 1, 1971�
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Parliament, the federalists set out to exploit the election to force the 
parties in the elected Parliament to give their immediate support to the 
proposed EMU�
The conference proceedings were published in full21, and one look at 
the contents page gives an idea of the intellectual and organizational effort 
that the Italian federalists put into it� In his introductory report Petrilli 
noted that the failed attempts to implement the Werner Plan, “should 
make us set aside the traditional opposition between economists and 
monetarists, as it no longer applies to the current situation,” referring to 
the division between those who wanted national economies to converge 
before the creation of the EMU and those who supported a fixed exchange 
rate regime as a condition of convergence� According to Petrilli, “the 
creation of the European currency must in the first place enable the 
globalization of the Community’s balance of payments, which in turn 
requires a set of income transfers within the integrated economic area� The 
latter are only conceivable in the presence of a European executive with 
autonomous spending power and powers to coin money, and therefore able 
to implement employment policies and investments on a European level, 
addressing the nodes connected to the presence of structural inequalities�”22 
In his report Pierre Werner, after analysing the extrinsic and intrinsic 
causes for the failure of the plan he drew up in 1970, proposed breaking 
the deadlock by: “a) reconfirming the ultimate goal of Monetary Union, 
as described in the report of the Werner group, and setting a time limit for 
it, which could be extended by a few years if necessary� […] b) deciding 
on a short-term state of ‘pre-monetary union’ characterized by a set of 
consistent measures to strengthen both economic and monetary solidarity, 
and policy convergence�”23 In his report summarising the preparatory 
work carried out by the MFE study group, Alberto Majocchi framed the 
crisis in the process of European integration in the global context, namely 
the crisis of the Bretton Woods system� Europe contributed to this crisis, 
because “it was not able – in parallel with the growth of the Common 
Market – to take on a more active role in the system of international 
payments and by not taking part in financing world trade, it effectively 
sterilized monetary resources�” The system of generalized fluctuations, 
supported by economists like Milton Friedman, did nothing to solve the 
problems of Europe, or those of the rest of the world� In Majocchi’s view 
it was intended as a move towards a world “where the internal market 
21 ME-MFE, L’unione economica e il problema della moneta europea, Milan, Franco 
Angeli, 1978�
22 Ibidem, p� 23-24�
23 Ibidem, p� 39�
and the international market would self regulate effectively,” but this was 
not the case, because “the process of fluctuation, rather than reducing the 
imbalances that exist in the international market between weak currencies 
and strong currencies, tends to accentuate the gaps; […] if there is not 
a democratic supranational authority with the power to control the 
economy and the currency, the result is the hegemony of the strongest 
state�”24 In Europe the generalized fluctuation of currencies had disastrous 
consequences� “Fluctuation caused a sharp decline in the volume of trade 
in Europe and worldwide, and gave rise to a strong push for protectionism 
in our countries�” For this reason it was vital to relaunch the EMU� It 
should however be clarified that “in our analysis European currency does 
not mean a pure and simple return to a fixed exchange rate system� […] We 
feel it is extremely important to strengthen the central budget of the EEC, 
devoting a quota of VAT income to the Community, […] and making a 
commitment to use all Community funds for the purposes of equalizing 
and stabilizing cyclical trends�”25
At the conference the MFE study group presented several introductory 
papers on key issues of an economic, social and political nature� The 
authors of these were: G� Montani, A� Majocchi, D� Velo, C� Romiti, 
A� Mosconi, A� Jozzo, G� Meroni, G� Usai and D� Moro� Communications 
at the Conference were presented by G� Magnifico (Economic Advisor 
to the Bank of Italy), R� Masera (head of the Monetary Department at 
the Bank of Italy), and E� Tuccimei (Vice Director of the Bank of Italy)� 
I would like to mention just a few of the 27 addresses given, many by party 
representatives� Emilio Colombo, President of the European Parliament, 
after mentioning the increasing public attention to the direct election 
of the European Parliament, stated that he found “the approach to the 
elections for the European Parliament formulated by Professor Petrilli 
and put forward by the MFE, to be fair and just”; Gaetano Stammati, the 
Treasury Minister, observed that in 1971 “there was no unified European 
response to the crisis of the dollar, and the snake in the tunnel construction 
revealed all its fragility, above all due to the fact that it fell to the weaker 
countries alone to support the weight of this construction, namely joint 
fluctuation�” Dirk Spierenburg, Chairman of the Dutch government’s 
Committee on “The European Union” stressed the crucial question of the 
relationship between monetary union and national budgetary policies� 
According to Spierenburg, “the Union would need to have regulatory 
powers over certain important elements of national budgets: a� annual 
admissible variations in the level of public spending; b� the permissible 
24 Ibidem, p� 46-7�
25 Ibidem, p� 51, 53-54�
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scope of budget deficit; c� the way the deficit could be financed� The 
Union’s institutions should therefore establish the limits of fiscal policy, but 
governments would remain free to choose the items of the budget within 
these limits�” Lastly, Spierenburg stressed the political importance of setting 
a date for the EMU, although its implementation could proceed in stages, 
“according to a previously established schedule�” He concluded his speech 
with the following words: “I believe you were right to target the political 
parties, so that once the European Parliament is elected, its new members 
can immediately address the question of the EMU�” 
It is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to understand how and at 
what speed ideas travel among active politicians, namely those who are 
pressured by urgent issues and have to make decisions� The fact remains 
that in October 1977, in the European University of Florence, the then 
President of the European Commission Roy Jenkins, gave a speech on 
Europe’s present challenges and future opportunity, which was decidedly in 
favour of creating the EMU� As he put it: “My belief is that we should use 
the period immediately prior to the first direct elections of the European 
Parliament, to re-launch a major public debate on what monetary union 
has to offer�” He went on to pinpoint the issues, costs and benefits of 
Monetary Union� His observations on the relationship between monetary 
Union and European taxation were especially significant, observing that: 
“in the Community of today, we have a battery of financial instruments, 
but all of them rather small guns�” Monetary Union required a quantum 
leap, namely a significant (but not impossible) increase in the European 
budget� As Jenkins recalled: “The overall magnitude of budgetary spending 
at the European level for this type of community has recently been 
estimated by a group of independent economists under the chairmanship 
of Sir Donald McDougall� As against present Community expenditure 
of the order of 1% of GNP, they estimated that very substantial progress 
on economic integration could be achieved with the aid of expenditure 
of 2 to 2�5% of GNP; they believed that a definitive monetary union 
might be viable with expenditure of the order of 5 to 7% of GNP� These 
are of course very large sums of money, which would have to be built up 
gradually by a transfer of some expenditure from national budgets and 
not by a superimposition, but they are quite small by the standards of the 
classic federations where the top tier of government takes 20 to 25% of 
GNP� There is therefore for the Community a new and realistic model for 
a highly decentralised type of monetary union�”26
26 The speech by Roy Jenkins in Florence, his subsequent speech to the European 
Parliament and a summary of the McDougall Report were published in Il Federalista, 
No� 1, 1978�
The speech given by the President of the European Commission 
in Florence appeared to give further confirmation of that the political 
initiative conducted by the MFE had been successful� In the space of 
a few years the proposal for a European currency had been accepted 
by the Community’s institutions� In addition to that the Commission, 
thanks to the McDougall Report, had provided a major missing piece 
in the general framework outlined by the federalists, by quantifying the 
minimum size of the EU budget, 2 to 2�5% of GNP, needed to create 
a pre-federal union, i�e� excluding defence spending� This proposal 
concerning the fiscal capacity of the Union, together with the strategy 
that emerged from the Conference in Rome, for a pre-monetary union, 
made the entire project even more realistic� It was time for the national 
governments to have their say and decide on the next steps to take�
A plan for “pre-monetary union” was in effect announced by the 
European Council in Bremen in July 1978, based on a joint proposal 
from the French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and the German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt� In December 1978 the European Council 
in Brussels finally decided to launch the European Monetary System 
(EMS), namely a system of fixed exchange rates between the European 
currencies, which aimed to make Europe (then with nine member states) 
a zone of monetary stability in a world of floating exchange rates� Overall, 
it was a proposal that fell far short of the indications in the Werner Plan 
for the EMU, and the demands of the federalists� The EMS was a system 
of fixed exchange rates in reference to a central rate, the ECU (European 
Currency Unit), which is a weighted average of European currencies� What 
was new about this was that the European currencies no longer had the 
dollar as their point of reference, but a basket containing only European 
currencies� It was a timid step towards the full monetary autonomy of 
Europe, which only came about in Maastricht� The EMS also included 
weak solidarity mechanisms between the different central banks and, in 
theory, the creation of a European Fund of reserves, as Robert Triffin 
and the federalists had requested� However, due to the opposition of the 
Bundesbank this Fund (which would have been the first step towards 
European monetary sovereignty) was never established27�
The establishment of the EMS was the end of the first crucial stage of 
the federalist struggle for a European currency� In Italy it was rekindled 
once more in 1978, when the question of Italy acceding to the EMS 
arose� As it meant a return to fixed exchange rates and a policy of 
27 On the creation and development of the EMS, see Gros, D� and Thygesen, N�, 
European Monetary Integration. From the European Monetary System to European 
Monetary Union, London, St� Martin’s Press, 1992�
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budgetary rigour, there were protests against Italy joining the EMS from 
the protectionist ranks, including Confindustria, various trade unions, 
certain economists (especially Keynesian economists), some political 
parties and even the Bank of Italy� The MFE reacted strongly, and 
counted on the support of Altiero Spinelli, who by then was a member 
of the Italian Parliament and did not hesitate to speak out against the 
PCI, which wavered between the new prospect of Eurocommunism and 
safeguarding the interests of national trade unions� In the end, however, 
Italy joined the EMS partly thanks to a special clause enabling a less 
stringent exchange rate constraint�28
In the run-up to the first universal European elections, the European 
Union of Federalists (UEF) pointed out to Europe’s citizens the close 
relationship between the European election and the construction of a 
European government� In a motion of March 1979 the UEF Federal 
Committee, having approved the report presented by its President, 
Mr  Albertini, proposed: “a) the need to intensify propaganda for the 
European currency, for a Community budget appropriate to the situation, 
for the creation of a European government; b) the completion of an 
agreement between MEPs and federalist forces in order to raise the profile 
of the work of the European Parliament; c) a commitment to establish 
genuine European political parties�”29 A European currency, European 
budget and European government therefore became the central objectives 
of the federalist strategy for exploiting the new supranational democratic 
power gained with the direct election of the European Parliament�
From then on, until the end of the first term, the federalists focused 
their attention on the constituent project championed by Altiero Spinelli 
in the new European Parliament� The MFE and the UEF attempted to play 
an active role in terms of public opinion on a national level, re-launching 
the battle for the constituent initiated by the MEPs� The “Draft Treaty 
establishing the European Union”, voted for by a very large majority in 
February 1984, on the eve of the second European election, effectively 
created a democratic government for the economic and monetary 
union, given that foreign policy and defence were still seen as a potential 
competence, temporarily to be handled by national governments� The 
Draft Treaty stated that “The Union shall have concurrent competence 
for the progressive achievement of full monetary union” (article 52); 
moreover it granted co-decision making power to Parliament and the 
Council (by majority vote) on its own financial resources, with the 
28 On the issue of Italy’s accession to the EMS see Pistone, S�, op. cit., p� 96-99�
29 The resolution was published in Il Federalista, No� 2, 1979, p� 142-143�
authority to issue loans (article 71)� Ultimately, bearing in mind that 
the Commission would effectively become a government, supported 
by the majority vote of the European Parliament (article 25) it appears 
legitimate to conclude that the European Union would shortly become 
“the democratic government of the economic and monetary union,” 
therefore not yet a complete European Federation, but at least a “pre-
Federal” union� Unfortunately, the differences within the European 
Council and the weakness of the countries in favour of the proposed 
European Parliament, especially France, Germany and Italy, enabled 
opposition from Britain and Margaret Thatcher to gain the upper hand� 
So a few years later, following the fall of the Berlin wall, the reunification 
of Germany and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the European 
Union took faltering steps towards creating a precarious EMU with an 
institutional set up that was sorely lacking in democratic terms�
3. Taking Stock of the Past and Looking to the Future
Nearly half a century after the events discussed in the previous 
paragraphs, we can try to formulate a few considerations on the soundness 
of those strategic proposals and the effectiveness of the action taken by 
the MFE� 
Within the MFE the strategy of constitutional gradualism has often 
been misunderstood� Some have misinterpreted it as a strategy of ‘small 
steps’� This interpretation is not correct because in this regard Albertini 
was very clear: the question regards making a (provisional) state to make 
the (federal) state� This means that constitutional gradualism is about 
coming up with institutional innovations that call national sovereignty 
into question, and therefore currency and taxation too, in terms of the 
economy; foreign policy and defence, in the context of collective security, 
and lastly a democratic government, in terms of the constitutional basis 
of the federal state� This needs to be clarified in order to understand the 
difference between constitutional gradualism and Monnet’s version of 
mere gradualism alone� Jean Monnet never connected the creation of the 
European currency to the constitutional role of the European Parliament� 
Of course small steps are possible within a constitutional process, such as 
creating a banking union after setting up the European currency and the 
European Central Bank� However, in this case it was merely a question 
of acknowledging the fact that European governments, in an awkward 
attempt to retain certain powers of control over their national credit 
systems, were not ready in Maastricht to do what economic theory and a 
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number of economists were proposing� In this respect, it is also incorrect 
to call the euro a “currency without a state” because the EMU is already 
a piece of a state, i�e� a state set up to make a state (i�e� the Federation)� 
It would be more correct to say that the euro is a currency without a 
federal budget and a federal government: a limping EMU, a monetary 
area with no protection from opposing external forces, like the financial 
crisis of 2008, and internal contradictions, like the crisis caused by overly 
indebted national economies and clashes between European governments 
over the criteria for sharing the risks and the costs of convergence, as 
shown by the disputes between the German government and the Greek 
government�
Misunderstandings and heated debates have also arisen over the notion 
of the “inclined plane”, which has been interpreted as a deterministic 
conception of the integration process� Yet with regard to this notion too, 
Albertini explicitly clarified that it was the product of circumstances rather 
than political will� Political action, i�e� a project supported by political 
will, always arises in a context characterised by circumstances, events and 
forces that oppose change, and these have to be taken into consideration 
by those attempting to change the course of events� There is nothing 
deterministic about this idea� The notion of state is crucial to modern 
politics, because it defines a set of conditions that are destined to endure, 
like the institutional structures of government, the economy, the legal 
system, defence, etc� If we accept that currency is an essential component 
of the state, then it can also be said, without contradictions, that the 
creation of the EMU and the direct election of the European Parliament 
place the political process of integration on an inclined plane30� This does 
not mean that the EMU, European Parliament and whole of the EU is 
destined to last forever� The Soviet Union disintegrated, the European 
Union may also break up at some point� 
I believe that the proposals made and the experience gained during 
that period in terms of both the constitution and the architecture of 
government, are crucial when it comes to understanding the present 
crisis in European integration, and identifying what needs to be done to 
30 The expression “make a state to make the state” leaves a margin of ambiguity when 
it comes to interpreting the existing situation� To what extent can the EMU be 
described as a state? Here we have opted to see the creation of the European currency 
and the ECB as the embryonic form of the European state, because currency is not 
just the symbol of national sovereignty, but also an effective power of government� 
This interpretation was also adopted by the MFE which, after the Maastricht Treaty, 
approved a resolution affirming that: “the heads of state and government have 
acknowledged the construction of Europe to be state-like in nature” (Unità Europea, 
No� 215, January 1993)�
complete it and identify the action required to introduced federalism on 
a global scale� To sum up the key elements: 1) constitutional gradualism, 
with the European Parliament as a permanent constituent, because 
the construction of a federal European state requires more than just a 
single act, but a constituent process; b) identifying the main objectives 
of the currency, budget and democratic government of the EMU as a 
preliminary step before foreign policy and security� These aspects of 
federalist strategy show us that national governments have succumbed 
to the forces defending national interests, confusing the protection of 
corporative interests with the protection of the common good of Europe’s 
citizens� If we take the Schuman Declaration – which views the ECSC as 
the first step towards a European Federation – we would have to say that 
the national governments have betrayed the founding pact� Below I will 
list just a few of the ‘compromises’ with nationalism� 
One of the first omissions was not having ratified the ‘Draft Treaty’ 
of the European Union approved by the European Parliament in 1984 
on a national basis� It should be recalled that article 82 of the Spinelli 
Project stated that it should be ratified when “a majority of the member 
states of the Community, with a population representing 2/3 of the 
total population of the Community” had approved it� In other words, 
the European countries in favour of it, France, Germany and Italy in 
particular, could have decided to go ahead without Great Britain, but 
didn’t� The consequence of this was that when the Berlin Wall fell, the 
Community lacked a government or effective tools to continue the 
process of expanding eastwards, including taking action to prevent 
the breakdown of former Yugoslavia� The second serious omission 
came about at Maastricht, when it was decided to create a monetary 
union without a European budget and a democratic government� The 
consequences of this were not immediately evident, but emerged strongly 
with the financial crisis of 2008, which we will discuss shortly� Lastly, the 
third omission was the convoluted procedure for ratifying the European 
constitution project formulated by the European Convention in 2003� 
The Constitution would have represented a step towards the creation of 
a European federal state, both symbolically and in view of a number of 
institutional innovations� First of all the governments decided to add a 
huge number of additional articles regarding the policies of the Union 
to the existing 59, basically making the Constitution incomprehensible 
to the citizens, and then they called for a unanimous ratification, ignoring 
the negative outcomes of this in the past� This gave the Eurosceptic 
parties or minorities, as was evident in France, a formidable weapon 
against their national governments� A process of ratification by majority, 
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as detailed in the Spinelli Project, would have highlighted the fact that 
the majority of citizens and states in the Union were in favour of the 
European Constitution� This procedure would finally have revealed the 
“will of the people of Europe”� Perhaps European governments feared 
that the spectre of a European people would finally materialise�
Before focusing on the fourth shortcoming, namely how the sovereign 
debt crisis was handled by the European Council – the real government 
of the EU – it is worth looking at the historical and political causes for the 
renewed vigour of nationalism in Europe, and the advent of political forces 
that are not only Euro-sceptic, but openly anti-European� Ultimately, 
since the outset, in the days of the ECSC, the European project has come 
up against explicit nationalist opposition, like that of de Gaulle, or a veiled 
form, like that of the political parties sensitive to national protectionism� 
Yet while the first stage in the process of constructing Europe took place 
in the context of the cold war, the current stage is unfolding in an entirely 
new global scenario: the decline of the American superpower and the 
rise of new powers like China, India and Brazil, in short, a multi-polar 
world order� We should remember that the end of the cold war was 
preceded by a period of détente between the superpowers, despite the 
fact that Reagan’s stance against the “evil empire” had rekindled the arms 
race� It was the arrival of Gorbachev that radically changed the terms of 
the problem� Perestroika and Glasnost would never have been successful 
in the context of the cold war� The path towards the democratization of 
the Communist system and of the Soviet Empire, together with the 
conversion of the command economy into a market system would 
not have been successful if the USSR had been forced to use growing 
portions of its production to cover unproductive expenditures, such as 
weapons spending� This was why Gorbachev consistently supported 
a plan of bilateral nuclear disarmament between the two superpowers 
and the transition from the Soviet imperial system towards the notion 
of a common European home, with the idea of opening up to peaceful 
cooperation with the European Union� This project failed, because after 
the first democratic elections of the Soviet Parliament and the republics, 
the conservative forces within the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, 
faced with drastically reducing their power and the transformation of 
the Empire into a confederal system, reacted with a coup d’état which 
fatally weakened Gorbachev� Shortly after that, the nationalistic revolt 
of the ‘sovereign’ republics marked the end of the USSR� The failure of 
Gorbachev’s reform had serious consequences internationally, because it 
reawakened the spectre of nationalism in Eastern and Western Europe, 
and Asian countries� The fall of communism meant not only the victory 
of democracy over communism, but also that of nationalism over a 
project of peaceful cooperation in Europe and globally� It was this period 
that saw the creation of secessionist and anti-European parties, like Italy’s 
Northern League, based around the mythical sovereignty of the Padania 
region� 
The cold war and period of military standoffs between the US and 
the USSR were characterized by an ideological confrontation between 
democracy and socialism, two great ideologies of human emancipation� 
This relationship between the imperial power of the superpowers and 
ideology also helped curb – though in many cases hypocritically, as always 
happens when power politics are not reconciled with the values they 
claim to defend – the aspirations to domination of the two superpowers 
and their allies: in the various continents, from Latin America to Africa 
and Asia, they were forced, at least nominally, to pay tribute to the values 
of secularism, democracy and social justice� The end of the cold war 
spelled the end of respect for its ideological superstructure� The slow path 
towards a multipolar world dominated by a number of major powers (but 
no longer superpowers) gradually crushed political and social cohesion 
in the intermediate world, in areas where the formation of the modern 
state is more fragile, such as the Middle East and Africa� This has led to 
the creation of movements of buccaneers and tribal leaders that exploit 
the weak cohesion of the various states and the religious beliefs of the 
local people� Alongside nation-states seeking to assert themselves in the 
world there is now the adventurism of terrorist groups using modern war 
technologies to exterminate their opponents� 
Europe’s governments do not seem to realise that these structural 
changes are taking place� They have tackled the idea of extending the EU 
eastwards, asking NATO to extend its military protection to the East, 
and in the process angering Russia, which has responded by splitting the 
Ukraine, and also irritating the United states, increasingly reluctant to pay 
for defending wealthy countries� They have virtually ignored the hotbeds 
of tension in the Mediterranean, starting with the Israeli-Palestinian 
crisis, and the attempts of as yet weak democratic forces in Arab countries 
to break free from dictatorial regimes� Today European countries are 
facing massive waves of political and economic immigration� Despite 
the creation of the euro, European countries vote separately in the 
IMF, instead of presenting a unified front both in the IMF and the UN 
Security Council, to achieve effective European foreign policy on a global 
scale� Lastly, with regard to the ecological crisis, the EU has clung to the 
illusion that a sound European environmental policy would suffice to 
tackle what is actually a global issue, ignoring the fact that effective UN 
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action, based on a binding long-term plan for all Member countries, is 
the only way forward�
Against this depressing backdrop of misrule by arrogant national 
governments, it is not difficult to understand the reasons for the fourth 
shortcoming we mentioned� At the beginning of the financial crisis in 
2008, European governments were convinced that the Treaty of Lisbon 
guaranteed the EU an almost definitive institutional structure� Following 
negative referenda against the draft European Constitution and the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, governments were no longer willing 
to consider further institutional reforms, and the European Parliament 
passively accepted this stalemate� This consolidated the view that the 
EU was a stable, permanent confederation� A confederation of sovereign 
nation states� 
So when financial crisis struck, the Union resolved to deal with it using 
the existing tools at its disposal� The Lisbon Treaty had partly increased 
the powers of Parliament and the Commission, but also those of the 
European Council, with the establishment of a permanent President� 
Soon the Commission and Parliament were confronted by the decisions 
taken by a Council increasingly determined to impose a severe policy of 
austerity� Within the Council, France, which had played a leading role 
since the Foundation of the European institutions, had to hand the reins 
over to unified Germany: nobody challenged the fact that when managing 
an economic crisis the strongest economic power should take charge� A 
hard line was therefore taken with spendthrift nations, namely those with 
excessive debts and deficits, despite the fact that some of the countries in 
crisis, such as Ireland, Spain and Portugal, had their accounts in order 
when the crisis first loomed� The objective was not to get the recovery 
process under way as quickly as possible, tackling the issues country by 
country, in the context of a European government supportive of the 
weaker countries – although Greece and Italy deserved a call to order – 
but only to impose a Nessus shirt on national budgets� The federalists 
immediately pointed out that monetary Union without a federal budget 
and a democratic government needed first of all to make the reforms 
necessary to address the shortcomings in European governance, in the 
first place the lack of a policy of sustainable growth and economic and 
social cohesion� Yet no governments heeded this message, despite the fact 
that many economists and political commentators were calling for the 
same things�
It cannot therefore come as a surprise that after six years of recession 
and mismanagement of the Union in all Member countries, Germany 
included, there are increasing popular protests against European 
policies, and anti-European parties have formed� The economic crisis 
has turned into a political crisis and the future of the European Union is 
at risk� If we return to Albertini’s strategic observation that introducing 
the European currency meant making a state to make a state, we can say 
that EMU is a badly designed state institution, because no monetary 
union, common to a group of democratic countries, with modern 
social policies, can work if member countries are not willing to sacrifice 
the average income of its citizens on the altar of monetary stability 
(with deflationary policies, namely consumer spending and wage 
compression, to regain competitiveness)� A monetary union is not a 
system of fixed exchange rates: it is a pact between countries that decide 
to equip themselves with common tools, thus not only a currency but 
also federal taxation, in other words a European budget big enough to 
generate investments, growth, employment and economic and social 
cohesion�
For these reasons it can be argued that Europe’s current architecture 
has produced a serious political crisis� European democracy is in crisis 
because it is no longer possible to solve national problems without 
democratic European institutions attentive to the criticism from and needs 
of Europe’s citizens� On one hand, we have a state without democracy: 
the European Council cannot be challenged by a vote of no confidence 
by any parliament� On the other we have democratic European bodies, 
the European Parliament, with representatives of parties elected by the 
people, which cannot ask the Commission for effective policies because 
of the minuscule European budget� Perhaps it is also due to this that 
throughout the crisis the European Parliament passively accepted the 
guidelines imposed by the European Council� The paradox of European 
democracy, a state without democracy and a democracy without a state, 
generates obvious dystonic public debates� Let’s take the case of Greece 
and its debt� There is no doubt that Greece has been badly governed in 
the past� Yet we are attempting to solve a political problem using only 
economic means: blackmailing lenders, which have forced the Greek 
government (right and left) to accept draconian measures, causing the 
GDP to fall by about a third over five years� The European Council should 
be reminded that the Greeks are also European citizens and as such are 
entitled to use the euro as their currency, as they have democratically 
opted to do� It is unlawful to threaten expelling them from the EMU� 
Sicily and Lazio are also poorly governed and deserve to default� It is one 
thing if the government collapses – a political event that should be taken 
into account in a constitution – but quite another to challenge one of the 
pillars of the Union, namely the integrity of the EMU� When the cities 
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of New York and Detroit defaulted, nobody called the integrity of the 
dollar, as a currency area, into question� 
The European Union must become a democratic state, and it should 
become a Federation, to take on internal and international challenges� If 
this does not happen within the next few years the world’s great powers 
will understand that the spirit of disunity prevails over that of unity, 
and will exploit these divisions to convince some of the member states 
to abandon the sinking ship: divide et impera� As classical Greece was 
plundered by the Macedonian and Roman Empires, the European Union 
will become a land of conquest�
4. Politics, Economics and Federalism
In this closing section I would like to talk about the resistance to and 
misunderstandings of federalists’ action among both the political classes 
and in academic circles� In principle this issue is connected to the study of 
the ideology, and has long been discussed by federalists� In short, it could 
be argued that the power of the dominant ideology, namely the set of ideas 
supported by national governments to support their European policies – 
or lack thereof – relegate federalist thinking and proposals to the utopian 
realm, an illusion, or future scenario that will never come to pass� Karl 
Mannheim expresses this very clearly: “Whenever an idea is called utopian, 
it is almost always by a representative of a past era� […] It is always the 
dominant group, in full agreement with the existing order, that determines 
what is to be regarded as utopian, while it falls to the group that is emerging 
or runs counter to the existing situation to determine what should be 
regarded as ideological”31� Another way of saying that history is always 
written by the victors, or at least by those who have not yet fallen from 
power, albeit in a precarious position� The federalists have to be aware of 
this harsh reality that condemns them to a sort of limbo on the margins of 
political, social and intellectual life� Within a nation state, minorities who 
are fighting for national power can take part in elections and gain public 
visibility when they enter parliament, even with just a handful of seats� 
Federalists oppose the nation state in general, not a specific government, so 
they have no way of getting their ideas across to the public at large, except 
in exceptional circumstances, as happened when Altiero Spinelli, in the 
European Parliament, was recognized as the leader of a political project that 
had the potential to change the future of the Union� 
31 Mannheim, K�, Ideology and Utopia, London, Routledge, 1991, p� 183�
These brief comments on the relationship between ideological and 
utopian thinking can help us see that the federalist battle must not be 
fought purely in terms of activism and contingent political action, but 
also in terms of providing an intellectual critique of the dominant ideas, 
as happened during the 17th and 18th centuries when the enlightenment 
harshly criticised the ancien régime. This is a huge task that requires a 
convergence of cultural players (philosophers, historians and social 
scientists) that goes beyond a single movement of militants, however 
determined� Indeed something of the sort is taking place, because the 
crisis of the European Union has led to many commentators discovering 
federalist ideas� I would therefore like to make a few remarks on the 
lessons that can be drawn from events that we have talked about� 
In the light of the essays written by federalist economists ahead of 
the meeting in Rome32, and those which were used to introduce the 
conference33, it can be seen that they provide a comprehensive analysis 
of the construction of economic and Monetary Union that still remains 
topical today� The crisis of the European Union is predicted in detail in 
those papers, starting with the role of the European Central Bank, which 
has to be independent from the national governments and cannot on its 
own solve the problems caused by the lack of fiscal union� Yet they all 
but ignore a paradigm that has become a key element in the academic 
analysis of those same issues, namely the theory of optimum currency 
areas� This was clearly not due to naivety or dogmatism on the part of the 
federalist economists, but rather a preference for an alternative approach 
that seemed more appropriate to the study of that problem� The Werner 
Report had provided a satisfactory definition of economic and monetary 
union, clearly specifying that: a) monetary union was not to be seen 
merely as a system of fixed exchange rates, but a politically irreversible 
decision; b) alongside monetary union there had to be fiscal union, with 
an increased European budget (as the subsequent MacDougall Report 
reiterated); c) there had to be a central decision-making power, namely 
a European government� For this reason the federalist economists’ 
arguments were directed against those (the monetarists), who defended 
a return to a traditional fixed exchange rate system, as the solution to 
the problem of the convergence of European economies, and against 
those who defended the idea of flexible exchange rates (some American 
economists like Milton Friedman, and almost all the European Keynesian 
economists, under the illusion of being able to maintain the practice of 
32 See Le Fédéraliste, No� 1, 1974�
33 Published in the ME-MFE book, L’unione economica e il problema della moneta 
europea, op. cit.
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competitive devaluations)� The federalist economists adopted a conceptual 
framework formulated by Lionel Robbins in his pre-war writings on the 
need for an international economic order based on a central bank and a 
federal system of government�34 The optimum currency areas approach 
undoubtedly provides a number of structural elements that can help us 
understand the phenomenon of monetary integration, such as the need 
for more flexibility in the labour market and the mobility of labour and 
capital, but leaves out some decisive political aspects, such as the role 
played by federal fiscal union in guaranteeing the convergence and very 
survival of the monetary union, which is the political responsibility of the 
federal government� Indeed the history of academic debate on the theory 
of optimal currency areas can be traced35 without considering the problem 
of the construction of the Federal state as the indispensable political 
setting where a supranational currency can come into existence and reach 
its full potential� This gap between economic theory and political theory 
is even more marked in the theory of the international economy as it is 
presented in textbooks, in terms of both trade and currency�
There is therefore an obscure relationship between economic theory 
and political theory that has to be resolved� To understand how this came 
about, we must return to an important observation made by Robbins, 
who denounces “the error of classical economists”, namely that of entirely 
ignoring the need to complete the institutional analysis they carried out 
admirably as regards the functioning of the domestic market (which, as 
Robbins observes, they by no means view as a spontaneous order but as 
an order that requires a government and a legislative system to organize 
the competition between the different productive forces), by analysing 
the workings of the international order, which is on the contrary viewed 
as a spontaneous order, based on the implicit hypothesis that the various 
governments set out to pursue a harmonious system of relationships, even 
when this harmony would require sacrificing their national interests� 
The error of classical economists was repeated and compounded36 by 
the founders of modern marginalist, or neoclassical economics� In the 
34 See Robbins, L�, Economic Planning and International Order, London, Macmillan, 
1937�
35 Masini, F�, “A history of the theories on Optimum Currency Areas”, in The European 
Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Vol� 21, No� 6, December 2014, p� 1015-
1038�
36 While they perfected their analytical techniques such as those based on the principle 
of marginal utility, the production function and the general economic equilibrium, 
there was complete disregard for the institutions governing the international market, 
which is conceived as operating in conditions of competition (more or less perfect) 
in theoretical models, in the implicit context of a set of nation states� Unfortunately 
works of Stanley Jevons, Léon Walras, Carl Menger, Alfred Marshall and 
Knut Wicksell we find but few references to the issue of the international 
economic order and the political institutions required to make it work� 
Indeed the gold standard came about in the course of the 19th century 
as a spontaneous order, that no one had designed and which operated 
thanks to the common interest of all the countries involved� There was 
no need to study why and how it had come about: the theory of the 
benefits of free trade appeared to cover it quite adequately� It was only 
after the great depression of 1929 that people began to understand that 
an international economic order could only survive if the countries 
involved were willing to abide by certain rules of conduct� This awareness 
resulted in the Bretton Woods system and rules for international free 
trade guaranteed by the post-war hegemony of the United states� 
This error in economic theory was accompanied by a parallel 
misconception in the theory of international relations� Various modern 
texts, like those of Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron and Kenneth 
Waltz37 make crucial observations on the relationships between national 
sovereign states, study systems of states (bipolarism, multipolarism, 
imperialism, colonialism, etc�) and consider the hypothesis of a world 
state or world federation, but only to relegate it to the realm of utopian 
thinking� Contemporary politics evolves “pragmatically” in the arena 
of power relations between sovereign states and the defence of national 
interests (the balance of power)� For this reason, even when considering 
the phenomenon of economic integration, of which European integration 
is a notable example, the idea of completing economic integration by 
creating a federation is never discussed as a “realistic” possibility� Only 
since the 1970s, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, has an 
academic approach been formulated with the explicit goal of moving 
beyond the vision that divides international economics and international 
relations into watertight compartments� This is International Political 
Economy (IPE), a new scientific paradigm, which has generated a vast 
amount of literature38� The limit of this approach, however, is that the 
premise of national sovereignty is never challenged, meaning that the 
reality differs from this imaginary construction� When international economic crises 
arise the harmony vanishes and neoclassical economists resolutely search for a new, 
more perfect, general model�
37 Morgenthau, H�, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, 
McGraw-Hill, 1985; Aron, R�, Paix et guerre entre les nations, Paris, Calman-Lévy, 
1984; Waltz, K�, Theory of International Politics, New York, Newbery Award Records, 
1979�
38 For a review see Cohen, B� J�, Advanced Introduction to International Political Economy, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2014�
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interesting analyses of the effects of economic integration on the relations 
between states, and, vice versa, the effects of cooperation and conflicts 
between states on the integration of the international market has been 
developed in a conceptual framework which at the most hints at a new 
international economic and political order, but with no clear vision of an 
alternative to the international system in crisis�
Dissatisfied with these approaches to the study of the relationship 
between economics and politics, I have explored the consistency 
and relevance of a new point of view, Supranational Political Economy 
(SPE)� The specific nature of the European construction, starting with 
the ECSC, lies in its supranational structure, namely by a number of 
states deciding to give up some sovereign powers, which are assigned 
to a supranational ‘government�’ For these reasons, European federalism 
is different from all existing models of federal state� To the extent that 
the EU progresses towards greater unity, supranational federalism will 
differ greatly from traditional federal models, almost all characterized by 
a strong concentration of power at the central level� The path taken by 
institutional progress has been and will be characterized by constitutional 
gradualism, as Albertini theorized with regard to the struggle for 
the European currency� Now it is a case of generalizing that insight� 
Supranational political economy represents a new scientific paradigm39 
which can be used both to delve deeper than the current academic 
literature into the process of European integration, and to design the first 
supranational institutions of a world that is becoming multipolar, yet not 
able to significantly reform the old international institutions inherited 
from the cold war� The panorama of international politics is increasingly 
worrying: in place of the bipolar peace guaranteed by the ideological 
and military confrontation of the two former superpowers there is 
increasing anarchy fuelled by the collapse of states artificially created 
by European colonialism in Africa and the Middle East� Moreover, 
centuries of unbridled industrial development are set to result in the 
systematic destruction of all forms of life on the planet, unless we make 
a serious commitment to sustainable development on a supranational 
scale� Absolute national sovereignty, which in the past represented the 
crucial guide for political action, has now become a major obstacle to 
cooperation between peoples in pursuit of the supreme common good: 
the survival of the human species, thanks to the peaceful coexistence 
39 For more on this, see my essay “From National to Supranational: A Paradigm Shift 
in Political Economy”, in Iglesias-Rodriguez, P�, Triandafyllidou, A� and Gropas, R�, 
Shifting Paradigm After the Crisis. Legal, Economic and Political Perspectives, New York, 
Palgrave, 2016�
among ancient civilizations, finally united by shared cosmopolitan values� 
The supranational principle allows us to design institutions capable of 
bridging the gaps between different national cultures and peoples� It is 
not a question of abolishing the nation states of the past, but opening 
them up to fruitful cooperation to achieve common goals�
These developments show that the experience of years of struggle 
for the European currency contains unexpected seeds� Yet it is necessary 
to specify a limit to the supranational political economy approach 
and identify a problem when it comes to extending the notion of 
constitutional gradualism to the global political order� The first obvious 
limitation is that the economic-political approach must be accompanied 
by a political-economic approach, in the sense that while the economic-
political approach sets out to explore the benefits of the creation of 
supranational institutions to govern the economy to foster the integration 
of national peoples, the political-economic approach should aim to 
explore the issues facing supranational institutions when guaranteeing 
the security of national peoples and the relationship between national 
democracy and supranational democracy40, because as the case of the 
crisis in the European Union shows, if you create supra-national state 
institutions, such as the EMU, important tools of national government 
are taken away from the citizens, and this must be compensated for by 
providing democratic tools of government on a supranational level�
The problem regards the relationship between the construction of a 
European Federation and the building of a new, federal world order� As 
the MFE succeeded in playing a ground-breaking role in the process of 
European integration, the European Union, to the extent that it becomes 
a model for and an example of a democratic supranational government, 
will lead the way in terms of spreading of federalism in the world� Yet 
although European integration is moving towards “an ever closer Union”, 
it will never represent an ideal model for the national peoples of other 
continents, because Europe will necessarily prioritize its own interests 
above those of other countries, until the foundations are laid for relations 
based on a supranational rule of law and democracy� The European 
40 Some academics, like D� Held (Cosmopolitanism. Ideals and Realities, Cambridge, 
Polity, 2010) and D� Archibugi (The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. Toward 
Cosmopolitan Democracy, Princeton, Princeton University Press) posit the need for 
a cosmopolitan democracy� This general aim is correct and goes in the direction 
sought by the federalists� However, their proposal does not entail the creation of a 
democratic world government, namely the institutions needed to steer the economy 
and power relations between states on the planet� If democracy is conceived as the 
self-governance of citizens, it is not clear why sovereignty should be limited to the 
national level�
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Federation is therefore an imperfect and partial model of cosmopolitan 
federalism; a state set up to make a state (the world federation)� This 
remark in no way detracts from the value and importance of the political 
efforts made by European federalists� We should be aware that the 
Ventotene Manifesto and the initial successes in the construction of the 
European Union started a process of change in the international political 
order that will be as lengthy, uncertain and troubled as the enlightenment, 
the real dawn of the modern age� All each of us can do is add our grain of 
sand to the foundations of a building we will never see the upper floors 
and roof of� This is the issue that has haunted our generation and that, 
most likely, will also burden the lives of our grandchildren�
L’euro entre problèmes de naissance  
et incertitudes identitaires (1991-2016)
Carlo Degli abbati
Les contenus monétaires du premier pilier du traité de Maastricht – 
entré en vigueur le 1er novembre 1993, après une phase difficile de 
ratification – sont la conséquence du trade-off franco-allemand 
qui comportait la conversion de l’euro de monnaie commune à 
monnaie unique contre l’extension au système européen du mode de 
fonctionnement de la Bundesbank en tant que banque centrale� Par 
conséquent, en pleine cohérence avec l’attribution à la BCE de la seule 
fonction monétaire, ni le traité ni le statut de la BCE n’ont confié à 
celle-ci une responsabilité en tant qu’institut préteur de dernier ressort� 
Cette circonstance a, depuis le début du fonctionnement de la monnaie 
unique, privé la BCE des moyens nécessaires pour s’opposer de manière 
anticyclique aux tendances défavorables des marchés� L’inversion du 
cycle économique mondiale, amorcée par la crise américaine des 
«  subprimes  », s’étant manifestée à compter de 2008, la navigation 
du système monétaire européen s’est avérée depuis lors soudainement 
complexe� Cet article vise à illustrer les difficultés initiales de gestation 
de l’euro, les différentes mesures adoptées au niveau des institutions 
et de la BCE pour parier à ses difficultés, les perspectives actuelles de 
la monnaie unique, ainsi qu’un aperçu des conséquences économiques 
fortement négatives pour les EM périphériques de la zone euro découlant 
de l’imparfait fonctionnement du système monétaire européen�
1. Les difficultés imprévues de gestation (1991-2002)
Construit autour d’une monnaie unique, appelée non plus ecu mais 
euro, le nouveau système monétaire européen nait en 1992 avec le traité 
de Maastricht comme matière du premier pilier consacré aux politiques 
communes1� 
1 UE, Recueil des traités, TCE, titre VI, Politique économique et monétaire, 1993�
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Mais son rôle de monnaie unique, et non commune, est dès le 
début l’effet d’une contorsion politique� La Commission présidée par 
Jacques Delors avait prudemment proposé une introduction graduelle 
de la nouvelle monnaie dans le concert des marchés monétaires 
internationaux� On avait imaginé d’abord une double circulation de 
l’euro (Jacques Delors voulait lui attribuer une dénomination plus liée à 
l’histoire européenne, l’appelant florin) à côté des monnaies nationales, 
la substitution de celles-ci par l’euro devant intervenir seulement à fur 
et à mesure de la progressive acceptation par les marchés de la nouvelle 
monnaie�
Mais entre le projet de la Commission et la signature du traité de 
Maastricht étaient intervenus dans l’histoire de l’Europe deux évènements 
tant énormes qu’inattendus : l’écroulement de l’Union Soviétique et la 
réunification de l’Allemagne�
Par conséquent, une nouvelle superpuissance régionale de plus de 
80  millions d’habitants se formait au centre de l’Europe, prenant la 
place du réseau géopolitique des trois et, ensuite, des quatre puissances 
moyennes autour desquelles s’était acheminé bon gré (pour France, Italie, 
Espagne) mal gré (pour la Grande-Bretagne) le processus d’intégration 
européenne�
En particulier la Wiedervereinigung était destinée à déplacer les 
priorités de la nation allemande en Europe, d’une appartenance disciplinée 
à l’Union à la réussite du processus d’intégration national BRD/DDR 
couplée à la réussite de l’intégration de la nouvelle entité étatique dans le 
contexte commercial mondiale� Un contexte que les États-Unis avaient 
voulu totalement déréglementer, dans le cadre du cycle Uruguay 1986-
1994 du GATT, pour permettre à leurs multinationales de produire 
désormais à économie d’échelle de la planète�
Bien avant l’introduction de l’euro, l’élévation de la part de la 
Bundesbank allemande en décembre 1991 de la rémunération du 
Deutsche Mark à 4%, quand le dollar était rémunéré à 1% et le Système 
monétaire européen (SME) prévoyait une bande d’oscillation des parités 
centrales entre les monnaies de (plus ou moins) 2,25%, avait prouvé 
comme l’exigence de l’afflux de capitaux vers l’Allemagne réunifiée était 
devenue pour Berlin beaucoup plus importante que le maintient d’un 
système monétaire européen viable� L’abandon du SME de la part de la 
lire italienne et de la livre britannique en septembre 1992, après une vaine 
et coûteuse opposition aux larges fluctuations des parités respectives, en 
fut une conséquence bien connue�
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Mais il y eu plus que la rémunération du DM à influencer la situation 
monétaire européenne� La décision monétaire de la Bundesbank 
s’accompagnait le même jour de fin décembre 1991 à la décision du 
gouvernement fédéral de procéder à la reconnaissance unilatérale 
de l’indépendance de la Slovénie et de la Croatie, dans le cadre de 
la progressive fragmentation de la République fédérative socialiste 
d’Yougoslavie� Cette décision comportait la première fracture, depuis la 
fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, en matière de politique étrangère 
entre l’Allemagne et la France de François Mitterrand, peu disposé à 
assister à la fin accélérée d’une république socialiste, liée à l’histoire de 
France par la longue alliance traditionnelle avec la Serbie� Dans ces 
conditions, aux yeux de la France, la survie du Deutsche Mark (DM) 
dans le cadre d’une monnaie commune européenne, devenait intolérable� 
On devait passer à une monnaie unique, à travers un marchandage 
bilatérale avec l’Allemagne, d’ailleurs peu orientée à voir la mise hors 
circulation de sa forte et stable monnaie� 
L’accord de compromis franco-allemand, à l’origine de la composante 
monétaire du Traité de Maastricht, comportait en échange de la 
disparition de la monnaie allemande, comme « contrepartie », Austausch, 
une compensation équivalente reconnue au gouvernement de Berlin : le 
clonage à l’intérieur du projet de système monétaire européen du modèle 
allemand de Banque Centrale, la Bundesbank2� 
Or, le système monétaire allemand avait été conçu après la Deuxième 
Guerre mondiale, en 1945, par les puissances occupantes réunies dans le 
comité quadripartite interallié, formé par États-Unis, France, Grande-
Bretagne, URSS, selon des préoccupations politiques sur l’avenir de 
l’Allemagne qui en avaient déterminé une structure différente de toute 
autre système monétaire européen�
L’idée de base des puissances occupantes était d’éviter à tout prix la 
répétition du cadre d’inflation galopante qui, pendant la République de 
Weimar, avait constitué le milieu de culture pour l’affirmation politique 
du nazisme�
Il fallait donc la création d’une banque centrale autonome, appelée à 
l’origine Bank Deutscher Länder, monopolisant comme fonction exclusive 
le contrôle de la masse monétaire, en vue de la maîtrise de l’inflation, 
aux dépens du nouveau gouvernement fédéral auquel restait, en matière 
monétaire, comme unique compétence la politique de change� 
Dès le début, restait donc soustraite à la Bank Deutscher Länder, 
devenue ensuite Bundesbank, en particulier la fonction typique de tout 
2 Idem, articles 105-115�
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banque centrale, celle d’être le prêteur de dernier ressort, le pourvoyeur 
discrétionnaire de liquidités aux institutions financières ou au marché�3 
Une intervention censée s’orienter à la sauvegarde de la valeur de la 
monnaie et des activités financières devant les crises de liquidité, les 
risques systémiques et la contagion financière, à savoir les possibles 
faillites du marché�
Dans la hâte, on avait aussi imaginé du côté français, comme 
contribution à l’arrangement bilatéral, le bien connu paramètre du 
-3% / +6% du PIB comme déficit/surplus annuel maximal du budget 
des pays participants� On avait définit, comme prémisse indispensable 
à l’introduction d’une monnaie unique, que les économies des pays 
participants auraient dû converger sur les trois axes du niveau d’inflation, 
du déficit/surplus du budget national, ainsi que du niveau maximale de la 
dette consolidée par rapport au PIB� Les conditions qui devaient devenir 
ensuite les composantes du « pacte de stabilité » repris par le Traité de 
Lisbonne de 2007� D’ailleurs, le critère de la convergence préalable des 
économies des états participant à la future monnaie européenne avait 
été déjà désigné par le Plan Werner de 1970, approuvé par le Conseil des 
ministres présidé par Pierre Werner, le premier ministre luxembourgeois, 
sur la base de la proposition que la Commission avait approuvée en 
1969, étant Raymond Barre le commissaire responsable des affaires 
économiques et financières�4 
De cette manière, sur la base d’un compromis national bilatéral et 
d’une atmosphère euphorique sur l’avenir inévitablement radieux de la 
nouvelle monnaie européenne, le traité de Maastricht introduisait un 
euro sans prévoir l’assistance d’un effective Banque Centrale Européenne, 
légalement fournie de moyens pour s’opposer de manière anticyclique à 
tous les futurs trends défavorables des marchés, sans vouloir mentionner 
les hypothèses extrêmes de leur faillite�
Encore, au moment de l’approbation du Traité, il était désormais clair 
qu’à Genève, dans le cadre du cycle Uruguay du GATT, on s’acheminait 
vers le triomphe de la deregulation, de la déréglementation totale du marché 
du commerce mondial, d’après les desiderata de la délégation américaine, 
simple expression diplomatique des grands groupes multinationaux export-
oriented�5
3 Pittaluga, G� B�, Economia monetaria, Milan, Hoepli, 2012�
4 Rapport au Conseil et à la Commission concernant la réalisation par étapes de 
l’union économique et monétaire dans la Communauté « Rapport Werner », 
Luxembourg, 8 octobre 1970, Bull� CE, Suppl� 11-1970, p� 12-13�
5 WTO/OMC, Textes juridiques : les accords de l’OMC 1986-1994, OMC, Genève, 
2016�
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Cette ouverture imminente des marchés, qui coïncidait pratiquement 
avec le processus de réunification, avait convaincu la nouvelle capitale 
allemande que la stratégie même de réunification devait être accompagnée 
par l’insertion de l’Allemagne dans le nouveau cadre offert au commerce 
mondial par l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC), qui d’ailleurs 
devait admettre en 2001 la Chine comme membre à part entière�
En d’autres termes, la réussite du processus de réunification devait 
s’accompagner d’une stratégie de flexibilité salariale, de délocalisation 
des activités industrielles à bas contenu technologique, d’une partielle 
déconstruction du système sociale étatique, afin de rendre le pays le plus 
concurrentiel possible sur le plan global�6
Cette stratégie, que l’on pourrait définir proche de la figure 
classique du dumping économique et sociale, à l’intérieur du marché 
unifié, consentie par l’Union dans le cadre des conditions tout à fait 
exceptionnelles d’un pays en réunification, faisait prévaloir en Allemagne 
une logique de croissance export-oriented qui était en opposition avec 
la stratégie de croissance des pays industriellement concurrents, comme 
la France, l’Espagne e l’Italie, habitués historiquement à concevoir la 
consommation intérieure, soutenue par des salaires suffisamment élevés, 
comme l’instrument principal de croissance�
À cette situation, qui constituait déjà la prémisse inévitable de la 
future contraction des activités industrielles en France, Italie et Espagne, 
la mise en place de l’euro comme monnaie unique, avec une composition 
de monnaie-panier identique à l’ECU de 1979 dans le cadre du SME, 
devait ajouter un nouvel élément de déséquilibre concurrentiel en faveur 
des productions allemandes�
Mis en circulation en mars 2002 comme monnaie unique, killer 
donc des monnaies nationales, dont la circulation simultanée avec la 
nouvelle monnaie avait été réduit seulement à deux mois – du 1er janvier 
au 28 février 2002 – l’euro avait été imaginé comme une basket-currency, 
sur la base d’un panier formé par les monnaies des pays adhérents� Au 
sein de ce panier, la participation de chaque monnaie nationale dans le 
calcul des parités réciproques était basée sur son cours de change vis-à-vis 
du dollar US, pondéré avec le pourcentage de participation de la même 
monnaie aux échanges européennes avec le reste du monde� Conçu de 
cette manière, l’euro se retrouva à réfléchir en prépondérance la valeur 
6 Bolaffi, A�, Deutsches Herz : Das Modell Deutschland und die Europaeische Krise, 
Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 2014�
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de l’ancien Deutsche Mark, première monnaie en valeur et, de surcroît, 
prépondérante en volume dans les échanges européennes�7 
À partir de mars 2002, le jour après la fin de la double circulation de 
l’euro avec les monnaies nationales, la capacité d’achat dans le pays non 
DM se retrouva réduite de 20 à 40 % en raison d’une inflation galopante 
des prix en euros par rapport aux prix exprimés dans la monnaie nationale 
précédemment en vigueur, tandis qu’en Allemagne les prix et le pouvoir 
d’achat restaient foncièrement stables�
De cette manière, l’euro constituait désormais par rapport au DM un 
ultérieur avantage comparatif à l’exportation pour les firmes allemandes et 
un désavantage compétitif pour les firmes concurrentes appartenant aux 
pays européens à monnaie faible (France, Espagne, Italie, en particulier)�
À partir de 2002, par conséquent, l’Union monétaire formée par les 
pays admis à faire partie de l’euro se voyait confrontée à des conditions 
concentriques de dualisme économique, opposant son centre à sa 
périphérie� C’était cela le risque interne du marché commun unifié, que 
les pères fondateurs avaient voulu à tout prix conjurer, dès le début de la 
création de la CEE, d’après leur commune idéologie chrétienne sociale – 
et non ultralibérale – utilisant les avantages d’efficacité de l’économie 
de marché, mais la tempérant en même temps à travers une panoplie d’ 
interventions sociales, par moyen en particulier des fonds structurels�
Le déséquilibre économique et social conséquent, à l’intérieur de 
l’Europe, avait pu néanmoins rester longuement occulté, de 2002 à 2008� 
Les banques allemandes avaient en effet un intérêt à convertir en prêts 
la large disponibilité financière, obtenue grâce au surplus commercial 
annuel du pays, en absence de risque de change, à des pays présentant 
des taux d’inflation interne plus élevés et, donc, des taux d’emprunt plus 
rémunérateurs (les pays qui mériteront ensuite l’élégante dénomination 
de PIIGS – Portugal, Irlande, Italie, Grèce, Espagne)� Cet afflux continu 
de capitaux avait contribué à cacher dans les pays du sud la gravité de 
la situation économique interne, induite par les conditions structurelles 
économiques et monétaires mentionnées dessus, au moins jusqu’à 2008�
Avec la crise financière américaine de 2008, enclenchée par les prêts 
subprime des banques locales, et devenue ensuite une crise économique 
par ricochet aussi européenne, la contraction générale du crédit 
interbancaire (credit crunch) en Europe a rapidement tari le financement 
des obligations d’État et privées des pays européens du sud et porté 
soudainement à la surface la situation des ceux-ci, touchés depuis des 
7 Strassen, D�, Les finances de l’Europe, Bruxelles, Perspectives européennes, 1991�
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années par la fermetures des entreprises et par le chômage de masse, mais 
aussi affectés à présent, de surcroît, par l’absence de moyens financiers�
En 2008, enfin, la crise des pays périphériques de l’euro pouvait 
éclater au grand jour�
2. Les années de la crise existentielle (2008-2012)  
et les perspectives actuelles (2016)
Confrontés au spill-over effect de la crise américaine, les États 
membres de l’UE ne retrouvent pas, depuis son début en 2008, l’unité 
pour pouvoir se confronter à la crise bancaire�
C’est cette désunion initiale qui sera à la base du problème européen des 
dettes souveraines et de la manifestation de la spéculation internationale 
successive contre l’euro�
Même le sommet Sarzoky-Merkel d’octobre 2008, qui eut lieu à 
trois semaines de la faillite de la banque newyorkaise Lehman Brothers, 
n’apporte aucun résultat concret� D’ailleurs, en Allemagne la Hypo Real 
Estate Holding AG, qui contrôle la banque immobilière DEPFA Bank, 
est sauvée de la faillite au dernier moment, ce qui prouve le manque 
initiale de perception par les autorités allemandes de la gravité de la crise�8
En 2009, la seule décision d’importance adoptée dans le cadre UE est 
la possibilité offerte à la BCE d’effectuer une manœuvre d’émergence qui 
permet le financement des banques et indirectement des gouvernements 
par l’acquisition des dettes souveraines�
Cette manœuvre, appelée The Great Bargain, qui constitue d’ailleurs 
la première violation du traité de Lisbonne de 2007 défendant la BCE 
de financer les États, bien que principalement dirigée dans l’intérêt des 
banques allemandes, mais aussi françaises et néerlandaises, constitue le 
casus belli de l’opposition entre la BCE et les gouvernements des États 
membres� En juin 2009, la Cour fédérale allemande, gardienne de la 
Constitution, dans son arrêt concernant la compatibilité du traité de 
Lisbonne avec la loi fondamentale allemande (Grundgesetz), affirme 
qu’aucun ultérieur processus d’intégration, ni aucune délégation de 
souveraineté à la UE ne pourront avoir lieu à l’avenir dans le cadre 
constitutionnel actuellement en vigueur en Allemagne� 
8 Bastasin, C�, Saving Europa. How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro, 
Washington, Brooking Institution Press, p� 14-18�
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En 2010, devant l’aggravation de la crise financière en Grèce et le 
début de l’orientation de la spéculation internationale vers une attaque 
massive à l’euro, la lenteur de la riposte européenne fait que seulement 
dans le mois de mai les États membres décident la création d’un fonds 
communautaire de soutien monétaire (European Financial Stability 
Facility) et l’offre d’une caution communautaire à la Grèce (bail-out)�
Mais, signe évident de l’absence de confiance réciproque entre les États 
membres, l’intervention communautaire en faveur de la Grèce ne reste 
pas confinée, comme il aurait été loisible et souhaitable, dans le cadre 
strictement communautaire� Elle est confiée à une troïka UE-BCE-FMI� 
De cette manière, les conditions assimilées par le FMI au prêt de 110 
milliards à la Grèce imposent à ce pays des manœuvres financières court 
terme comportant des coûts sociaux insupportables�9 
L’année se clôture, d’ailleurs, avec la décision adoptée par le duo 
Merkel-Sarzoky lors du sommet de Deauville, d’introduire le Private 
Sector Involvement (PSI), à savoir l’implication du secteur privé (haircuts) 
dans les futures faillites d’États� Le résultat inévitable de cette décision a 
été l’explosion de la panique sur les marchés financiers�
En 2011, malgré la situation des marchés, l’opposition États membres-
BCE continue, tandis que la spéculation internationale affecte désormais 
toute la zone euro, au-delà de la Grèce, avec la vente massive de bons du 
trésor italiens et espagnols�
D’un Conseil des ministres à l’autre (11 et 24-25 mars) on multiplie 
les mesures de contrôle sur les économies des États membres, du 
governance package au European Semester et au Euro-Plus Pact� L’effet réel 
des ces mesures, foncièrement dirigées à limiter tout dépassement des 
critères budgétaires établis par le Pacte de Stabilité mentionné, est sur 
le plan économique celui d’empêcher en particulier les États membres 
les plus affectés de concevoir des mesures anticycliques, en aggravant 
de ce fait leur conjoncture défavorable� D’autre part, il fait défaut toute 
solidarité fiscale européenne, malgré l’urgence imposée par la situation 
internationale�
La seule décision de poids du Conseil européen est l’extension, le 
11 mars 2011, des capacités de prêt de l’EFSF, qui porte à 750 milliards 
d’euros les disponibilités directes à faire face aux problèmes de liquidité 
de la zone euro�10 
9 Galbraith, James K�, Crise grecque, tragédie européenne, Paris, Seuil, 2016�
10 Bastasin, C�, op. cit�, p� 158-160�
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Le spread entre les titres italiens, espagnols et les Bund allemands 
atteint une incroyable différence de presque 7%, considérée comme 
l’antichambre du default de ces pays�
L’insuffisance des ripostes à la crise au niveau national et 
communautaire, la philosophie « punitive » du gouvernement allemand, 
couplée au manque de fiabilité de certains gouvernements, avaient 
entretemps contribué à convertir la crise de certains États membres en 
une crise générale de la zone euro� 
En août 2011, on doit exclusivement à la BCE le sauvetage du système 
monétaire européen� Malgré l’incroyable double augmentation du taux 
central BCE souscrite par le Président J� C� Trichet, pendant le premier 
semestre 2011 – preuve de l’obsession pour l’inflation au sein de la 
BCE, surtout en raison de la pression du représentant de la Bundesbank 
allemande au sein du Conseil des Gouverneurs – la BCE a le mérite 
d’avoir sauvé la situation, initiant l’acquisition sur les marchés des titres 
italiens et espagnols pour 22 milliards d’euros, selon une intervention 
typique de véritable banque centrale, les open market operations. 
Par contre, on peut indiquer l’année 2012 comme celle du début 
d’une collaboration enfin efficace entre les institutions européennes et 
la BCE�
D’une part, le sommet du Conseil du mois de juin vote l’approbation 
d’un système unique de supervision bancaire et la recapitalisation directe 
des banques de la part du ESM (le European Stability Mechanism), 
destiné à substituer l’EFSF à compter de 2013, avec les mêmes fonctions 
de soutien, mais avec une disponibilité financière élargie�
D’autre part, la BCE par la bouche de son nouveau Président, l’italien 
Mario Draghi, s’engage le 26 juillet 2012 à faire « whatever it takes to 
preserve the Euro »�
Une déclaration suffisante à balayer définitivement le chemin de l’euro 
du risque systémique identifié par le spread entre les titres de l’Eurozone� 
La positive action de la BCE en défense de l’euro continuera en 2014 
et 2015, quand, confrontée au risque européen de déflation, la BCE 
aura recours aux mesures de LTRO (Long Term Refinancing Operations) 
destinées au refinancement des déficits des États membres en difficulté, 
ainsi qu’au QE (quantitative easing), relâchement monétaire, visant à 
injecter de la liquidité monétaire suffisante dans le système� 
Si l’action de la BCE est efficace et cohérente, bien plus critiquable 
est, par contre, l’apport à la solution des problèmes économiques et 
monétaires européens provenant de l’énième traité européen de reforme 
du pacte de stabilité voté par le Conseil, inspiré à des critères rigides de 
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subsidiarité et d’austérité, le « traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la 
gouvernance dans l’union économique et monétaire » (Fiscal Compact), 
entré en vigueur le 1er mars 2013�11 
Les liens budgétaires ultérieurs que ce traité introduit pour les États 
membres, sous peine de sanctions automatiques ou quasi-automatiques, 
rendent en effet problématique la mise en œuvre de mesures anticycliques, 
«  proactives  », par les États membres, en particulier par ceux qui se 
trouvent en plus grande difficulté� L’approche à la crise exprimée par le 
Conseil se présente, de cette façon, antithétique aux actions entreprises 
en même temps aux États-Unis par la FED et le gouvernement fédéral 
pour assurer la relance de l’économie américaine�
C’est le résultat du lobbying gagnant exercé à l’intérieur de l’Union 
par le pays économiquement prééminent qui, en carence d’une stratégie 
dynamique, avançant les références à l’ordo-libéralisme et à la lutte contre 
le péril mortel de l’inflation, préfère avoir à faire à une « union aplatie 
sur son propre modèle pour ne plus courir de risques avec des partenaires 
indisciplinés, incohérents ou peu compétitifs », selon la pertinente observation 
de la correspondante à Bruxelles du quotidien « Il Sole 24 Ore », Adriana 
Cerretelli�
Si le QE de la BCE permet de combattre efficacement une déflation 
qui reste toujours au coin de la rue, avec les risques posés par la crise 
actuelle du secteur pétrolier mondial, on se demande par contre quels 
pourront être les effets sur l’avenir de la cohésion économique et sociale 
de l’UE, des tendances nationalistes au sein de l’Europe, manifestées avec 
une régularité inquiétante à chaque élection, européenne ou nationale� 
En effet, mise à part la question brûlante des immigrés, qui pourrait 
mettre en discussion la libre circulation des personnes à l’intérieur de 
l’Europe, plusieurs dossiers fondamentaux ont mis en lumière pendant les 
dernières quinze années et surtout après l’élargissement de 2004, le repli 
de l’Union sur un nouveau mode de fonctionnement� Un fonctionnement 
qui s’éloigne de la méthode communautaire pour ressembler davantage à 
une bonne, vieille coopération gouvernementale entre États souverains, 
basée sur la simultanéité coûts/avantages� Or, le général repli nationaliste 
au niveau des États membres rend de plus en plus problématique à présent 
tout transfert aux institutions de l’Union européenne de pouvoirs à la 
hauteur de la gravité des menaces qui pèsent sur le processus d’intégration, 
alors que, au contraire, l’Union Européenne aurait le plus grand besoin 
11 TSCG, Texte du traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance dans 
l’union économique et monétaire signé le 2 mars 2012 par 25 des 28 chefs d’État et 
de gouvernement et entré en vigueur le 1er mars 2013�
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pour sa propre survie d’achever pleinement son processus d’intégration� 
Le premier pas de ce processus vertueux devrait être, justement, la 
concrétisation d’une union économique et monétaire effective, au sein 
de laquelle devraient être inévitablement redéfinis les pouvoirs à présent 
attribués par les traités à la Banque centrale européenne, pour ne pas 
aggraver d’une manière irréversible le déséquilibre actuel entre le centre 
et la périphérie du système des pays adhérant à la monnaie unique�12
La difficulté à mettre en œuvre un système de gouvernance plus 
efficace et solidaire de la monnaie n’est pas sans analogies avec la difficulté 
à parvenir à une gestion efficace des flux d’immigration� 
Dans un cas comme dans l’autre, le repli national et les cynismes 
électoraux empêchent la concrétisation d’un front commun anti-crise et, 
de ce fait, mettent en danger l’existence même d’une Union à l’échelle 
du continent�
Sur le front monétaire, les mesures adoptées à l’intérieur de l’Europe, 
axées sur l’austérité et la parité budgétaire, et se basant sur des pactes de 
stabilité dans leurs différentes versions, ne se sont jamais accompagnées 
d’un réel esprit de solidarité effective entre États membres capable de 
compenser le déficit structurel des pouvoirs de la BCE� Ainsi, si elles ont 
contribué jusqu’à présent à éviter la crise totale de la monnaie unique, 
ont aussi eu l’effet collatéral de fragmenter la zone euro selon les lignes 
de frontière nationales, cloisonnant les marchés financiers nationaux, 
avec l’écroulement des flux interbancaires à l’intérieur de l’espace 
communautaire (calculé en -3,7 trillions d’euros entre 2007 et 2012)�13 
Le quadrillage des marchés a fait pendant jusqu’à présent au 
quadrillage des esprits� 
Devant cette évidence, l’absence d’une courageuse relance de cette 
énième Europe « des chantiers abandonnés » – relance qui pourrait passer à 
travers un sous-ensemble de pays adhérant à une coopération renforcée – 
peut comporter la déconstruction finale du processus d’intégration 
économique et politique d’une Union progressivement bloquée par la 
prééminence des égoïsmes nationaux, remplissant rapidement le vide 
laissé par le manque d’une stratégie d’ensemble�
12 Stiglitz, J�, L’EURO : Comment la monnaie unique menace l’avenir de l’Europe, Paris, 
Les liens qui libèrent, 2016�
13 De Cecco, M�, Berlino, Roma e i dolori del giovane EURO, Rome, LIMES, 2013�
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Fiscal Discipline and Growth within EMU
Alberto Majocchi
After about ten years from the starting of the crisis in the United 
States, economic growth is still weak within Europe� The benefits that 
were supposed to derive from the adoption of a single currency have 
been upset by an austerity policy that has been enforced on the large 
majority of European countries, following the wrong idea that the origin 
of the crisis was linked to the irresponsible governments’ behaviour in the 
management of the public finances, especially in the Southern Member 
States� Consolidation of public finances is certainly unavoidable, but 
must be backed by expansionary measures pursued at the European level� 
If this is not the case, the decline in the level of national income brings 
about a fall in tax revenues, while expenditures are increased for providing 
benefits to the unemployed and support to firms facing a decreasing level 
of domestic demand� As a consequence, deficits grow larger and new 
austerity measures are needed� 
In this paper we will try to survey the evolution of the European 
policy regarding the constraints on the behaviours of Member States in 
the field of public finance, starting from Maastricht and going through 
the Stability and Growth Pact, up to the Fiscal Compact� Having 
remarked the limits of these policy choices, we will explore a possible 
alternative, i�e� a policy promoting investments and production of public 
goods� In this perspective the Juncker Plan represents a starting point, 
but it is not enough� Institutional changes must be put high on the 
political agenda, and the creation of a Eurozone budget, funded through 
real own resources, should represent the final point of this process� A new 
institution, a Eurozone Treasury, subject to the control of the Council 
and the Parliament, should be charged of managing this budget�
1. The Logic Underlying the Process towards  
the Maastricht Treaty
The project of an Economic and Monetary Union within Europe 
starts as a necessary outcome of completing the Internal Market� Since 
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the EMS had created a condition of relative monetary stability, it was 
possible to proceed to the elimination of the other barriers that hindered 
the Common Market to be considered an effective internal market� The 
Delors project included the idea of different stages in order to achieve – 
exploiting the new institutional rules included in the Single Act – the four 
fundamental freedoms foreseen by the Rome Treaty (free movement of 
goods, services, capital and persons), starting from January 1, 1993� But 
once the free movement of capitals has been guaranteed, monetary policy 
becomes totally ineffective: during a recession, if a national Central Bank 
reduces the rate of interest in order to support the recovery, an outflow of 
domestic capital follows, since abroad the level of interest rates is higher, 
and the opposite happens if interest rates are raised to fight inflation, 
since capital inflows prevent the achievement of the deflationary goal� 
Hence, it appeared as unavoidable to proceed towards a single currency 
in order to regain at the European level the freedom of action lost at the 
national level� These are the basis on which it has been conceived the 
Treaty approved in Maastricht on December 11, 1991 and subscribed by 
Member States on February 7, 1992�
This Treaty is based on two fundamental principles� The first decision 
has been to proceed by stages towards the final goal of a Monetary Union, 
This method is quite different from the ‘shock therapy’ adopted in the 
case of the German monetary unification� In this last case, political 
unification took place before the starting of the monetary union� Hence, 
the German federal government was able to rule the process leading to 
the single German currency, having the possibility to use all the domestic 
instruments of economic policy – of fiscal and monetary nature� In 
the European case, monetary unification takes place in a confederal 
framework, where the only instrument of economic policy is coordination 
of national decisions� Then, Germany, the country that has to bear the 
largest costs in giving up the monetary sovereignty, wanted to be sure 
that the convergence process, in terms of inflation, fiscal and monetary 
discipline, could be wrapped up in time to avoid the risk of negative 
externalities deriving from incorrect behaviours of other countries�
The second decision – that follows from the gradualism adopted – 
was to establish just from the beginning the conditions that should be 
met to join the single currency� This choice is particularly significant as 
far as the fiscal discipline is concerned� In the Treaty the highest level of 
deficit is fixed at 3% and the highest level of the stock of debt at 60%� 
This rule has been largely criticized since these numbers appear arbitrary� 
The real reason underlying this choice is the fear of the inadequateness of 
the principle of no-bail out included in the Treaty, since Member States, 
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if not constrained by a rigid fiscal rule, could reach a point where the 
risk of default due to a too high level of debt will make unavoidable a 
support intervention of the European Central Bank as a lender of last 
resort, putting into danger the financial stability of the Monetary Union�
2. From the Maastricht Constraints to the Stability Pact
The political debate on the development of the Monetary Union was 
largely affected by the German pressure in order to extend the Maastricht 
constraints also after the starting of the Monetary Union� The point of 
departure of this debate has been represented by a speech in the Bundestag 
on November 7, 1995, of the German Finance Minister Waigel, where 
a new Stabilitätspakt für Europa was proposed, establishing the principle 
that the deficit could not exceed the limit of 3% neither during a negative 
cyclical downturn, while in normal times the limit of the deficit could 
not be higher than 1%� The German proposal was first evaluated by an 
initial Commission’s Note1, while a more in-depth analysis was contained 
in a following Note2 for the Monetary Committee�
In this second Note it is underlined that in the EMU monetary policy 
is managed at the European level and must aim, as a priority goal, at price 
stability� As a consequence, “budgetary policy, that remains under the 
responsibility of national authorities, should play an important role in 
macro-economic stabilisation during the economic cycle and in the case 
of asymmetric shocks”� The Commission remarks that a certain degree 
of flexibility must be ensured to the national budgets to make automatic 
stabilizers functioning during the cycle and to allow discretional fiscal 
measures in the case of country-specific shocks� Hence, the proposal put 
forward by the German government is considered weak, since it does not 
take into account that the national budgets are constrained in various 
ways according to the different convergence’s degree of each economic 
system and of the varying demographic perspectives in different 
countries� Furthermore, the room of manoeuvre that must be recognised 
to a national budgetary policy to face effectively the different phases of 
the economic cycle changes from one country to another and, generally, 
should be larger for small countries� Finally, the previously accumulated 
1 Towards a Stability Pact (Note for the Monetary Committee), Brussels, 10 January 
1996, II/011/96�
2 A Stability Pact to Ensure Budgetary Discipline in EMU (Note for the Monetary 
Committee), Brussels, 18 March 1996, II/I63/96�
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stock of debt should be considered in order to foresee different paths for 
complying with the constraints defined in the Maastricht Treaty�
The main conclusions of this Commission’s Note are the following:
a) “a certain degree of differentiation in national medium-term 
budgetary targets appears to be desirable from an economic point 
of view; 
b) a deficit target of 1% of GDP – as in the stability pact proposal – 
seems therefore arbitrary and, in the case of several countries, not 
sufficient either to accommodate cyclical developments or face the 
budgetary consequences of the ageing structure of the population; 
c) once a credible medium-term budgetary target well below the 
3% of GDP is retained at the national level, there is no need for 
additional constraints on the public debt-GDP ratio� 
But a radical change in the Commission’s stance – with a tightening 
in the direction of the German proposal – appears in further Note3, that 
reaches a conclusion that is ahead of the final version of the Stability Pact: 
“to keep budget discipline during the Phase three of the EMU represents 
an essential condition to exploit all the benefits of the single currency� 
The reference value of 3% of Gdp for the deficit must be considered 
as the upper limit during normal times� The strategy must be based on 
a two stages approach to budgetary discipline and to the coordination 
of budgetary policies: medium-term budget objective near to zero or in 
surplus, that allows to remain under the floor of 3% in normal times 
and provides the possibility of a certain degree of differentiation between 
Member States; coordination of budgetary policies at the Union’s level to 
guarantee a coherent scheme for the whole Union”�
In this Note the way is open to the final version that the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) will assume through the decisions of the 
European Council in Dublin (December 13-14, 1996) and the following 
integrations established in the Ecofin Council of Noordwijk�
3. The Content of the Stability and Growth Pact
The Stability and Growth Pact in its final version is a Resolution of the 
European Council (Amsterdam, June 17, 1997) engaging Member States 
to avoid excessive deficits, that is to guarantee budget close to balance or 
3 Ensuring Budgetary Discipline in Stage Three of EMU (Note for the Monetary 
Committee), Brussels, 19 July 1996 II/409/96�
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in surplus, and two Council Regulations: No� 1466/97 of July 7, 1997 
on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policies and No� 1467/97 of 
July 7, 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure�
The first Regulation states that each Member State should submit 
to the Council and the Commission a “stability programme” in the 
framework of the multilateral surveillance mechanism defined in Article 
103(3)� Such a programme must include the following information:
a) the medium-term objective for the budgetary position of close 
to balance or in surplus and the adjustment path towards this 
objective for the general government surplus/deficit and the 
expected path of the general government debt ratio; 
b) the main assumptions about expected economic developments 
and important economic variables which are relevant to the 
realization of the stability programme such as government 
investment expenditure, real gross domestic product (Gdp) 
growth, employment and inflation; 
c) a description of budgetary and other economic policy measures 
being taken and/or proposed to achieve the objectives of the 
programme and, in the case of the main budgetary measures, an 
assessment of their quantitative effects on the budget; 
d) an analysis of how changes in the main economic assumptions 
would affect the budgetary and debt position�
The Council shall, within the framework of multilateral surveillance, 
examine whether the medium-term budget objective in the stability 
programme provides for a safety margin to ensure the avoidance of an 
excessive deficit; whether the economic assumptions on which the 
programme is based are realistic and whether the measures being taken 
and/or proposed are sufficient to achieve the targeted adjustment path 
towards the medium-term budgetary objective� Where the Council, in 
accordance with Article 103, considers that the objectives and contents 
of a programme should be strengthened, the Council shall invite the 
Member State concerned to adjust its programme�
The second Regulation sets out the provisions to speed up and clarify 
the excessive deficit procedure, having as its objective to deter excessive 
general government deficits and, if they occur, to further their prompt 
correction� The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall 
be considered exceptional and temporary when resulting from an unusual 
event outside the control of the Member State concerned and which has 
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a major impact on the financial position of the general government, or 
when resulting from a severe economic downturn� The Commission shall, 
as a rule, consider an excess over the reference value resulting from a severe 
economic downturn to be exceptional only if there is an annual fall of real 
Gdp of at least 2%� The Council, when deciding whether an excessive 
deficit exists, shall take into account in its overall assessment the remarks 
made by the Member State concerned, showing that an annual fall of real 
Gdp of less than 2% is nevertheless exceptional in the light of further 
supporting evidence, in particular on the abruptness of the downturn or 
on the accumulated loss of output relative to past trends�
Whenever the Council decides to apply sanctions to a participating 
Member State in accordance with Article 104c(11), a non-interest-
bearing deposit shall, as a rule, be required� When the excessive 
deficit results from non-compliance with the criterion relating to the 
government deficit ratio, the amount of the first deposit shall comprise 
a fixed component equal to 0�2% of Gdp, and a variable component 
equal to one tenth of the difference between the deficit as a percentage 
of Gdp in the preceding year and the reference value of 3% of Gdp� 
Any single deposit shall not exceed the upper limit of 0�5% of Gdp� 
A deposit shall, as a rule, be converted by the  Council into a fine 
if two years after the decision to require the participating Member 
State concerned to make a deposit, in the view of the Council the 
excessive deficit has not been corrected� Deposits shall be lodged with 
the Commission� Interest on the deposits and the fines constitute other 
revenue referred to in Article 201 of the Treaty and shall be distributed 
among participating Member States without an excessive deficit, in 
proportion to their share in the total Gdp of the eligible Member States� 
It has appeared as politically inappropriate that also countries that are not 
part of the euro area could benefit of this mechanism�
4. From the SGP to the Fiscal Compact
The Stability and Growth Pact enters into force in 1997� In 2005 
EU law makers amend the SGP to allow it to better consider individual 
national circumstances and to add more economic rationale to the rules 
to be complied with� Surveillance and coordination are strengthened 
and the excessive deficit procedure is clarified and made faster� In 2011 
the SGP is made more comprehensive and predictable with a major 
enhancement of the EU’s economic governance rules through a collection 
of new laws, known as the “Six Pack”. The monitoring of both budgetary 
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and economic policies is organised under the European Semester and 
further details on the implementation of the SGP’s rules are laid down in 
the Commission document on flexibility4� 
Adherence to the SGP is further strengthened by new laws known 
as the “Two Pack”, which reinforces economic coordination between 
Member States and introduces new monitoring tools� But the most 
important step forward in reinforcing the rules of the SGP is achieved in 
2013 with the approval of the so-called Fiscal Compact (FC), which is 
a part of an intergovernmental Treaty known as the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Economic Governance� The budgetary targets set 
by the SGP’s preventive arm (the Medium-Term Objectives) are newly 
defined, stating that the structural deficit – net of the cycle’s influence – 
should not be higher than 0�5%, while the gap between the current ratio 
of the stock of debt to Gdp and the floor of 60% should be reduced by 
5% each year� Control procedures and sanctions are foreseen in the FC 
to avoid that the rules will not be complied with� 
Approving the Fiscal Compact Europe has done a largely innovative 
choice vis-à-vis the previous experience: growth does not require new 
debt� Current expenditures of the Member States must be covered in 
due time with fiscal receipts and investment expenditures with the 
current account surplus� Issuing bonds should be limited to financing 
investments that are able to guarantee – with the new income flowing 
from the investments – to pay the service of the debt�
This is a very strongly strengthened budgetary rule since a budget 
close to balance or in surplus must include also investment expenditures� 
In the classical theory of public finance the most accepted version of 
the golden rule5 implies that current expenditures must be covered by 
fiscal receipts, but that investments could be financed either with current 
account surplus or by issuing public bonds (with some limits, fixing for 
instance the maximum amount of tax revenues that could be appointed 
to cover the interest expenditures tagged to servicing the stock of debt)�
This classical version of the golden rule6 is justified by the fact that an 
expenditure, whose effects are extended for a long period of time – in 
4 European Commission, Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of 
the stability and growth pact, COM/2015/012 final�
5 Musgrave, R� A�, “The nature of Budgetary Balance and the Case for a Capital 
Budget”, American Economic Review, 1939, p� 260-271; Musgrave, R� A�, The Theory 
of Public Finance. A Study in Public Economy, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1959�
6 “The SGP contains a serious error: the way governments are expected to account 
for public investment� Correcting this error […] applying the rules of the SGP to 
the budget inclusive of nominal interest payments and of capital depreciation, but 
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some cases for some decades – could not be covered in a single year and 
should be spread through a series of following budgets� Furthermore, 
if the public investments promote higher growth, new revenues are 
provided to the budget, favouring the coverage of investment costs�
The hypothesis underlying the rule of a budget close to balance is the 
Ricardian equivalence, where savers are supposed to be wholly rational 
and information perfect, so that a current deficit implies that taxes must 
be increased in the future to cover the service of the debt� Hence, saving 
must be raised to face future costs and, consequently, domestic demand 
shrinks� On the contrary, if the budget is close to balance or in surplus� 
savers and domestic and international investors expectations change, 
interest rates diminish with positive effects on the budget due to the lower 
costs of servicing the debt� More resources could be devoted to fund public 
investments with an ensuing increase in the rate of growth of the economy�
As a matter of fact, the political consensus for the approval of the Fiscal 
Compact is explained by the increasing size of the stock of debt in some 
Member States, that has been one the reason that has caused the crisis of 
the sovereign debt� Nowadays Eurozone States are not only constrained 
in quantitative terms, but they have largely given up their sovereignty on 
budgetary issues, since they must submit a draft budget to the previous 
judgement of the European institutions� If the commitments held when 
the budget is approved are not satisfied, the rules foresee sanctions and, 
in the last resort, an appeal to the European Court of Justice� The launch 
of this budgetary Union, strongly supported by the German government, 
represents a first step towards an effective Fiscal Union, but it is only a 
point of departure, not of arrival� A balanced budget and a progressive 
contraction of the stock of debt are not sufficient by themselves neither 
to promote the recovery of the European economy, nor to guarantee 
that the institutional rules characterizing a fully-fledged democracy are 
complied with� 
5. The Degree of Centralisation within the Eurozone
One important feature of these developments could be clarified 
through a quotation by a recent paper7: “the Fiscal Compact systematically 
excluding net investment, would have several desirable characteristics” (Blanchard, O�- 
Giavazzi, F�, Improving the SGP through a Proper Accounting of Public Investment, 
CEPR Discussion Paper No� 4220, 2004, p� 3)�
7 Fabbrini, F�, The fiscal compact, the “Golden Rule”, and the paradox of European 
federalism, Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No� 013/2013�
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enhances the powers of the EU institutions to direct and police the 
budgetary policies of the states, thus increasing centralization in the 
EU architecture of economic governance� This development contrasts 
with the federal experience of the United States (US)� In fact, it appears 
that while most US states are also endowed with golden rules in their 
constitutions, the federal government never played a role in the adoption 
of these balanced budget rules and still today is barred from interfering 
with the budgetary processes of the states”� 
According to this remark, an unexpected paradox emerges in the 
institutional architecture of the EU� When the crisis exploded in 2008, 
the Eurozone governments rejected a US-like federal model as being too 
centralized for the EU, but they have ended up establishing a regime that 
is much less respectful of state sovereignty than the US federal system� 
The reason of this apparent paradox is simple� In the United States the 
federal government is endowed, in the areas where it has a competence, 
with an effective capacity of taking decisions, that are approved by the 
Congress and the Senate, where Member States are represented� Hence, 
a federal decision is founded upon a democratic process and could be 
enforced reasonably on Member States� But they keep their sovereignty 
where the competence is not attributed to the federal level, that cannot 
interfere with the exercise of Member States in the management of their 
policy decisions�
Within the Eurozone, by relying on the strict and detailed balanced-
budget rules mandated by the Fiscal Compact, the Commission will not 
only control the compliance with the constraints of the Stability Pact, 
but will be able as well to implement a more pervasive ex ante scrutiny 
on the sustainability and appropriateness of the draft budget bills which 
the governments submit for approval during the European Semester� In 
the end, it emerges that the Fiscal Compact, with its balanced-budget 
requirement, adds another stone to the path of increasing centralization 
in the EU, but without the guarantees through appropriate “checks and 
balances” of a fully-fledged federal structure� In this sense, it must be 
critically underlined that these developments do not fully involve the 
European Parliament, which does not play a central role in this new 
structure of the Eurozone, weakening the legitimacy of the transfer of 
growing slices of decision-making to the EU level�
The conclusion that it is possible to draw from these remarks is 
straightforward: from one side, the current economic crisis has shown 
the lack of an effective decision power at the European level� The only 
timely and effective measures to promote the recovery of the Eurozone 
economy, after the starting of the economic crisis in 2008, have been 
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implemented by the ECB, that is a federal institution; in all the other 
cases, the decisions have been taken by the Council only after a lengthy 
process, with larger costs and less effectiveness� But, at the same time, the 
fiscal sovereignty of Member States in defining their budget priorities has 
been largely limited during the European Semester procedure and by the 
rules of the Fiscal Compact� While EU’s governments have systematically 
discarded calls in favour of a federal arrangement for the EMU as being 
disrespectful of State sovereignty, they have established a regime for 
Eurozone governance that sacrifices State sovereignty much more than 
would have been permitted in a federal system�
If one wants to join efficiency and democracy in the field of European 
economic policy, the receipt follows simply: less binding and automatic 
rules, and more effective discretional decision power at the European 
level – including the power to enforce the decisions once they have been 
taken� But the decision process should be radically changed, recognizing 
the role of the Commission as the effective government of the Eurozone 
and including not only the ministers of the governments of Member 
States within a Council where majority vote is the general rule, but also 
the European Parliament; whereas, less interference should be guaranteed 
in national decision-making process in the areas where the competence 
is left to the Member States according to the subsidiarity principle� This 
evolution in the economic and monetary field will imply a decisive step 
forward towards a federal system, less centralised than the current one, 
but at the same time more efficient and democratic� 
6. Reform Proposals of the EMU Governance
During recent years the reform of the governance of the Economic 
and Monetary Union has been object of important contributions by 
the Presidents of the European institutions� In the last Report signed 
by the five Presidents8 the direction of travel is clear: “for the euro area 
to gradually evolve towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union, 
it will need to shift from a system of rules and guidelines for national 
economic policy-making to a system of further sovereignty sharing within 
common institutions, most of which already exists and can progressively 
fulfil the task”� But this evolution regards the future, since in Stage 1 
this document only envisages, as a move towards a Fiscal Union, the 
8 The Five Presidents’ Report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, 
Brussels, 22 June 2015�
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creation of an Advisory Fiscal Board and, in Stage 2, a vague stabilisation 
mechanism to cushion macroeconomic shocks� 
A previous Report of the Presidents9 included an important paragraph 
titled “Towards a fiscal capacity for the EMU” in which, after having 
noted that “while the degree of centralisation of budgetary instruments 
and the arrangements for fiscal solidarity against adverse shocks differ, all 
other currency unions are endowed with a central fiscal capacity� In this 
respect, the European Council in October 2012 asked to explore further 
mechanisms, including an appropriate fiscal capacity, for the euro area� It 
would support new functions which are not covered by the multi-annual 
financial framework from which it is clearly separated”�
This should be the right way to follow� But the basic idea underlying 
the Five Presidents’ Report is that, in the short run, the recovery of 
the euro area requires only a more efficient coordination of national 
economic policies, with a stronger focus on employment and social 
performance (that is naturally highly desirable)� Since, according to their 
view, euro-area governance is already well established for the coordination 
and surveillance of fiscal policies, the next step should be limited to the 
creation of a euro-area system of Competitiveness Authority� 
The Report retains the basic philosophy of rigid austerity that underlay 
the ruling of the EMU following the crisis and caused so many damages 
to the Eurozone economies10� On the contrary, it must be recognized 
that, while monetary policy is fully centralized, the other instruments 
of economic policies have remained firmly in the hands of the national 
governments� This is a serious flaw in the Eurozone design� Ideally, 
countries should hand over sovereignty over the use of these instruments 
to European institutions� However, the willingness to take such a drastic 
step towards political union appears largely absent11� While it is certainly 
correct to envisage that some instruments of economic policy, particularly 
in the field of fiscal policy, should be attributed to the European level, 
it seems equally reasonable to assume that nowadays the dramatic 
conditions of the Union confronted with terrorism, inflow of millions 
of migrants and political disorder in the Mediterranean area are able to 
provide an opportunity to recognize a fiscal power, and particularly a 
power to manage own resources, to the Eurozone�
9 Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, Brussels, 5 December 2012�
10 De Grauwe, P�, The Legacy of Austerity in the Eurozone, CEPS Commentary, 4 October 
2013�
11 De Grauwe, P�, “The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone”, Australian Economic Review, 
September 2012, p� 255-262�
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7. Differences in Economic Policy Management between 
the United States and Europe 
The deep crisis that ravaged the world economy after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 began in the US, but its main 
consequences were felt in Europe� Very soon after the Lehman collapse 
were the European banks affected by the American banks’ troubles, 
forcing European governments to intervene, supporting the banking 
system with great injections of public money� At the same time, the banks, 
facing serious financial difficulties, were forced to impose a credit squeeze 
on their customers and, in particular, on the productive system� The 
enterprises in financial straits reduced their levels of productive activity 
with the consequent contraction of the families’ income, bringing about 
a further impact on the demand of consumer goods� At this point, the 
crisis extended itself to the real sector and involved, albeit in different 
ways, all the other industrialized areas of the world�
Faced with the risk of a global recession, countries reacted immediately, 
overcoming the tendency to increasingly limit any type of public 
intervention that had become dominant since the Reagan and Thatcher 
times, and instead heavily financed the real economy and, simultaneously, 
they tried to guarantee employment levels through extensive use of social 
support provisions even if, in Europe in particular, unemployment rose 
significantly� The reaction to the crisis was stronger and more immediate 
in the United States than in Europe, where only the European Central 
Bank – an institution of a federal nature – was in the position to take 
rapidly the decisions needed to face the greatest economic crisis of the 
post-war period� The reactions of the EU and Eurozone countries were 
slower and weaker than that of the U�S� for two self-reinforcing reasons: 
first of all, the European Union is a structure of a confederal nature as far 
as interventions in economic policy are concerned� Policy reactions must 
essentially be based on coordination – slow and inefficient – of decisions 
taken at the national level12; furthermore, as far as fiscal interventions 
12 According to Article 120 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), “Member States shall conduct their economic policy with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union, as defined in Article 
3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in the context of the broad guidelines 
referred to in Article 121(2) TFEU� The Member States and the Union shall act in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, 
favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles 
set out in Article 119”� In Article 3 TEU, after having stated that “the Union’ aim is 
to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”, it is added that “the 
Union shall establish an internal market� It shall work for the sustainable development 
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are concerned, decisions must be taken unanimously13, leading to 
further delays with the – inevitable – compromises necessary to reach an 
agreement� 
The second factor that impeded a stronger and quicker reaction results 
from the fact that in a strictly interdependent economic area, it may be 
convenient for individual countries to act as free riders, that is, to wait 
for other countries to take the initiative increasing public expenditure 
or reducing taxes, because the positive effects of interventions in other 
countries quickly spread to the whole area� Consequently, no single 
European country had any interest in taking on the burden of financing 
the recovery of the European economy, whose cost would fall on the 
Member State’s citizens, while all of the countries of the economically 
integrated area would benefit from it� On the other hand, the intervention 
of the European Union was also constrained by the limited size of the EU 
budget (about 1% of European Gdp)� In conclusion, the United States, 
with its federal government and a budget of adequate size, were quickly 
able to support the economic recovery with adequate means� In Europe, 
economic policy measures needed to face the recession were entrusted to 
the Member States, were further constrained by the Maastricht Treaty 
rules regarding the extent of public deficits, and had the limited objective 
of preventing the crisis from turning into a catastrophic recession�
8. The Constraints on National Expansionary Policies
With the worsening of the sovereign debt crisis and the slowness of 
the European economic recovery, the Member States of the EU find 
themselves clamped in an increasingly tight vice: on the one hand, they 
are forced to adopt harsh measures to avert the risk of collapse of entire 
sectors, financial as well as industrial; on the other hand, they need 
of Europe based on balanced economic growth and social progress, and a high level 
of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment� It shall promote 
scientific and technological advance”� Finally, and most important, Article 3(4) 
TEU states that “the Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose 
currency is the euro”� Then, a monetary union is not enough and Europe should 
proceed towards a full economic union, in view of an “ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe” (Article 1 TEU)�
13 Article 312(2) TFEU states: “The Council, acting in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, shall unanimously and after consulting the European Parliament 
adopt a decision laying down the provisions relating to the system of own resources of 
the Union” (Article 311 TFEU)� And regarding the Multiannual Financial Framework 
limiting the development of expenditures “the Council shall act unanimously after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament”�
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to support workers who lost their jobs and, in general, lower income 
classes that suffer the effects of the crisis to a greater extent� All this in a 
situation in which public finances are deteriorating endogenously due to 
the contraction of the revenues following the fall of income, and are also 
constrained by the necessity to avoid overcoming in a significant manner 
the restrictions imposed by the Maastricht Treaty to avoid being strongly 
penalized by the markets through a widening of the spread in interest 
rates to be paid on new emissions� 
Considering the budget problems that weigh heavily on the countries 
of the Eurozone and limit their abilities to launch an expansionary policy, 
the European Union should play a decisive role to help the recovery 
through a Growth Pact that will help to reduce social tensions that are 
becoming unbearable in many countries and, thanks to the positive 
automatic effects on tax revenues of the Gdp increase, to relax the ties 
that weigh on the national budgets� However, the EU’s budget resources 
are limited and, in any case, at the moment governments do not seem 
much inclined to implement a more wide-ranging plan to bring Europe 
out of the crisis� 
The experiences of European countries in the last few years have 
revealed the limits of the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy14, and 
within an important international organization such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) it has been recently recognized15 that fiscal 
multipliers are normally larger than one and that fiscal consolidation 
measures necessarily bring about deflationary effects16� Furthermore, 
14 According to the Keynesian theory an increase in public expenditure or a reduction in 
taxes will provide expansionary effects on Gdp� Recently, a new school of thinking has 
expressed a different view, assuming that a reduction in expenditures or an increase 
in taxation will increase Gdp since people “expect” that a reduced deficit will imply 
lower tax needs in the future, then more disposable income, and begin immediately 
to spend more (these are the presumed non-keynesian, expansionary effects of fiscal 
consolidation)� See, for instance: Giavazzi, F�, Pagano, M�, Non-keynesian effects of 
fiscal policy changes: international evidence and the Swedish experience, NBER WP 
5332, National Bureau of Economic Research, November 1995�
15 IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2012, p�  41-43� See also: Blanchard, O�, 
Leigh, D�, Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers, IMF Working Paper 13/1, 
January 2013� See also: Ostry, J� D�, Loungani, P�, Furceri, D�, “Neoliberalism: 
Oversold?”, in Finance & Development, June 2016, Vol� 53, No� 2�
16 In a recent paper it has been underlined that “the stronger the austerity programme, 
the deeper the decline in Gdp� The estimated equation suggests that on average for 
every 1% increase in austerity, output declines by 1�4%”� This implies that “a 1% 
increase in austerity only leads to a 0�5% improvement in the budget balance� Put 
another way, in order to improve the budget balance by 1%, an austerity programme 
of at least 2% is necessary� Given our measure of the fiscal multiplier of 1�4, this also 
implies a drop in Gdp of 2�8%� Thus, the eurozone austerity programme imposed 
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given the interdependence within the Internal Market, recession in one 
country implies a reduction of its imports, and consequently of exports 
from the other European countries, deepening the economic crisis in the 
entire Eurozone� 
There is no “national” solution to ending the crisis� Expansionary 
measures are impossible at the level of Member States, who are 
obliged by the Maastricht constraints and the Stability Pact to choose 
fiscal consolidation as a priority, that is, less expenditures and more 
taxes; furthermore, such expansionary measures would in any case be 
domestically ineffective, since a large part of the effects ensuing from 
national measures would be lost through increased imports from other 
European countries� This course of action would result in every country 
trying to behave like a free rider, waiting for expansionary measures 
funded by other Eurozone Member States� Thus, such a stabilisation 
policy would prove to be sub-optimal� 
Therefore, to get out of this impasse, what is needed is to launch as 
soon as possible a Eurozone recovery plan� In parallel, given the more 
and more stringent environmental constraints, this initiative should take 
into account the fact the current crisis marks the end of a growth phase 
for the European economy, since it cannot be overcome with a policy 
exclusively aiming to support the demand of consumer goods that use a 
large amount of natural resources�
9. A Policy Promoting Investments and Production  
of Public Goods 
Many steps forward have been achieved towards effective governance 
of the Eurozone area for the sake of guaranteeing financial stability, with 
the signature of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
(the Fiscal Compact) in March 2012, the Six Pack in December 2011, 
a very unfavourable trade-off for the periphery countries: in order to improve their 
government budget balance by 1% a sacrifice of 2�8% of Gdp was necessary”� The 
political conclusion follows that “the imposition of austerity programmes in the 
eurozone has fallen victim to the fallacy of composition� What works for one nation 
fails to work when every nation applies the same policies […]� When all countries try 
to save more at the same time, each country’s attempt to do so makes it harder for the 
others to achieve their objectives”� Then, “it is high time that the Commission takes 
up its role of defending the interests of the debtor nations with the same vigour that it 
defends the interests of the creditors”� See De Grauwe, P�, Ji, Y�, The Legacy of Austerity 
in the Eurozone, CEPS Commentary, 4 October 2014�
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and the Two Pack’s entry into force in May 201317 Furthermore, with the 
approval of these rules it is clear that there is now a general consensus 
that every country is obliged to comply with the duty to pay back its own 
debt accumulated in the past� The measures are now in place to ensure 
that financial stability will be pursued by each Member State within the 
Eurozone under stringent European control� But fiscal consolidation will 
be difficult to achieve if a quick recovery of the European economy is not 
rapidly forthcoming� 
Structural reforms are urgently needed and unavoidable in 
indebted countries in order to improve productivity and to increase 
competitiveness, but the positive results of these reforms will only be 
achieved in the medium and long term� Therefore, in order to overcome 
the crisis it is necessary to initiate a new phase of growth and to promote 
an increase in employment by linking a policy of fiscal consolidation in 
each Member State with the immediate creation within the European 
budget of a sufficiently large fund appointed to Eurozone countries and 
targeted to promoting growth and employment18, since growth must be 
supported by a European initiative� 
Huge investments from both the public and private sectors are needed 
to meet the infrastructure challenge� The fund could immediately start 
to finance these projects, while preparing a plan over the medium-term 
to improve the competitiveness of the European economy through 
investments in higher education, research, and technological innovation� 
A smaller part of the fund’s capacity could be used to support structural 
reforms in Member States that enter into arrangements of a contractual 
nature with EU institutions through limited, temporary, flexible, and 
targeted financial incentives – the Convergence and Competitiveness 
Instrument suggested by the Commission in its “Blueprint for a deep 
and genuine EMU”19�
A traditional policy based only on the support of consumption 
demand is largely insufficient� A new phase of growth in the European 
economy should be opened by promoting a sustainable development 
model� The driver of growth should become public investments, with 
17 European Commission, Six-pack? Two-pack? Fiscal compact? A short guide to the new 
EU fiscal governance, http://ec�europa�eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/ 
2012-03-14_six_pack_en�htm�
18 Majocchi, A�, A European Fund for Growth and Employment: A First Step Toward a 
Eurozone Budget, German Marshall Fund Policy Brief, June 2014�
19 European Commission, A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary 
union. Launching a European debate, COM(2012)777final, Brussels, 28 November 
2012�
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a positive short-run impact on demand, but also on long-run growth 
through an increase in potential output� The main declared goal of the 
fund should be improving European citizens’ quality of life and raising 
the productivity of European firms, through increased spending for 
frontier research and higher education, strengthening the material and 
immaterial infrastructural network, promoting energy efficiency and the 
use of renewable energy sources, supporting a soft mobility that does not 
worsen environmental conditions, guaranteeing conservation of cultural 
and natural assets, and favouring urban renewal�
In Japan and the United States, the recovery of the respective economies 
depends on expansionary monetary policy measures, mainly targeted to 
support an expansion of consumption demand and the building industry� 
These types of policy decisions are not conceivable in Europe, where 
the main problem centres on the increase in productivity to face the 
competitiveness challenge within the global economy and on favouring 
a reduction in the rate of unemployment, whereas for environmental 
purposes the amount of soil available – a truly scarce resource – must 
be protected against an excessive use� It is true that Europe suffers from 
a lack of consumption demand, but this problem should be addressed 
through effective redistribution measures in favour of the lower income 
classes, and not with credit measures20� 
With the approval of the Fiscal Compact the euro area has made an 
innovative choice compared to its past experiences: growth will no longer 
depend on the creation of new debt� In the meantime, it is generally 
recognized that economic development should be compatible with 
environmental conservation� Current expenditures should be funded 
with tax resources, while the issuance of bonds should be targeted only to 
financing investments, and not the current account� To be consistent with 
this choice, the fund created within the European budget should devote 
its resources to the financing of material investment, the production 
of human capital or of collective goods in order to support sustainable 
development, an increase of productivity, and, consequently, of the 
competitiveness of the European economy� 
20 This issue has been restored in the political debate by a recent book of Piketty 
(Piketty, T�, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Harvard Univ� Press, 2014)� See also: 
Stiglitz, J� E�, The price of inequality. How today’s divided society endangers our future, 
W�W� Norton, 2012; Atkinson, A� B�, Inequality. What can be done?, Harvard Univ� 
Press, 2015�
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10. The Juncker Plan: a Turning Point, but not enough
A change of attitude has recently emerged regarding the policy choices 
to be adopted for addressing the European crisis� Supply side reforms 
are considered unavoidable, but nevertheless insufficient� While the 
goals of fiscal consolidation and labour market reform are recognised as 
important in the medium term, what appears as urgently needed is a 
demand-side policy to counter falling domestic demand for consumption 
and to encourage investment� Up to now monetary policy has been 
the only instrument available to provide the necessary liquidity to the 
market, and the latest decision of the European Central Bank to make 
a monthly purchase through the secondary market of up to 80 billion 
euro-denominated investment-grade securities issued by euro area 
governments and agencies and European institutions has again proved 
the important role played by the only institution of a federal nature 
tasked with economic policy within the euro area21� 
The adoption of the Juncker Plan is a turning point, showing that 
the prevailing point of view in the new Commission is that a fiscal shock 
for supporting investment demand is needed to complement the efforts 
of the ECB� The Commission will conclude an agreement with the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) on the establishment of a European 
Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), which will enjoy a guarantee up 
to €16 billion by the EU and 5 billion by the EIB in order to conduct 
its financing and investment operations� The financial resources required 
will be found by reducing other appropriations within the existing 
European budget� This does not seem the best path to follow� There are 
two main flaws in the plan: firstly there is no additional public money 
on the table and, secondly, there is a problem of governance since the 
choice of investments and the distribution of benefits among Member 
States is not a technical issue, but requires a political choice that cannot 
be assigned to the EIB� 
An effective growth plan implies that new taxes are collected and, 
on this basis, eurobonds are emitted� In this way large sums of money 
could be made available to finance not only investments to complete 
the infrastructural network within Europe, but also to provide European 
public goods (in primis, expenditures on R&D and in promotion of higher 
education), in order to kickstart a structural change in the European 
economy, strengthening the competitiveness of European firms and 
21 Castaldi, R�, La BCE: la forza di un’ istituzione federale, Turin, Centro Studi sul 
Federalismo, Commento No� 77, 14 March 2016�
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improving the quality of life of European citizens� The decisive challenge 
is to provide “adequate fiscal capacity” to the Eurozone, as was proposed 
in a previous Blueprint by the European Commission22: defining the 
resources that can be collected from taxpayers, allocating these resources 
within the budget to a fund appointed to the Eurozone countries, based 
on the guarantee of these resources emitting eurobonds to finance a large 
investment plan and deciding at the same time to transfer responsibility 
for directly managing the growth plan to the Commission, under the 
control of the European Parliament� 
According to the Juncker plan the EFSI should be set up within the 
EIB as a dedicated trust fund� But if new own resources are allotted to 
financing a fund managed by the Commission, since Member States 
should be involved to guarantee cooperation between European and 
national levels, the Economic Directorate within the Commission 
should be expanded to include high representatives of the Treasuries of 
the Member States in an extended Directorate that could be called the 
European Fiscal Institute – as was done with the European Monetary 
Institute when creating the European Central Bank – and will represent 
the first step towards a European Treasury23� 
However, given the harshness of the economic downturn and the 
ensuing huge social costs, and the time period required for Juncker Plan to 
extensively deploy its positive effects on the European economy, transitory 
and extraordinary measures should be immediately implemented to 
increase the financial capacity of the EFSI, using all the legal instruments 
that are now available� Additional financial contributions could be obtained 
from Member States, and these could also co-finance individual projects 
financed by the EFSI, through its banking system as well� This co-financing 
will benefit from the ‘investment clause’ if the Gdp growth of a Member 
State is negative or Gdp remains well below its potential� According to the 
new flexibility rules proposed by the Commission, these payments will not 
negatively affect compliance with the deficit or debt rules established by the 
Stability and Growth Pact� 
Furthermore, it is to be remembered that 12% of the ECB’s 
liquidity injection via Quantitative Easing (80 billion monthly) can be 
used to purchase securities on the secondary market issued by European 
Community institutions or by European agencies (such as the EIB or 
ESM), and then ultimately to purchase bonds from the EIB or from the 
22 Towards a genuine economic and monetary Union, Report to the European Council, 
Brussels, 5 December 2012�
23 Majocchi, A�, Un piano per l’Europa. Sviluppo sostenibile e occupazione, Bologna, Il 
Mulino, 2015, pp� 164-169�
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European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) created by the Juncker 
Plan� In this context, a recent paper24 has examined the state of play of 
the Juncker Plan and has put forward the interesting proposal to raise 
this 12% to at least 20% (a percentage corresponding to that part of 
the ECB’s liquidity injections not guaranteed by the national central 
banks)� 
11. New Resources for Funding the Juncker Plan
Since the outbreak of the crisis, public and private investment has 
been declining� Different estimates quantify a current gap in a range 
between € 190 billion for the Eurozone and € 300 billion for the EU as 
a whole per year25, and present initiatives are insufficient to bring current 
investment levels up to potential levels� According to what has been 
published by the Commission (April 2016) a total of 222 projects have 
been approved: based on €11�2 billion provided under the EFSI, they 
will receive additional funding of €82�1 billion� The main beneficiaries 
are Italy, France, Germany and United Kingdom� From these data it 
could be noted that “the size of the mobilized resources is not enough to 
compensate the Eurozone investment gap� Hence a more systemic way to 
mobilize resources has to be introduced”26� 
The proposal in a nutshell is to substantially increase the amount of QE 
asset purchases by the ECB from the EIB in order to finance supranational 
investments� The EIB issues new bonds (“Investments Bonds”) and sells 
them on the markets� At present, the EIB issues additional bonds to the 
extent of €60 billion, three times the guarantee of the EFSI (€21 billion), 
while the remainder (up to € 315 billion) is collected through private 
financing� The “internal multiplier” has to be increased� The ECB should 
be ready to buy “Investment Bonds” on the secondary market within the 
framework of a renewed QE through an increase of base money on the 
liabilities side of ECB’s balance sheet� Funds made available are then passed 
on the EFSI which could expand grants to the States according to some 
24 Fontana, O�, Vannuccini, S�, Conventional Direction to Unconventional Measures: 
Using Quantitative Esing to Shape Eurozone Fiscal Capacity, Centro Studi sul 
Federalismo Research Paper, Turin, May 2016� In the same perspective a previous 
contribution is: Watt, A�, Quantitative easing with bite: a proposal for conditional overt 
monetary financing of public investment, IMK WP 148, March 2015.
25 Rubio, E�, Rinaldi, D�, Pellerin-Carlin, T�, Investment in Europe: making the best of 
the Juncker Plan. With case studies on digital infrastructure and energy efficiency, Notre 
Europe Studies and Report, No� 109, March 2016�
26 Fontana, O�, Vannuccini, S�, ibidem, p� 16�
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equity criteria� In the proposal it is explicitly stated that Member States will 
continue to be responsible for their level of earlier debt and will bear debt 
service on grants received� 
In order to be of significant magnitude, but remaining compatible 
with existing rules, the purchasing of EIB bonds which are part of the 
investment program should be increased within the 20% risk-sharing 
regime of the Juncker Plan, given the amount of monthly asset purchases, 
through a corresponding decrease in the share of other European 
institutions’ securities and government and agencies bodies� In a second 
phase the EFSI should become a sort of Euro Treasury under the control 
of the European Parliament, like the one proposed by Bibow27, the 
French and German Governors of their respective Central Banks28 and 
the Italian Minister of Economy and Finance29� 
12. Towards a Eurozone Budget
The creation of a fund promoting growth and employment within 
the European budget does not represent the final endpoint of a political 
initiative intended to achieve an in-depth change in European economic 
policy making, opening the way to a new era of reforms in the EU starting 
in the euro area, towards an effective federal structure� Hence, the fund 
should be considered an intermediate objective� It must be followed by 
an attempt to achieve an agreement of all Member States of the euro area 
on the new resources that could be targeted to finance a Eurozone budget 
included in the larger EU budget�
If all Member States of the euro area finally agree on the introduction 
of new own resources devolved to the European level30, the fund could 
effectively represent the genesis of a budget for the Eurozone� According 
to a recent proposal31, Article 136 could conceivably be designed to 
address the issue of the pooling of new resources and the creation of 
27 Bibow, J�, Making the Euro Viable: The Euro Treasury Plan, Levy Institute, WP No� 84, 
July 2015�
28 Weidman, J�, Villeroy de Galhau, F�, L’Europe à la croisée des chemins, Banque de 
France, February 2016�
29 Padoan, P� C�, “Il faut un ministre unique des Finances de la zone euro”, in Le 
Figaro, 30 mars 2016�
30 Majocchi, A�, “Nuove risorse per il finanziamento del bilancio europeo”, in Rivista 
di Diritto Finanziario e Scienza delle Finanze, 2015, p� 467-487�
31 Rossolillo, G�, “A Budget for the Euro Area: The Road leading to the Decisive Federal 
Leap”, in The Federalist, LV, 2013�
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a body responsible for managing them32� This article, which introduces 
provisions specific to Member States whose currency is the euro33, has 
already served as the legal basis for the adoption of the Treaty establishing 
the European Stability Mechanism adding a new paragraph to the 
original text of the Treaty� The above Article would allow the adoption 
of a Treaty that would enable the Eurozone states to pool the revenue of 
the new own resources and to simultaneously entrust its management to 
an intergovernmental body, following the experience of the European 
Monetary Institute during the transition towards monetary union, “with 
the goal to open the way to the establishment and the functioning of a 
European Treasury”34�
Such a Eurozone budget should support the growth of the European 
economy and, at the same time, absorb the effects of asymmetric shocks 
to the Member States, with a large saving of resources vis-à-vis the amount 
of money currently attributed to the European Stability Mechanism� 
After the time needed to reach a political consensus, with the transition 
from the fund to a Eurozone budget, a European Treasury should be 
established to manage the budget under the democratic control of the 
European Council and the European Parliament� As long as new resources 
and expenditures are attributed to the Eurozone budget, the amount of 
taxes charged by Member States should be reduced so that fiscal pressure 
on European taxpayers would remain unchanged� In a later stage, taking 
advantage of the saving of resources through a common production of 
European goods, for instance in the area of defence policy, fiscal pressure 
could be eventually cut down35�
An adequate fiscal capacity can be created within the Eurozone with 
the adoption of new own resource� But in this perspective, the democratic 
control on the use of these resources should be warranted� “No taxation 
32 “Secondary legislation could be used to introduce a rainy-day-fund (Article122� 136 
and 352 TFEU) and a euro area budget could be established as part of the larger 
EU budget” (C� Allard et  al�, Toward a Fiscal Union for the Euro Area, IMF Staff 
Discussion Note, September 2013, p� 24)�
33 “In order to ensure the proper functioning of economic and monetary union […] the 
Council shall […] adopt specific measures […] (a) to strengthen the coordination and 
surveillance of their budgetary discipline; (b) to set out economic policy guidelines 
for them, while ensuring that they are compatible with those adopted for the whole 
of the Union”�
34 Barthalay, B�, Une nouvelle donne pour l’Europe, Paris, Puissance Europe, 2012� 
This proposal has been taken up by Aglietta, M�, Brand, T�, Un new deal pour 
l’Europe. Croissance, euro, compétitivité, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2013�
35 Some recent estimates indicate that total cost of non-Europe in the defence field may 
be up to €120 billion a year� See Briani, V�-Chevallard, G�, The Costs of Non-Europe in 
the Defence Field, CSF-IAI, April 2013�
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without representation” is a fundamental principle of democracy� The 
Commission has correctly underlined that “the progress towards a deep 
and genuine EMU would over the medium term necessitate a structure 
akin to an EMU Treasury within the Commission to organise the shared 
policies undertaken with the common fiscal capacity to the extent that 
they imply common resources and/or common borrowing”36� Therefore, 
this new budgetary authority that will be charged to manage the joint 
resources and to manage the European economy should be democratically 
controlled by the European Parliament and the Council� It has been 
remarked that “any progress towards a genuine fiscal union would have 
to include establishing a European Treasury with the power to raise taxes, 
the power to decide on how to spend these monies, and the power to 
issue joint and several guaranteed euro bonds� A federal fiscal union with 
a central authority having discretionary spending, taxing, and borrowing 
powers would decisively move the European Union towards a genuine 
political union – a supranational state, calling for the corresponding 
democratic mechanisms necessary to ensure political legitimacy”37� 
Similarly, a paper by the Directorate General of the French Treasury 
underlines that “the creation of a common budget for the eurozone 
represent a medium term process that requires a step forward in the 
political integration to ensure democratic legitimacy of the tasks 
attributed to the European level”38� A recent paper issued by the 
Italian government39 recognizes that “in the long term, the Monetary 
Union should be equipped with a fiscal capacity tailored to the tasks of 
promoting investments and smoothing the cycle� A strongly integrated 
area, like the Emu, is characterised by public goods that can be better 
provided at a systemic level� This is the case of large scale investments, 
stabilisation function and financing of policies in a Member State with 
positive spillovers� These functions could be managed by a Eurozone 
Finance Minister […]� Of course, such a Minister should be politically 
endowed to play this role� While this figure could be enshrined within 
36 European Commission, A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary 
union. Launching a European debate, COM(2012)777final, Brussels, 28 November 
2012�
37 Macaes, B�, Fiscal Union, Banking Union: Two Opposite Paths for Europe, The 
EuroFuture Project, The German Marshall Fund, May 2013�
38 Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances et ministère du Commerce Extérieur – 
Direction générale du Trésor, Un budget pour la zone euro, Trésor-Éco Lettre, n° 
120, Octobre 2013�
39 Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, A Shared European Policy Strategy for 
Growth, Jobs and Stability, Rome, February 2016, p� 8�
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the European Commission, it would be important to have a strong link 
with the European Parliament”�
However, at that point one is clearly outside the perimeter of the 
Lisbon Treaty� If the fund becomes a Eurozone budget with its own 
resources and an expenditure capacity to effectively support the European 
economy, new rules on the political procedures to be followed to provide 
new own resources and to define kind and level of expenditures at the 
Eurozone level should be established� A new institution, a Eurozone 
Treasury, should be created, subject to the control of the Council and the 
Parliament� Then, an in-depth reform of the existing institutions is needed 
and this is urgent since the deadlock of the European economy risks 
putting Europe in a declining position in the worldwide competition� 
Crisis and Possible New Start  
of Integration Process
Beyond the Eurozone Predicament
Franco Praussello
Concerning the link between the state of the European integration 
process and possible advancements on the road to an “ever closer union” 
of the partner countries a widespread view, which has become perhaps a 
platitude, says that the latter are as a rule possible only in the aftermath of 
a crisis of the former� Such an assumption, which finds its dignified roots, 
among other things, in Spinelli’s writings and federalist political efforts1, 
was confirmed for instance at the beginning of the process, when the 
need to reconstruct France and Germany’s economies during the Fifties 
led to the launch of the European Coal and Steel Community, but was 
falsified later in the same period by the collapse of the European Defence 
project in 1954� Similarly, the end of gold exchange standard by the 
beginning of the Seventies prompted a first attempt to set up a European 
single currency, which however failed to materialise at the first forecast 
deadline and was achieved only in 1999�
Nowadays we are confronted with a similar choice: the ailments of 
monetary union as the most advanced stage of integration could pave 
the way for a subsequent fiscal and political union, but might also lead to 
an unravelling or a stop of the process, should the euro-area crisis not be 
fixed and result in a break up� 
In this note, we shall analyse origins, remedies so far employed and 
possible way outs of the still ongoing eurozone crisis in view of a possible 
revamping of the integration process, focusing mainly on the errors made 
by governments within the Eurogroup in their inefficient management 
of the flaws, which were at the basis of the sovereign debt predicament 
1 Altiero Spinelli, or the leader of the Hamiltonian federalist approach to European 
integration, developed a crisis theory, according to which only in the presence of a 
bad predicament showing their inability to meet modern-day challenges national 
governments could be forced to give up their exclusive sovereignty� See Spinelli, A�, 
La crisi degli stati nazionali. Germania, Italia, Francia, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1991� 
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that put at risk the viability of monetary integration� The rest of the 
writing is organised as follows� In the next two paragraphs we give our 
interpretation about the institutional failings that characterise the setup 
of the monetary union within the eurozone and the ensuing criticism 
levelled in economic literature at its future working by ex-ante forecasts, 
along with some lessons deriving from its ex-post negative outcomes in 
terms of manifold ailments which put at risk its survival� Paragraph 4 
describes how the global financial shock born in the US produced the 
sovereign debt crisis within the euro area due to constraints associated 
with monetary integration� Paragraph 5 focuses on different policy 
tools at hand for recovering economic growth, comparing conflicting 
experiences in the eurozone on the one hand and in countries such as the 
US, the UK and Japan on the other� The following Paragraphs 6 and 7 
scrutinise the limits of the European response to the crisis, by shifting the 
crisis management from the Community system to intergovernmental 
negotiations within the Eurogroup and by imposing on periphery 
countries in trouble the overall medicine of austerity� Paragraph 8 
identifies some possible ways out of eurozone predicament, while the last 
one concludes the writing with a few final considerations�
1. Flaws in the Design of the Eurozone
A useful starting point for tracing back the origins of the euro-area 
crisis consists in clarifying the economic foundations of the single 
currency project as described in the Maastricht treaty� In a previous 
research of mine, I  espoused2 the thesis of De Grauwe, according to 
whom monetary integration in Europe was realised on the basis of the 
Brussels-Frankfurt consensus3, the neoliberal tenet of efficient markets 
or the theory that the latter are perfectly self-regulating and the room 
for public authority interventions is very limited if not virtually absent� 
According to the ordo-liberalism or Ordo-liberalismus thinking, a local 
version of such a theory particularly widespread among mainstream 
economic and political Germany’s decision makers, what is necessary 
for an economy to grow on a stable path is to follow clear ex-ante rules, 
whereas an independent central bank has to deliver only price stability 
2 See Praussello, F�, “Asymmetric Shocks and Monetary Disintegration: The Case of 
the Eurozone”, in Jovanovič M� (ed�), International Handbook on the Economics of 
Integration, Vol� II, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011, p� 360-377�
3 See De Grauwe, P�, “What we Have Learnt About Monetary Integration Since the 
Maastricht Treaty?”, Paper prepared for the Special Issue of the Common Market 
Studies, January 2006�
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and fiscal policies are constrained in the straitjacket of a zero-deficit 
budget�
In a wider context, economic literature has produced two different 
approaches when it comes to modelise monetary integration: the Optimum 
Currency Area (OCA) theory and the money cartalist or chartalist view� 
Following the former, a viable monetary union needs to be protected 
from adverse asymmetric shocks, i� e� large deviations from an established 
economy’s state of affairs, which in a short period triggers a fall in income 
and employment in one or a few member regions or countries included 
in it� Due to the fact that the single monetary policy cannot differentiate 
among members (a necessary case of “one-size-fits-all policy”), alternative 
offsetting mechanisms have to be used, among which in the initial stage of 
the union4 the foremost ones can be considered labour mobility across its 
constituent parts and the existence of a centralised budget, large enough 
for exerting sufficient stabilisation effects by alleviating the negative impact 
of disturbances on the relevant economy� Our description of the OCA 
approach is necessarily synthetic enough, since the whole richness of such 
a literature strand cannot be here scrutinised5� 
By contrast, the central tenet of the chartalist view is quite simple in 
its essence� Focusing on the origin of money, such a theory underscores 
the principle that its classical features of unit of account, exchange 
medium and store of value are to be referred to the State, as last-resort 
guarantor of the currency value� With the caveat that such a theoretical 
background holds true even when the competence of managing the 
common monetary policy is attributed to a nominally independent 
central bank, due to the power of last resort belonging in an exclusive way 
to government and public authorities in charge of articulating the state 
sovereignty and hence of setting also by law the limits of attributions 
transferred to it�
Applying the theoretical instruments developed by the two approaches 
shortly described along previous lines is conducive to similar outcomes 
in terms of durability of the eurozone� The absence of a sufficient degree 
of labour mobility and of a suitable central budget at the euro-area level 
4 In later stages of the setup of monetary integration other offsetting tools are at hand, 
for instance in the form of a unified capital market� In any case, in order to be effective 
such mechanisms have to be automatic, without resorting to long and cumbersome 
bargaining among member countries�
5 However, a hint to recent developments of the OCA endogenous theory cannot here 
be avoided, due to identification of optimality characters which are provided ex post 
by the mere functioning of a viable monetary union� See, among others, Praussello, F�, 
“The Theory of Endogenous Optimum Currency Areas: A Critical Note”, Economia 
Internazionale/International Economics, 2012, LXV, p� 83-95�
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or other effective tools to offset asymmetric shocks does not allow to rate 
the eurozone as an optimum currency area, whereas the judgement of 
the chartalist view is absolutely negative: devoid of a political union or a 
European sovereign, a currency without a State could never exist, at least 
in the long run�
2. European Monetary Integration from ex-ante Forecasts 
to ex-post Outcomes 
Against such a theoretical setting, a number of scholars, in rating the 
incoming working of the euro area in view of principles just described, 
anticipated future malfunctions of the single currency, which could 
result in a possible failure of the long-coveted European monetary union� 
Among them, with hindsight we find particularly interesting the views 
expressed by three mainstream renowned economists such as Dornbusch, 
Friedman and Feldstein� Dornbusch thought that giving up the exchange 
rate as an adjustment tool in intra-European relations would leave as 
a residual offsetting mechanism the local labour market (via the so-
called internal devaluation), prompting a prospective dismantling of the 
welfare state with an ensuing anti-European reaction6� Clearly, a possible 
correct interpretation of the present-day rise of Eurosceptic or Anti-EU 
movements in the eurozone�
In his turn, Friedman maintained that the single currency is in its 
essence a political project aimed at producing a European political union� 
However, being a wrong-headed economic instrument it will be doomed 
to failure and its collapse will prompt a destruction of the euro area and 
of the integration process at large, with the consequence that instead of 
uniting, it will divide Europe7� A useful reminder of what could lie ahead 
should the eurozone break up� Along similar lines Feldstein concluded 
that after the euro-area breakdown revamped tensions between France 
and Germany could imperil the current peaceful setup of European 
relationships8� An extreme view concerning the most precious outcome 
of the integration process: the achievement of peace in the old continent 
after centuries of tensions and wars� 
6 See Dornbusch, R�, “Euro Fantasies: Common Currency as Panacea”, Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 1996�
7 See Friedman, M�, “Wither the EMU?”, The Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1997�
8 See Feldstein, M�, “The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability”, NBER Working Paper No� 6150, 
1998�
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In fact, several shortages on which the monetary union was going 
to be built upon made a fatal prognosis about its future viability quite 
easy� Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty lacked both an increased centralised 
budget and advancements towards a fiscal union and was based on a 
strict interpretation on the no bail-out clause, whose guarantee was 
nominally assured by the Stability pact� Due to the fact that the 
founding members did not have a political will to complement the 
monetary union with a parallel fiscal union, the latter, in particular, 
was meant to avoid moral hazard behaviours by members eager to take 
advantage of a possible future implicit or explicit bailout by partners 
and overfishing in the common pool of European debts9�
In the wake of its launch, the functioning of the monetary union 
vindicated ex post several concerns which presided over its birth� In short, 
in the absence of robust shock-offsetting tools within the eurozone core 
and periphery countries followed divergent growth paths� In general 
terms, before the outburst of the subprime crisis, whereas the former 
experienced lower GDP growth associated with lower inflation rates 
than the latter’s, in the subsequent period such a pattern was reversed� 
Notably, eurozone periphery countries took the opportunity offered by 
the large interest rate reduction linked to the setting up of the monetary 
union (the utmost advantage for them)10, for fostering private spending, 
often in the form of a property boom, and also – but to a lesser extent – 
public spending in excess, with a consequent worsening of public debt� 
However, during the following Great Recession the eurozone put to 
the fore its very nature of a pegged exchange rate system implying a 
mechanism of asymmetric adjustment11, putting the whole brunt of 
it on debtor countries, in not too a different way from the old gold 
standard� At the same time, as early as 2003 the Stability pact was 
violated by Germany and France, the two main economies in the euro 
area, with the active connivance of Italy12� Since then, an unwritten rule 
of the pact became that it is valid only for second-ranking countries�
9 See De Grauwe and Ji, Y�, “How Much Fiscal Discipline in Monetary Union?”, in 
Journal of Macroeconomics, 2014, 39, p� 348-360�
10 Moreover, after the birth of the eurozone, in the run-up to the global financial crisis 
outbreak periphery countries enjoyed particularly low real rates, i�e� nominal interest 
rates decided by the European Central Bank (ECB) for the whole euro area adjusted 
for inflation�
11 See Person, K� and Sharp, P�, An Economic History of Europe, 2nd edition, Cambridge, 
CUP, 2015�
12 By that time Italy presided over the Union and gave a negative advice on the possible 
opening of an excessive deficit procedure against Germany and France� In its turn 
Italy was officially declared in breach of the Stability pact for the first time in 2005�
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In a wider framework, taking into account developments brought 
about by its occurrence, lessons gained from the euro predicament 
are summarised by Eichengreen in eight lessons plus a conclusion13, 
considering mainly the standard approach of OCA theory� At the top 
of his list, however, he does not explicitly consider the starting point of 
the incorrect management of the crisis by the Eurogroup or the member 
country governments: a serious diagnostic error about its very origins� 
Indeed, contrary to what the Eurogroup thought due to its bias in 
favour of the ordoliberal interpretation of the eurozone predicament, the 
crisis was largely ignited not by an excess of public debt triggered by 
profligate fiscal policies, whose remedies were in principle a variety of 
austerity programmes, but by a private debt excess� As a matter of fact, 
when the predicament erupted the latter was on a growing trend, whereas 
after 2008 an explosion of public debt took place following a balance 
sheet recession, since private sector needed to reduce its debt overhang 
and governments decided to assume private debt in order to avoid a debt-
deflation dynamics14�
Having failed to emphasise this point, Eichengreen’s inventory of non-
anticipated outcomes of the eurozone’s working opens with a first lesson: 
the fact that asymmetric shocks are intrinsic to monetary union� To 
support this, he shares the view that within the latter inflation rates in core 
and periphery countries might not converge quickly with destabilising 
consequences� However, as shown by the endogenous optimum 
currency areas theory, other monetary integration consequences could 
produce offsetting effects in terms of an adverse asymmetric disturbance 
reduction, should the union prompt more intra-industry trade, i�e� more 
homogenous economic conditions across union’s constituents� 
A second lesson states that a monetary union without banking 
union cannot survive� Due to the vital role played by the bank system 
in a financial space largely based on saving channelled through banking 
intermediation, like the European one, for preventing moral hazard and 
other destabilising disturbances from spreading across the euro area a 
complete banking union is needed, with the whole set of necessary tools: a 
single supervision, a single resolution mechanism and a common deposit 
insurance� So far, only the two first items have been partially delivered, 
but not the last one since some countries, and above all Germany, fear to 
13 See Eichengreen, B�, “The Eurozone Crisis: The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas 
Bites Back”, Notenstein Academy White Paper Series, March 2014�
14 See De Grauwe, P� and Ji, Y�, “How Much Fiscal Discipline”, op. cit�
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be obliged to take part in bailout of reckless banks in partner economies 
without political backstops�
The third lesson has to do with the mission of the BCE: a normal 
monetary union requires a normal central bank� According to Eichengreen, 
its President Mario Draghi, with his famously cited commitment to do 
“whatever it takes” to save the eurozone from disruption opened in 2012 
its lender-of-last-resort season, but is still far from being a normal central 
bank� As proofs, its initial reluctance to combat deflation risks and its 
participation in the Troika pressures on member countries in order to 
introduce structural reforms� However, despite the regime change in 2012 
approximating the BCE to a lender of last resort through the Outright 
Monetary Transaction (OMT) programme involving the purchase of 
government securities on secondary market, it is also debatable that its 
strict mandate, exclusively focused on following a monetary policy rule, 
not taking into account the need to support employment and growth in 
a fragmented euro area, is up to the tasks of a normal central bank� 
Lesson four came as a possible surprise, asserting that labour mobility 
within a monetary union is a mixed blessing� Indeed, such an offsetting 
mechanism of an asymmetric adverse shock had been considered as a 
standard feature of the OCA theory, but recently a number of fresh 
studies have shown that in some circumstances its validity has been called 
into doubt� In particular, this holds when labour force cannot easily 
find a booming economy where to migrate to, as it happened during 
the Great Recession, which was globally scattered all over the eurozone� 
Furthermore, nowadays migration flows involve mainly high-skilled 
workers, prompting a long-term worsening of growth opportunities in 
laggard countries of origin� We can conclude that in such a context, other 
insurance tools against asymmetric disturbances have to be employed, 
with specific reference to a eurozone-wide centralised budget�
Linked to the previous point is the following lesson five, stating 
that fiscal union has distributional consequences, making it politically 
impossible to be achieved� In fact, as we saw when describing the main 
tenets of OCA theory, a normal offsetting tool alternative to a high degree 
of labour mobility is to make use of built-in stabilisers due to a centralised 
budget� However, the latter can be only devised in the framework of a 
fiscal union, whose stabilisation effects imply long-term redistributive 
consequences between partner countries� We find here one of the main 
stumbling blocks, which hamper the setting up of a viable eurozone: the 
refusal of Germany to give birth to what they call “a transfer union”� 
Nevertheless, it is not impossible in the not-too-distant future to offer 
the leading country of the euro area sufficient political guarantees to 
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overcome such an obstacle, if anything by reducing transfer effects to an 
acceptable size� 
The next two lessons concern both the link between fiscal policies 
and public debt� Lesson six focuses on the feasibility of self-insurance 
at the national level through countercyclical policies as a substitute for 
insufficient union-wide insurance mechanisms� In Eichengreen’s opinion 
fiscal stabilisation can be provided nationally with only if debt overhangs 
are removed, since the latter can reduce government policies credibility, 
even within the straitjacket of the Fiscal compact� Indeed, the functioning 
of automatic fiscal stabilisers, which in principle might be authorised at 
the union level, could not be enough to counteract a cyclical downturn 
in a shock-hit economy, when past public debt is so high as to prompt an 
increase in spreads on sovereign bonds, worsening the debt sustainability� 
As to more effective discretionary policies in the form of Keynesian 
interventions, they are not considered politically acceptable, due to the 
ordoliberal orthodoxy ruling the eurozone setup� We find here one of the 
foremost roots of the governments’ inability to fix the euro-area flawed 
bases�
A possible way out of this cumbersome state of affairs could consist 
in resorting to the view expressed in lesson seven, following which the 
eurozone needs a mechanism for restructuring unsustainable debts� As it 
happened in the case of Greek experience, that goal can be approximated 
by market-based debt restructuring, but also – when necessary – using 
bailout opportunities offered by the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM)� What is clear is that against a background of future stagnation 
or low growth perspectives, public debt in a number of periphery 
countries, such as Italy among others, might reveal unsustainable, with 
dire consequences for the eurozone long-term survival�
The final lesson eight of Eichengreen’s analysis establishes that 
monetary union is forever, more or less� Extending on previous richer 
inquiries15, the author argues that economic costs of adjustment in the 
aftermath of a secession are higher than those of an adjustment within 
the euro area� 
At the bottom of the list, his ending conclusions are that the only 
option at hand is fixing the eurozone, since its disruption would trigger 
“the mother of all financial crisis”, and that an orderly dismantling of the 
euro area is quite impossible� 
15 See Eichengreen, B�, “The Break-up of the Euro Area”, NBER Working Paper, 
No� 13393, 2007�
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All that, not taking into account the huge political capital invested 
in the eurozone membership� However, since he honestly recognises 
that nothing is irreversible, his view is far from being iron-clad, like all 
forecasts� Think about the threat to expel Greece from the eurozone 
during the bailout bargaining in Summer 2015�
3. Global Financial Crisis and Impacts on Sovereign Debt 
Predicament within the Euro Area
Going back to the roots of eurozone predicament, as a matter of 
general knowledge global financial crisis had its origins in the property 
subprime market in the US following the bursting of the housing bubble 
in 2007, causing bank insolvencies and negative wealth effects which 
translated into recessionary consequences for economic activities both 
at the national and international levels� Concerning the transmission 
of deflationary contagion to the world economy, the initial shock gave 
birth to what came to be dubbed the Great Recession in a large number 
of countries with peculiar features in the case of the euro area, which 
suffered from a double ailment: a customary slump due to the fall in US 
economic activity on the one hand and an idiosyncratic form of sovereign 
debt crisis which came to the fore in Greece in the autumn 2009, on the 
other, due to the fault lines on which the single currency had been based�
In addition to the diverging mechanism identified by Eichengreen 
in his first lesson on the intrinsic source of asymmetric shocks, another 
endogenous cause of sovereign debt crisis within the eurozone explaining 
Greek difficulties by that time is to be found in what could be called the 
“euro as a foreign currency trap”� As shown by De Grauwe in his “fragility 
hypothesis” paper, in the framework of the single currency area a debt 
denominated in euros is an equivalent of a foreign currency liability, on 
which the issuing country has no direct control, as it were an emerging 
economy16� 
As a result, in the absence of a fully-fledged central bank acting as a 
lender of last resort prior to the regime change in 2012 with the launch 
of the OMT programme, a sovereign country becomes fragilised, since it 
cannot warrant under all circumstances to serve its debt in a currency, over 
which it has lost any power� Hence, two destabilising effects produced 
in terms of self-fulfilling liquidity crisis on the one hand, and of wrong 
16 See De Grauwe, P�, “The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone”, CEPS Working 
Document, Economic Policy, May 2011�
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cyclical policies on the other� The former materialises when markets lose 
confidence in the debtor’s solvency and begin selling off sovereign bonds 
while investing in safe-haven debt titles such as the German ones, thus 
raising spreads and turning after few time liquidity into solvency crises� 
The latter are the consequence of a switching off of automatic fiscal 
stabilisers, when a debtor country in order to soothe speculation rises 
taxes and cuts spending, managing procyclical policies, which worsen the 
debt-to-GDP ratio�
At the end of the day, the final outcome of such a trap is that 
international markets increase their disciplinary power on countries 
such as the periphery ones, by triggering self-reinforcing slumps, thus 
imperilling the political and social acceptability of monetary integration: 
all in a sudden a shift from the promised heaven of the monetary union 
to the hell of a painful Great Recession hitting millions of people, in De 
Grauwe’s words17�
4. Different Remedies for Restoring Economic Growth 
In general terms, a severe recession can be fought by a mix of policies 
ranging from discretionary interventions in the form of Keynesian 
monetary and fiscal expansionary measures to rule-based contractionary 
measures aimed at recovering market confidence� Over such a continuum 
of recipes the chosen menu depends on the trust in the belief that fiscal 
policy can exert real effects18 and above all on the ideological bias against 
or in favour of government interventions� What is sure is that a number of 
governments have re-discovered Keynesian suggestions in the wake of the 
Great Recession whatever their political colour, with the salient exception 
of eurozone policymakers, cast in the straitjacket of the ordoliberal 
orthodoxy� With the caveat that the latter’s task was particularly difficult, 
due to the need to fight on two fronts: the economic downturn and the 
failures of eurozone’s foundations�
Indeed, in order to subdue impacts of the global recession triggered 
by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy countries such as the UK, the US 
and Japan carried out both fiscal and monetary discretionary policies 
that in broad terms can be considered of Keynesian type� Governments 
17 See De Grauwe, P�, “Design Failures in the Eurozone – Can they Be Fixed?”, 
European Economy, Economic Papers 491, April 2013, p� 9�
18 According to economists belonging to the rational expectation school, public 
investment crowds out private sector spending, i�e� is a substitute for the latter, thus 
resulting in no output increase�
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introduced tax and spending expansionary measures, whereas central 
banks adopted conventional and unconventional policies of monetary 
easing19, decreasing respectively interest rates and increasing emissions of 
central bank money through asset purchase programmes of both private 
and public sector assets, mainly in the form of government securities�
Thus, as far as fiscal policies are concerned, in the UK, in the time 
span 2007-2010, during the Brown government, after a huge £500 bn 
bank bailout and multibillion tax cuts combined with increased public 
spending, the budget deficit ballooned from -2�7 to -10�2 per cent, 
whereas the debt-to-GDP ratio doubled from 44�5 to 80 per cent� At 
the same time, the Bank of England reduced its policy rate from 5 to 
0�5 per cent from October 2008 to March 2009 and in the period 2007-
2010 through its quantitative easing programme of £200 bn expanded 
its balance sheet in terms of GDP by three time, i�e� to an unprecedented 
level over the past two centuries� As a result of such interventions, as early 
as 2010 GDP growth came back into positive territory with a +1�2 per 
cent change, compared to a -6�1 per cent in 200920� 
Along similar lines, in the US the government launched the largest 
intervention package at the international level on record to combat 
the economic downturn: a fiscal programme of $ 787 bn articulated in 
283 bn of tax cuts and 504 bn of public spending, mainly in infrastructure 
works with a budget deficit increased to -10 per cent in 2009� In parallel, 
the Fed reduced its federal funds rate from 5�25 in September 2007 to 
0-0�25 per cent in December 2008, starting also its quantitative easing 
policy in the same year, with assets purchases ballooning to $ 1�25 tn� As 
a consequence of such prompt responses, by mid-2009 the US recession 
was brought to an end: at that time GDP growth resumed to about 
2�7 per cent�21
As to Japan, the global recession hit the country hard with the largest 
post-war downturn causing a slump in GDP by 9 per cent� And in that 
case too, strong and prompt expansionary policies were carried out by 
19 See Klyuev, V�, de Imus, P� and Srinivasan, K�, “Unconventional Choices for 
Unconventional Times: Credit and Quantitative Easing in Advanced Economies”, 
IMF Staff Position Note No� 27, November 2007�
20 See Liu, L�, The Austerity Trap: Economic and Social Consequences of Fiscal 
Consolidation in Europe, Charleston, SC, Create Space Independent Publisher, 
2015; alongside Joyce, M�, Lasaosa, A�, Stevens, I� and Tong, M�, “The Financial 
Market Impact of Quantitative Easing”, Bank of England, Working Paper No� 393, 
August 2010�
21 See Rich, R�, “The Great Recession of 2007-09”, http://www�federalreservehistory�
org/Events/DetailView/58, accessed on 2 January 2016; Pollin R�, “US Government 
Deficits and Debt Amid the Great Recession”, PERI WP Series, No� 263, August 2011�
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both the government and the central bank� The former, beginning in 
2008 introduced several fiscal stimulus packages which reached a 4�7 per 
cent of that year’s GDP, while the general government deficit rose from 
-1�86 to -8�84 per cent in the period 2008-2009� In addition, the Bank 
of Japan cut its policy rate from 0�5 to 0�1 per cent by December 2008 
and in March 2009 extended the purchase of government securities from 
1�4 to 1�8 tn yen per month, after a previous programme of quantitative 
easing managed in the time span 2001-2006� Despite Japan’s long term 
deflationary experience, such interventions were accompanied by the 
technical closing of the recession in the first term of 2009, even though 
some time later a new downturn was triggered by the 2011 earthquake22�
Against such a backdrop showing a number of successful attempts to 
fight the severe economic downturn by authorities in countries disposing 
of the whole set of fiscal and monetary tools, the story of the long search 
for a way out of slumps within the eurozone was completely different, 
taking into account the fact that here the Great Recession extended to 
2014, since the economic downturn was coupled with the sovereign debt 
crisis in periphery countries�
5. A Biased Institutional Model Leading to  
a German Europe
Inside the euro area, when in 2009 starting with the Greek predicament 
market sentiments translated the economic downturn inherited from the 
US into a sovereign debt crisis and hence of the stability of the whole 
building of monetary integration, the EU realised that the euro was a 
naked emperor, whose survival was in jeopardy� In the absence of common 
sufficient backstops in the form of a centralised budget and other shock 
absorbing tools the first response from European policymakers consisted 
in a drastic change of policy regime� Due to the fact that the EU lacked 
credible alternatives, the task to alleviate the crisis was assigned not to the 
Community system with its set of imperfect albeit partially democratic 
institutions, but to national governments negotiations� 
Thus, a new body was created: the Eurogroup, in the framework of 
which creditor countries led by the most exposed and powerful of them, 
Germany, dictated their conditions in order to bail out debtor countries 
22 See OECD Economic Survey: Japan, OECD, Paris, 2001, alongside OECD, 
General Gov ernment Deficit (indicator)� Doi: 10�1787/77079edb-en, accessed on 
3 January 2016�
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on the brink of insolvency through mandatory fiscal consolidation 
programmes� 
Useless to say, in such a body Germany’s bargaining power in front of 
each debtor periphery country asking for a financial help was a high multiple 
of the latter’s, strengthening the former’s temptation to make use of its 
new-found might achieved after the national re-unification and its labour 
market restructuring (or a form of an ex-ante internal devaluation), for 
obtaining what was judged to be the best terms for it� Hence, it came as 
no surprise that the programmes imposed on periphery countries, both 
officially subject to an aid procedure (in turn Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Cyprus) or being a possible candidate for them, such as for 
instance Italy, were inspired by the ordoliberal orthodoxy and the rule-
based contractionary approach� With the caveat that the triumph of so 
a Weltanschauung has been crowned by the fact that in a short time the 
austerity rules were introduced into the EU legislation too and even, as 
far as the fiscal compact principle is concerned, with internal laws at 
constitutional level� 
In a nutshell, for a country which is still scared by the ghost of 
hyperinflation that destroyed its currency four generations ago, whose 
Zeitgeist confounds “debt” and “guilt”23 and maintains that inter-country 
cooperation can only require national integrity with no need for collective 
action24, the danger is looming that the old dream of a European Germany 
evoked in the aftermath of re-unification may become the nightmare of 
a German Europe, as was later showed by the capitulation imposed by 
the Finance Minister Schäuble on Greece during the bailout bargaining 
in Summer 2015�
Against this background, a last point worth being underscored regards 
the manifold contradictions characterising the position of the pivotal 
country of the eurozone as to the continued European integration process� 
The same Schäuble, who authored with Lamers in 1994 a groundbreaking 
project to set up a core Europe (Kerneuropa) for accelerating the shift to 
a political union25 and is still considered one of the strongest promoters 
of European federalism, belonging to the old German generation of 
23 The reference here is to the German word “Schuld”, which bears the double meaning�
24 The root of the saying: “Let everyone sweep in front of his own  door, and the 
whole  world  will be clean”, which is frequently quoted by several German 
policymakers, as for instance the Finance Minister Schäuble, meaning that a country 
can be bailed out only on the basis of its own efforts, implying no collective action 
problem, is to be found in Goethe’s sentence, according to which “Jeder kehre vor der 
eigenen Tür und die Welt ist sauber”�
25 See Lamers, K� and Schäuble, W�, “More Integration is Still the Right Goal for 
Europe”, Financial Times, August 31, 2014�
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statesmen such as Kohl, did not hesitate to challenge the perennity of 
monetary integration threatening Greece with expulsion from the euro 
area, during the said bargaining� A fatal error that markets will not forget 
in the future, jeopardising the durability of the eurozone by emphasising 
its metamorphosis into a trivial fixed exchange rates system, beyond the 
asymmetric adjustment burden entirely shifted on debtor countries� 
Not to speak of Germany’s unwillingness to reflate enough its economy 
exploiting its huge current account surpluses for helping periphery 
countries’ sluggish recovery, or of the hard stance of the constitutional 
court in Karlsruhe, which under pretext of the European Parliament 
democracy gap, with its rulings casts into doubt the primacy of the EU 
legal system, let alone of – last but not least – renouncing to use its top-
heavy power position among member governments for openly exerting 
its leadership in the frame of the general Community system, with its full 
set of albeit limited democratic checks and balances�
6. Austerity or the Wrong Treatment
Alongside the biased institutional model of inter-government 
bargaining instead of the usual Community system, as to its content the 
initial governments response to the euro area’s crisis was focused on a 
two-pronged strategy: to build up a number of financial firewalls aiming 
at mobilising a first economic aid for supporting periphery countries 
in trouble, on the one hand, and compel the latter to carry out severe 
fiscal consolidation programmes, on the other� In such a way a number 
of emergency funds were established, such as the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) and the ESM, awaiting at the same time for the 
bailout interventions to produce their effects� 
The latter, however proved in many cases disappointing26: only the 
credible commitment in 2012 by the ECB President Mario Draghi to 
act as a European Hamilton27 by providing the euro with unlimited 
financial support via the newborn OMT succeeded in subduing market 
speculation attacks lifting the eurozone out of the breakup verge on 
which it was reduced� In addition, in order to save the huge political 
26 Not to speak of Greece, which in the period 2009-2015 was under three Eurogroup 
fiscal consolidation programmes, also Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus despite (or 
owing to) their bailout measures recorded increased debt-to-GDP ratios�
27 Alexander Hamilton, head of the Federalist Party, in his capacity of US federation 
first Secretary of the Treasury, strengthened the newborn state by consolidating the 
liabilities of the former 13 American colonies into a fresh common federal debt� 
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capital invested into the monetary integration achievement and to avoid 
unprecedented possible economic, social and political costs caused by 
its collapse, governments were obliged to introduce into the EU law 
provisions casting a straitjacket on the residual fiscal autonomy of euro 
area’s member countries with an emphasis on a European control on 
national stability legislations and measures linked to the Fiscal compact 
packet, together with prospective steps towards a future banking union� 
The reasons why contractionary policies failed to fix the periphery 
countries predicament causing on the contrary an increase of their debt-
to-GDP ratios were first explained by Irving Fisher in a breakthrough 
paper published in 1933 in the wake of the Great Depression28� In 
short, according to De Grauwe’s interpretation29, following the former’s 
description of his debt-deflation dynamics, the attempt to rein in an 
excessive public debt overhang through government spending cuts was 
often self-defeating, since the latter produce new downturns with income 
falls which raise the relative weight of residual government liabilities� As 
an early vindication of such a point, one can refer to the fresh recession 
brought about by Roosevelt in 1937 when his administration decided 
too rapidly to stop monetary and fiscal expansionary policies and reduce 
the debt incurred for fighting the Great Depression30�
Despite that history lesson, thanks to the ordoliberal thought ruling 
the Eurogroup managing of the crisis together with some policy recipes 
advocated by a number of mainstream economists belonging to the anti-
Keynesian approach, bailout programmes were based on procyclical 
austerity measures in terms of spending cuts and balanced budgets�
As a consequence, fiscal consolidation achieved in all euro-area 
countries in trouble was associated with economic downturns, increasing 
at the same time the burden of the government debt in relation to GDP, 
as we have hinted� For instance, in the case of Greece, the worst one 
among periphery countries, in a paper31 on the costs incurred due to 
the bailout cure, Gechert and Rannenberg show that austerity suffered 
in the period 2010-2014 explains almost entirely the significant fall in 
GDP experienced since 2009 (by about 26-28 per cent)� In the absence 
28 See Fisher, I�, “The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions”, Econometrica, 
1933, 1, p� 337-357�
29 See De Grauwe, P�, “What Kind of Governance for the Eurozone?”, CEPS Policy 
Brief, No� 214, September 2010�
30 See Krugman, P�, “How the Case for Austerity Has Crumbled”, The New York Review 
of Books, June 6, 2013�
31 See Gechert, S� and Rannenberg, A�, “The Costs of Greece’s Fiscal Consolidation”, 
IMK Policy Brief, March 2015, revised version, June 18, 2015�
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of it, the Greek economy would have gone through a long time span of 
stagnation but not of depression: the GDP would have been similar to 
that of 2009 and the debt-to-GDP ratio would have be only somewhat 
higher32� As to the economic costs altogether of austerity in Greece it 
should be added that according to some estimates its Great Recession has 
been worse than the US Great Depression33�
Austerity policies were based on mainstream economic theories, 
which have been discredited by the outcome of the severe global crisis 
erupted in 2007-2008� As shown by the recent literature within the 
Institute of New Economic Thinking (INET) foundation of economic 
analysis, in particular, the three main pillars of the dominant neoliberal 
thought that can validate them have been falsified by the real behaviour 
of economies at the international level� In fact, nor the dogma of market 
self-regulation, or those of euthanasia of government interventions and 
the optimum allocation features of free market can be considered as 
scientifically safe in a context of world globalisation34� 
Among recent neoclassical theories that prompted European 
policymakers to adopt procyclical measures we can cite those describing 
the merits of the so-called expansionary austerity, by authors such as 
Alesina and Ardagna35 on the one hand, and Reinhart and Rogoff’s 
alleged discovery that a debt level higher than 90 per cent of GDP was 
incompatible with a steady growth36, on the other�
According to Alesina and Ardagna, large cuts in public spending in 
advanced countries did not cause economy to contract, as the Keynesian 
32 However, taking into account the first two bailout programmes in the period 2009-
2014, Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 130 to 177 per cent�
33 See Klein, E�, “Greece’s Debt Crisis Explained in Charts and Maps”, Vox Policy 
and Politics, July 6, 2015, http://www�vox�com/2015/7/1/8871509/greece-charts 
accessed on 9 January 2016�
34 See Reverchon, A�, “Pour un nouvel âge de l’économie”, Le Monde, 11 avril, 2015; 
The INET “Liberté, Egalité, Fragilité”, Conference New Economic Thinking, Paris, 
8-11 April 2015, http://beta�ineteconomics�org/ accessed on 14 April 2015; Kay J�, 
“Pragmatism Works Best in the Reform of Economics”, Financial Times, April 15, 
2015�
35 See Alesina, A� and Ardagna, S�, “Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes Versus 
Spending”, NBER Working Paper No� 15438, 2009� For a critique of Alesina’s thesis 
see, among others, Islam, I� and Chowdhury, A�, “The Debate on Expansionary Fiscal 
Consolidation: How Robust is the Evidence?”, The Economic and Labour Relations 
Review, 23, No� 3, 2012, p� 13-37; Krugman, P�, “That Old-Time Economics”, The 
NewYork Times, April 17, 2015, besides Coy, P�, “Keynes vs� Alesina� Alesina Who?”, 
Bloomberg Businessweek, June 29, 2010�
36 See Reinhart, C� and Rogoff, K�, “Growth in a Time of Debt”, NBER Working Paper 
No� 15639, 2010� See also Krugman, P�, “That Old-Time”, op. cit�
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theory states37, but by contrast produced in several cases an expansionary 
stimulus increasing output and employment� The explanation was that a 
more balanced budget can foster the animal spirits of the private sector, 
boosting confidence and sustaining growth� Along with other papers of 
the so-called “Bocconi boys”, the case for expansionary fiscal austerity was 
made� With the caveat that many influential international policymakers 
in search of a theoretical justification for their ideological bias against 
the welfare state swiftly followed that intellectual lead and translated it 
into policy measures38� The trouble with such a theory is that it is largely 
groundless� 
Indeed, a subsequent inquiry by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) based on 173 cases of fiscal changes in seventeen OECD countries 
showed that the expansionary austerity hypothesis was found to have had 
little support� In most experiences under scrutiny fiscal consolidation was 
not followed by an economic expansion but by a slump39�
As to Reinhart and Rogoff, their much quoted paper showing the 
need to rein in excessive debt in order to restore growth via austerity 
incurred a worse fate� Their main findings covering a data set of forty-
four countries over a time span of about two centuries were that above a 
ceiling of debt-to-GDP ratio of 90 per cent median growth rates decline 
by one per cent and average rates fall even more, and that external debt 
has a larger impact: by a height of 60 per cent of that ratio growth is 
reduced by about two per cent while collapsing by a half for higher levels� 
However, not taking into account some minor doubts as to its validity, 
when the authors published the data sheets on which their study was 
based, their results proved wrong, due to a number of trivial computing 
mistakes and above all to the omission in the sample of countries such as 
Canada, New Zealand and Australia� In fact, by attempting to reproduce 
their findings a team from the University of Massachusetts Amherst 
showed their irrelevance and found that by contrast a quite high level of 
debt may be associate with satisfactory growth rates40�
37 Keynes, cited by Krugman, P� (“How the Case for Austerity”, op. cit, p� 1), maintained 
that “the boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity”�
38 See Islam, I� and Chowdhury, A�, “The Debate on Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation”, 
op. cit�
39 See Guajardo, J�, Leigh, D� and Pescatori, A�, “Expansionary Austerity: New 
International Evidence”, IMF WP No� 11/158, IMF, 2011�
40 See Herndon, T�, Ash, M� and Pollin, R�, “Does High Public Debt Consistently 
Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff”, PERI, University of 
Massachusetts Amherst 4/15/2013� The authors find, among other things, that at an 
over 90 per cent debt-to-GDP ratio the average growth rate, properly calculated, is 
2�2 per cent�
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Beside the theoretical rout caused by the falsification of two of its main 
pillars, the case for expansionary fiscal austerity suffered from miscalculation 
of fiscal multipliers, i� e� the quantity links between fiscal changes and their 
effects in terms of growth-rate differences� Whereas consolidation measures 
within bailout programmes were deemed to have a fiscal multiplier of 0�5, 
a few of subsequent assessments found that the latter was biased by an error 
factor of 3 or 4, that is to say that the contractionary outcomes of such 
measures were far worse than initially thought41� 
7. Possible Ways Out of the Eurozone Crisis
Despite the huge economic and social costs in terms of foregone growth 
and increased unemployment caused by the euro-area predicament and 
the poisonous medicine of austerity used in order to cure it, by early 2016 
the eurozone crisis seems far from having been fixed: at best it has been 
frozen or, according to a possible pessimistic view has been put into a state 
of pharmaceutical coma, thanks mainly to the quantitative easing cure 
delivered by the ECB42� On average, the euro area’s recession is over, and 
even its GDP per head at market prices has recovered to the levels of 2006-
200743� In addition, after the third bailout programme for Greece and the 
41 De Grauwe and Ji estimate that with a fiscal multiplier of 1�4 the periphery countries 
had to cut their GDP by 2�8 per cent in order to improve their fiscal balance by 1 per 
cent� See De Grauwe, P� and Ji, Y�, “The Legacy of Austerity in the Eurozone”, CEPS 
Commentary, October 4, 2013� See also Blanchard, O� and Leigh, D�, “Growth 
Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers”, IMF Working Paper No� 13/1, 2013�
42 For an updated balanced assessment of the euro experience see CER, “Conference 
Report: Has the Euro Been a Failure?”, Ditchley Park Oxfordshire, http://www�cer�
org�uk/sites/default/files/Ditchleyreport_11Jan16�pdf, accessed on 13 January 2016� 
Concerning the effects of the quantitative easing (QE) purchases within the euro area 
launched in March 2015, a couple of forecasts put forth by the ECB in the same period 
gives no room for expecting a quick resumption of a satisfactory growth within the 
eurozone� Indeed, even by the end of 2017, unemployment in the area could be as 
high as 9�9 per cent, i� e� far above the 7�2 minimum recorded in 2008 (see Jones, C�, 
“Eurozone Jobless Outlook Points up Fears of Persistent Stagnation”, Financial Times, 
March 24, 2015)� On the other hand, the level of workers non employed in the US was 
at 5�5 per cent in February 2015 and in the UK was heading to 5�3 per cent towards 
the year’s end� On the general effects of QE see also Fleming, S�, “No Easy Way for the 
Fed to Reverse Course”, Financial Times, December 19-20, 2015� In addition, risks 
that a zero interest-rate policy, as the quantitative easing interventions indeed are, could 
nurture future asset bubbles have to be taken into consideration, as the Bundesbank 
and German officials vocally maintain (See Charrel, M�, “Le ‘bazooka’ de Mario Draghi 
n’est pas sans risque”, Le Monde, 15 avril 2015)�
43 See European Commission, “Ameco Results”, http://ec�europa�eu/economy_finance/
ameco/, accessed on 22 April 2015�
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looming catastrophe of the Greek expulsion, both governments and EU 
authorities have moved along a bumpy road leading to more integration 
within the eurozone, whose main steps were an accelerated shift of fiscal 
powers to the European system, together with advancements towards a 
banking union� 
However, challenges that could imperil in the medium-long run 
the very survival of the eurozone and of the EU at large44 have been 
increasing, both at the internal and external levels� The latter witness 
the management of biblical migrations from African and Middle East 
countries and the fight against terrorism of varied origins� The former 
are if possible more daunting since they include economic and political 
danger backstops ranging from the need of an urgent change into 
the economic paradigm towards growth-oriented policies, let alone 
to combat the anti-European populist movements and parties, which 
have already conquered the government power or are near to it in a 
number of countries, to measures aimed at fixing the eurozone fault 
lines in order to make sure its perennity, to the necessity of stopping 
the disintegration drive towards secession or expulsion, beginning with 
keeping Greece within the euro area, in the wake of UK Brexit45�
As to the first point, after the launching of the quantitative easing 
purchase of government bonds by the ECB in 2015, its disappointing 
effects on inflation rates, which remain largely below the target of just under 
two per cent, and the subsequent extension of it to 2017, along with the 
sluggish growth in the area, it is manifest that the monetary policy has to 
be complemented by a parallel expansionary fiscal policy� What is needed 
are expansionary fiscal measures and a fresh policy of public investments, 
beyond the narrow flexibility recently introduced by the Commission: 
without it unemployment is bound to remain too high� In fact, the much 
trumpeted Juncker investment plan has proved unsatisfactory both for its 
limited size and effects46, above all if the hypothesis of secular stagnation 
recently revisited by Larry Summers could at least explain part of the low 
44 Possible scenarios of future fates for the European institutions should they prove 
unable to meet current challenges include disorderly collapses such as that of the 
Soviet Union implosion or of a loss of vitality and irrelevance as it happened over 
centuries to the Holy Roman Empire�
45 Yet, it should be added that views are developing, according to which a eurozone 
freed from diverging countries such as Greece or an EU without a Eurosceptic UK 
could accelerate a shift towards a European political union�
46 On the limits of the 315 bn Juncker Plan see De Masi, F�, Lopez, P� and Viegas, M�, 
“Juncker-Voodo, Why the Investment Plan for Europe Will not Revive the Economy”, 
www�fabio-de-masi�de/kontext, accessed on 13 January 2016� 
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growth in Europe47� All that, not to mention the fact that in a framework of 
economic stagnation the public debt burden for most indebted countries 
such as Italy, which is currently alleviated by the negligible interest rates 
paid on government liabilities due to the ultra-loose ECB monetary policy 
through quantitative easing measures, once the latter concluded, in a 
context of raising rates risks becoming unbearable� In a nutshell, the case 
for expansionary fiscal policies and more investment-oriented policies is 
really compelling� From this standpoint, a European plan for a sustainable 
development could be the right choice48�
Concerning the reforms needed in order to stabilise the eurozone, the 
road map should be clear enough: increasing the shift from the current 
Eurogroup management based on government negotiations to more 
integration within the Community system� 
From the political standpoint, what is mostly necessary are advances 
towards more democratic accountability within the Union� As clarified by 
the dramatic experience of Greek capitulation after the hard bargaining 
of the third bailout programme, the democratic gap of the latter has been 
greatly increased, since democracy at the national level, as expressed by 
local parliaments and governments, is more often than not conculcated by 
European bodies� Indeed, as shown by Rodrik’s trilemma, deep economic 
integration, nation state and democratic politics are mutually exclusive 
in the sense that in order to save two of them the third item has to be 
renounced to� In particular, deep economic integration acts as a « golden 
straitjacket » on nation state in the absence of democracy, whereas deep 
economic integration and democratic politics can be compatible with the 
nation state via the « global federalism » choice� Applied to the case of the 
EU-eurozone, that implies that the clash between national democracy 
and deep economic integration may be solved by the federal replication 
of democratic politics from the national to the European level49�
From the economic point of view, after the incoming banking 
union, what is needed are new steps forward towards a complete 
economic integration, ranging from the capital market union to a fiscal 
47 See Summers, L�, “US Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, and the 
Zero Lower Bound”, Business Economics, 2014, 49, 65-73� In any case, the current 
recovery within the eurozone could be short lived if Summers’ interpretation of 
the secular stagnation hypothesis should prove correct, as the IMF’s 2015 Spring 
Outlook seems to suggest� See Wolf, M�, “An Economic Future that May Never 
Brighten”, Financial Times, April 15, 2015�
48 See Majocchi, A�, Un piano per l’Europa. Sviluppo sostenibile e occupazione, Bologna, 
Il Mulino, 2015�
49 See Rodrik, D�, “How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Winter 2000, 14, p� 177-186�
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union, implying a form of fully-fledged political union� The plan for 
a functioning banking union has to be completed with the third pillar 
of a European-wide deposit insurance, after those of the ECB banking 
supervision and the single resolution mechanism� German resistances to 
the setting up of such a pillar due to the fear of turning the eurozone 
into a transfer union have to be overcome, awaiting for the moment 
when in the wake of 2017 new elections in Germany and France it will 
be possible to open the site of treaty changes, that will make it feasible 
to go on the route towards a two-tier Europe, with a larger circle based 
on the single market and an inner one of a eurozone fiscal union50, with 
a single Treasury and an autonomous budget51� We have seen that a fiscal 
union implies profound transfer effects between member countries, 
which require a democratic control on them in a framework of a kind 
of fully-fledged political union, where the fundamental principle of 
« no taxation without representation » will be articulated in a European 
context, beginning with a eurozone Parliament�
All that provided that enough political capital for such an ambitious 
goal might be collected, a prerequisite, whose availability is currently 
lacking� Hoping that in the meanwhile forces that are working for the 
EU disintegration will not prevail�
8. Final Remarks
In this note we have described the manifold aspects of the eurozone 
crisis origins and outcomes with a view to identifies some possible ways 
out of the current predicament, where the euro area is still trapped� 
We have seen how the fate of monetary integration and the European 
integration process at large are linked together and how an eventual 
failure to fix its ailments could translate into a stop or unravelling of such 
50 Mody shows how high are the risks for the stability of the euro area in the absence of a 
fiscal union� See Mody A�, « Living (Dangerously) Without a Fiscal Union », Bruegel 
WP No� 3, March, 2015� See also Bénassy-Quéré, A�, Ragot, X� and Wolff, G�, “Which 
Fiscal Union for the Euro Area?”, Bruegel Policy Contribution, February 18, 2016�
51 Recently the German and the French Presidents of local branches of ECB put forth 
a proposal for the creation of a eurozone Treasury supplemented by an independent 
fiscal council under the control of a eurozone parliament, in the framework of a 
“financing and investment union”, which can be considered as an intermediate stage 
between the current incomplete monetary integration and a future fiscal union, in 
line with the EU Commission’s project for the capital market union� See Villeroy de 
Galhau, F� et Weidmann, J�, “Renforcer l’intégration européenne pour restaurer la 
confiance”, Le Monde, 7 février 2016�
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a long-lasting endeavour to build up an ever closer union of European 
countries, at a time where risks of disintegration are increasing�
According to standard economic thinking, or the OCA approach, 
the model of monetary union on which the eurozone setup was based 
was flawed, since the neoliberal bias of the so-called Brussels-Frankfurt 
consensus at its roots was unfit to safeguard the stability of a monetary 
building which lacked asymmetric adverse shock-absorbers, such as 
labour mobility or a large enough centralised budget� Hence the diverging 
trends between core and periphery countries within the eurozone in the 
wake of its creation, that put in jeopardy its viability� With the caveat 
that the global finance predicament deriving from the US property 
bubble, in its contagion effects on the UE translated into not only an 
economic downturn but a sovereign debt crisis too� In the absence of 
effective shock-absorbing mechanisms and a central bank not acting, at 
least initially, as a last-resort lender, periphery countries found themselves 
trapped in a situation of emerging economies indebted in a currency over 
which they had no control�
In reacting to the crisis, member countries made two fatal errors: from 
the institutional point of view the Community system was abandoned 
for the benefit of intergovernmental negotiations, on the one hand, 
and from the economic standpoint only the bitter medicine of austerity 
programmes was delivered as a cure, on the other� The first mistake 
paved the way to a German Europe, where the power gap between the 
leading country in the eurozone and its followers grew unbridgeable, 
while the second one caused an area-wide long lasting downturn and 
made economic ailments of periphery countries worse, with social 
and economic costs soaring, in at least a case, the Greek one, to levels 
higher than the US Great Depression’s� The two errors were in fact 
intertwined since the mainstream ordoliberal orthodoxy predominant 
among German policymakers prescribes austerity as the main cure for 
a downturn, even though recent theories on advantages of procyclical 
measures such as those of expansionary fiscal consolidation and anti-
growth effects of excessive debt have been shown to be lacking sound 
scientific evidence� By contrast, at the global level, countries such as 
the US, the UK and Japan fought the downturn resorting to standard 
countercyclical measures with monetary and fiscal expansionary policies, 
coming out of recessions in a few years� 
In Europe, only at a later date reforms in the institutional setting of 
the euro area were carried out, for increasing the resilience of the monetary 
building in terms of enhanced integration in the banking sector and 
strengthening of a shift of fiscal power from the national to the union 
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level, beyond the emergency aid funds set up in the immediate aftermath 
of the crisis� 
At the same time, only the regime change introduced by the President 
Draghi in 2012 to save at any cost the euro making the ECB a sui generis 
lender of last resort and the subsequent purchase of government bonds 
through quantitative easing interventions succeeded in freezing at least 
temporarily the crisis, while another dumb mistake made by German 
authorities during the third bailout negotiations threatening to expel 
Greece from the area underlined the metamorphosis of eurozone into 
a fixed exchange rate system, after the adjustment burden put on the 
shoulders of debtors only� 
All this, not to speak of the populist backlash against the Eurogroup 
policies and of the increasing contradiction between national democracy 
and deep economic integration, which is putting at risk, along with more 
recent dangers, the very survival of the eurozone and of the EU at large�
Against such a conflicting background, possible remedies could 
consist in more growth-oriented policies via expansionary fiscal policies, 
public investment programmes or bold European plans, beyond the 
unsatisfactory Juncker project, as to the economic suggestions, and in 
advancements towards more integration by revamping the Community 
system, completing the banking union and making progress towards a 
fiscal union, along with adding to the national one also the European level 
of democracy and politics, as to the institutional and political initiatives�
All that, hoping that the disintegration forces that are currently 
at work could not prevail in the near or in the not-too-distant future 
delivering the eurozone-EU to the fate of the former Soviet Union or of 
the century-long but irrelevant Holy Roman Empire�
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1.  Introductory Considerations: Problems of 
Interpretation in EU Law following the Euro Crisis
Several years have passed since the onset of the so-called sovereign debt 
crisis and the turbulence that marked the European Monetary Union 
(EMU)� In spite of the laudable efforts made above all by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) to prevent irrevocable damage to European 
Monetary Union (EMU), and the agreement reached in August 2015 
over the third Greek bailout, I believe that the need for reform of the 
current legal framework of the EMU is patently obvious together with 
probably the economic and political constitution of the European Union 
as a whole� Moreover, without reforms it is unrealistic to imagine that 
further serious systemic risks can be avoided even though European 
institutions and Member States have managed, some more than others, 
to stave off the danger and avert the disintegration of the European legal 
system� Apart from the essentially political question of Greece, one has 
only to think of the European Court of Justice’s decision in the Gauweiler 
case1, which legitimised the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions 
(hereinafter OMT) in the face of the German Constitutional Court’s 
rhetorically worded reference2�
1 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400�
2 About the preliminary ruling of the German Constitutional Court see Editorial 
comment, “An unintended side-effect of Draghi’s bazooka: An opportunity to establish 
a more balanced relationship between the ECJ and Member States’ highest courts”, in 
Common Market Law Review (from now on Comm. Market Law Rev.), 2014, 375 ff�; 
Pernice, I�, “A Difficult Partnership between Courts: The First Preliminary Reference 
by the German Federal Constitutional Court to the CJEU”, in Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law (from now on Maastr. Jour. Eur. & Com. Law), 
2014, 3; Di Fabio, U�, Karlsruhe Makes a Referral; Mayer, F� C�, Rebels Without a Cause? 
A Critical Analysis of the German Constitutional Court’s OMT reference; Murswiek, D�, 
ECB, ECJ, Democracy, and the Federal Constitutional Court: Notes on the Federal 
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It is true that recent important works by scholars have sought to go 
beyond a mere reassessment of the constitutional system of the EU and 
EMU3; it is also true that over the last few years legal studies on economic 
and monetary union have occupied considerable space in specialised 
journals after years of relative disinterest4�
Having said this, it is evident that in an effort to safeguard the EMU 
and with it the European Union, the overall consistency of the system has 
suffered from legal contrivance (bending of the rules) that has weakened 
the very principles of the rule of law on which the Union’s legal system 
over decades has been built5� 
Constitutional Court’s Referral Order From 14 January 2014; Bast, J�, Don’t Act Beyond 
Your Powers: the Perils and Pitfalls of the German Constitutional Court’s Ultra Vires 
Review; Gärditz, K� F�, Beyond Symbolism: Towards a Constitutional Actio Popularis in 
EU affairs? A Commentary on the OMT Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court; 
Kumm, M�, Rebel Without a Good Cause: Karlsruhe’s Misguided Attempt to Draw The 
CJEU Into A Game Of “Chicken” and What the CJEU Might Do About it; Schneider, K�, 
Questions and Answers: Karlsruhe’s Referral for a Preliminary Ruling to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union; Thiele, A�, Friendly or Unfriendly Act? The “Historic” Referral of 
the Constitutional Court to the ECJ Regarding the ECB’s OMT Program; Goldmann, 
M�, Adjudicating Economics? Central Bank Independence and the Appropriate Standard 
of Judicial Review; Gerner-Beuerle, C�, Küçük, E�, Schuster, E�, Law Meets Economics 
in the German Federal Constitutional Court: Outright Monetary Transactions on Trial; 
Petersen, N�, Karlsruhe Not Only Barks, But Finally Bites – Some Remarks on the 
OMT Decision of the German Constitutional Court; Schiek, D�, The German Federal 
Constitutional Court’s Ruling on Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) – Another 
Step Towards National Closure?; Beukers, T�, The Bundesverfassungsgericht Preliminary 
Reference on the OMT Program: “in the ECB We Do Not Trust. What About You?”; 
Pliakos, A�, Anagnostaras, G�, “Blind Date Between Familiar Strangers: the German 
Constitutional Court Goes Luxembourg!”, all in German Law Journal (from now on 
Ger. Law Jour.), 2014, 107 ff� 
3 See Lenaerts, K�, “EMU and the European Union’s Constitutional Framework”, in 
European Law Review (from now on Eur. Law Rev.), 2014, 753 ff� On this topic see also 
Chiti, E�, Teixeira, P� G�, “The constitutional implications of the European responses 
to the financial and public debt crisis”, in Comm. Market law. Rev�, 2013, 683 ff�; 
Leino, P�, Salminen, J�, “Should the Economic and Monetary Union Be Democratic 
after All; Some Reflections on the Current Crisis”, in Ger. Law Jour�, 2013, 844 ff�; 
Tomkin, J�, “Contradiction, circumvention and conceptual gymnastics: The impact 
of the adoption of the ESM Treaty on the state of European democracy”, in Ger. Law 
Jour�, 2013, 169 ff�; Maduro, M� P�, de Witte, B�, Kumm, M� (eds�), The Democratic 
Governance of the Euro, RSCAS Policy Papers 2012/08, Badia Fiesolana, 2012; 
Allen, F�, Carletti, E�, Simonetti, S� (eds�), Governance for the Eurozone: Integration or 
Disintegration?, Philadelphia, 2012�
4 See also infra, § II�
5 See, Von Bogdandy, A�, Ioannidis, M�, “Systemic deficiency in the rule of law: what it 
is, what has been done, what can be done”, in Comm. Market Law Rev�, 2014, 59 ff; 
Beck, G�, “The Court of Justice, the Bundesverfassungsgericht and Legal Reasoning 
during the Euro Crisis: The Rule of Law as a Fair-Weather Phenomenon”, in European 
Public Law (from now on Eur. Pub. Law), 2014, 539 ff� More generally, Besselink, 
I will not discuss here in detail all the steps in the euro crisis6 and the 
medium-term measures adopted, from the so-called ‘Six Pack’7 to the 
adoption of the Fiscal Compact and the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM)8� Being outside the scope of this work, I will also not discuss 
L�, Pennings, F�, Prechal, S� (eds�), The Eclipse of the Legality Principle in the European 
Union, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2011� 
6 On this topic, see De Streel, A�, “The Evolution of the EU Economic Governance Since 
the Treaty of Maastricht: an Unfinished Task”, in Maastr. Jour. Eur. & Com Law, 2013, 
336 ff�; Megliani, M�, “Verso una nuova architettura finanziaria europea: un percorso 
accidentato”, in Diritto del Commercio Internazionale (from now on Dir. comm. int.), 
2013, 67; Viterbo, A�, Cisotta, R�, “La crisi del debito sovrano e gli interventi dell’UE: 
dai primi strumenti finanziari al ‘Fiscal Compact’”, in Diritto dell’Unione europea, 
2012, 323 ff�; Peroni, G�, La crisi dell’euro: limiti e rimedi dell’Unione economica e 
monetaria, Milan, 2012; Tosato, G�  L�, “L’integrazione europea ai tempi della crisi 
dell’euro”, in Rivista di Diritto Internazionale (from now on Riv. dir. int.), 2012, 681 ff�
7 Reference is made to the Reg� (EU) No� 1173/2011 (OJEU L 306 of 23 November 
2011, 1 ff�), No� 1174/2011 (ibidem, 8), No� 1175/2011 (ibidem, 12), No� 1176/2011 
(ibidem, 25), and No� 1177/2011 (ibidem, 33), and of Dir� No�  2011/85/EU 
(ibidem, 41)�
8 On the two treaties see, among others, Cantore, C� M�, Martinico, G�, “Asymmetry or 
Dis-integration? A Few Considerations on the New ‘Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union”, in Eur. Pub. Law, 2013, 
463 ff�; Baratta, R�, “Legal Issue of the Fiscal Compact  – Searching for a Mature 
Democratic Governance of the Euro”, in Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2012, 647 ff�; 
Cogliandro, G�, “L’impatto del fiscal compact sul sistema di governance europea”, in 
Diritto comunitario e degli scambi internazionali (from now on Dir. com. scambi int.), 
2013, 337 ff�; Della Cananea, G�, “L’ordinamento giuridico dell’Unione Europea dopo 
i nuovi accordi intergovernativi”, in La Comunità Internazionale (from now on Com. 
Int.), 2012, 3 ff�; Gocaj, L�, Meunier, S�, “Time will tell: the EFSF, the ESM, and 
the Euro Crisis”, in Journal of European Integration (from now on Jour. Eur. Integr.), 
2013, 239 ff�; Stephanou,  C�  A�, “Building Firewalls: European Responses to the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis”, in Hieronymi, O�, Stephanou, C� A� (eds�), International Debt: 
Economic, Financial, Monetary, Political and Regulatory Aspects, Basingstoke, 2013, 127 
ff�; Editorial Comment�, “Some thoughts concerning the Draft Treaty on a Reinforced 
Economic Union”, in Comm. Market Law Rev., 2012, 1  ff�; Baron Crespo,  E�, 
Holland, S�, “Resolving the Eurozone Crisis and Enhancing Global Governance”, in 
La com. int., 2012, 13 ff�; Besselink, L� F� M�, Reestman, J� H�, “The Fiscal Compact 
and the European Constitution: Europe Speaking German”, in European Constitutional 
Law Review (from now on Eur. Const. Law Rev.), 2012, 1 ff�; Calliess, C�, “From Fiscal 
Compact to Fiscal Union? New Rules for the Eurozone”, in Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Lega Studies (from now on Cambr. Year. Eur. Leg. Stud.), 2011-2012, 101 ff�; 
Calliess, C�, Schoenfleisch, C�, “Auf dem Weg in die europäische “Fiskalunion”? 
– Europa  – und verfassungsrechtliche Fragen einer Reform der Wirtschafts – und 
Währungsunion im Kontext des Fiskalvertrages”, in JuristenZeitung, 2012, 481 ff�; 
Craig, P�, “The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics 
and Pragmatism”, in Eur. Law Rev�, 2012, 231 ff�; De Gregorio Merino, A�, “Legal 
developments in the Economic and Monetary Union during the Debt Crisis: The 
Mechanisms of Financial Assistance”, in Comm. Market Law. Rev., 2012, 1613 ff�; De 
Streel, A� and Etienne, J�, “Le Traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance 
au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire”, in Journal de droit européen (from now 
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limits to the ECB’s responsibilities or the legitimacy of initiatives that in 
recent years and months it has adopted, thereby enacting the powers and 
mission assigned to it by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) and in particular article 127, which has been open to 
diverging interpretations9� 
My aim here is to highlight this bending of rules and the response of 
case law� In this way, I will suggest how such contrivances may condition 
possible paths to reform and the destiny of the EMU in a context of 
unchanged legislation� 
2. The Limited Attention of Jurists to EMU Rules…
Any analysis of the economic governance of the European Union 
must start with a qualitative assessment of the rules contained in the 
TFEU and those that in particular determined the European Monetary 
Union�
As jurists, perhaps we thought that, as we were talking about rules 
aimed at regulating predominantly economic processes and more precisely 
macroeconomic ones, our job was essentially to describe or better still to 
narrate� After all, these rules seemed connected to extremely technical 
(and political) issues about which we were probably ill-equipped to do 
what is normally expected of us, which is to read the norms rather than 
necessarily write them� The objective of our work should be then to 
regulate not only events in the past, but above all those in the present 
and future on the basis of an analysis of foreseeable scenarios, i�e� on the 
basis of the possible interpretations and applications available�
on Jour. dr. eur.), 2012, 182 ff�; Middleton, T�, “Not Bailing Out […] Legal Aspects of 
the 2010 Sovereign Debt Crisis”, in Arpio Santacruz, M� et al�, A Man for All Treaties: 
liber amicorum en l’honneur de Jean-Claude Piris, Bruxelles, 2012, 421 ff�; Kocharov, 
A� (eds�), Another Legal Monster? An EUI Debate on the Fiscal Compact Treaty, EUI 
Working Paper Law No� 2012/09; Louis, J� V�, “The unexpected revision of the Lisbon 
Treaty and the establishment of a European Stability Mechanism”, in Ashiagbor, 
D�, Countouris, N�, Lianos, I� (eds�), The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, 
Cambridge, 2012, 284 ff�; Zarka, J� C�, “Le traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la 
gouvernance dans l’union économique et monétaire”, in Recueil Dalloz, 2012, 893 ff�; 
Louis, J� V�, “Les réponses à la crise”, in Cahiers de droit européen (from now on Cah. dr. 
eur.), 2011, 353 ff�; Ohler, C�, “The European Stability Mechanism: The Long Road 
to Financial Stability in the Euro Area”, in German Yearbook of International Law (from 
now on Ger. Year. Int. Law), 2011, 47 ff�; Ruffert, M�, “The European Debt Crisis and 
European Union Law”, in Comm. Market Law Rev., 2011, 1777 ff�
9 Bassan, V� F�, “Le operazioni non convenzionali della BCE al vaglio della corte 
costituzionale tedesca”, in Riv. dir. int�, 2014, 361 ff�
So, whilst nearly all the rules of the EU’s legal system were put under 
the microscope, legal analysis on economic and monetary issues appeared 
more superficial10� This approach also applied to core constitutional 
aspects of the Union, such as the workings of the EMU, the relation 
between exclusive EU competences established in article 3, letter c) 
TFEU and the coordination of economic policy responsibilities set out 
in article 5�1 TFEU, as well as the powers assigned to the System of 
European Central Banks (SECB)�
Even more serious was the lack of any critical analysis as to the 
existence of possible solutions – let alone appropriate ones – in the event 
of system criticalities� As a result, and first and foremost, the illusion 
spread that the euro was totally immune to risks and that membership 
was the gateway to advantages for all, from Member States down to 
their citizens: the reduction in interest rate charges on public debt, 
the possibility of acquiring goods and services at better conditions, the 
abolition of price instability� Second, evident economic and monetary 
shortcomings in the treaties were put down to teething problems already 
experienced at the launch of the European Union� What was important, 
as previous events in the history of European integration had shown, 
was to lay the normative foundations – though incomplete – to enable 
the system to develop; refinement would occur pragmatically, perhaps 
as usual in such matters thanks to the help of the Court of Justice11� 
10 For preliminary remarks, see Smits, R�, “The European Constitution and EMU: 
An appraisal”, in Comm. market law rev., 2005, 425; Louis, J� V�, The Economic and 
Monetary Union: Law and Institutions, ibidem, 2004, 575 ff�; Herdegen, M� J�, Price 
stability and budgetary restraints in the Economic and Monetary Union: The law as 
guardian of economic wisdom, ibidem, 1998, 9 ff�; Louis, J� V�, A legal and institutional 
approach for building a Monetary Union, ibidem, 1998, 33 ff�; Hahn,  H�  J�, The 
Stability Pact for European Monetary Union – Compliance with deficit limit as 
constant legal duty, ibidem, 77 ff�; Tizzano, A�, Qualche considerazione sull’Unione 
economica e monetaria, in Diritto dell’Unione europea, 1997, 455 ff�; Daniele, L�, 
Unione economica e monetaria, obblighi degli Stati membri e poteri sanzionatori delle 
istituzioni, ibidem, 1996, 931 ff�; Pipkorn, J�, “Legal Arrangements in the Treaty of 
Maastricht for the Effectiveness of the EMU”, in Comm. Market Law Rev�, 1994, 
263 ff�; Jacobs, F� B�, The European Parliament and Economic and Monetary Union, 
ibidem, 1991, 361 ff�
11 On this topic see also Cucchiara, M� F�, “Fiscal Compact e Meccanismo Europeo di 
Stabilità: quale impatto sull’equilibrio istituzionale dell’Unione?”, ibidem, in Diritto 
dell’Unione europea, 2015, 91 ff�; Caruso, C�, Morvillo, M�, Economic governance and 
budgetary rules in the European context: a call for a new European constitutionalism, 
ibidem, 2014, 699 ff�; Tufano, M� L�, Pugliese, S�, Il nuovo strumento di convergenza e 
competitività: verso una governance negoziata per l’UEM?, ibidem, 317 ff�; Donati, F�, 
Crisi dell’euro, governance economica e democrazia nell’Unione europea, ibidem, 2013, 
337 ff�; Rossi, L� S�, “Fiscal Compact” e Trattato sul Meccanismo di Stabilità: aspetti 
istituzionali e conseguenze sull’integrazione differenziata nell’UE, ibidem, 293 ff�
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Even when the first cracks started to appear, it seemed sufficient to 
define the rules in question as ‘stupid’, the term the-then President of 
the European Commission, Romano Prodi, famously used to describe 
the rules contained in the Stability and Growth Pact (articles 1466/97 
and 1467/97)12�
The fact that rigorous legal analysis had severe problems with the 
subject matter was already shown in the first significant dispute referred 
to the Court of Justice – the Stability Pact Decision of 200413� The Court 
struggled to handle within a legal framework what was an essentially 
political issue, deciding to suspend an excessive deficit procedure against 
two key Member States (Germany and France), thereby distancing itself 
from the recommendations the Commission had adopted in applying 
the rules mentioned above�
In this way, possibly also due to an error in design – or in forecasting – 
by the very same economists who had conceived the EMU as a system 
built to withstand any external pressure, we jurists (and not only us) 
found ourselves unprepared for the crisis that exploded in 2007� It was 
only then we understood the inadequacy of the normative framework 
and the unprecedented situations it determined at the European law 
level, such as conflicting economic objectives (e�g� the incompatibility 
of the buzzwords ‘rigour’ on the one hand and ‘growth’ on the other), or 
market pressure, both of which stemming from the absence of a precise 
system of rules� 
At first, and spurred by the urgency to react at all costs and often 
in only a few hours, rules were produced that can only be termed as 
12 Reg� (CE) No� 1466/97 (GUCE L 209 of August 2 1997, 1 ff�), and No� 1467/97 
(ibidem, 6 ff�)� As it is well known, the two regulations have been replaced by the 
so-called six pack, two pack and by the Fiscal Compact, whose perspective about the 
subject matter is external to the European Law� For references see footnote 7 above�
13 Case C-27/04, Commission v. Council, [2004] ECR, I-6649� For some some 
comments to the judgement see Diman, P�, Salerno, M�, “Sentenza Ecofin: gli 
equilibri della Corte tra tensioni politiche, Costituzione economica europea e soluzioni 
procedurali”, in Rivista di diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo (from now on Dir. 
pub. comp. eur.), 2004, 1842 ff�; Maher, I�, “Economic policy coordination and the 
European Court: excessive deficits and ECOFIN discretion”, in Eur. Law Rev., 2004, 
831 ff�; Doukas, D�, The Frailty of the Stability and Growth Pact and the European Court of 
Justice: Much Ado about Nothing, in Legal Iss. Ec. Int�, 2005), 293 ff�; Torrent Macau, R�, 
“¿Cómo gobernar aquello que se desconoce?: el caso de la Comunidad Europea en 
tanto que Unión Económica y Monetaria”, in Revista de derecho comunitario europeo 
(from now on Rev. Der. Com. Eur.), 2005, 47 ff�; de la Quadra-Salcedo Janini,  T�, 
“La discrecionalidad política del Ecofin en la aplicación del procedimiento por déficit 
excesivo: reflexiones tras la Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de 13 de julio de 2004”, in 
Revista de Estudios Politicos (from now on Rev. Est. Pol.), 2004, 15 ff�
embarrassing in their improvisation� An emblematic case was the 
European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), a company agreed by the 17 
Eurozone Member States of the time and incorporated in Luxembourg 
under Luxembourg law one night in June 2010� Capitalised in the 
course of a few days with around 190 billion euros, the Fund’s aim was 
to provide financial support to Greece, Portugal and Ireland through the 
issue of long-term bonds14� In this context, the legal basis of this solution 
and other temporary measures adopted at the time appears somewhat 
forced, i�e� article 122�2 TFEU, which was envisaged to provide financial 
help to cope with natural disasters or exceptional circumstances probably 
very different from those the temporary measures were designed for15� 
Later, Member States and European institutions developed better-
thought-out and more stable rules that managed to avert the derailing 
of the EMU� Nevertheless, a definitive judgement on them has to be 
postponed for a variety of reasons, primarily because their adoption went 
at least in part beyond the bounds of the EU’s constitutional system� 
In fact, the Fiscal Compact and European Stability Mechanism both lie 
outside the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union16�
Moreover, the content of these rules, at least for what concerns the 
behaviour of the States affected, but also for the institutions themselves, 
appears as yet ‘immature’ as rule of law� This is shown by repeated requests to 
modify or reinterpret these rules as part of a review that implies a substantial 
renegotiation of their contents, a hypothesis that is garnering support in an 
increasing number of Member States and European institutions� 
Further cause for suspending judgement on these rules lies in the 
uncertain effects this new constitutional architecture of the EU and 
EMU will have� One need only think that, as a result of the ESM Treaty, 
Italy, which has a stake of just over 17% of the capital, is committed 
to underwriting shares equivalent to a paid-in capital contribution to 
14 Replaced by the ESM, from the 1st of July 2013 EFSF’s only aim is to manage 
the issued financing and to receive loan repayments from its three (for further 
information, see www�efsf�europa�eu)�
15 On the subject, see Athanassiou, P�, “Of Past Measures and Future Plans for Europe’s 
Exit from the Sovereign Debt Crisis: What is Legally Possible (and What is Not)”, in 
Eur. Law Rev., 2011, 558 ff�
16 On this topic, see Craig, P�, “Pringle and Use of EU Institutions Outside the EU Legal 
Framework: Foundations, Procedure and Substance”, in Eur. Const. Law. Rev�, 2013, 
263 ff�; Peers, S�, “Towards a new form of EU law? The use of EU Institutions outside 
the EU Legal Framework”, in Eur. Const. Law. Rev., 2013, 65 ff�; Pinon, S�, “Crise 
économique européenne et crise institutionnelle à tous les étages”, in Revue de l’Union 
Européenne (from now on Rev. Un. Eur.), 2013, 218 ff� See also infra footnote 18�
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the ESM of more than 125 billion euros� What is more, in order to 
maintain a high rating, the ESM established the rule that it will invest 
only in high-rated, high-quality and highly-liquid securities17� The 
outcome for Italy is that through the ESM it ends up financing with 
its own public debt less-indebted economies (those commonly referred 
to as more virtuous)� We can discuss whether this is the right price to 
pay to have a State bail out fund, but a certain ‘cross sightedness’ of the 
rules emerging cannot be ignored� 
Last but not least, so far there are no details of the rules of any plan 
B to be applied in the event last ditch efforts fail to save the euro-zone 
membership of some States� The irreversibility of membership to the 
euro is a position which, though insistently repeated, appears no longer 
unequivocal or even particularly persuasive, especially when some EU 
Member States insist on keeping their national currencies� The dogma 
of irreversibility is even less convincing if we consider the weeks leading 
up to Greece’s third bail out when a possible ‘Grexit’ seemed plausible� 
Politically, it is understandable as well as justifiable and appropriate 
that any ‘plan B’ should not be regulated by law if only because, as past 
events have shown, this would trigger speculation and political, economic 
and financial opportunism� The following initiatives at both a legal and 
operational level by Member States and European institutions focusing 
above all on bolstering the EMU are therefore to be applauded: at the 
legal level, examples are, in addition to the ESM and Fiscal Compact, 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)18 and banking 
17 According to Moody’s Investor Service report, dated October 6 2014, “The ESM 
operates conservative capital and liquidity management policies to ensure that there 
is no shortfall of liquid assets to service ESM’s own obligations, even if a borrower 
defaults� The paid-in capital cannot be used in lending operations but has to be 
invested (together with the reserves) in high-quality and liquid securities� As of 
end-March 2014, nearly all of the investments were in Aaa and Aa-rated securities� 
In accordance with the Investment Policy approved by the Board of Directors, the 
ESM’s liquidity pool is divided in two separate portfolios” (7); the full text of Moody’s 
(and other agencies’) report is available on the ESM website (www�esm�europa�eu/
investors/rating/index�htm)�
18 See Reg� (EU) No� 1095/2010 (OJEU L 331 of December 15 2010, 84 ff�)� On the topic, 
Andenas, M�, Chiu, I� H� Y�, “Financial Stability and Legal Integration in Financial 
Regulation”, in Eur. Law Rev., 2013, 335 ff�; Tridimas, T�, “Financial supervision and 
agency power: reflections on ESMA”, in Gormley, L�, Shuibhne, N� N� (eds�), From 
Single Market to Economic Union: Essays in Memory of John A. Usher, Oxford, 2012; 
Moloney, N�, “Reform or Revolution� The Financial Crisis, EU Financial Markets 
Law, and the European Securities and Markets Authority”, in International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (from now on Int. Comp. Law Quart.), 2011, 521 ff�; 
Schammo, P�, “The European Securities and Markets Authority: Lifting the veil on 
the allocation of powers”, in Comm. Market Law Rev., 2011, 1879 ff�; Teixeira, P� G�, 
union19, whilst operationally, the ECB’s OMT and quantitative easing 
programmes20�
Nevertheless, on the basis of what can be seen, the modus operandi is 
unusual and at a purely legal level the system leaves too many unresolved 
questions; if it were, in the absence of norms or procedures regulating 
the departure of a Member State from the EMU, this would inevitably 
create the basis for fiscal union with real integration of economic policy 
and a collective (at least in part) debt redemption fund that consequently 
overcomes the ‘no bail out clause’ established by article 125 TFEU21� 
These solutions are all legally conceivable, but politically controversial�
Any jurist interested in European matters is faced with alarming 
cracks in the EU’s legal architecture� This situation will be the focus of 
the next paragraph� 
“The regulation of the European financial market after the crisis”, in Della Posta, P�, 
Talani, L� S� (eds�), Europe and the Financial Crisis, London, 2011, 9; Moloney, N�, 
“EU Financial Market Regulation after the Global Financial Crisis: ‘More Europe’ or 
more Risks?”, in Comm. Market Law Rev., 2010, 1317 ff�
19 As it is well known, Banking Union is made up of the so-called Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, as per Reg� (EU) No� 1024/2013 (OJEU L 287 of October 29 2013, 
63  ff�), and of the so-called Single Resolution Mechanism, as per Reg� (EU) 
No� 806/2014 (OJEU L 225 of July 30 2014, 1 ff�) and No� 2015/81 (OJEU 
L  15, of January 22 2015, 1 ff�), on the institutional structure of the Banking 
Union, among others, A� Di Marco, “Il controllo delle banche nell’UEM: la 
(problematica) nascita di un sistema integrato di vigilanza prudenziale”, in 
Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2013, 549 ff�; Moloney, N�, “Banking Union: 
Assessing Its Risks and Resilience”, in Comm. Market Law Rev., 2014, 1609 ff�; 
Wolfers, B�, Voland, T�, “Level the Playing Field: The new supervision of credit 
institutions by the European Central Bank”, in Comm. Market Law Rev., 2014, 
1463  ff�; Witte, A�, “The Application of National Banking Supervision Law by 
the ECB: Three Parallel Modes of Executing EU Law”, in Maastr. Jour. Eur. & 
Comp. Law, 2014, 89; Lo Schiavo, G�, “From National Banking Supervision to 
a Centralized Model of Prudential Supervision in Europe: The Stability Function 
of the Single Supervisory Mechanism”, in Maastr. Jour. Eur. & Comp. Law, 2014, 
110  ff�; Wissink,  L�, Duikersloot, T�, Widdershoven, R�, “Shifts in Competences 
between Member States and the EU in the New Supervisory System for Credit 
Institutions and Their Consequences for Judicial Protection”, in Utrecht Law Review 
(from now on Utr. Law Rev.), 2014, 92 ff�; Dammann, J�, “The banking union: 
flawed by design”, in Georgetown Journal of International Law (from now on Georg. 
Jour. Int. Law), 2014, 1057 ff�; Lastra, R� M�, “Banking Union and Single Market: 
conflict or companionship?”, in Fordham International Law Journal (from now on 
Ford. Int. Law Jour.), 2013, 1190 ff�
20 See also infra, § X, for further interesting evolutions of the system�
21 On this topic R� Palmstorfer, “To Bail Out or not to Bail Out? The Current 
Framework of Financial Assistance for Euro Area Member States Measured against the 
Requirements of EU Primary Law”, in Eur. Law Rev�, 2012, 771 ff�; Louis, J� V�, “The 
No-Bail Out Clause and Rescue Packages”, in Comm. Market Law Rev�, 2010, 971 ff�
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3.  …and the Sudden Wake Up Call caused by Emergency 
Judgements: ESM and EMU, a Clash of Two Worlds in 
the Pringle Case
I have drawn attention to the qualitative inadequacy of economic and 
monetary rules contained in the EU and TFEU treaties, the inadequacy 
of the rules rushed out during the euro crisis and the limits for manoeuvre 
of Member State representatives in terms of their political mandate� 
Not surprisingly then the first time these rules were referred to the 
Court of Justice (CJEU), i�e� in Pringle22, the Court’s decision raised 
some concerns� In particular, alongside a certain relief for a sentence that 
confirmed the legitimacy of the normative instruments designed to save 
the EMU and perhaps the Union itself, the legal pressure the Court was 
under to reach this result did not go unnoticed� 
The first concern arising from the Pringle judgement relates to the 
question of competence: the CJEU was asked to determine whether 
the new article 136�3 TFEU23 went beyond monetary policy alone and the 
coordination of Member-State economic policy, but instead represented 
an amendment to the competences in monetary and economic policy, 
arising from giving Member States the possibility to grant financial 
assistance in ways other than those foreseen by the same TFEU and so 
essentially in addition to the (albeit inadequate) provisions of article 
22 Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Ireland and others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756� For 
a comment to the judgement see, Mengozzi, P�, “Il trattato sul Meccanismo di 
stabilità (MES) e la pronuncia della Corte di giustizia nel caso Pringle”, in Studi 
int. europ., 2013, 129 ff�; Gambaro, E�, Mazzocchi, F�, “Le regole dell’Unione 
europea alla prova della crisi dei debiti sovrani: il caso Pringle”, in Dir. comm. int., 
2013, 545 ff�; Adam, S�, Mena Parras, F� J�, “The European Stability Mechanism 
through the Legal Meanderings of the Union’s Constitutionalism: Comment on 
Pringle”, in Eur. Law Rev., 2013, 848 ff�; Borger, V�, “The ESM and the European 
Court’s predicament in Pringle”, in Ger. Law Jour., 2013, 113 ff�; Craig, P�, “Pringle: 
Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology”, in Maastr. Jour. Eur. & Comp. Law, 
2013, 1 ff�; De Witte, B�, Beukers, T�, “The Court of Justice approves the creation of 
the European Stability Mechanism outside the EU legal order: Pringle”, in Comm. 
Market Law Rev., 2013, 805; Nettesheim, M�, “Europarechtskonformität des 
Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus”, in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 2013, 14 ff�; 
Van Malleghem, P� A�, “Pringle: A paradigm shift in the European Union’s monetary 
constitution”, in Germ. Law Jour., 2013, 141 ff�; Thym, D�, Wendel, M�, “Préserver 
le respect du droit dans la crise: la Cour de Justice, le MES et le mythe du déclin de 
la communauté de droit”, in Cah. dr. eur., 2012, 733 ff�
23 This provision was adopted with decision No� 2011/199/EU (OJEU L 91 April 6 
2011, 1)�
122 TFEU or article 143 TFEU for non-EMU Members24� If this were 
the case, this provision would however not only have affected part 
3 TFEU but also part 1, in violation of rules regarding modifications to 
the treaties� In fact, article 136 TFEU was integrated using the simplified 
treaty revision procedure established by article 48�6, i�e� implementing the 
provisions of the TEU regarding simplified revisions contained in article 
48�6, first and second paragraphs TEU, and possible where modifications 
affect solely the provisions of part 3 TFEU� 
The Court rejected the applicant’s argument stating that ‘having regard 
to Articles 4(1) TEU and 5(2) TEU, the Member States whose currency 
is the euro are entitled to conclude an agreement between themselves 
for the establishment of a stability mechanism’25, implicitly excluding 
that the ESM was the particular stability mechanism foreseen by article 
136�3 TFEU; indeed, the ECJ was adamant in assessing that the ESM is 
extraneous to the EMU, hence depriving the new drafting of article 136 
TFEU of any relevance, as if this provision were inserted fortuitously�
The consequences for the Court for having reached such a conclusion 
were significant, forcing it to develop a line of reasoning that was not 
particularly convincing26, above all with regards to the general question of 
Member States’ external competences and particularly to the possibility of 
their concluding extra-EU agreements on matters regulated by EU law27� 
24 As it is well known, § 3 of art� 136, as introduced by the above mentioned decision 
2011/199/EU, provides that “the Member States whose currency is the euro may establish 
a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro 
area as a whole and stating that the granting of any required financial assistance under 
the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality”�
25 See case C-370/12, Pringle, above, point 68�
26 I’m not personally convinced by the reasoning in Cisotta, R�, “Disciplina fiscale, 
stabilità finanziaria e solidarietà nell’Unione europea ai tempi della crisi: alcuni 
spunti ricostruttivi”, in Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2015, 57 ff�, at 72 ff�, stating 
that the Court’s solution in Pringle is “legitimised” by a “vuoto riguardante la tutela 
della stabilità finanziaria dell’area euro nel suo insieme” [“vacuum related to the 
safeguarding of financial stability in the euro area as a whole”], and by the fact 
that the possibility given by art� 352 TFEU to take action on the subject has been 
excluded� Nonetheless it is correct to consider this as an ex post conclusion, arising 
from the analysis of what happened, with the decisions made by the same States that 
also decided to involve EU institutions into the “ESM world”, with all the forcing 
widely described here�
27 With specific reference to the economic and monetary policy, on external relations 
see Malatesta, A�, Ricci, C�, “Le relazioni esterne della Comunità europea in 
materia monetaria”, in Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2002, 229 ff�; Herrmann, C� W�, 
“Monetary sovereignty over the euro and external relations of the euro area : 
competences, procedures and practice”, in European Foreign Affairs Review (from 
now on Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev.), 2002, 1 ff�; Basso, R�, “Sulle relazioni esterne della 
Comunità europea in materie riguardanti l’Unione economica e monetaria”, in Riv. 
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Admittedly, the ESM Treaty was signed exclusively by EU Member States� 
However, this has little relevance given that, in order to protect EU law 
vis-à-vis international agreements (inter-state included), the CJEU in the 
Pringle case drew attention to the duty of Member States to respect EU law 
when carrying out their respective competences� It did so by mentioning 
the Elisa Gottardo case, which concerned a treaty signed with a non-EU 
Member State28� 
So, to protect the ESM from being judged a violation of EU 
competences, in Pringle the Court was forced to allow the signing 
amongst Member States of international agreements that overlap EU 
competences but are external to the Union, provided the obligations 
deriving from these agreements respect EU law29� This undoubtedly is a 
step backwards with regards to the supposed parallelism of internal and 
external competences first established in AETR30, which later became an 
integral part of EU primary law, as illustrated by article 3�1 TFEU and, 
ad abundantiam, article 216 TFEU31�
The independence of the ESM with regards to those stability 
mechanisms nevertheless foreseen by article 136�3 TFEU forced the 
Court to perform other acrobatics in reasoning, this time on the subject 
whether the involvement expressly established in the ESM Treaty of 
Union institutions in fact meant an increase in the Union’s competences 
or in those of its institutions32: this widening of competences could not 
have been achieved in fact by the new article 136�3 TFEU, because this 
provision had been enacted pursuant to the simplified treaty revision 
procedure� 
Here the Court’s response is even more elliptical, being based 
essentially on the idea that, as the ESM is outside EMU rules, the contents 
dir. int., 2001, 111 ff�; Weinrichter, N�, “The world monetary system and external 
relations of the EMU: fasten your safety belts!”, in European Integration (from now 
on Eur. integ.) online papers, 2000, 10 ff�
28 Case C-55/00, Gottardo v� INPS [2002] ECR I-413, point 32�
29 “Strict conditionality under paragraph 3 of Article 136 TFEU, the article affected by 
the revision of the FEU Treaty, is in order to ensure that that mechanism will operate 
in a way that will comply with European Union law, including the measures adopted 
by the Union in the context of the coordination of the Member States’ economic 
policies” (see Pringle, above, point 69)�
30 Case 22/70, AETR [1971] ECR, 263�
31 In this sense, the Schengen experience would not be possible anymore� Such experience 
could be considered as a paradigm to include ESM in EMU (see Cucchiara, M� F�, 
above, esp� 98 ff�), but the starting point of legality is undoubtedly very different�
32 Pringle, above, points 71 ff�
of the ESM Treaty also vis-à-vis the involvement of EU institutions do 
not modify their competences� 
Alas, the Court preferred not to base its legal reasoning on the premise 
that the ESM is basically an agreement that derives in some way from 
article 136 TFEU and is subject to it� If it had, though this approach 
would certainly have required a more detailed analysis in the area of 
international law and perhaps some further legal acrobatics on whether 
the ESM represented a modification of some competences, it would 
have in some way reined in the ESM within the Union’s constitutional 
framework� Such an approach in this way would also have confirmed 
more effectively the centrality of the framework over the ESM� It would 
also have offered an authoritative proposal as to how the ESM’s system 
(also legal) could in the future be incorporated within the EMU; the 
solution I believe to be the most appropriate for re-compacting the EU’s 
constitutional architecture�
Also because, as we have already seen and as we will see, the ‘horizontal’ 
and ‘parallel’ approach instead of the ESM and EMU raises significant 
doubts, for instance, when the Court assumes that the ESM does not 
exclude measures of financial assistance inside the EU system, based on 
article 122 TFEU, ‘that fact is not such as to affect common rules of the 
Union or alter their scope’� As one stability mechanism is more than 
enough, frankly such a hypothesis appears somewhat unrealistic� 
Similarly unconvincing is the part of the judgement where the Court, 
though having to recognise the significant points of contact between the 
ESM and EMU, attempts to settle the question simply by stating that ‘the 
ESM will, among other tasks, assume the tasks allocated temporarily to 
the EFSM’, i�e� an instrument of temporary financial support established 
however with the aim of implementing article 122�2 TFEU33� 
In brief, the Court identifies two parallel worlds, one inside the EMU, 
the other outside it, both compatible and able to coexist without having 
to modify Union competences or those of the Member States: and in 
Pringle the ESM would anyway be necessarily consistent with EU rules, 
as Member States cannot contract obligations that contrast with these 
rules� 
Personally, such a line of reasoning appears flawed� It seems difficult 
to assume that two interchangeable instruments can coexist without the 
working of one affecting the working of the other� This however, as we 
will now see, is the conclusion reached by the Court also in the Gauweiler 
decision� 
33 Pringle, above, point 103�
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4.  The Principle of Conditionality in the Face of Economic 
Policy Measures and Monetary Policy Choices 
The parallel worlds generated by the coexistence of the ESM with 
EMU rules and instruments also produce problems concerning the 
ESM’s impact on rules established at EU level to coordinate economic 
policy�
On this point, the Court of Justice declared that ‘the ESM is not 
concerned with the coordination of the economic policies of the Member 
States, but rather constitutes a financing mechanism’34, in this way, 
rejecting the view that through the ESM the areas of competence existing 
amongst Member States and between them and the Union had changed� 
The Court’s reasoning is nonetheless less convincing when it regards the 
conditionality the Member State using the financial assistance is subject to 
and the impact this conditionality has on the beneficiary’s economic policy; 
an impact the Court terms as ‘indirect consequences’� In fact, economic 
policy measures are imposed on States by the principle of conditionality, 
whose application presupposes financial assistance� Strictly speaking, we 
are talking here of imposition rather than coordination. However, the TFEU 
rules on economic policy coordination imply certain discretional powers 
on the part of Member States, so offering them some room for manoeuvre 
in terms of sovereignty; room which is far greater than that offered to States 
applying for financial assistance35� 
In fact, and leaving aside questions of the system’s democratic deficit, 
it is clear to all – especially to euro-zone Members – that the rules on 
economic policy coordination, those of the EMU, have tended to be 
applied as long as the situation is physiological� When a Member State 
however has to ask for a form of financial assistance, it leaves the world of 
the EMU to enter that of the ESM, triggering conditionality mechanisms 
that radically reduce the country’s sovereignty� According to the Court, 
all this conforms to the treaties because the ESM is distinct from the 
EMU, despite the existence of article 136�3 TFEU that foresees exactly 
the same tie between financial assistance and conditionality and which 
implicitly must remain a dead letter (even though formally it can happily 
coexist with the EMS) because otherwise its working would alter the 
34 Pringle, above, point 110�
35 On the topic of conditionality see Ioannidis, M�, “EU Financial Assistance 
Conditionality After ‘Two-Pack’”, in Zeitschrift für öffentiches Recht und Völkerrecht 
(from now on ZaöRV), 2014, 100 ff�; Rogers, C� J�, The IMF and European 
economies: crisis and conditionality, Basingstoke, 2012�
structure of intra-EMU competences, an outcome not allowed for by 
treaty reform mechanisms� 
The limits of this line of reasoning become clear when we consider 
that financial assistance via the ESM is just one of a range of options 
available and used to help a Member State in difficulty: one has only 
to think of the ECB’s commanding role in shoring up over months the 
situation caused by the Greek crisis� However, in the Court’s reasoning, 
this role loses its real sense of being a complementary and fundamental 
instrument in crisis management to become simply an instrument of 
monetary policy which, almost by chance, has effects also in other areas� 
In fact, in Gauweiler the Court had to address the very same ‘indirect 
consequences’ that implementation of the OMT programme might (or 
should) have on the economic policies of beneficiary States resulting from 
the purchase on secondary markets by the ECB of their sovereign bonds, 
in particular as this programme ‘may, indirectly, increase the impetus to 
comply with those adjustment programmes and thus, to some extent, 
further the economic-policy objectives of those programmes’� Once 
again, the Court held that all this does not change the nature or confines 
of the ESCB’s competence, which remains restricted to monetary policy36�
Yet, with all the goodwill and understanding in the world that we 
owe a judge faced with the task of providing solutions distinctly outside 
the sphere of law, the rule bending carried out by the ECJ is apparent� 
Luckily, at least between the lines, in Gauweiler the Court, I believe, tried 
to anchor its reasoning to some principle of EU law, i�e� the principle 
of loyal cooperation amongst institutions (here, the ECJ and the ECB)� 
The Court uses this principle to confirm the tenet of the ESCB’s absolute 
autonomy: this enables it to avoid entering into a legal review concerning 
decisions that are essentially technical and discretionary, i�e� the OMT 
programme, for the purposes of assessing whether these decisions go 
beyond the confines of the competences attributed to the ESCB or to 
the ECB� Indeed, as we will see later, Gauweiler has the undoubted merit 
of re-establishing a basis of legal principles concerning the interpretation 
and application of programmatic rules such as those relating to the 
EMU, thereby defusing attacks aimed at delegitimising the ECB and, as 
a result, at weakening overall the European legal system vis-à-vis alleged 
constraints stemming from the need to safeguard the prerogatives of 
Member States (and in particular of some of them)� 
36 Gauweiler, above, points 58 ff�
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5.  Economic Policy and Monetary Policy in the Pringle  
and Gauweiler Judgements: Rule of Law or 
Realpolitik?
The Court’s legal reasoning suffered further… bending in particular 
on the question of the reach of monetary policy� In its attempt to scale 
down the ESM and, upstream, the amended article 136 TFEU, the 
Court in Pringle marked out the scope and objectives of monetary policy 
exclusively in terms of price stability� Unequivocal in this sense are, 
amongst others, paragraphs 56-57 of the judgement in which the Court 
states that the ESM’s objective was ‘to safeguard the stability of the euro 
area as a whole, that is clearly distinct from the objective of maintaining 
price stability, which is the primary objective of the Union’s monetary 
policy� Even though the stability of the euro area may have repercussions 
on the stability of the currency used within that area, an economic policy 
measure cannot be treated as equivalent to a monetary policy measure 
for the sole reason that it may have indirect effects on the stability of the 
euro’� Along these lines, the Court specifies in paragraph 57 that ‘[t]he 
grant of financial assistance to a Member State however clearly does not 
fall within monetary policy’�
This reasoning is excessively schematic given that economic policy and 
monetary policy are far more interrelated than the Court wants to admit� 
In fact, the ECB is in no way extraneous to the ESM, having right from the 
system’s creation offered an opinion on the compatibility of amended article 
136 with article 125 TFEU before the adoption of decision 199/201137� 
From this perspective therefore it becomes also more difficult to base an 
argument in terms of the confines of the ECB’s powers because, if the 
solution provided by the Court in Pringle makes sense in terms of saving the 
institutional and inter-state solutions made necessary by the emergency, 
the precedent is offered up to the German Constitutional Court in its 
request for a preliminary ruling in Gauweiler38 on the legality of the OMT 
under EU law, precisely starting from the basis of the ’ECJ’s restrictive 
interpretation of monetary policy given in Pringle�
37 As it is stated by the Court itself “[A]s is apparent from paragraph 5 of the ECB 
opinion on the draft European Council Decision amending Article 136 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for 
Member States whose currency is the euro, the activation of financial assistance by 
means of a stability mechanism such as the ESM is not compatible with Article 125 
TFEU unless it is indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability of the 
euro area as a whole and subject to strict conditions” (see case C-370/12, Pringle, 
above, point 136)�
38 See above, footnote 2, and below, §§ VII and IX�
On this point and above all ex post, perhaps this particular cloud had 
one silver lining given that in Gauweiler, and in marked opposition to the 
arguments raised by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Court declared, on 
the question of the ESCB’s competences and the objectives of monetary 
policy that ‘[w]ithout prejudice to the objective of price stability, the 
ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a 
view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union�’
Admittedly, there is nothing new here as the wording tracks that of 
article 127 TFEU� Moreover, it is right that the ESCB’s hands are not 
tied solely to price stability, as probably some proponents of their own 
national central-bank model would prefer� 
Nonetheless, it is a fact that from this perspective the competences 
of the ESCB and the EMS do tend to overlap and that consequently 
the interpretations of the rules offered in Pringle appear to have served 
exclusively for contingencies� At the end of the day, the Court put 
Realpolitik before the rule of law39�
The same Realpolitik can be seen also in Gauweiler: having ascertained 
that both the OMT programme and the activities of the ESM consist 
in the purchase of government bonds on the secondary market and that 
these purchases are subordinate to a programme of macroeconomic 
adjustment, the Court rejected the idea that the OMT programme can be 
regarded in any way as a measure extraneous to monetary policy, simply 
specifying that the ‘the difference between the objectives of the ESM and 
those of the ESCB is decisive� Whilst […] a programme such as that at 
issue in the main proceedings may be implemented only in so far as is 
necessary for the maintenance of price stability, the ESM’s intervention 
is intended to safeguard the stability of the euro area, that objective not 
falling within monetary policy�40’
So, once the ESCB, in carrying out its powers ‘independently’ and 
‘without any political pressure’41, has identified price stability as the 
objective of its actions, this in the Court’s opinion suffices to block any 
legal dispute regarding the question of attributed competences� As we 
will see, fortunately, in Gauweiler the Court’s reasoning appears slightly 
more organic and complete and is grounded on general principles of law 
39 This conclusion seems to be shared by Cisotta, R�, Disciplina fiscale, above, esp� 70 ff�, 
who however offers a more generous interpretation of Pringle judgement�
40 Gauweiler above, point 64�
41 Ibidem, point 40� Once more it’s apparent the descriptive intent of this part of the 
judgement motivations in the strong (political) debate about the limits to EBC 
powers and prerogatives�
From Pringle to Gauweiler 261
262 The History of the European Monetary Union
typically used in legal reasoning� The overall result, therefore, is without 
doubt more convincing� 
6. Fundamental Rights and Freedom under the ESM
Another problem here to be highlighted, though relating only to the 
Pringle judgement, is nevertheless symptomatic of the climate generated 
by the euro crisis and its effects on the Union� The final part of the 
judgement confirms that the governance systems put in place outside 
the confines of the Union are not subject to any controls regarding their 
compatibility with the fundamental rights established by the Charter 
because ‘the Member States are not implementing Union law, within the 
meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, when they establish a stability 
mechanism such as the ESM where […] the EU and FEU Treaties do 
not confer any specific competence on the Union to establish such a 
mechanism’42� 
The argument is apparently impeccable and logically follows from the 
ratio decidendi of the judgement� However, once again it fails to persuade 
because, as the ESM and EMU by definition have to work together43, it 
is difficult to imagine that Member States and institutions which when 
in an EMU setting adopt economic or monetary policy measures are 
expected to abide by the Charter and may fail to do so when the same 
or similar measures are adopted in an EMS setting, perhaps as part of a 
specific bail-out plan for one Member State, as was the case in the Greek 
crisis� 
In this sense, the Court though correctly arguing as to the non-
application of the Charter, perplexingly omitted to mention even the 
possibility, at least in theory, that the EMS system should at least conform 
to the principles of fundamental rights and freedom that have emerged 
from the constitutional traditions shared by Member States�
Such an omission cannot be fortuitous� Certainly, reference, had it 
been there, to the common constitutional traditions and, a fortiori, to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) would have evoked 
and perhaps brought new life to article 6�3 TEU44, so dismissing the idea 
42 Pringle, above, point 180�
43 See above, § III�
44 Such provision lost most of its utility with the coming into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon and the formal entry of the Charter in the European Union primary law system 
(see case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105)�
that the ESM lies somehow outside the EU and FEU Treaties� If the 
Court had wanted to, it certainly could have developed lines of reasoning 
similar to those which, from the 1970s onwards, progressively integrated 
fundamental human rights into European law� Therefore, it is realistic to 
claim that the Court deliberately decided not to express itself on these 
issues� Why? There are two possible explanations: the first could be out 
of a form of self restraint on the part of the Court towards a question 
that is unprecedented and potentially disruptive to the system of EU law, 
perhaps preferring to wait for a later and less controversial opportunity 
to return to the question� In fact, the Court has still to express itself on 
the rules of economic governance and perhaps also offer an analysis that 
takes into account principles or fundamental rights45� 
The second explanation, which is less optimistic and more 
problematical, lies in the possibility that the Court had already 
absorbed – in line with indications provided by the doctrine and some 
national courts46 – the inconsistency of these new instruments of financial 
assistance with some fundamental individual rights� 
In particular, this last point is of considerable interest to jurists since it 
shows how the application of measures designed to safeguard the euro are 
starting to create problems for the common constitutional values within 
Member States and upon which the Union should be founded, according 
to the preamble and article 2 of the EU Treaty, and the principle of the 
rule of law that we jurists in Europe have been accustomed to for decades� 
Here it should be added that, also after Pringle, despite repeated 
requests, the ECJ has declined to address the impact the ‘indirect 
consequences’ of financial assistance measures adopted as part of the new 
European instruments will have on fundamental rights and individual 
freedom� Two cases in point are Sindicato dos Bancàrios do Norte and 
Sindacato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins, where the Court 
opted not to consider the issue, preferring technically valid if arid 
solutions that ultimately provide no opinion obiter dictum or otherwise47� 
In the light of this, the self-restraint explanation mentioned above appears 
45 So believes Porchia, O�, “Il ruolo della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea nella 
governance economica”, in Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2013, 593 ff�
46 On the topic, see the perspicuous remarks by Baratta, R�, above, esp� 673 ff�, and 
M� Starita, “Il Consiglio europeo e la crisi del debito sovrano”, in Riv. dir. int., 2013, 
384 ff� As per national law, see infra, § VIII�
47 Case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and others v� Banco Português de 
Negócios, ECLI:EU:C:2013:149 and case C-264/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2036� The 
two cases were (rightly) declared inadmissible, but following the judges’ request for 
a sign, the closure of the Court is even too indicative of its strong reluctance to deal 
with the subject�
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even less convincing� Fortunately, signs of some support on the level of 
fundamental individual rights appears to have been provided recently by 
other institutions� I will discuss this in paragraph X48� 
7.  The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Conditioning of EMU 
and EU Rules. Quousque tandem? 
It is useful at this stage to understand whether, in these turbulent 
years, there are other players on the scene� In this regard, I believe that 
a significant addition to the problems in discussing European economic 
governance has come from Germany’s Constitutional Court� In fact, 
since the notable Lissabon-Urteil judgement of 30th June 2009, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVG) has confirmed the existence of excessive 
inherent limitations in the Grundgesetz that hinder further forms of 
European integration49�
Several years on, we can now track the course developed by the BVG: 
keeping abreast of the times, it has managed to place several domestic 
constitutional hurdles in the way of European integration, thereby limiting 
the bargaining and political power of the Union’s most powerful Member 
(Germany)� This solution has been obtained through a significant revival 
of the theories of ‘counter-limits’� Such theories had appeared destined to 
be consigned to the history books of European integration, since in most 
recent years obstacles to integration had come from the political sphere 
or in the form of referendums, thereby excluding any technical or legal 
reasoning50� 
In 2009, the sovereign debt crisis had yet to explode but already the 
BVG saw perhaps more than many others the cracks that were appearing 
in the EMU and set about erecting defences around the German legal 
system� 
48 See infra, § X�
49 This is not the proper place to deal with the subject� In Lissabon-Urteil (cases 
No� 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08, 
2 BvR 182/09, in www�bverfg�de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208�html), 
literature is massive: for all, see Poiares Maduro, M�, Grasso, G�, “Quale Europa 
dopo la sentenza della Corte costituzionale tedesca sul Trattato di Lisbona?”, in 
Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2009, 503 ff�, and Cannizzaro, E�, Bartolini, M� E�, 
Continuità, discontinuità e catastrofismo. Sulle reazioni della dottrina al Lissabon-
Urteil, ibidem, 2010, 1 ff�, also for further references�
50 On the subject of counterlimits, for all, Nascimbene, B� (ed�), Costa/Enel: Corte 
costituzionale e Corte di Giustizia a confronto, cinquant’anni dopo, Milan, 2015�
In Lissabon-Urteil, the Court established in a fully-rounded way the 
workings of the so-called Einzelermächtigungen, i�e� a reading of the 
principle of conferral from the point of view of Member States’ legal 
systems and Germany’s in particular: as competences are ‘conferred’, the 
Union cannot increase them without violating the sovereignty of Member 
States and their constitutional systems; if the Union wishes to increase 
these competences, it must ask for specific measures to attribute power to 
modify them on a case-by-case basis� 
The effects on the EU legal system are evident as they impact the 
flexibility clause (article 352 TFEU), severely limiting its application 
potential� And this is why, for instance, two years after Lissabon-Urteil, the 
Union – or more precisely, its Member States – were forced to change the 
treaties by amending article 136 TFEU, a norm that provided significant 
application potential if one reads the argumentation the ECJ was forced 
to develop in Pringle51� 
Moreover, also the mechanisms that test the constitutionality of 
German laws repeatedly provide the BVG with the opportunity to lay 
down the conditions to its government and parliament and consequently 
to EU institutions52, primarily to the European Council and Council� 
Particularly, by using the Verfassungsbeschwerde, i�e� a constitutional 
complaint procedure and replying to literally thousands of complaints 
made by citizens, scholars, organisations and even political parties53, the 
BVG can clarify and strengthen domestic constitutional limits vis-à-vis the 
adoption of all the main State bail-out measures coming from both inside 
and outside the EU system, from the Greek bail-out to the ESM Treaty54� 
51 See above, §§ III-VI�
52 On the subject see Gärditz, K� F�, above�
53 The reference is made to the party die Linke, whose complaints to the BVG reveal a 
strong opposition against financial assistance to Southern Europe countries affecting 
German citizens’ economy� This shows that there’s a less and less international overview 
also by traditionally socialist parties, whose principles of solidarity with the weak 
apparently end at the national border� This said, it’s also true that the BVG minimizes 
the decisions about the relationship between the Grundgesetz and matters relating to 
euro, given the really low percentage of direct actions dealt with by the Court�
54 On the actions against the Greek bail-out (case n� 987/10 of 7 September 2011, 
in www�bverfg�de/entscheidungen/rs20110907_2bvr098710�html) and against 
the EMS Treaty (cases n� 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 BvR 
1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12 and 2 BvE 6/12, in www�bverfg�de/entscheidungen/
rs20120912_2bvr139012�html), for references, Lo Bue, M�, Crisi economica e 
trasformazione delle istituzioni europee. Meccanismi istituzionali di governo della 
recessione, Turin, 2013, 158 ff� and 202 ff�, Calliess, C�, “The Future of the Eurozone 
and the Role of the German Federal Constitutional Court”, in Year. Eur. Law., 2012, 
402 ff�; Curzan, J�, “A Critical Linkage: the Role of German Constitutional Law in 
the European Economic Crisis and the Future of the Eurozone”, in Fordham Int’l 
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In this way, thanks to the assertion of the principle of democracy, 
protected by the Grundgesetz, and consequently of the sovereignty of the 
German people and their representatives, i�e� the Bundestag, the BVG, in 
maintaining control over the main budgetary decisions, exerts considerable 
constitutional influence over inter-governmental methods and over the 
possibility of modifying treaties to establish instruments designed to 
reform economic governance within the EU� In fact, once excluded the 
German government’s power to introduce bail-out mechanisms that are 
not ratified by the Bundestag, or better, that have not been decided by it, 
any German law enacting agreements made inside or outside EU confines 
that introduces open-end mechanisms to provide financial assistance 
to States is subject to an assessment of constitutional legitimacy by the 
BVG, since the economic and financial effects of these mechanisms on the 
German system are always subject to parliamentary approval55� 
Therefore, the BVG’s consent to the German government and State 
both on the question of financial assistance to Greece in 2012 and on 
Germany’s capitalisation of the ESM, though at first judged positively, 
in reality appear to limit possible broader-based solutions� In fact, the 
domestic constitutional constraint posed by the BVG with regards to 
another Member State reduces the range of possible solutions necessary 
to address the current incompleteness of the EMU and the EU and 
resolve the contradictions of the system described above� 
What is more, given that in general the search for parliamentary 
consent on international issues can be exploited for domestic political ends, 
this indirectly but significantly weakens Member States’ representative 
institutions and the ‘Community method’ adopted in Europe that has 
for decades represented the real difference between the EU and other 
international organisations� 
Apart from the obvious domestic political pressure exerted by 
Bundesverfassungsgericht case law, the legal limits of the Court’s decisions 
on the German government in European negotiations and on the Union 
as a whole are clear� 
Law Jour., 2012, 1543 ff�; Schmidt, S� K�, “A sense of déja vu? The FCC’s Preliminary 
European Stability Mechanism Verdict”, in Ger. Law Jour., 2013, 1 ff�; Wendel, M�, 
“Judicial restraint and the return to openness: The Decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court on the ESM and the Fiscal Treaty of 12 September 2012”, in 
Ger. Law Jour�, 2013, 21 ff�; Schneider, K�, “Yes, but… One more thing: Karlsruhe’s 
ruling on the European Stability Mechanism”, in Germ. Law Jour., 2013, 53 ff�
55 As it will be said, in Gauweiler the Court of Justice takes a very different position 
(see infra, § VIII)�
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Unsurprisingly, the BVG’s first request for a preliminary ruling by 
the ECJ on article 267 TFEU was assertively and almost rhetorically 
worded, expressly indicating to the Court the conditions under which 
the measures announced by the ECB as part of the OMT programme 
were compatible with EU law56� In actual fact, the BVG was asking the 
Court to declare the OMT programme incompatible with the Treaties, 
using for this purpose the weaknesses present in Pringle, in particular 
with reference to the scope of monetary policy – and so the very mission 
of the ECB – as set forth in the TFEU� 
The distance between a European institution and the supreme judge 
of one of the Member States is unprecedented in the history of EU law� 
In some way, this conflict, let us say, ‘breaches’ also the principle of loyal 
cooperation established by article 4�3 TEU, a principle that from the 
BVG’s point of view was perhaps in fact breached by the ECB� The affair 
has changed the nature of the dialogue between national judges and 
the ECJ expressed as we have known it for decades in the form of the 
reference for a preliminary ruling57� 
However, as we will see, the Court was in no way conditioned by this 
method and if anything wanted to reaffirm, first, its exclusive prerogative 
as interpreter of EU law and, second, the binding nature of its decision 
on any national court58� Such a stance has significant consequences: the 
first and most immediate is the legitimisation of the OMT programme 
under EU law� The Court however also indicated the systematic control 
it intended to exercise on the instruments chosen by the ECB to carry 
out its mandate59; the second and considerably more complicated 
outcome potentially concerns Germany, which after Gauweiler, faces the 
dilemma of, on one hand, respecting EU law as interpreted by the ECJ’s 
56 See De Petris, A�, Un rinvio pregiudiziale sotto condizione? L’ordinanza del Tribunale 
Costituzionale Federale sulle Outright Monetary Transactions, in federalismi�it, 
4/2014� For further information see press releases available at: http://www�ecb�europa�
eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1�en�html; http://www�ecb�europa�eu/press/ 
pressconf/2012/html/is120906�en�html; http://www�ecb�europa�eu/press/key/date/ 
2013/html/sp130902�en�html� In literature see also Altavilla, C�, Giannone,  D�, 
Lenza,  M�, The financial and macroeconomic effects of OMT announcements, BCE 
working paper series 1707/2014, in www�ecb�europa�eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1707�
pdf; Petch, T�, The compatibility of Outright Monetary Transactions with EU law, in Law 
and Financial Market Review (from now on Law & Fin. Mark. Rev.), 2013, 133 ff�; 
Cour-Thimann, P�, Winkler, B�, The ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures the 
role of institutional factors and financial structure, BCE working paper series 1528/2013, 
available in http://www�ecb�europa�eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1528�pdf�
57 On the topic see Thiele, A�, above�
58 See Gauweiler, above, point 16�
59 See also above § IV�
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preliminary rulings whilst, on the other, overcoming the constitutional 
rigidity produced by BVG case law60� 
8.  Tensions from the Mediterranean EU, but not  
only from there
However, it is not only the Bundesverfassungsgericht that is weakening 
Member States’ shared constitutional traditions� In fact, an interpretation 
of national primary laws in support of a political stance grounded on rigour 
in interpreting European decisions (EU or not) on financial assistance 
for Member States in difficulty, runs up against an interpretation of the 
constitutional laws of those States opposed to the application of measures 
adopted by them in implementing the ‘strict conditionality’ required by 
financial assistance programmes�
So, whilst in Pringle the ECJ rejected the admission of fundamental 
rights and individual freedom as a yardstick for the legality of financial 
assistance measures, Greece’s Court of Audit and Supreme Court judged 
the Greek government’s public spending cuts unconstitutional61� A few 
months later, Portugal’s Constitutional Court declared that provisions 
contained in the 2013 Budget Law passed by the Portuguese parliament 
as part once more of the austerity measures made necessary by the ‘new 
normative instruments’ adopted to save monetary union violated the 
principles of equality and of fundamental social rights62� The Court was 
to confirm this judgement three more times63� 
60 So much that someone (Cafaro, S�, above; Kumm, M�, above) assumed that because 
of BVG’s rigidity on these issues, Germany could be in breach of the EU law rules 
with the related consequences�
61 Particularly, with the opinion of 31 October 2012, the Court of Audit issued a 
negative decision on the raising of the retirement age and on the cuts to pensions and 
to the allowances provided to Greek pensioners� On 7 November 2012 the Supreme 
Court declared unconstitutional cuts to Greek judges’ salaries� On 27 February 2013, 
again, the Court of Audit declared unconstitutional the rules retroactively adopted by 
the Greek legislator to cut public salaries and wages� Since I don’t have any knowledge 
of Greek language, I’d like to thank Chiara Cellerino and Nikolas A� Verras for the 
summary of the three above mentioned decisions�
62 Tribunal Constitucional, 5 April 2013, Case No� 187, also available (together with a 
summary in English) in www�tribunalconstitucional�pt/tc/en/acordaos/20130187s�
html� For comments and remarks, Gallo, D�, Cisotta, R�, “Il Tribunale costituzionale 
portoghese, i risvolti sociali delle misure di austerità ed il rispetto dei vincoli 
internazionali ed europei”, in Diritti Umani e Diritto internazionale, 2013, 465 ff�
63 For further details, see Fabbrini, F�, “The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review 
and the Political Process in Comparative Perspective”, in Berkeley JIL, 2014, 64 ff�
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In this conflict between Courts and their respective founding values, 
worthy of note are two judgements (Nos� 223/2012 and 116/2013)64 of 
the Italian Constitutional Court, which declared unconstitutional cuts 
to judges’ salaries carried out by the Berlusconi government in 2010 and 
to ‘fat cat’ pensions decided by the Monti government in the second half 
of 2011, i�e� at the height of turbulence when the spread of Italian bond 
yields over comparable German bunds ballooned to over 500 basis points65� 
Although both judgements, particularly the second, were seen by some 
as an inappropriate defence of the unacceptable benefits of a privileged 
few, here I would like to highlight how also the Italian Constitutional 
Court revealed an evident conflict between, on one hand, the application 
of austerity measures decided by Member States in an EMU setting and 
the founding principles of the Italian constitution on the other66� The same 
Court’s judgement No� 70/2015 can be seen in a similar vein: though basing 
its argument on the inadequacy of the reasoning offered by the Italian 
legislator, the Court declared the Italian government’s decision to block 
pension upgrades unconstitutional despite the fact that the measure was 
taken as part of cost containments required to meet euro-zone convergence 
parameters ‘imposed’ by the EU67� 
64 Respectively, Cost� Court October 11 2012, Case No� 223, “A� e altri c� Min� giust�”, 
in Giur. Cost., 2012, 3293 ff�; Cost� Court 5 June 2013, No� 116, “B�G� e altri c� Inps 
e altri”, in Giur. Cost., 2013, 3587 ff�
65 More precisely, the judicial reviews as to constitutionality were, respectively, related 
to art� 18, par� 22-bis, Law Decree of 6 July 2011, No� 98 (Disposizioni urgenti per 
la stabilizzazione finanziaria – Urgent provisions for financial stabilization), converted, 
with amendments, by Law of 15 July 2011, No� 111, as amended by art� 24, par� 
31-bis, Law Decree of 6 December 2011, No� 201 (Disposizioni urgenti per la crescita, 
l’equità e il consolidamento dei conti pubblici – Urgent provisions for growth, fairness and 
consolidation of public finances)�
66 For a recent and persuasive reconstruction of the case-law of our Constitutional Court 
acting also as “European” judge, see Ivaldi, P�, “Diritto dell’Unione europea e processo 
costituzionale”, in Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2013, 191 ff� More generally see also 
Rosas, A�, “The National Judge as EU Judge; Some Constitutional Observations”, 
in SMU Law Rev., 2014, 717 ff�; Grabenwarter, C�, “National Constitutional Law 
Relating to the European Union”, in Von Bogdandy, A�, Bast, J� (eds�), Principles of 
European Constitutional Law, Oxford, 2010, 83 ff�; Tizzano, A�, “Ancora sui rapporti 
tra Corti europee: principi comunitari e c�d� controlimiti costituzionali”, in Diritto 
dell’Unione europea, 2007, 734 ff�
67 The reference is made particularly to par� 25 of art� 24, Law Decree of 6 December 
2011, No� 201 (Disposizioni urgenti per la crescita, l’equità e il consolidamento dei 
conti pubblici – Urgent provisions for growth, fairness and consolidation of public 
finances), converted, with amendments, by art� 1, par� 1, Law of 22 December 2011, 
No� 214� This law, as it is known, was said to be contrary to articles 3, 36, first 
paragraph, and 38, second paragraph, of the Italian Constitution� The Constitutional 
Court proved to be unwilling to support some referring judges’s decisions considering 
the contested rules as detrimental to fundamental rights as provided for by ECHR�
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Fortunately, not all constitutional courts are antagonistic with regards 
to EMU or ESM rules or more precisely with regards to the implications 
these rules have at national level68� In an overview of the positions taken 
by national constitutional courts, the judgement of the Estonian Supreme 
Court is significant� The Court was asked whether the 85% majority 
foreseen within the ESM Board of Governors was compatible with the 
country’s constitution, on the basis of the fact that only three Member 
States (Germany, France and Italy) can exercise a veto, meaning that the 
other members have to comply with the Board’s decisions69� 
The Estonian Supreme Court had no hesitation in judging this rule 
consistent with the principle of proportionality and therefore legitimate 
even though it restricts the financial competence of the Estonian 
Parliament, the principle of rule of law and the sovereignty of Estonia70� 
Without wanting to overemphasize the significance of this judgement, it 
does nevertheless show that, at least on economic issues, the most recent 
EU Member States – and their judges – believe in European Monetary 
Union and the ‘community’ method perhaps more than others� 
9.  The Gauweiler Judgement and its Possible Impact on 
the Structure of the EMU
Amongst the varying opinions on the constitutional effects determined 
by the shortcomings of the EMU, the ECJ has had, at least so far, the last 
word in Gauweiler� 
Clearly, the judgement was the product of a solely EU perspective� 
Admittedly, few doubted that the Court would have delegitimised the 
OMT programme and by doing so sound the death knell of monetary 
union� 
However, apart from the outcome, a reading of the judgement 
motivation suggests that the Court had no intention of obtaining a 
minimum result, but instead bravely – and at least on the political level 
persuasively – sought to offer a system-wide indication and at the same 
time halt perhaps once and for all repeated attempts to delegitimise and 
weaken the ECB, i�e� the institution that, over the last few years, had 
68 A short overview of the internal constitutional case-law on ESM is provided by 
Cucchiara, M� F�, above, 110 ff�
69 See art� 4�4 of ESM Treaty�
70 Estonian Supreme Court, judgements of 3-4 1-6 of 12 July 2012, available at www� 
riigikohus�ee/?id=1347, §§ 208-209�
more than any other taken on the task of saving the euro and the EU 
against a backdrop of political (and has we have seen, for some, also legal) 
paralysis characterised by the actions of Member States�
The Court’s iter decidendi is not perfect, nor does its attempt to create 
a continuum between its judgement and Pringle fully convince� Also 
because, as I have already pointed out, it was by no means easy to counter 
the BVG’s astute referrals on the basis of the weaknesses inherent in the 
Pringle judgement� 
The Court, however, clarified point by point the issues raised in the 
referral, so providing a structured defence of the workings of the ESCB, 
which can be summarised as follows� 
First and foremost, a ‘strong’ legal review of ESCB and ECB 
measures is not allowed as these institutions enjoy absolute autonomy 
and independence with regards to any form of political pressure and 
consequently a considerable margin of discretion in making technical 
decisions71� The only limit they have in performing their institutional 
mission concerns the motivations of the decisions they take, which 
can be subject to judicial review where there is a ‘manifest error of 
assessment’72� On this question, a reading of ECB documents regarding 
the transmission of monetary policy in the euro area, made up by all ‘the 
various channels [and I include the OMT programme as one of them] 
through which monetary policy actions affect the economy and the level 
of prices in particular’73 will suffice to show, also jurists, how difficult it 
is to interpret and categorise in a rigid way (and in doing so, mistakenly) 
measures that are extremely complex and variable� In this sense, the 
Court is to be commended for those parts of the judgement motivation 
where, clarifying that the objective of the OMT programme is to remedy 
instabilities in the monetary policy transmission mechanism, it recognises 
that assessments made by the ECB should be respected even though 
these may concern selective measures that have indirect consequences 
71 Gauweiler, above, esp� points 68 ff�
72 Gauweiler, above, point 74� Even more emblematic – and symptomatic of the 
Court’s will to promptly reply to BVG – is point 75: “[…] the fact, mentioned by 
the referring court, that that reasoned analysis has been subject to challenge does 
not, in itself, suffice to call that conclusion into question, since, given that questions 
of monetary policy are usually of a controversial nature and in view of the ESCB’s 
broad discretion, nothing more can be required of the ESCB apart from that it use its 
economic expertise and the necessary technical means at its disposal to carry out that 
analysis with all care and accuracy”�
73 See the analysis “La trasmissione della politica monetaria nell’area dell’euro”, in 
Boll. mensile BCE, 2000, 41 ff�
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on the economic policy objectives established in parallel adjustment 
programmes agreed on (or imposed) as part of the EFSF or ESM74� 
Having made this clarification, the Court had little difficulty 
in reaching further conclusions that strengthened the EMU and 
consequently the Union as a whole� Above all, we have already seen 
how the Court’s preference for an analysis of relevant treaty norms that 
does not seek the rigid compartmentalisation of economic policy and 
monetary policy measures implies also its preference for a more flexible 
interpretation of the principle of conferred competences� It is here, I 
believe, that the greatest divergence emerges between the Court of Justice 
and the principles of conferral theorised by the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
already seen in the Lissabon-Urteil judgement� Indeed, in Gauweiler, 
the Court sought to take this opportunity to stress, in contrast to the 
rigidity of the German judgements, the need for and legal correctness of 
a flexible approach vis-à-vis the interpretation of rules assigning powers 
to institutions, particularly those of the ECB� Such flexibility is fully 
consistent with the principle of loyal cooperation and presupposes the 
need to allow the ECB to be able to assume the role and the responsibility 
also institutional which, in the current critical situation, the ECB itself 
has marked out� 
Furthermore, and once more in contrast with the BVG’s line of 
reasoning, the ECJ clarified that the bond-purchase programmes 
established for certain Member States and for categories of bonds issued 
(such as the OMT programme) are already ‘circumscribed and limited’, so 
making it unnecessary and indeed wrong to set ‘a quantitative limit […] 
prior to its implementation, such a limit being likely, moreover, to reduce 
the programme’s effectiveness’75� 
Obviously, we are a long way from the legitimisation of any open-end 
measure, which puts the ECB’s independence and capacity to act at risk 
and infringes therefore article 123 or article 125 TFEU� Nevertheless, there 
is an unmistakeable similarity between the Court’s judgement and Mario 
Draghi’s famous ‘whatever it takes’ declared during the announcement 
of the OMT programme as an instrument to counter speculative attacks 
on certain euro-zone States’ public debt� So, the assessment in terms of 
proportionality made by the Court with regards to a programme that 
does not have quantitative but rather methodological limits takes on an 
importance that goes beyond the specific case in question and can help 
74 Gauweiler, above, points 55 ff�
75 Gauweiler, above, point 88�
to design further instruments to be used by EU institutions as part of an 
overhaul of the EMU� 
It is of little importance if this discretionary action includes ‘generally, 
the possibility of the ESCB purchasing from the creditors of such a State, 
bonds previously issued by that State’� If this in fact occurs with a series 
of ‘sufficient safeguards to ensure that the latter does not fall foul of the 
prohibition of monetary financing in Article 123(1) TFEU’, this decision 
also appears legitimate76� 
In the analysis of the Gauweiler judgement, a question, perhaps 
of little real importance, does come to mind: did the Court want to 
challenge the Bundesverfassungsgericht, or at least a part of it, for having 
over-played their role as defenders of German democracy? Certainly more 
important, also for the European cause, is to view positively the position 
the Court took with regards to the BVG, i�e� as a natural part of the 
dialogue between courts and the essence of preliminary ruling referrals� 
In this sense, if the obligations arising from EU-membership mean a 
community-oriented reading of certain Grundgesetz rules, then this is 
simply how relations between national and EU laws normally work and 
is part and parcel of what jurists have studied since Van Gend en Loos77, 
which has also conditioned the constitutional structure of all Member 
States, with the landmark Frontini judgement of the Constitutional 
Court as an example from Italy78�
10. Conclusions
Apart from the political aspects, from the legal viewpoint the obvious 
shortcomings of rules concerning the EMU and financial assistance to 
States that I have described represent a threat to the overall stability of 
the European system�
Some, optimistically, characterise the current phase of European 
integration as being ‘semi-intergovernmental’ in method79� However, 
76 Gauweiler, above, points 95 ff�
77 Case 23/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. 
Netherlands Inland. Revenue Administration [1963] ECR, 3 ff� For a reinterpretation 
of this judgement, fifty years later, see Kokott, J� and Prechal, S� (Tizzano, A� ed�), 
Van Gend en Loos 1963-2013, Conference Proceedings, Luxembourg 13 May 2013, 
available at www�bookshop�europa�eu�
78 Constitutional Court, December 18, 1973, Case No� 183, available at www�
cortecostituzionale�it�
79 So Lenaerts, K�, above, 756 ff�
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the effect at a technical-juridical level determined by positions taken by 
national supreme courts is evident� In fact these courts, working from the 
perspective of their own domestic legal systems, limit room for political 
negotiation or anyway uphold constitutional values (no longer common) 
in the name of safeguarding the interpretation and application of EU or 
ESM rules� 
In this respect, it is worth pointing out legislative initiatives aimed 
at formally linking the EMU and ESM systems, such as Regulation 
472/2013, which establishes the conditions to be complied with by 
Member States in serious financial difficulties or which have applied 
for financial assistance80� Interestingly, and a fact not missed by the 
doctrine81, the economic adjustment programmes (the so-called 
Memoranda of Understanding) signed by Member States’ applying for 
financial assistance subject to conditionality are applied by the Council, 
the Commission and Member States, which ‘shall take into account 
national rules and practice and Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union’82� The reason why reference is made only 
to the social rights contained in the Charter, i�e� article 28, is not fully 
clear unless in the sense of referring exclusively to acts (e�g� MOUs) still 
considered outside the EU system and so not subject to article 51 of the 
Charter�
As regards the Court of Justice, Gauweiler represents a major step 
forward after Pringle, despite the fact that some questions remain 
unanswered� The danger of not implementing real mechanisms of 
financial assistance for Member States has been averted� Judgements, 
like Pringle, I would define as emergency decisions that raise doubts and 
generate conflicts in the system which need to be resolved by normative 
reforms� If these reforms are not forthcoming, the Court risks becoming 
an institution more political than it should be, with critical effects on the 
entire EU legal system� 
With this in mind, the Gauweiler judgement offers up one final 
point that deserves attention� This can be found in the part already 
referred to that establishes the jurisdictional limits to the Court’s review 
of the ESBC’s activities: the recognition of these limits with regards to 
80 Official Journal of the European Union L series (from now on OJEU L) 140 of 
27 May 2013, 1 ff�
81 See again Lenaerts, K�, above, 757 ff�
82 So art� 1�4 Regulation (EU) No� 472/2013, above, providing that “Accordingly, the 
application of this Regulation and of those recommendations does not affect the right 
to negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements or to take collective action 
in accordance with national law”�
the  activities of highly technical institutions like the ESBC, ECB and 
in the future also other bodies and agencies charged with managing the 
euro-zone is consistent with an increasingly complex legal environment� 
This situation is yet another example of the distance between citizens’ 
political representatives, the rules adopted where these representatives 
sit, and the ‘government choices’, which I have attempted to show are 
certainly not limited to the economy or the currency�
The constitutional consequences in the history of European 
integration appear episodic, driven by different contingencies and 
without the attention and legitimisation, also democratic, that should 
instead be fundamental�
Not by chance, some proposals for euro-zone reforms doing the 
political rounds put forward the idea of a parliamentary institution made 
up by euro-zone representatives with specific and more effective powers 
than they have at present on the issue of reform83� 
The time has come to help also the Court of Justice do its job in a 
better way� 
83 In this regard, see the interview with the French Minister for Economy Emmanuel 
Macron, Il Sole-24 Ore, September 5 2015, 6�
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On the Metamorphosis of the Crisis  
and the Prospects for European  
Economic Governance1
Adriano Giovannelli
1. EMU under Threat, the Bailout Funds and the Troika
The concluding article of this volume, devoted to the history of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, focuses on the most recent events, starting 
from the turbulent final years of the first decade in the new millennium 
and stopping just before the Brexit referendum�
The purpose of this essay is to illustrate the new microeconomic 
scenarios, juridical instruments, policies and perspectives of the common 
economic governance, giving account of the sometimes hard debates 
which accompany each step forward and of the problems arisen, while 
the crisis progressively changes its nature and cracks open in the walls of 
the European building�
Since the second half of the 1990s, the concept of “governance”2 has 
spread in European documents� Its origin is closely linked to a North 
American corporate culture, the prevalence of the term being a good 
illustration of the current dominance of managerial logic on the need 
for representation and legitimacy� The European integration process has 
helped to introduce the concept of multilevel governance into scientific 
and political debate�
In some countries, use of the term “governance” has met with 
decreasing resistance� The French were the last to surrender, and at 
1 This study takes into account events occurring up to May 31, 2016� For reasons of 
space, in the brief footnotes of this long essay, references will be made only to few of 
the most recent and relevant studies, normative texts, documents and interventions 
examined�
2 For the concept of governance see Risse Th� (ed�), Governance Without a State? 
Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood, Columbia University Press, New 
York, Chichester, West Sussex, 2011 and Wiszniowski, R�, “New Governance: 
some theoretical assumptions”, in Wiszniowski, R�, Glinka, K� (eds�), New Public 
Governance in the Visegrád Group, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń, 2015�
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the end of 2012 they became resigned to replacing the original term 
“pilotage”, in the definitive text of the loi organique implementing the 
Fiscal Compact (FC)� 
The expression “economic governance” is now used to indicate the set 
of institutions, procedures and policies which are functional to achieve 
common objectives in the economic field� I will try to distill in few pages 
some aspects of this complex issue�
The premise must be acknowledged that, in the Maastricht 
Treaty, issues relating to the economy and finance were placed next 
to the Community pillar� Even if those missions considered to be of 
European interest spread beyond the building of the common market, 
the competences required to perform them remained the responsibility 
of the States, and the Brussels institutions could be used simply for 
the coordination of national policies and measures� The non-binding 
character of the ambitious 2000 Lisbon economic agenda is one 
important reason for its failure, which became clear during the last 
years of the decade�
A tsunami wave, which began in North America in 2008 (whereas 
in 2016 the turbulences have come mainly from the East), crossed the 
Atlantic in 2009, just when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force� 
As the European Court of Auditors recognized in January 2016, the 
European Commission was at that moment unprepared, since it 
underestimated the signs of weakness of the national financial systems 
and fiscal imbalances� The explosion of the private debt crisis in some 
European countries and the public debt crisis (related to interventions 
supporting the banks) soon drew the attention of the markets to 
countries such as Italy, which seemed less exposed at the beginning� 
Also, the implicit partial default by Greece raises the fear of an extension 
of the contagion to the second indebted State, too big to fail, without 
systemic effects�
The doubt concerning sovereign debt soon turned into distrust 
about the strength of the euro, whose introduction had leveled the rates 
among the States at which national debts had been financed� This shock 
risks undermining the entire Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
architecture� 
The governance of the crisis has taken shape in four different ways, 
which I will mention briefly in this order: through the multilateral financial 
support to countries in greater difficulty; through the intervention of 
the ECB – which faces the Bundesbank (BUBA) on the structure and 
limits of the monetary policy; through increased surveillance of fiscal 
and macroeconomic policies3 and through the creation of a Banking 
Union (BU) aimed at breaking the vicious circle between sovereign debts 
and banks� I will focus briefly on each of these topics, which are closely 
intertwined, referring also to the prospects for the immediate future�
In 2010, bilateral loans were initially used, and the path of transitional 
(for this reason less contested) stabilization mechanisms was tried, 
derogating from art� 125 TFEU, which bans the bailout of States, a 
principle imposed by Berlin as a precondition of the euro and linked to 
the illusion of the 1990s that convergence was inevitable�
The fleeting European Financial Stabilization Mechanism4, managed 
by the Commission, and the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF)5, based on an Agreement in the euro area, were born� Their legal 
basis is found in art� 122 concerning assistance to countries in difficulties 
caused by natural disasters or exceptional circumstances beyond their 
control, situations pragmatically assimilated to the crisis in Greece, to 
which German and French banks are particularly exposed� As regards 
the most solid European Stability Mechanism (ESM), in 2011 it was 
necessary to insert a new paragraph into art� 136 TFEU which authorizes 
its establishment and activation “if indispensable to the stability of the 
euro area a whole”, by adding that “the granting of any required financial 
assistance […] will be made subject to strict conditionality”�
It should be noted that Italy proposed, in 2016, to transform this 
ESM into a European Monetary Fund in order to derive full benefit from 
its pool of resources� This idea was partly echoed soon in a debate in the 
Eurotower, where the Italian economist Giavazzi proposed the creation 
of a European fiscal Institute, with more resources and a more simplified 
governance than that of the ESM, taking away functions considered to 
be unfit from the European Commission and the ECB (whose hybrid 
nature has increased over time)� In the Bank of France, reflection began 
concerning the creation of a European Treasury which would combine the 
ESM and the economic services of Palais Berlaymont� Lastly, a Franco-
Italian document of April 2016 asked that the ESM should, as quickly as 
possible, be made the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF) in the transitional period (up until 2024) in which resources may 
be insufficient to tackle a serious banking crisis�
3 See Giovannelli, A�, “Vincoli europei e decisione di bilancio”, in Quaderni 
costituzionali, 2013, No� 4�
4 This mechanism is based on the emergency clause of Article 122 (2) TFEU�
5 The EFSF is not based on the EU legal framework, but on an Agreement among the 
euroarea States�
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With the ESM, regulated by a Treaty6, the schemes of conditionality 
experienced up until then become stronger, offering also a point of 
reference to the ECB, suspected in Berlin of unduly sliding from the 
monetary sphere to the political one�
The Eurotower, playing more a political than a technical role, has, 
moreover, already joined the partners of the dreaded Troika, the European 
Commission and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)� Under 
pressure from the big players of the euro area (despite the concerns of the 
emerging countries), this latter has in fact included among its criteria of 
intervention the “risk of systemic disruptive effects on the international 
financial system”�
Within the Troika, discussions have taken place on the philosophy 
of conditionality and on the dynamics of financial consolidation� The 
main criticism came in 2014 from the European Parliament (EP), which 
highlights the lack of democratic legitimacy and the indifference to social 
sustainability of the sacrifices asked in exchange for aid�
The Troika, which has been operating since 2010 in Greece (where it 
evokes the mythological three-headed dog situated at the gates of Hades) 
gave rise to the rejection by Athens in 2015, and it has been, for some 
time and only formally, replaced by the “European Institutions”, and then 
by the Brussels Group, in which first the EFSF and then the ESM joined 
the three partners mentioned� Since the end of March 2016, Greece has 
been the only country under this constraint, following the exit of Cyprus 
from the bailout program� Even though there are strong doubts regarding 
the Greek case, the Troika therapy has had a positive economic impact 
in several countries, generating, at the same time, social impoverishment 
and political instability� 
In the most difficult years of the crisis, the conditionality of the 
Memorandums of Understanding, signed by States which need financial 
aid, created strong pressure for the national Parliaments, squeezed 
between the role played by their governments – the first counterparts of 
the Troika – and the activism of some Constitutional Courts� Particularly 
relevant is the Portuguese one7, constantly oscillating between pragmatic 
resignation to the international constraints resulting from the state 
of crisis and a willingness to protect social rights, deeply eroded by 
measures imposed by the Troika� The Constitutional Court of Lisbon 
6 The Treaty Establishing the ESM passes the careful but pragmatic scrutiny by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court on September 12, 2012, case No� 2 BvR 
1390/12�
7 See Cisotta, R�, Gallo, D�, The Portuguese Constitutional Court case law on austerity 
measures: a reappraisal, LUISS Academy Working Paper, Rome, 4/2014�
is even indicated as the “national figure” of 2013 (the year in which 
J� P� Morgan grossly points out the Constitution as having been a limit to 
the Lusitanian consolidation) by the influential magazine Espresso�
2. A Growing Political Role for the Eurotower
The condensed nature of this study forces me to step back from the 
guardian-of-conditionality role played by the Troika to examine the 
monetary policy decisions of the ECB, even if the reference to monetary 
policy has sometimes seemed to BUBA an alibi to cover heterodox 
interventions of a political nature� The Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) program, launched in September 2012, is often referred to as 
‘Draghi’s bazooka’; it represents an evolution aimed at reducing German 
mistrust (with reference to the strong conditionality of the ESM) and at 
making more effective – in terms of the potentially unlimited acquisition 
of government bonds – the Security Market Program (SMP) initiated 
by Trichet in spring 2010 with the gradual purchase on the secondary 
market, in order to bypass art� 123 of TFEU, of a significant amount of 
national treasury bonds�
Berlin seems to look the other way when the interventions concern 
small and peripheral countries such as Portugal, Ireland and Greece; 
the criticisms increase in volume when there is a need to intervene in 
Spain and in Italy� The Bundesbank seems no longer content with the 
statements of the Eurotower, which claims that it wants to overcome, 
through its interventions, the obstacles to the transmission of monetary 
policy, arising when national rates diverge excessively� This argument 
is, however, not dissimilar from that used in the 1970s by the BUBA 
President to buy federal bonds�
With the Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO), at the turn of 
2011 and 2012, the EBC also granted significant funding to the banks (not 
forbidden by art� 104 of the Maastricht Treaty)� This massive intervention 
is aimed at giving time to the States in a situation of imbalance� The 
liquidity of the EBC in fact replaces that of the markets, which play a 
destabilizing role (but make the sovereign-banks loop problem worse)�
The OMT program of early autumn 2012 (legitimized by the euro 
area summit held the previous June, immediately after the European 
Council, in which Monti won a political arm-wrestling contest with 
Merkel) detonated growing tensions with Berlin, until the Federal 
Constitutional Court referred the matter to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), which finally took its reassuring decision in 
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spring 20158, although the judges of Karlsruhe reserve the right to assess 
whether some of the legal limits they have set down for the protection 
of national sovereignty and German taxpayers are respected� The final 
decision could perhaps arrive in the terrible last week of June 2016, 
precisely the week of a possible Brexit nightmare�
If the OMT program has never been activated, and the communicative 
web (from “whatever it takes” of July 2012 to “whatever is needed” of 
April 2016) built by the “forward guidance” of Draghi seemed for some 
time to be sufficient, the confrontation with Berlin on the unconventional 
interventions of the ECB moved on Quantitative Easing (QE)� Around 
this, Draghi gradually firmed up a laborious consensus (in a process whose 
last stages can be found in the speeches of Paris, Amsterdam and Jackson 
Hole of 2014), acceding to concessions aimed at reassuring Germany, such 
as the allocation of 80% of the risk in the Central National Banks�
It seems that Europe has partly moved from a Franco-German engine, 
for which Berlin provided the energy while Paris controlled the steering, 
to a Frankfurt-German engine, whose dynamics became clearly evident 
when Draghi was invited to speak in the Bundestag� France – linked to 
German tolerance for its high deficit – maintains only a symbolically 
preferential relationship, but really (as demonstrated by the fact that 
information on the reception of Syrian refugees has not been previously 
agreed with Paris, which takes a harder line on the migrants problem) 
plays only a covering role vis-à-vis Germany, greatly strengthened by 
the dynamic of economic governance� The Eurotower – even lacking in 
democratic legitimacy and institutionally focused on aspects of economic 
coexistence – has become the dynamic force for integration in the euro 
area, while the German Institutions, the Bundestag, the Court of Karlsruhe 
and the Government (despite there being significant differences between 
the balanced silent consents of the pragmatic Chancellor and the position 
of the Finance Minister), control the brake� 
In addition, the Bundesbank, as former Chancellor Schmidt said in 
1996, has heavily influenced even the writing of the Maastricht Treaty (at 
a point at which the German Minister for Foreign Affairs was, by chance, 
the actual Finance Minister, Schäuble)�
The joint intervention9, on February 2016, of the BUBA President 
and the Governor of the Banque de France (who think it is important to 
8 See the judgment of June 16, 2015, Peter Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, 
C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400�
9 See the Weidmann, J� and Villeroy de Galhau, F� joint op-ed for the German daily 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 8, 2016�
restore confidence in the Franco-German axis) is symptomatic of the role 
of the central banks in this metamorphosis of relations between Berlin 
and Paris� They call for the creation of a European Minister for Finance 
of the euro area (which Draghi, however, had already recommended 
few days previously)� Some see, in this unusual intervention, the aim 
also of reducing the psychological centrality of the Eurotower policy 
of supporting the economy� The Governor of the EBC replies on 
February 15, during a hearing in the EP, recalling that the only stimulus 
policy had been that of the institution he leads, which has the merit of 
around 50% of the economic recovery in the euro area� Downsizing the 
Eurotower – Draghi thought – makes sense only if States show courage 
in their fiscal policy�
A dynamic role is played by Germany with regard to the more 
political subject of the refugee crisis� In the last months of 2015, 
however, the daring line of Chancellor Merkel weakened her leadership 
within her party and later contributed to the political growth of the 
populist right wing in some Länder� The shadows cast on the national 
image by the Volkswagen scandal, the divergent political dynamics of 
some governments (not only Eastern ones) that traditionally referred 
to Berlin, the fall of several austerity-focused executives and the 
disorienting effects produced by the events of Cologne also take their 
toll� The Kanzlerdämmerung vibe and the blurred German role, at the 
turn of 2016, led to a withdrawal of the BRD; its Government has 
been forced to reflect on the possibility of abandoning the philosophy 
of centralized coordination, leaving to the States the responsibility for 
problems for which Berlin no longer wants to undertake risk, paying 
heavy costs� The ECB has therefore been left alone, playing a growing 
substitute role (of a more political than technical nature) as the only 
institution of a federal nature in the euro area, while recent elections in 
several States have made the national reforms, necessary to support the 
effects of the monetary stimuli, more difficult�
The interventions of Draghi (and of the members of the Executive Board 
closest to him) have progressively outlined a strategy which encourages 
European political convergence, as the basis for a sustainable economic 
and monetary integration, giving a glimpse of a new institutional level 
in a euro area possessing legislative capacity� Several countries, pressed by 
troubled public opinion, nevertheless have had difficulty receiving these 
messages constructively�
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3. European Quantitative Easing and the Crisis
Given the disappointing effects of the TLTRO of June 2014 (a 
“targeted” intervention, intended to deliver to the real economy those 
flows which were not generated by the injections10 of the LTRO in 2012), 
the ECB finally takes the big step, entering into what was up until then 
uncharted territory� After having won consensus for the idea that the 
purchase of government bonds can be justified, given the presence of 
substantial changes in the macroeconomic situation with effects on the 
medium-term inflation outlook, the Eurotower assumes a no longer 
merely reactive but a proactive role, announcing, on January 22, 2015, a 
60 billion monthly purchase (from the following March) of public sector 
debt instruments, always on the secondary market, in proportion to the 
States’ participation shares in the ECB, until inflation in the euro area 
should be close to 2%, a level which has long been considered maximal, 
but whose meaning in the new scenario has been revised to avoid or slow 
down a deflationary drift�
The effects on the rates for refinancing the national public debts 
(with important benefits for the countries of the southern periphery) and 
partly on the Euro exchange – which would not formally be a target 
of the ECB  – are evident, with positive consequences for European 
competitiveness, encouraged also by the changed policy of the Federal 
Reserve Bank (FED) and, at the end of 2015, by the prospect of a further 
US interest rate increase in the summer of 2016; the maneuvers connected 
to China’s crisis unfortunately weigh negatively at the beginning of 2016�
The QE effects, by contrast, are still modest in relation to the level 
of inflation (which represents the formal objective of the intervention)� 
This latter is kept very low by various factors, including the dynamics 
of oil and raw material prices, globalization (which everywhere 
reduces the ability of Central Banks to control inflation), and the new 
demographic, technological, macroeconomic scenarios� If they do not 
replace Friedman’s “helicopter drop” (an extreme measure for the Belgian 
executive board member Praet) invoked by some economists who study 
the Bank of Japan, the monetary stimuli nevertheless mitigate the impact 
of the slowdown of the emergent countries on the European economy�
After the enlargement, in September, of the national public debt 
shares which can be purchased, QE is still being reinforced in various 
10 The Long Term Refinancing Operation is a process by which ECB provides liquidity 
to Eurozone banks� The cheap loans are backed up by collaterals and banks can use 
assets such as sovereign bonds�
ways (among them the extension to debt instruments issued by local 
governments), via a decision taken by a large majority in November 2015; 
the deadline for QE is extended from September 2016 to March 2017� 
Further liquidity will also be introduced into the system, reinvesting the 
incomes of the matured bonds in other securities� 
In December, Draghi declared that there are no defined time limits to 
hard intervention by the ECB (suggesting to some ironic analysts that he 
could move to the logic of “forever it takes”)� QE is a drug from which it 
will be difficult to free the euro area� 
The Eurotower reports soon show the possibility for further 
reinforcement of the intervention� This was a review which, before the 
EP, the EBC Governor had envisaged for March (a time when, because of 
the principle of rotation in the Governing Council, the German Central 
Banker and other northern “hawks” do not vote), even if, presenting 
the 2015 BUBA budget, the President of the latter invited to consider 
the risks of an ultra-accommodative monetary policy� The position was 
taken over, in the Financial G20 in Shanghai, by the German Minister 
Schäuble, who stated that growth driven by debt even creates “zombie 
economies”� 
In a deflationary scenario, the shock therapy of the BCE (whose 
armoury is not yet empty) preceded by further warnings by the German 
banks, was finally decided by an “overwhelming majority” in the 
Governing Council on March 10, who adopted a synergic package of 
calibrated measures (of which I summarize the most relevant)� Their aim 
is to normalize inflation, while other policies cannot or do not contribute 
to higher growth, to use the words of the vice-president Costancio11, 
which well reflect the solitude of the Eurotower (recognized also by the 
IMF), whose hyperactivity is the other side of the coin of the States’ 
inaction at a time when strong headwinds blow against the European 
boat� 
With its monetary policy, the Eurotower (which is becoming the 
main holder of European debt in a silent process of implicit potential 
mutualization) buys time for the implementation of national reforms, 
which remain essential for bringing actual growth close to potential 
growth� 
The monthly purchase – a window of opportunity for improving 
resilience, open until March 2017 – is expanded to 80 billion (more 
11 See the opinion piece by Vítor Constâncio, March 11, 2016, In defence of Monetary 
Policy, available at https://www�ecb�europa�eu/press/inter/date/2016/html/
sp160311_1�en�html�
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than the market expectations) and, in addition to public sector bonds, 
investment grade bonds issued by non-bank corporations of the euro 
area, chosen by a special committee, are included in the list of eligible 
assets in order to strengthen the financial conditions of the real economy� 
It is interesting to observe that, at present, the relatively small European 
corporate bond market is wider in Germany (and moreover, because of 
their size, the Italian companies should profit less from this opportunity)�
The issuer and the issue share limit for the bond purchase of 
international organizations and multilateral development banks (for 
which there is no capital key, thus disallowing an adequate increase in 
interventions in small, fragile countries of the European periphery, as 
becomes evident in April) are raised�
The reference rate is lowered to zero� Four new quarterly TLTROs will 
be launched from June; their interest rate could be as low as that of the 
deposit facility of the ECB – which decreases to minus 0�40 points – if 
banks lend to households for business more than a fixed benchmark� 
These TLTROs, in which banks are paid by the Eurotower to lend money, 
should compensate for the effects of the negative deposit rate (lenders pay 
for holding their excess reserves with the EBC) against the profitability 
of the banking system� Later, Draghi informs the International Monetary 
and Financial Committee of the IMF that the negative rates could go 
below the horizon of the asset purchase� 
In the German press, this set of accommodating monetary policy 
measures was seen as a massive transfer of economic resources from 
the savings-rich north to the indebted south of the continent� Some in 
Mediterranean Europe began to wonder what will happen after 2019, 
when the ECB Governor will be chosen from the Central Bankers 
of the north, and prudent Merkel will perhaps be replaced in the 
Bundeskanzleramtsgebäude�
The growing political ambitions of Minister Schäuble – in the context 
of the Bundestag elections of 2017 – become evident� In April, expressing 
the fears of the Sparkassen regarding the negative rates (despite the German 
traditional insistence on the autonomy of the Central Banks, which must 
not suffer public officials’ interference), he strongly attacks the ECB, 
accusing it of creating “extraordinary” problems and of impoverishing 
German savers, encouraging the growth of populism12� A surprise reply 
12 On April 8, 2016, receiving in Kronberg the Wolfram Engles prize from the 
Stiftung Marktwirtschaft, the Federal Minister went so far as to blame the ECB 
President for the rise of rightwing AfD party� See on this http://blogs�reuters�com/
macroscope/2016/04/10/schaeuble-vs-draghi/�
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by Weidmann (in the past an advisor to Merkel), who defends the ECB, 
disorients Schäuble�
The battle for the succession to the Chancellorship crosses with that 
for succession in the Eurotower� The Bavarian CSU openly calls for the 
option of a guarantor of the German tradition of monetary stability 
(after Trichet and Draghi, considered responsible for encouraging deficit 
spending policies)� This helps to further understanding of the new 
approach of the Bundesbank President (outvoted in many important 
decisions of the ECB Governing Council)� His dissent now no longer 
concerns quantitative easing policy, but rather the specific decisions 
taken in order to carry it out� In Rome, at the end of April, Weidmann’s 
fire shifts to the European Commission (also in relation to many choices 
shared with the Eurogroup and Ecofin), considered responsible for 
subordinating its technical role to a political pragmatism (more cunning 
than intelligent) that leads it to be over-tolerant towards States such as 
Italy, encouraging their moral hazard13� In the meantime, discussion in 
the German press about Draghi’s “Italianness” appears aimed at preparing 
the rise of a Teutonic saviour at the Eurotower�
Aware of Schäuble’s criticism, Draghi remembers that the ECB has a 
mandate, established by a treaty, “to pursue price stability for the whole 
of the Eurozone, not only for Germany” (a statement on which, at the 
end of May, the German Finance Minister, surprisingly, resigns himself 
to converging), and announces that the Governing Council is unanimous 
in defending ECB independence� We obey laws, the Governor adds, not 
politicians� The German Chancellor immediately replies (to avoid being 
caught in an intermittent but strong political headwind within her party), 
stating that German discussion of Eurozone interest rates “is legitimate 
and should not be taken as an interference in the ECB’s independent 
policies”� 
The internal tensions in Germany increasingly spread to the European 
debate while, in the opinion polls, the Große Koalition parties fall below 
50%� 
13 See Weidmann, J�, Solidität und Solidarität in der Europäischen Währungsunion, speech 
delivered at the German Embassy in Rome, April 26, 2016, available at https://www�
bundesbank�de/Redaktion/DE/Reden/2016/2016_04_26_weidmann�html�
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4. The Greek Stress-Test for the Eurozone
The intervention of the EBC, anesthetizing the markets, assumes 
particular importance during the phases of the Greek crisis, which 
explodes once again violently in January 2015, three days after the launch 
of QE� Concern, snaking across Europe, about a possible contagion 
arising from the Hellenic situation is contained, and the ECB intervenes, 
towards Athens in particular, with a calibrated use of Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance (ELA)�
The effects of this complex crisis (to which it is possible here to devote 
only a few pages) deserve specific analysis� It seems that, after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, the conflict between East and West was replaced by 
tension between North and South; the Hellenic events appear, in 2015, 
the most significant symptom of this dialectic� However, very soon, 
reactions to the refugee crisis and the political dynamics in Central and 
Eastern Europe re-exacerbate to some extent the divisions between East 
and West which were considered a thing of the past but which instead 
now combine with those between the north and south of the continent�
The Greek referendum, during the (politically) hot July of 2015, and 
the strong reaction of the northern countries, seem at one point even to 
call into question the reversibility of the euro� As Juncker writes at the 
end of that difficult year14, some bridges between States are destroyed, 
words not easy to retract are said, and there is confrontation between 
the democracies of Europe� Berlin even threatens a (legally dubious) 
temporary suspension of Greece from the euro area�
Just when things are on the brink of collapse, European pragmatism 
prevails once again, owing not to a sudden burst of solidarity but to 
the need to save the euro (and perhaps to pressure from Washington, 
worried about a destabilizing geopolitical drift)� However, it expresses 
itself in terms of a dilatory intervention which is considered insufficient 
by the IMF, subject to pressures from the emerging countries (whose 
voting rights increase over time) and hostile to the use of resources in a 
rich continent like Europe� Even if Foggy Bottom reenters the game, its 
positions are more and more divergent from those of the other members 
of the rescue group�
The bomb has not yet been defused, as is shown in February 2016 by 
the increased spread (even if it is slowed by the QE) between the bonds 
of the peripheral States and the German bund at the first sign of the 
14 See Juncker, J�-C�, “La vera forza dell’Europa è la sua perseveranza”, Il Sole 24 ore, 
December 29, 2015�
fragility of the Athens Government, subject to widespread protests over 
the reforms necessary to obtain aid of the third recovery plan� 
It seems at one point that a glimmer of hope appears, because a 
restructuring of public debt begins to be seen as possible compensation for 
the role played by Athens in the refugee crisis; this solution is proposed to 
Berlin by the IMF, which considers the Greek fiscal targets unrealistic and 
the debt unsustainable in the long run� The main problem is the consent 
of the Bundestag to a “haircut”, owing to the divisions in Merkel’s party and 
the fear of further increasing the growth of populism in Germany�
A compromise is close to being found in the Eurogroup meeting of 
April 23, 2016, which in exchange for strong commitments by Athens 
gives its President a mandate to examine forms of reprofiling not involving 
a real “haircut” to the nominal value of Hellenic public debt (which is by 
now held by the ECB and by States, whereas in 2011 it was largely in the 
hands of banks and privy funds)� In this way it is hoped to keep the IMF 
in the aid plan for Greece�
However, resistance to the new austerity measures required by Foggy 
Bottom, and initial Greek constitutional doubts about the possibility 
of an automatic contingency mechanism (an “Italian-style” safeguard 
clause requested by the IMF), make it necessary to postpone a decision 
to the Eurogroup meeting scheduled for April 28� Tsipras immediately 
demands the convening of the Eurosummit, which (because of negative 
German reaction) is refused� While liquidity in Greece is running out 
and, without the new tranche of European aids, it is impossible to refund 
the proportion of matured Greek debt owned by the ECB, a stress 
scenario recommences, causing even more concern (including in the 
US Government) lest it impact on the aforementioned UK referendum, 
helping the Brexiteers�
Something is now very slowly changing in Berlin, where the Vice-
Chancellor, Gabriel (a social democrat), shows signs of being open to a 
restyling of the Greek debt� Below the surface of several erratic statements 
by Schäuble, the tactical intention becomes ever more obvious of making 
the German public digest decisions as difficult as they are inevitable� 
However, the growing claims of the IMF (which wants a moratorium on 
capital repayment and interest until 2040), and the commitment made 
by the Chancellor before the Bundestag, not to pay money to Athens 
without the involvement of Foggy Bottom (much less accommodating 
than Palais Berlaymont), make the solution ever more vexed� Only with 
the IMF psychological shield would it be possible to win approval in 
Germany for substantial changes to the 2015 decisions�
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The requisite additional unpopular austerity measures are voted for by 
a slim majority in the Greek Parliament on May 22, and, after many hours 
of negotiation, another ambiguous agreement, between the Eurogroup 
and Foggy Bottom, is reached in the early morning of May 2515, putting 
a temporary end to the new Merkel–Lagarde chess match� The tranche of 
bailout aids agreed in 2015 is divided into two parts, the first paid in June 
to refund the ECB and the second at the end of the following summer 
after implementation of the Greek reforms has been checked�
The 2012 commitment to lighten Greece’s debt when the country 
reaches a primary budget surplus is postponed to 2018� In that year 
Greece must respect a target of 3�5 of GDP as requested by Berlin; the 
surplus target for the following years is nevertheless left unspecified� 
Regarding the short term, the Eurogroup asks the EFSF and ESM boards 
to take technical decisions to smooth the repayment profile and reduce 
the interest rate for the 2012 bailout program to the level of that currently 
paid to the ESM� As regards the medium term, a complex policy package 
is decided upon, including decisions such as to use the SMP profits to 
reduce future financial needs of Greece, to utilize unused resources within 
the ESM program to cut interest rate costs and to cap and defer interest 
due to the EFSF�
This process could bring possible true debt relief in mid-2018, 
after the German federal elections (and this postponement is for sure a 
Schäuble victory)� A contingency mechanism would be activated after 
the bailout program in the event of an adverse scenario� This mechanism 
could entail measures such as further reprofiling, capping and deferral 
of interest payments� Greece’s financial needs should remain below 15% 
of GDP during the post-program period and below 20% (considered 
sustainable) thereafter; in any case, a permanent recession is in prospect�
Without the involvement of the Bundestag, the IMF Managing 
Director recommends to its Washington executive board a decision to 
be part of the third rescue plan, approving the arrangement before the 
end of 2016 (though nobody knows what will be the position of non-
European countries, which call for a true “haircut”, even if US political 
influence is not to be underestimated)� The new temporary equilibrium 
found in the Eurogroup opens the door to ECB acceptance of the debt 
instruments issued by the Greek Government as collateral in the banks’ 
refinancing operations�
15 See the European statement on Greece, May 25, 2016, available at http://www�
consilium�europa�eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/24-eurogroup-statement-
greece/�
5. The Need for Increased Fiscal Discipline
In the common governance of public budgets by the European 
institutions, the turning-point regarding flexibility16 comes on January 
13, 2015, only a few days before the QE announcement and the explosion 
of the dangerous Greek crisis� This change happens thanks to a specific 
Communication of the Juncker Commission, a text formally toned 
down and scattered among numerous other documents adopted at the 
same meeting (so as to make it less visible to public scrutiny in the most 
intransigent countries, whose governments have been highly perplexed 
about the new directions)� Such a development, strongly invoked by 
Italy, is immediately criticized by the Eurotower, which with QE gives up 
the conditionality of the OMT program and is worried about calling into 
question the balance that had with great difficulty been achieved, giving 
new voice to those who link accommodative monetary policy and the 
danger of moral hazard in the less responsible countries�
Since 2010, numerous interventions have been implemented in the 
field of European economic governance, creating tools fit to make the 
Union stronger, preventing and treating crisis� This system has nevertheless 
progressively taken on a perhaps excessive complexity (a defect finally 
recognized in the informal Ecofin on April 23, 2016, which launches a 
discussion about a technical simplification, not aiming at reducing the 
rules but at making them more transparent and understandable by the 
public)�
The European Semester has been established (six years later it will be 
revamped), setting out a framework for and an integrated calendar of 
common supervision on fiscal policies� With the five regulations and the 
directive of the Six Pack (SP) in 2011, also the public debt (a key pillar 
of the financial system), for better implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), has received full evidence� It is not only financial 
imbalances that are considered relevant but also macroeconomic ones, 
even if the related obligation is so weak that Germany evades it, with a 
surplus of its commercial balance which would allow Berlin to develop 
expansive policies involving non-financial investments, with positive 
spillover effects for the whole euro area� In February 2016, Minister of 
Finance Schäuble declares that this surplus will be used entirely to help 
the refugees, but in March the BRD is for the first time subjected to light 
specific monitoring� 
16 See the Communication of the Commission on January 13, 2015, Making the 
best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
COM/2015/012/final� 
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Coming back to the complex legal framework of the European 
economic governance, it should be said that, at the end of 2011, the slow 
legislative process of the Two Pack began� This came into force in 2013 
and consists of two regulations applicable to euro-area countries, aimed 
at making financial monitoring more pressing, extending it to the second 
semester�
The year 2012 was dominated by the treaty universally known 
(from its Title III) as the Fiscal Compact (FC), according to a formula 
of Hamiltonian origin launched by Draghi on December 1, 2011� The 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), outwith EU 
law, is signed by 25 States on March 2, 201217� The bearing structure 
of the FC is already in the Six Pack, and the obligation to transpose the 
principle of the balanced budget, via constitutional rules or provisions 
with substantially the same legal value, comes from the Euro Plus Pact18� 
It is interesting to observe that still in May 2016 the European 
Commission opens a consultation about the progress made by the States 
in implementing FC within national juridical systems�
The FC reaffirms, in particular, the obligation to effect a percentage 
reduction of government debts, equal to 1/20 per annum of the 
difference to the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio, indicated in the Protocol on 
excessive deficit procedure� This controversial obligation was already 
present in the SP, but only after the FC did belated dismay spread, also 
because of the wrong interpretation often placed upon the rule�
The TSCG institutionalizes the Euro Summit, a body that has low 
visibility also because of the union between its presidency and that of the 
European Council, carried out with Van Rompuy� After the assignment 
of the position to the Polish Tusk and the decision not to separate it from 
the presidency of the Euro Summit, this latter is led by a leader from a 
country outside the euro area�
The more the pressure of the public debt crisis eases, the more distrust 
grows in some countries towards the common fiscal surveillance and 
the austerity imposed by European constraints, established at a time 
when it was necessary to send reassuring messages to the international 
17 About the Fiscal Compact, its critical aspects, the problems linked to its application 
in several countries, its difficult future incorporation in the EU legal framework, see 
Giovannelli, A� (ed�), Aspetti della governance economica nell’UE e in alcuni Stati 
dell’Unione, Giappichelli, Turin, 2014�
18 The Euro Plus Pact is an Agreement signed by the Head of States and governments of 
23 countries, in March 2011� This Pact was adopted under the EU’s Open Method 
of Coordination� See the conclusions of the European Council, March 24/25, 2011, 
Brussels April 20, 2011, EUCO 10/1/11, REV 1�
markets� Several leaders consider the margins of flexibility which may 
be found within the interstices of a very stratified legislation (also 
thanks to the SGP reform implemented in 2005 to make it less rigid 
with reference to the structural balance) to be no longer sufficient� 
This, however, opens a discussion about discrepancies in the temporal 
horizon of the analysis and the methodology for calculating the output 
gap (different from that used by the OECD)�
If, in the informal Ecofin of April 23, 2016, the European Commission 
is asked to work to solve a number of problems, enabling (as requested by 
eight countries) a medium-term analysis of the national accounts rather 
than a short-term one; political consensus concerning this reform seems 
perhaps close to being reached in Brussels at the end of May� 
As regards calculation of the output gap a solution has not yet been 
found, because any methodological change would benefit some countries 
and damage others� Also, the concept of structural deficit – always criticized 
by the ECB – is under fire, and there is increasing convergence regarding 
the difficulty of understanding it because of its somewhat esoteric nature; 
the tangle of economic indicators that must be considered accentuates the 
uncertainty and makes the European Commission’s evaluation fluid� 
The danger, however, is that, after a reform too much focusing on the 
benchmark of public spending (as desired by Dijselbloem), Brussels will 
revert to an excessively rigid interpretation of the SGP�
6. “Stupid” Austerity and Deficit Spending Policy
Since 2014, there has been tense confrontation between certain states 
and the German Government� Berlin is initially willing to recognize 
margins of movement only in exchange for legally binding agreements, 
formalizing ex ante the commitment to reforms� Concerning contractual 
arrangements, which then become (more elegantly) “Partnerships for 
Growth, Jobs and Competitiveness”, a debate has been developing for 
some time; it ceases during the Italian semester of the EU Council 
presidency, hypnotized by the magic reflections of the long-awaited 
flexibility�
The connection between reforms and flexibility, however, becomes 
increasingly important, including with reference to the path for 
re-entrance below the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio� This level – equivalent 
to the average of applicant countries for entry into EMU in the 
early 1990s  – evokes a now far-distant scenario, as well as the 3% 
deficit-to-GDP ratio, dating back to the time when annual growth 
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in Europe was 5% and inflation 2%� The euro, created without an 
adequate governance framework to reduce the Mark’s strength, ends, 
paradoxically, by moving national planets around Berlin’s hegemony, in 
orbits defined long ago with the aim of making the European economy 
resemble the German one more closely� 
In July 2014, the ECB Governor19 compares the common governance 
of the reforms to that of the public finances (an issue which, in a less 
structured approach, is echoed at the end of April 2016 by an interview 
with Djesselbloem, who furthermore links the European evaluations to 
the political cycle of the governments)� In Draghi’s view, the first should 
be the subject of a new compact, in order to encourage States to make 
choices otherwise considered too politically costly� Without reforms – 
Draghi later stresses – the same QE will have limited effect in the long 
run� The intertwining of the various aspects of economic governance 
appears more and more evident�
The already-mentioned Communication of January 13, 2015 
represents a temporary point of arrival of the querelle concerning the best 
use of flexibility within the existing rules of the SGP, which connotes 
the last months of the semester of the Italian presidency, the legacy of 
which is a number of controversies between Juncker and Renzi, including 
about the political paternity of the decisions that have been taken� The 
Italian premier even connects these to the agreement that has supported 
the election of the Luxembourg leader (Spitzenkandidat of the party 
with more seats in the 2014 election) to the presidency of the European 
Commission (which loses its image of technical neutrality without 
increasing the legitimacy of its role)�
Such a Communication indeed gives substance to the commitments 
made by Junker, presenting the new Commission to the EP� Without 
amending the European legislation, the guidelines better specify the scope 
for interpretation of the FC-implementing dynamic� In fact, States are 
allowed a longer period of time to achieve their medium-term objectives 
in relation to major structural reforms with positive, demonstrable 
long-term effects on the budget and potential growth; they can deviate 
temporarily from their adjustment path if investments are carried out 
(but without providing a true golden rule), including in these expenses 
the co-financing of European projects� 
19 See the hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European 
Parliament, Strasbourg July 14, 2014, available at https://www�ecb�europa�eu/press/
key/date/2014/html/sp140714�en�html�
The national contribution to the ectoplasmic EFSI20 (for whose 
establishment the Commission has proposed a special regulation, then 
it entered into force the following July) of the weak Investment Plan for 
Europe (known as the Juncker plan) is not taken into account as regards 
the deficit� 
Coming back to the Communication, the European Commission 
should finally take into account the fluctuations of the economic cycle 
and severe economic downturns in the euro area or the EU as a whole, as 
a consequence reconfiguring the fiscal adjustment path�
The margins of flexibility seem thus to have significantly increased� 
However, they have already existed – also in relation to the debt rule, 
poorly written and interpreted with broad discretion, as the ECB 
remembers – since the same regulation of 1997 concerning the procedure 
for addressing excessive deficits, which made reference to “unusual events 
outside the control of member States”� Today, this formula evokes a 
further weakening of the cage of the FC in relation to the expenses – 
which remain to be defined precisely – connected to the management of 
migratory flows, including those for the contribution to Turkey or linked 
to security (a concept which is becoming increasingly wide, and which 
could be extended to embrace inclusiveness)�
In January 2016, however, at the beginning of the Dutch semester, 
the President of the Eurogroup, Dijsselbloem, states that in its ex-post 
evaluation (based on the costs incurred by the States) the European 
Commission could not apply the different criteria of flexibility 
cumulatively as Italy requested� Shortly afterwards, the vice-president of 
the Commission, Dombrovskis, states that flexibility can be recognized 
on a “time” basis (not permanently, as Rome wishes, owing to the absence 
of a clear rule covering this question) and that it has limits� The European 
Commissioner, Moscovici, concurs, recalling that flexibility is “by 
definition a marginal element” and emphasizing the excessive public debt 
of Italy, which risks the infringement procedure� At the end of January 
2016, the annual report on public finance in the EU by the DG for 
Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission highlights 
that high public debt limits, in the medium term, Italy’s capacity to 
respond to possible shocks� Heated controversies ensue, involving Palais 
Berlaymont, the President of the EPP Group and the Italian President 
of the Council of Ministers, who threatens the fall of the European 
20 From a historical point of view, it is worth mentioning that the creation of a fund 
similar to this European Fund for Strategic Investments was already hoped for in the 
Declaration of Messina, with which, on June 3, 1955, the ECSC’s Foreign Affairs 
Ministers opened the way to the establishment of the Common Market�
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Commission for breaking the political pact on which the parliamentary 
majority in Strasbourg was formed� A calmer Roman meeting between 
Juncker and Renzi follows, but the search for a compromise remains 
difficult, partly because of the weakness of the Italian economic recovery� 
On March 12, at the Summit of the European leaders of the PSE, the 
Premier Renzi (thinking about the political costs of reforms whose positive 
effects are perceptible only in the medium term) reaffirms that flexibility 
has to be applied every year and without quantitative limits, but – owing 
to the doubts of some Nordic socialist leaders – the determination of a 
common political platform has been delayed�
In March, unusual letters from the European Commission come to 
several countries in the watch list� That addressed to Italy21 – in line with 
the Eurogroup and Ecofin – again draws attention to the insufficient 
progress towards compliance with the public debt reduction benchmark� 
The ECB Economic Bulletin of March recalls that vulnerable countries 
with high levels of debt need to use profits resulting from the low interest 
rate environment for building up resilience against potential shocks� 
Finally, at the end of April, Juncker declares that drawing expenses out of 
the PSC for fighting terrorism, at least, will be considered�
In May 2016, the problem of the permitted margins of fiscal 
movement is finally solved� Italy asks for more kinds of flexibility and, 
at the same time, becomes a special observed country – together with 
Portugal, which threatened to veto the agreement with London – due to 
its supportive deficit spending choice, despite vulnerability related to its 
huge “explicit” public debt (recalled also in the 2016 Country Report on 
macroeconomic imbalances), with possible negative spillover effects� If 
the President of the European Commission promises, pragmatically, to 
enact his role without falling into a rigid and “stupid”22 policy of austerity, 
21 This letter, signed by the European Commission’s Vice President Dombrovskis and the 
Commissioner Moscovici, was sent to the Italian Minister Padoan on March 2016� 
Palais Berlaymont confirmed that the letter was sent and its text, which had to remain 
confidential, soon appeared in the Italian press (see Il Foglio, March 9, 2016, http://
www�ilfoglio�it/economia/2016/03/09/caro-padoan-ti-scrivo-in-esclusiva-la-lettera-
dellue-al-governo___1-v-139221-rubriche_c198�htm)� It is worth remembering that 
also the ECB letter, signed by Trichet and Draghi, sent to the Italian Government 
on August 5, 2011, was soon published on the newspaper Corriere della sera, also if 
it was strictly confidential and the other countries which received similar letters kept 
the secret�
22 See the Juncker’s reply to the debate in the the European Parliament on February 
3, 2016� The use of the term “stupid” with reference to the European budget rules 
was introduced in the European semantic by the President of the Commission Prodi 
in 2002 (Le Monde, October 18, 2012) and all his successors dealt with it� Before 
Juncker, Barroso in the press conference on May 8, 2012 said that, far from being 
some in northern Europe fear that a too indulgent attitude towards 
Italy (which moves always later towards its medium-term objective of a 
balanced budget) may incite other countries to pay less attention to their 
fiscal equilibrium� 
As the recommendations of Palais Berlaymont draw near, Weber, 
leader of the European People’s Party in the EP, calls on May 2 for a 
“strict” application of the SGP, on which, according to him, depends 
the very “legitimacy” of the Union� There follows an increasing polemic 
between those who highlight the risks of an over-rigid approach – at a 
politically and economically critical time – and those who see, in the 
possible tolerance of the European Commission, an inadvertent assisting 
of the growth of populism in Germany� 
The soft option wins, however, because realpolitik finally prevails, 
including in reluctant Berlin, which does not use all its influence to 
weaken relatively stable government or traditional political allies, while 
the Brexit danger is looming and the red scorpions of Karlsruhe are 
almost at the end of their judicial work on the OMT program of the 
Eurotower (a decision which could impact on the same QE)�
In a letter of May 17 written by Dombrowskis and Moscovici 
to Padoan, it is stated that no other State “has requested or received 
anything close to the unprecedented amount of flexibility” asked for 
by Italy� Having remembered the May 9 letter in which Padoan affirms 
that “reducing the public-debt-to-GDP ratio is one of the key economic 
policy goals”, they demand from him a “clear and credible commitment 
that Italy is set to respect the requirement of the preventive arm of 
the SGP in 2017, in order to grant further flexibility for 2016”� The 
Italian Minister immediately reiterates the commitment “to broadly 
comply with the EU fiscal rules in 2017”, including with regard to the 
path towards the MTO23 of the deficit� Following intense dialogue, an 
exchange takes shape between flexibility in the Commission’s evaluation 
for 2016 and the threat – scarcely credible – of a rigid approach in that 
for 2017 (precisely the year in which divergent public reactions will be 
tested in French and German elections)� 
While the Fiscal Compact is basically going to stand by (or be 
scrapped, as Pittella, leader of the Socialists and Democrats group in 
Strasbourg, states), the pragmatic reading of the European rules (which 
stupid, the Stability Pact is designed in an intelligent way, because it allows for 
adaptability�
23 The Medium Term Objective is a budgetary target defined in structural terms, taking 
into consideration the economic cycle and filtering on-off and temporary measures 
having only transitory effects�
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have already been used for France in 2015) is again confirmed by the 
gentle recommendations made to the Council, approved on May 1824�
Any sanctions against Spain (which looks forward to difficult 
elections) and Portugal (where a fragile Executive has just been formed) 
are postponed until July, at the end of the European semester: a decision 
politely criticized by Schäuble on May 27 during a meeting with the 
international press� A conditional “yes” is said to Rome, with the usual 
framework of recommendations for structural reforms – largely intended 
to remain unheard, as the ECB has long time pointed out – for the 
implementation of which States may request the technical support of a 
service established by the European Commission� 
Having considered all the relevant factors highlighted by Italy, 
Finland and Belgium, the European Commission, without initiating 
an infringement procedure, concludes that the debt criterion should be 
considered as having been complied with� A further report on the debt 
will be elaborated in November and, for Italy, the test represented by 
the new “budget law” will be decisive (but the European Commissioner, 
Moscovici, suggests that a flexible approach could also be used the 
following year)�
Germany (for which very gentle wording is chosen) must achieve a 
sustained upward trend in public investment, using the available fiscal 
space� Finally, the procedures for the excessive deficits of Ireland, Cyprus 
and Slovenia are closed, because the results achieved are considered 
sustainable; only six countries, including France, now remain under this 
procedure (very few when compared to the 24 States of the dangerous 
year 2011)�
It is worth recalling that, just before the spring country-specific 
recommendations of Palais Berlaymont, the BUBA President again 
criticizes the political role that is usually played by this latter, at the 
expense of the common budgetary discipline� Accordingly, he relaunches 
the idea, shared by Schäuble, that it would be better to place the burden 
of objectively evaluating compliance with fiscal rules on an independent 
body, separating economic analysis and political decisions� In terms of 
general background, there is also a battle over the real degree of autonomy 
to be enjoyed by the new European Fiscal Board, figured by some as 
a counterweight to the excessive discretion of a too-political European 
Commission�
24 The country-specific recommendations of the Spring 2016 European Semester 
package are available at http://ec�europa�eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-
specific-recommendations/index_en�htm�
7. The Difficult Path towards a “Real” Banking Union
The last phase of the seventh European legislature has been absorbed 
by efforts to break the relationship between bank risk and sovereign risk� 
The fiscal compact and the surveillance of public finances would not have 
been sufficient to avoid crises in Ireland and Spain, initially related to 
private debt and to inadequate regulation of the banking system�
The fast legislative iter for the institution of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), the first pillar of the BU, is completed in 201325, by 
giving the ECB direct supervision of the big credit institutions (129 at 
the end of 2015) for over 80% of the activities in the euro area, even if 
the supervision of the opaque small national and local banks remains to 
be adequately harmonized� In 2014, not only a regulation and a directive 
on the resolution, the second pillar of the BU, are laboriously approved, 
but a new Intergovernmental Agreement26 is even agreed concerning the 
progressive mutualization of privy resources (resulting from the annual 
contributions of the banking sector) in a Single Resolution Fund which 
still needs to be made strong and credible� According to the IMF, this 
transition has to be significantly accelerated�
On the initiative of Germany, which since the crisis began had used 
more than 7% of GDP in the rescue of its banks, increasing a public 
debt largely financed by non-residents (and benefiting from other States’ 
contribution to the bailout of countries where its credit institutions 
were widely exposed), the principle of bail-in is crystallized, after having 
been tumultuously experienced in spring 2013 with Cyprus, which later 
emerges positively from the crisis (also because the costs of bail-in are 
partly discharged on Russian investors)� Around 800 billion had been 
used for the public bailing out of banks between 2008 and 2014, but it 
25 See Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of October 15, 2013, conferring 
specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and the Interinstitutional Agreement 
between the EP and the ECB on the practical modalities of the oversight over 
the exercise of the tasks conferred on the ECB within the framework of the SSM, 
OJ L 320 of November 30, 2013� See also the December 11, 2013, Memorandum 
of understanding between the Council of the European Union and the ECB on the 
cooperation on procedures related to the SSM, available at https://www�ecb�europa�
eu/ecb/legal/pdf/mou_between_eucouncil_ecb�pdf�
26 On May 21, 2014, 26 member States signed an Intergovernmental Agreement on 
the transfer and mutualisation of contribution to the Single Resolution Fund� The 
regulation establishing a Single Resolution Mechanism for the Banking Union was 
published in the OJ of the EU on July 30, 2014� 
 The SRM became operational on January 1, 2016, implementing the Bank recovery 
and Resolution directive published in the OJ on June 12, 2014�
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is decided now to overcome the distortions arising from the expectation 
of State interventions�
The bail-in – challenged by the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof  27 – 
became operational on January 1, 2016 (in a European market that 
remains heterogeneous in terms of cultures of saving, tradition, 
organization and bankruptcy legislation), creating stress in the most 
fragile systems, burdened with nonperforming loans (NPL) partly 
related to the crisis and very difficult to manage�
For the Governor of the Bank of Italy, who would have preferred a 
longer and less traumatic transition (as proposed by Rome during the 
legislative process), this mechanism needs to be reviewed, starting from 
2018� The Italian Ministry for Economic Affairs and Finance denounces 
an increase in instability, and the absence of national or European 
instruments fit to prevent limited crisis from having negative systemic 
effects� Problematic aspects are also reported by the Advocate General 
of the CJEU, who asserts that the bail-in must have no disproportionate 
results�
The repeated formal reactions of Brussels and Frankfurt are not, 
however, encouraging, even if, for the first application of the bail-in, 
the European Commission seems to turn a blind eye to some national 
situations� Lastly, on May 18, 2016, the ECB Board member Praet 
expresses unexpected perplexity at the possible bail-in effects in the 
event of a crisis in important credit institutions� On May 31, Visco 
adds a number of critical considerations concerning the option of giving 
retroactive effects to bail-in rules�
In December 2014, the ESM increased – for only 60 billion – direct 
recapitalizations for the banks (and Italy, followed by France, proposes in 
2016 that it becomes the public backstop of the SRF, in order to better 
safeguard financial stability in the Union), but the third basic pillar, 
represented by a common insurance deposit system, is still missing�
During the first years of the crisis, a heated debate focused on 
the partial mutualization of national public debts, at least to increase 
investments� Soros, in February 2016, envisages issuing European bonds 
to tackle the migrant crisis� This suggestion is rapidly relaunched by Italy 
and linked to the proposal of the 2015 Valletta Summit in a strategic 
hypothesizing of a migration compact� The idea (on which work has been 
already done in the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs of the European Commission) is to hybridize the trust fund 
27 See Austrian Constitutional Court’s decision July 3, 2015, G� 239/2014 UA, 
V14/2015 UA, on the law concerning the bail-in of the Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank�
EU-Africa with the model of the rather limited International Finance 
Facility for Immunization, which can issue bonds� While recognizing 
that the migration problem is a structural issue which cannot be tackled 
only by derogations from flexibility, Berlin nevertheless fears opening 
up a path that leads progressively from migration bonds to forms of 
growing mutualization of national public debts (still unacceptable to the 
German public)� The Development Minister Müller then, on May 24, 
unrealistically proposes to divert 10% of the (already insufficient) EU 
funds to deal with the refugee crisis�
With the growing debate about BU completion, the attention of 
the economic and political world shifts to some extent to private risk 
sharing, which equally gives rise to reservations in Berlin, whose sense of 
solidarity fades in parallel with the weakening of its leadership� Fearing 
that the national taxpayer could become liable for the depositors of other 
countries, the German Government, with the support of the whole 
country, affirms that, first, States must complete the path of de-risking (in 
a more serious sense than transferring problems from distressed to sound 
banks involved in a small fund pushed to participate in capital increase 
and acquire NPL)� Furthermore, serious common insolvency rules have 
to be achieved (while several countries adopt the more favourable British 
legal model)�
Looking beyond 2016, BUBA takes up the hardly acceptable idea – 
envisaged in 2015 by the responsible for banking supervision of the 
ECB, chair of the SSM Board (whose equilibrium still expresses the old 
Franco-German relationship), and immediately rejected by the vice-
president of the Eurotower – that some limits to the sovereign bonds of 
a single country, held by banks, must be provided and that their levels 
of risk have to be taken into account, thereby giving further power 
to rating agencies� If government bonds are not considered risk-free, 
this implicitly means that the EU cannot intervene in the event of 
emergency�
The Bundesbank begins to believe also that an ordered default, via 
sovereign debt restructuring28, should become compulsory before 
the intervention of the ESM: a kind of States’ bail-in, to which the 
vice-president of the European Commission Katainen also gives 
attention� These ideas seem inspired by a recent study29 of the German 
28 Such position is reaffirmed by the Bundesbank’s President in the introductory speech 
at the press conference for the accounts 2015 presentation, on February 24, 2016� 
The text is available at https://www�bis�org/review/r160301f�htm�
29 See the Annual Economic Report entitled “Focus on Future Viability”, 
November 11, 2015, available at http://www�sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft�de/
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Council of Economic Experts (without, however, resuming the partial 
mutualization of the public debts that this latter had proposed in 2011 
according to a model outlined by Visco in 2010 and finally relaunched by 
the Governor in the form of “final considerations” proposed on May 31, 
2016 presenting the “Relazione annuale” of the Bank of Italy)� Any 
suggestion of a supportive pact which could accompany the transition, 
avoiding catastrophic effects, is completely lacking�
If banking bail-in has liberated the States from the burden of bailing 
out credit institutions, Berlin focuses on ridding the banks of the 
risks related to owned domestic sovereign bonds, by causing a certain 
proportion of them to be reintroduced into the market (what is more, 
not in normal but in turbulent times), without it being possible to 
exchange these securities with others issued by an European institution� 
In this way it would be possible to neutralize the QE, considered 
propitious to financial indiscipline� 
Some, pointing out the country-specific risk, now say that only the 
international markets could push to that respect of the rules which 
European institutions cannot or do not want more to obtain by the States� 
Some in Germany perhaps think, irresponsibly, that a traumatic catharsis 
among the least disciplined countries could have a highly educative effect� 
Interference between politics and Protestant ethics, which has marked 
the perception of the crisis from the beginning, has returned�
The Governor of the EBC reaffirms, however, that the problem of 
sovereign risk feedback on the banks’ stability is on a global scale and 
cannot be tackled separately by Europe� The Committee on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs of the EP and the European Systemic Risk Board 
call for caution too� The danger of overcrossing the psychological effect of 
banks’ bail-in with that of States’ bail-in could, moreover, become highly 
destabilizing� 
After a preparatory report by the Dutch Presidency, in which the high 
level of national public debt owned by banks is considered an important 
risk factor, the Ecofin meets in Amsterdam on April 22, and, because of 
the fear of turbulence in the markets, The Netherlands, Germany and 
Finland remain isolated in their tough positions� Rome provocatively 
raises the problem of the derivatives present in the BRD credit institutions 
(an issue which, in the Bank of Italy’s opinion, should become an object 
of attention for the European supervisory authority)� Finally, the banks’ 
jahresgutachten-2015-2016�html?&L=1� This document (totally in line with the 
July 2015 Special Report about the euroarea) stresses the need of an insolvency 
mechanism for sovereign, with the aim of strengthening the “no bail-out” clause�
exposure to sovereign risk will be discussed in the Basilea Committee, 
where Japan will surely be against the German proposal� “Easier said than 
done?” is the ironic title of a study devoted by the Bank of Italy to its 
dangers and uncertain benefits30�
8. The Debate around the Five Presidents’ Proposals
The complex choices summarized here regarding the bailout funds, 
the restoration of the transmission channels of monetary policy and the 
difficult fight against deflation, the joint surveillance of national budgets, 
and the BU (in a largely bank-centred economy), are closely interlinked, 
and they must be improved and completed through interventions of 
various kinds�
Gaps, rigidities and weaknesses have progressively emerged in 
the overall governance of the crisis, and on October 24, 2014, the 
Eurosummit addresses an invitation to the President of the Commission 
to work along with the Presidents of the European Council, the ECB 
and the Eurogroup in reflecting on these issues (which were already the 
subject of an important document31 presented by the four Presidents in 
June 2012)� The European Council of December 18, 2014 formalizes 
the mandate to the so-called “Quartet”, to whom the President of the 
European Parliament is finally added, to draw up reform proposals for 
common governance� Discrete preparatory work by 32 “sherpas” is 
carried out and specific national documents are presented�
The mandate has been given at a time when the weak Juncker Plan 
was nebulous, before the European Commission presented the already-
mentioned Communication about flexibility, the Eurotower launched the 
QE and the Greek elections changed the Hellenic scenario, reopening, 
for several months, discussion about the reversibility of the euro� All these 
30 Lanotte, M�, Manzelli, G�, Rinaldi, A� M�, Taboga, M�, Tommasino, P�, Easier said 
than done? Reforming the prudential treatment of bank’s sovereign exposures, Banca 
d’Italia, Occasional Papers, No� 326, April 2016�
31 On June 26, 2012 the President of the European Council Van Rompuy transmitted 
to the European Council a Report prepared in close collaboration with the 
President of the Commission Barroso, the President of the Eurogroup Juncker and 
the President of the ECB Draghi� The Report “Towards a Genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union” sets out a vision of the economic and monetary integration� The 
work of the four Presidents continued to develop proposals for a stage based process 
toward the completion of the EMU; this roadmap was presented on December 
2012� See http://www�consilium�europa�eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/134069�pdf� 
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events have an impact on the choices relating to economic governance, 
and they soon will influence the evaluation of the results achieved by the 
FC which the TSCG of 2012 asked to be implemented within five years 
at most (an issue that is for Italy very important)� 
The Five Presidents’ Report32 was presented on June 22, 2015, just 
before the potentially disruptive referendum of July 5 on the plan 
proposed to Greece by the international creditors� The report is preceded, 
a few days beforehand, by a French–German interministerial document 
(which, mentioning that presented by the four Presidents in 2012, still 
raises the problem of a new common budget, supported with Europe’s 
own resources) and by a Hollande–Merkel document� 
According to the mandate received, the five Presidents’ proposals aim 
to develop mechanisms for stronger political coordination, convergence 
and solidarity, preparing the next steps on better governance in the euro 
area, in order to make progress towards an economic and fiscal Union 
“that ensures to each economy the structural features to prosper within 
the monetary Union”� These proposals are outlined below, taking into 
consideration, on a case-by-case basis, the political debate raised and 
some subsequent related suggestions� 
Up until June 30, 2017, working within the existing Treaties, the 
economic and institutional architecture of the EMU should be further 
consolidated also strengthening democratic control by increasing the 
involvement of national parliaments in the decision-making processes�
The creation of a network of independent “euro area competitiveness 
authorities” (aimed at analyzing and preventing economic divergences) 
needs to be noted, as well as the creation – which Palais Berlaymont 
worked promptly on, even if some rules of the game have been changed 
after a few months, causing criticism and suspicion – of a European 
advisory Fiscal Council, which will coordinate and complete the system 
of the national Fiscal Councils33, independent bodies set up in the States 
on the basis of the Six Pack and of the FC� 
32 See the Five President’s Report “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union”, 
available at https://ec�europa�eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-report_
en�pdf� It is worth observing that this report has been prepared by the President of the 
European Commission Juncker, in close cooperation with the President of the Euro 
Summit Tusk, the President of the Eurogroup Dijsselbloem, the President of the ECB 
Draghi and the President of the European Parliament Schulz, whereas in 2012 the 
coordination of the work was given to the President of the European Council�
33 About the Fiscal Councils, see in particular Magarò, P�, Independent Fiscal 
Institutions: A Comparative Analysis, in Transylvanian Review of Administrative 
Sciences, No� 39, 2013; Id�, “Les institutions budgétaires indépendantes”, in Revue 
Française de Finances Publiques, No�  126, 2014 and “L’Ufficio parlamentare di 
In a Position Paper of February 2016, Italy takes up this matter, 
submitting a daring proposal� The new European Fiscal Council “should 
take a pan-European view in its analysis and formulate a fiscal policy and 
recommendation for the euro area as a whole” in order to support an EU-
wide growth strategy� It is worth mentioning that the recommendations 
addressed to the euro area – although no one knew who had to implement 
them – were already provided for (alongside those to individual States)� In 
Italy’s view, the task of elaborating them would shift from the European 
Commission to the new fiscal council; furthermore, no reference is made 
to country-specific recommendations, but attention is focused on the 
aggregate level, whose symmetric implications could help to rebalance 
both in-surplus and in-deficit States�
The need to move from a sum of countries’ evaluations to a strategic 
overview has supporters in Paris, where, however, as we will see, a new 
figure is proposed for this task who will combine the role of Eurogroup 
President with that of a Minister for the coordination of economic 
policies and their surveillance� 
The Five Presidents’ Report asks for a strengthening of the still 
ineffective procedure for addressing the excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances (to which Palais Berlaymont has nevertheless lastly begun 
cautiously to pay more attention, while the same BUBA has recently 
focused on the German surplus)� 
The BU should, on an optimistic assessment, be completed in the 
year 2017, with the addition of the already mentioned European deposit 
insurance scheme (EDIS), which could be conceived of as an insurance 
mechanism for the national deposit guarantee systems� This proposal 
is discussed in November 2015 by the European Commission, which 
envisages a process of gradual mutualization until 2024, similar to that of 
the SRF (and the allocation of the deposit guarantee function to the Single 
Resolution Board, according to a model inspired by the US experience)� 
In the Eurogroup of January 2016, however, strong German resistance 
blocks the project� Draghi, speaking in the EP on February 1, 2016, asks 
for its implementation, with the aim of making savers confidence in bank 
deposits the same, regardless of States’ jurisdiction� The proposal returns 
in the already-mentioned Italian Position Paper (in which, on the other 
hand, the request to revise the bail-in is temporarily dropped)� Without 
EDIS – so the ECB Executive Board member Praet says, imagining a 
bilancio”, in Giovannelli, A� (ed�), Aspetti della governance economica nell’UE e in 
alcuni Stati dell’Unione, op. cit�
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more realistic five-year path – BU is not yet “a real Banking Union”34� 
The IMF Global Financial Stability Report confirms the importance of a 
deposit insurance scheme� 
Finally, in a legal opinion of April 2016, the Eurotower writes that it 
is not possible to condition the common deposit insurance (envisaged 
as a third pillar in the 2012 road map) to uncertain future events, as 
suggested by Germany, which links it to the introduction of limits to the 
domestic sovereign bond owned by banks�
The five Presidents propose the launching of a new Capital Markets 
Union� This would be a step comparable to that fostered in 2001 by the 
Committee of Wise Men regarding regulation of the European Securities 
Market�
The union of capitals, the BU and the Juncker Plan – of which the 
European Investment Bank is an important agent – should be integrated, 
according to the already-mentioned German and French Central Bankers 
document, as part of a “Financing and Investments Union”� The Juncker 
Plan will, however, make a useful contribution only if an appropriate 
complex of not only privy resources (and sound investment projects 
specific to the euro area) can be soon identified; an indirect reference, not 
yet noted by economic analysts, in the ECB decision of March 10, 2016, 
appears interesting …
In the second step of the institutional path to complete EMU, 
preceded in the spring of 2017 by a White Paper of the Commission35, 
according to the Five Presidents’ Report the processes of convergence 
(by agreeing on a set of legally binding “common standards”) should be 
formalized� 
Member States are invited to participate in dynamics leading to a 
new stabilization mechanism; this one has to be different from the ESM, 
which is functional in crisis management and not in dealing with shocks 
preventing crises� A permanent Eurogroup presidency and a still-elusive 
euro area treasury, which could be the missing counterpart of the EBC 
(up till now remained too isolated), are proposed� In this regard, it should 
be noted that the creation of a Finance Minister for the euro area was 
proposed in 2011 (and that in 2012 the debate on fiscal union arrived in 
Germany to the extent of giving life to an unprecedented hypothesis of 
34 See the interview with La Repubblica, March 18, 2016, available at https://www�ecb�
europa�eu/press/inter/date/2016/html/sp160318�en�html�
35 The document should probably evoke the European Commission’s White Paper 
“Completing the internal market” (COM/85/0310), discussed on June 28, 1985 in 
the Milan European Council� With this White Paper Delors created the premises of 
the Single European Act�
having recourse to a referendum)� After the five Presidents’ document the 
idea re-emerges, as outlined above, in February 2016 with the words of 
Governor Draghi, and, as we briefly saw, with the joint intervention of the 
Central Bankers of Germany and France� They link up, in a gradual and 
voluntary process aimed at financial union, each risk sharing to a further 
transfer of sovereignty, which appears at the moment quite difficult� 
The creation of a Finance Minister who does not represent a 
bureaucratic simulacrum or an additional level of control would imply 
not only the power of coordination but the setting up of a real treasury 
of the euro area, with resources based on common fiscal capacity, a 
sovereign debt, and the possibility of issuing bonds (to support growth-
oriented investment policies, the management of migratory flows and the 
strengthening of common security)� Such decisions would be desirable for 
Italy, which imagines a Finance Minister of the euro area having a status 
similar to that of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy36, but widespread reluctance still exists, because northern countries 
consider the Italian proposal a pretext for postponing fiscal consolidation 
(not to mention that, at the end of March 2016, the terrorist attacks in 
Brussels temporarily displace the debate on the creation of a European 
Minister of the Interior)� On the other hand, some believe that – in their 
joint intervention – the French and German Central Bankers (and in 
particular Weidmann) are indeed pushing for a Plan B, rigidly austerity-
oriented� 
This suspicion is intensified by the intervention, at the end of April, 
of the BUBA President, in which he expresses his doubts regarding the 
possibility of achieving further transfers of sovereignty, alternatives to the 
hardening of rules and controls necessary to prevent the Eurozone from 
becoming vulnerable, because of the excessive debt of some States� It is 
contradictory to ask – he observes in Rome, referring just to Italy – for 
mutualization of public debt and common guarantees on bank deposits 
while at the same time pretending the full autonomy of national fiscal 
decisions�
Without the indispensable sharing of sovereignty, the two Central 
Bankers write, it would be necessary to return to a decentralized approach� 
Fiscal rules need to be further strengthened� Risks, including that of 
sovereign exposure, have to be properly taken into account, reducing the 
banks’ vulnerability to turbulence caused by government debts� These 
36 See the document “A shared European Policy strategy for Growth, Jobs and Stability”, 
of February 22, 2016, available at http://www�governo�it/sites/governo�it/files/
ASharedPolicyStrategy_20160222�pdf�
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interventions bring us back, therefore, to our previous remark concerning 
the difficult itinerary of the BU (and some destabilizing proposals, 
against the implementation of which the President of the Italian Council 
of Ministers threatens to use his veto)�
Concerning the issue of the European resources, Berlin, which firmly 
contests the migration bonds, nevertheless gradually offers positive signs 
of willingness (up to the idea of a targeted and temporary European 
surtax on fuel to cover the reception costs of migrants, a surtax which 
could give, however, support to Europhobics and which would require 
unanimous consent or a willing coalition), making us aware that Germany 
could in context accept a specific euro area budget� Unfortunately, work 
on enhanced cooperation for a tax on financial transactions has not yet 
been done� It would have been a way of starting a limited but necessary 
strengthening of the common resources, which are now totally unfit to 
compensate for asymmetric shocks and support areas affected by crises� 
Coming back directly to the Five Presidents’ Report: this demands the 
integration of the Euro Plus Pact, of the ESM Treaty (an update to which 
is formally proposed in order to create a strong public backstop for the 
banking system), of the TSCG and of the Intergovernmental Agreement 
on the SRF, in the legal framework of the Union� 
Following the suggestion of the French–German interministerial 
document, which soon precedes the Five Presidents’ Report, it is proposed 
that the EU and the euro area should have unified representation in the 
international financial institutions37, in particular in the IMF�
By 2025 at latest, the path towards deep, genuine, prosperous and 
attractive EMU (with institutions strengthened in terms of efficiency, 
legitimacy and transparency) should be completed� This roadmap, too 
vague and timid for some, is considered aware of the existing obstacles 
by other people� 
9. Metamorphosis and Deepening of the Crisis
The European Council of December 2015 (absorbed by other 
problems and new tensions), after having requested the Commission 
to report by June 2016 on the progress made, merely states: “the legal, 
economic and political aspects of the more long-term measures contained 
37 The roadmap for moving towards a more consistent euroarea external representation 
in international fora is presented in the European Commission communication of 
October 10, 2015 (COM/2015/0602 final)�
in the Report need to be further explored�” Justus Lipsius will come back 
to them by the end of 2017, the year of the review of the FC, of the 60th 
anniversary celebrations of the Treaty of Rome, but also of French and 
German national elections�
While several controversial decisions are postponed to the meeting 
of the European Council, at the moment scheduled for the end of June 
2016 (soon after the Brexit referendum which could destabilize the same 
euro area and at the expiration of the sanctions on Russia), the ECB 
Governor calls for quick action� “One needs clarity on the future of the 
EMU”, he strongly declares on March 17, after a session of the European 
Council devoted to economic issues, which the German Chancellor 
(concerned about the growth of the populist right wing in the elections 
of three Länder) considers inappropriate for a discussion of the bank 
deposit guarantee�
Having regard to the risks resulting from the incomplete nature of the 
EMU, in the Eurotower reflection is ongoing about the best way to speed 
up a deepening of economic integration� This preparatory work also takes 
into account its persistent lack of democratic legitimacy� Playing for time 
is a luxury that Europe can no longer afford�
It is a moment of fragility in which the crisis suffers a further 
transformation, from global financial crisis to sovereign debt crisis, to 
economic recession, to stagnation, then – while European GDP reaches 
2008 levels for the first time – to political crisis within the European 
States and to lack of confidence among them (with the growth of the 
consensus to policymakers who defend loudly national interests as if 
they were in a zero-sum game, losing the very sense of staying together)� 
This is conjoined with a number of international crises: a “policrisis not 
yet fully controlled”, to use the words spoken by Juncker in January 
201638� Even if each problem can be individually faced and managed, 
the interconnectedness of the shocks assumes the characters of a perfect 
storm, in which some see the whitecaps of “cupio dissolvi” while new 
Europhobics take the place of the Eurosceptics� As President Hollande 
says39, “disappointment was followed by disenchantment, and after doubts 
came suspicions and for some even rejection or breakup”�
The scenario is made every day more complex by the nightmare 
of a destabilizing Brexit, which worries both the IMF and the White 
38 Hear the opening remarks of the President’s New Year’s press conference, on January 
15, 2016 (http://ec�europa�eu/avservices/video/player�cfm?ref=I115044)�
39 See the French President’s intervention in Douaumont, at the ceremony marking the 
centenary of the battle of Verdun, on May 29, 2016, available at http://www�elysee�
fr/declarations/article/ceremonie-a-l-ossuaire-de-douaumont-3/�
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House, is considered by the financial G20 of Shanghai and the financial 
G7 of Akiu to be an important shock, and leads the Bank of England 
to prepare contingency plans for financial turbulences� Other problems 
are expected to be caused by the following: (1) the large numbers of 
asylum-seekers and migrants (with a resultant increase in national 
public spending and the use of European funds initially planned for 
humanitarian assistance in Third World countries); (2) ambiguities 
of the Turkish Government; (3)  the already-clear inadequacy of the 
Dublin III regulation, approved when it seemed unlikely that a country 
could be overwhelmed; (4) the serious erosion of the Schengen Treaty, 
whose implications open an unforeseen breach in the Single Market and 
undermine the same identity of a Union built to dawn walls; (5) new 
dynamics in the global financial markets, less controllable through 
monetary interventions, as evidenced by the Bank for International 
Settlements; (6) geopolitical risk factors in the east of the continent 
and in the Mediterranean region, intertwined with security problems 
related to the terrorist network challenge, which accentuates British 
isolationism� The Security Pact – so President Hollande declares after 
the deadly attacks on Paris of November 2015 – “prevails over the 
Stability Pact”� In the shadow of Berlin’s benevolence for the spending 
policy of the French partner (put under political pressure by the Front 
National), the Italian Government also finds comfortable refuge� In 
addition to all this, the Austrian suspense – in a political battle whose 
outcome was decided by only a handful of votes – spreads anxiety over 
the whole continent, making even more evident the problem of the 
anti-system parties’ growth (keenly observed also by the international 
markets)�
Increasingly discordant answers correspond to the exogenous tensions 
(which accentuate European divisions, calling into question traditional 
alliances among States and generating centrifugal pushes)� The existing 
danger does not yet represent an external federative factor, just when 
a real common response is even more necessary� The aspiration to 
strengthen smaller and more culturally cohesive clubs (like the Visegrad 
Group, divided, however, over relations with Russia) arises just when it is 
evident that their dimensions too are largely inadequate for dealing with 
the new challenges, and that the real external borders are those of the 
Union� Rodrik’s trilemma40 is there to remind us that only by thinking on 
a continental scale is it possible to reconcile globalization and democracy�
40 On the difficult relations among democracy, national sovereignty and global economic 
integration, see Rodrik, D�, The Globalisation Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the 
World Economy, W� W� Norton & Company, New York and London, 2011�
While the idea of a Europe of concentric circles (with a highly 
integrated neo-Carolingian core built through separated treaties or 
strengthened cooperations and a weak periphery exposed to several 
dangers) powers ahead, the need to keep London in the Union, avoiding 
a political and institutional domino effect (which could also trigger, 
starting from Scotland and the Crown Dependencies, an uncontrollable 
new secessionist dynamic in several countries), intensifies the process 
of differentiation between States, making the path of integration 
an increasingly divergent one� Some in France begin to recall the 
pessimistic old prophecy of de Gaulle about the consequences of UK 
entry into the EEC� 
10. Attempts to Wake from the Brexit Nightmare
Following a letter from Prime Minister Cameron and a document by 
President Tusk41, discussions in the European Council of February 18–
19, 2016 are very difficult, partly because the migrant crisis coincides 
with the nightmare of Brexit and Athens threatens for a while to apply 
its veto to the settlement with London� The discussions do not present 
a nice spectacle, but  – considering the breakup of the relationship 
with UK, coming moreover at the worst possible moment, against the 
common interest the 28 leaders find a compromise, rich in diplomatic 
ambiguity, which reinforces British special status in the Union� The 
arrangement (whose possible consequences have to be better evaluated) 
will become effective only if the UK decides, in the difficult referendum 
of June 23, to remain in the EU� 
On the result of this referendum (preceded by the less important, but 
significant, Dutch consultative referendum on the association agreement 
with Ukraine) are also hung important decisions concerning the revision 
of economic governance� “Wait and see”: many discussions are suspended, 
and emergency plans begin to be secretly elaborated by the ‘sherpas’ of 
the most important European States� In the event of a negative response 
by the UK people, after long technical and political negotiations, in the 
best scenario London will only be able to enter the European Economic 
Space in the manner of Norway, or else to sign a free trade treaty with 
the Union�
41 See the important letter of February 2, 2016 sent by President Tusk to the members 
of the European Council with his proposal to prevent the Brexit, available at http://
www�consilium�europa�eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/02-letter-tusk-proposal-
new-settlement-uk/�
Prospects for European Economic Governance 311
312 The History of the European Monetary Union
The complex result of the work in the February European Council42 
consists of a decision of the Heads of State or governments, plus several 
annexed declarations of the Council and the Commission, which have to 
submit proposals for amending secondary legislation (and the role of the 
EP should not be forgotten)�
The decision via which treaties are reinterpreted (by applying at the 
highest legal level the pragmatic approach that was already behind the 
Communication on flexibility) is determined as being legally binding – 
also if we have to remember the powers of the CJEU – and may be 
amended only by common accord� “The substance of the decision” has 
to be incorporated into the treaties “at the time of their next revision” (a 
vague indication that raises doubts in the UK)� It should be noted that 
the proposal to indicate also the TSCG between those treaties has finally 
been rejected, also owing to Italian and British opposition�
Among the many issues arising, some are worth mentioning in the 
context of this short analysis of the compromise that was reached� It 
is stressed that the Single Market is a multi-currency one� The States 
not involved in the deepening of EMU will not create obstacles to this 
process, which will respect (in all legal acts, including intergovernmental 
agreements) the rights and competences of the non participating States� 
This formula echoes the appeal to the European justice43 won in 2015 
by a company owned by the London Stock Exchange against an EBC 
text, imposing on market infrastructures operating mainly in euros the 
obligation to establish themselves in countries which use the euro as their 
currency� In the event of Brexit, the ECB should no longer accept that, in 
case of crisis similar to that of 2008, a large amount of financial activity 
in euros will take place outside its control�
Rules on the BU are applicable only to credit institutions located in 
the euro area or States that have concluded a close cooperation agreement 
with the ECB� Specific derogations are admitted for the UK44 to the 
“Single Rulebook”, indicating prudential requirements which financial 
42 See the conclusions of the February 18-19, 2016, European Council meeting, the 
decision concerning a new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European 
Union and the annexed documents, available at http://www�consilium�europa�eu/en/
meetings/european-council/2016/02/18-19/�
43 See the judgement of March 4, 2015, United Kingdom v. European Central Bank, 
T-496/11, EU:T:2015:133�
44 This autonomy (which could help the financial hub of the City, encouraging 
delocalization processes from the continent) is, however, reduced by the reference to 
the respect for equal conditions in the internal market and by the persistent control 
powers of the European Banking Authority and the European Securities and Markets 
Authority, powers which could also be increased�
institutions must respect in the EU� Emergency measures to safeguard 
the financial stability of the euro area will not involve the budgetary 
responsibility of States outside this or the BU� The Eurogroup shall 
respect the power of the Council, as an institution within which States 
coordinate their economic policies�
In a formula richer in symbolic than in practical effects, it is 
recognized that the UK is not committed to further political integration 
into the EU, thus making clear that the reference to ever-closer union 
(existing from the Treaty of Rome) does not apply to the UK and cannot 
be used to support an extensive interpretation of the competences of 
the Union�
A red card procedure is created, which could give more power to the 
national Assemblies (despite the shortness of the time allowed)� “Where 
reasoned opinions of non-compliance of a draft legislative act, with the 
principle of subsidiarity, sent within 12 weeks from the transmission of 
the draft, represent more than 55% of the votes allocated in national 
Parliaments”, the item will be discussed in the Council and consideration 
of this act will cease, “unless the draft is amended to accommodate the 
concerns” expressed in these opinions�
With regard to legislative acts related to economic governance, it is 
said that, if one member of the Council not participating to the BU 
indicates its opposition, “the Council shall discuss the issues and try to 
find a satisfactory solution to address concerns raised”� A request for 
discussion in the European Council may be presented, without “allowing 
a Member State a veto”� This fuzzy formula expresses the UK’s fear of 
being placed in a systematic minority by the countries of the euro area 
and allows London to refer the possible problems to an ad hoc summit�
The deal section on competitiveness contains platonic references to 
the reduction of cost and administrative burdens for companies, as well 
as of unnecessary legislation (commitments already existing in Juncker’s 
political program)�
Finally: it is possible here to mention only briefly the controversial 
innovation according to which, in exceptional situations, it is possible 
to temporarily exclude residents of other EU countries from UK welfare 
benefits (granted, moreover, only progressively)� Such a decision provokes 
reactions especially in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe� It is 
a serious step backward, which Justus Lipsius has had to accept, hoping 
to keep London in the Union even though it means lowering the flag of 
the European social model� The philosophy of the workers’ mobility and 
the same project of an integration not too arid are injured to the heart� A 
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dangerous precedent is created, and other States could try to imitate the 
British example� Receptive Germany is, surprisingly, the first45� 
The decline of our Continent risks becoming moral disintegration, 
while opinion polls show that European populations are increasingly 
attracted by a possible outbreak of secessionist referendums�
11. The Danger of Halting in Mid-Stream
Many events call into question the present tendency of several 
countries to ask for an integration à la carte, to step back towards forms of 
renationalization, or to pause hesitantly in the middle of the rushing river 
despite it being instead necessary to take a leap forward, reconsidering the 
weak institutional links of the present day, just when the world is moving 
towards a system of increasingly structured macro areas, called upon to 
assume growing responsibilities in managing planetary challenges46 and 
to protect peoples from the “storm of history”47�
The Eurozone in particular (if does not wish to resign itself to 
implosion or to the ordered dissolution that some in Finland evoke) 
should shift its focus and move, in crucial new fields, from governance 
via the rules to government by federal political institutions, with real 
decision-making powers� If not now, when?
After a common narrative of the crisis has been elaborated, after 
mistakes have been recognized and a more fully shared perception of 
the problems reached, after it has been well noted that the force of 
functionalism – for a long time necessary but insufficient – has had its day 
(whereas the euro’s symbolic fertility was, to say the least, overestimated) 
and that, in the long run, it may be impossible to continue the daring 
experiment of a currency without State, after all this, it will be necessary 
not only to make the baroque EMU architecture much more solid and 
harmonious, but also to give the Union a new democratic soul, instilling 
into its political processes stronger legitimacy and a deeper social 
sensitivity, reducing existing economic differences� These latter have 
grown up between the core and the peripheries of the Union (which 
45 On April 28, 2016 the German labor Minister Nahles presents a bill which cuts 
Hartz IV law social benefits for foreigners from other EU countries�
46 These words were said on April 13, 2016 by the Italian President Mattarella in Turin, 
at the Italian-German High Level Dialogue (http://www�quirinale�it/elementi/
Continua�aspx?tipo=Discorso&key=309)�
47 These words were said by President Hollande on May 29, 2016, at the already 
mentioned ceremony with Chancellor Merkel, in Verdun�
have been impoverished by job cuts or wage deflation) and inside the 
States, as is shown also by the uninspected widening of the gap between 
the West and the East of the BRD – excepting a few cities – during the 
crisis� It is therefore particularly important to strengthen EMU’s “social 
dimension”, as requested in the Rome Declaration of September 14, 
201548 (a document which gratuitously becomes the critical target of the 
Brexiteers in the UK political debate)�
The implementation of a long-term unemployment insurance scheme 
(a proposal launched in 2015 in France and in 2016 in Italy, and finally 
integrated in Germany through the idea of a specific European authority 
designed to prevent the incorrect use of public funds) could help to 
absorb shocks, limiting their regional impact and stabilizing the whole 
European economic and social system� In a medium-term perspective, to 
avoid legal disputes, it would be useful also to openly give a dual mandate 
to the ECB, similar to that of the Fed, whose target is not only inflation 
but also unemployment level� Above all, however, it will be necessary 
to tackle the widespread representation of Europe as an evil stepmother 
(who imposes discipline without providing an opportunity to grow up) 
and to win the “beginning of the end” feeling, to use again the words 
spoken by the President Juncker in the already mentioned first press 
conference of 2016�
Only a real strengthening of the intensity and quality of the common 
bond, reacting to the negative excesses of intergovernmentalism which 
have increasingly marked the dynamics of economic governance 
(promoting inside the European Council, for the purpose of contingent 
internal interests, a muscular dialectic among national leaders at the 
most difficult times, as Monti clearly states in the Trilateral Commission 
meeting of April 2016), could avoid the proliferation of destructive 
germs in the marshy land between declining national sovereignties and 
incomplete common democracy�
When the old world dies and the new one can not be born, from this 
shadowing, as Gramsci warned in 1937, monsters may come out�
48 The Declaration “Greater European integration: the way forward” (available at 
http://www�camera�it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/attachments/shadow_ 
mostra/altro_file_pdfs/000/024/057/Rome_Conference_on_Europe_Declaration_
EN�pdf) was signed by the Presidents of the Italian Camera dei Deputati, of the 
German Bundestag, of the French Assemblée nationale and of the Chambre des deputés 
of Luxembourg� Later several other Presidents of Parliamentary Assemblies joined 
and the Declaration has now the signatures of 15 Presidents of national Assemblies of 
13 member States�
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